Universidade de Lisboa

Faculdade de Direito

Faculdade de Letras

Instituto de Ciências Sociais

Explaining Party System Institutionalization in Africa: From a Broad Comparison to a Focus on Mozambique and Zambia

Edalina Rodrigues Sanches

Tese orientada pela Doutora Marina Costa Lobo do Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa e coorientada pelo Doutor Gerhard Seibert da Universidade da Integração Internacional da Lusofonia Afro-Brasileira.

Ano| 2014

CONTENT

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF ACRONYMS

(italics is used for name in original language)

ABC	All Basotho Convention
AC	African Congress
ACD	Advance Congress of Democrats
AD	Alliance for Democracy
ADACD	*Aliança Democrática de Antigos Combatentes para o Desenvolvimento*
ADD	*Alliance pour une Dynamique Democratique*
ADD	Alliance for Democracy and Development
ADF-RDA	*Alliance pour la Démocratie et la Fédération - Rassemblement Démocratique Africain*
ADI	*Acção Democrática Independente*
AEB	*Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging*
Aford	Alliance for Democracy
Alimo	*Aliança Independente de Moçambique*
ANC	African National Congress
ANPP	All Nigeria People's Party
APRC	Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
AWEPA	Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa
AZ	Agenda for Zambia
BAC	Basutoland African Congress
BAM	Botswana Alliance Movement
BCP	Basotho Congress Party
BDP	Botswana Democratic Party
BFP	Botswana Freedom Party
BIP	Botswana Independence Party
BNF	Botswana National Front
BNP	Basotho National Party
BPP	Botswana People's Party
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi
CCM	*Conselho Cristão de Moçambique*

CDP	*Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès*
Chadema	Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo
CNE	*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*
CoD	Congress of Democrats
CP	Conservative Party
CUF	Civic United Front (Chama cha Wananchi)
DA	Democratic Alliance
DP	Democratic Party
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
EAZ	Economic Association of Zambia
ENEP	Effective Number of Electoral Parties
FAO	*Frente Alargada da Oposição*
FAP	*Frente de Accão Patriótica*
FARD-Alafia	*Front d'Action pour le Renouveau la Démocratie et le Développement*
FCBE	*Force Cauris pour un Bénin Émergent*
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FF	Freedom Front
FF+	Freedom Front Plus
FH	Freedom House
FL	Frente Liberal
FPTP	First-past-the-post
Frelimo	*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*
Fumo-PCD	*Frente Unida de Moçambique - Partido de Convergência Democrática*
GD	*Grupos Dinamizadores*
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GPA	General Peace Agreement
HP	Heritage Party
IC	Index of Closure
IDEA	International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IFA	Index of Familiar Alternation
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IFP	Independence Freedom Party

IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMV	Index of Ministerial Volatility
IPA	Interim Political Authority
JP	Justice Party
LAZ	Law Association of Zambia
LCD	Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LPC	Lesotho People's Congress
LWP	Lesotho Workers Party
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MDM	*Movimento Democrático de Mozambique*
MFP	Marematlou Freedom Party
MLSTP-PSD	*Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe-Partido Social Democrata*
MMD	Movement for Multiparty Democracy
MMM	Mouvement Militant Mauricien
Monamo-PMSD	*Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano - Partido Social Democrata*
MpD	*Movimento para a Democracia*
MPLA	*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*
MSM	*Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien*
NADA	National Democratic Alliance
NCCR-Mageuzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform
NCP	National Convention Party
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDF	New Democratic Front
NDP	National Democratic Party
NIMD	Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy
NIP	National Independent Party
NP	National Party
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NPP	National Progressive Party
NRP	National Reconciliation Party
OC	*Oposição Construtiva*
OJM	*Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*

OMM	*Organização da Mulher Moçambicana*
ONJ	*Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas*
ONP	*Organização Nacional dos Professores*
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
OPD-MT	*Congrès Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire - Mouvement du Travail*
OTM	*Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos*
PAC	*Partido Africano Conservador*
Pacode	*Partido do Congresso Democrático*
Pademo	*Partido Democrático de Moçambique*
Padres	*Partido da Aliança Democrática e Renovação Social*
PAICV	*Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde*
PAIGC	*Partido Africano para Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*
Palmo	Partido Liberal de Moçambique
Pamomo	*Partido para a Reconciliação em Moçambique*
Panade	*Partido Nacional Democrático*
Panamo	*Partido Nacionalista de Moçambique*
Parena	*Partido da Reconciliação Nacional*
Partonamo	*Partido para Todos os Moçambicanos Nacionalistas*
Pasomo	*Partido de Ampliação Social de Moçambique Social*
PAZA	Press Association of Zambia
PCB	*Parti Communiste du Bénin*
PCD-GR	*Partido da Convergência Democrática/Grupo de Reflexão*
PCN	*Partido da Convenção Nacional*
PCSEs	Panel Corrected Standard Errors
PDD	*Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento*
PDP	People's Democratic Party
PDP-PS	*Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès-Parti Socialiste*
PDS	*Parti Démocratique Sénégalais*
PDS	*Parti Démocratique Seychellois*
Pemo	*Partido Ecologista de Moçambique*
PF	Patriotic Front
PFD	Popular Front for Democracy

Pimo	*Partido Independente de Moçambique*
PL	*Parti Lepep*
PLDM	*Partido Livre e Democrático de Moçambique*
PMSD	*Parti Mauricien Social Democrate*
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PPPM	*Partido do Progresso do Povo de Moçambique*
PR	Proportional Representation
PRD	*Parti du Renouveau Democratique*
PRD	*Partido Renovador Democrático*
PRPB	*Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin*
PRS	*Partido da Renovação Social*
PS	*Parti Socialiste du Sénégal*
PSD	*Parti Social Democrate*
PSDM	*Partido Social Democrático de Moçambique*
PSI	Party System Institutionalization
PSM	*Partido Socialista de Moçambique*
PT	*Parti Travailliste*
PUN	*Partido da Unidade Nacional*
PUR	*Partido da União para a Reconciliação*
RB	*Renaissance du Bénin*
RDP	Rally for Democracy and Progress
Renamo	*Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*
RGB-MB	*Resistência da Guiné-Bissau - Movimento Bafatá*
RMM	*Renouveau Militant Mauricien*
RP	Republican Party
SACCORD	Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes
SNP	Seychelles National Party
STAE	*Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral*
SWAPO	South-West African People's Organization
TIS	Total Institutionalization Score
TSCS	Time-series-cross-section
UAP	United Action Party
UD	*União Democrática*

UDF	United Democratic Front
FDU	*Frente Democrática Unida*
UDP	United Democratic Party
UE	União Eleitoral
UM	União para a Mudança
Unamo	União Nacional Moçambicana
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UP	United Party
UPND	United Party for National Development
UPP	United Progressive Party
Usamo	União para a Salvação de Moçambique
ZANC	Zambia African National Congress
ZANLA	Zimbabwean National Liberation Army
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZCTU	Zambian Congress of Trade Unions
ZDC	Zambia Democratic Congress
ZDC	Zambia Development Conference
ZRP	Zambian Republican Party

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am extremely grateful for all the support that I have received over the last four years. Much of what I have learned, along with my professional and personal growth, I owe to those hereby mentioned.

I am in deep intellectual debt to my academic supervisors, Marina Costa Lobo and Gerhard Seibert, who have played an important role in my development as a researcher and scholar. They have encouraged me and pushed me forward with their comments, compelling criticism, and suggestions. I hope this thesis meets their high standards.

Other scholars and professors contributed greatly to the elaboration of this thesis. Professors Ingrid van Biezen (also supervisor) and Oda van Cranenburgh from the Institute of Political Science of Leiden University; Mohamed Salih from the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague; José Jaime Macuane, João Pereira, Domingos do Rosário, Carlos Serra and Teresa Cruz e Silva (also supervisor) from University Eduardo Mondlane; Jotham Momba (also supervisor) and Njekwa Mate from the University of Zambia; and Carlos Jalali from Aveiro University all merit a word of deep gratitude for having spent some time with me discussing the methodological and theoretical underpinnings of my thesis.

Numerous readers and presentation questions helped me refine my arguments. To Fransje, Anne, Cris, Jannine, Joeri, Wouter, Cynthia, Tom, and Luzia, I would like to offer many thanks for hosting me so well at the Leiden University, and for the careful reading of my first chapter. Fernando, I really benefited from your comments and from sharing the office with you, Danielle and Ekaterina.

Complementary courses were also a great source of feedback and friends. Thanks to my colleagues at the ECPR Summer School of Political Parties 2010, namely Guilherme, João, Patrícia, Tom, Luana, Sofie, and Sarah, and to Professor Henning Lohmann and the TA Alejandro Ecker, who were patient regarding all my queries at the ECPR Winter School in Methods and Techniques 2012.

To Cláudia, Isabel, Filipa, Ekaterina, Patrícia D. S., Patrícia S., Joana, Bárbara, Isadora, and José, thank you so much for sharing the process and for making it brighter along the way. Thank you also for the friendship and care, for always having an encouraging word and/or for more dedicated comments and reviews of the chapters of my thesis. To all members of the PhD seminars group at the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, namely

Silvia, Julio, Pedro, Ana, Isabella, Anti, thank you all so much. Really learned a lot from all of you guys.

To my long time friends Pedro, Patrícia, Rol, Cris, and Suf, thank you for the laughs, dinners, coffees, travels, lively debates about politics, care and support, and much more. To my flatmates Lea and Fred (in Netherlands), Laila and Andrea (in Mozambique), and Megan and Chisomo (in Zambia), thank you for receiving me so well. To all of the friends I made during fieldwork, namely Mauro, Gabriel, Janne, Carla, Muloongo, Eugene, Mark, Sims, and Alice, I would like to say a huge thank you! You made my life easier.

To my hosting institution, the Institute of Social Sciences of the University of Lisbon, to The Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology, and to The Gulbenkian Foundation, many thanks for all the financial and scientific support, without which I would not have been able to carry out this research.

Finally, to the family I chose to be born in, Helena and Fortunato, thank you for preparing me for life, for never making it look easy, for the love and support, and for always believing in me. Filó, Nelson, and Beto, you are the best siblings I could I have ever chosen. My love and appreciation for you is beyond words.

Obrigada!

ABSTRACT

The degree of institutionalization has become a paramount criterion to classify Third Wave party systems. Yet, in as much as institutionalization has attracted interest, it has also been surrounded by few conceptual challenges regarding measurement and scope. Moreover, there remain relatively open questions about the sources and mechanisms of varying degrees of party system institutionalization (PSI). This thesis tackles these issues through three questions: "To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?" "Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?" and "What mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI?" These questions are sequentially analyzed through a mixed methods design that unfolds as follows. We start with applying a partly new model of PSI to 19 Sub-Saharan African countries that have held regular and competitive lower house elections up until 2011. This analysis stresses that institutionalization entails a two-fold variance; one in terms of degree and the other in terms of quality. Secondly, we seek to explain PSI variance using an original pooled time-series cross-sectional dataset that assembles a range of independent variables considered relevant by the literature on institutional and party system development. We argue that variance in PSI is influenced by exogenous (social structure, polity durability, institutional design) and endogenous factors (party and party system characteristics). Lastly, we seek mechanisms of causality behind the results given by the quantitative analysis focusing on Mozambique and Zambia, which differ both in degree and quality of PSI. Furthermore, other exogenous (*critical juncture*) and endogenous factors (interparty networks and party-citizen linkages) are added to the study, and semi-structured interviews, conducted during fieldwork, are used to enrich the narrative. The case study analysis shows that the way through which external factors, notably party funding/finance and electoral system, are modeled by internal factors such as the structure of the party system helps explain PSI variance.

Key words: party system institutionalization, sources, mechanisms, Mozambique, Zambia.

SUMMARY

Esta tese conduz uma análise comparativa dos processos de institucionalização dos sistemas partidários (ISP) na África Subsaariana, e tem dois argumentos principais. Em primeiro lugar, que a institucionalização encerra duas formas de variação: uma em termos de grau, que aponta para uma ideia de linearidade ou não-linearidade ao longo do tempo, e outra em termos de qualidade, que é função de uma determinada relação entre o grau de institucionalização e os níveis de participação política e de democraticidade de uma sociedade política. Em segundo lugar, que a variação nos processos de ISP pode ser entendida à luz de fatores exógenos, ou seja dos contextos históricos, institucionais e estruturais em que os sistemas partidários estão inseridos, mas também de fatores endógenos, isto é de dinâmicas próprias de funcionamento dos sistemas partidários, nomeadamente o grau de competitividade ou de fragmentação, e as redes de relações que ligam os partidos políticos entre si e estes aos cidadãos.

Estes argumentos estruturam três questões investigação: "Em que medida os sistemas partidários da África Subsariana estão institucionalizados?" "Que fatores explicam a sua variação entre países e ao longo do tempo?" e "Que mecanismos sublinham diferentes processos de institucionalização?" Estas questões são analisadas sucessivamente através de um desenho de investigação multimétodo designado por *explanotory sequential design*. Este método arranca com uma fase quantitativa em que se pretende explicar um determinado fenómeno utilizando dados e metodologias eminentemente quantitativos, e continua com uma fase qualitativa em se procura refinar os resultados obtidos na etapa anterior. Neste sentido, adequa-se perfeitamente ao estudo das três questões aqui propostas.

Na fase quantitativa foram considerados 19 países que realizaram eleições legislativas consecutivas e competitivas até 2011 (englobando um total de 102 eleições) e analisaram-se as duas primeiras questões de investigação. Partindo de Huntington (1965; 1968), começámos por examinar as propostas disponíveis na literatura para medir a institucionalização. Porém, é sobretudo a partir de Mainwaring e Scully (1995) e Mainwaring (2008; 2008) que este exercício se torna mais relevante para o nosso estudo, na medida em que estes autores propuseram um dos modelos mais influentes para analisar os sistemas partidários em novas democracias. É neste âmbito que propomos um modelo parcialmente novo para medir a ISP, que se distingue por se centrar exclusivamente em elementos estruturais (observados nas várias arenas da sociedade política) e por considerar o grau e a qualidade da institucionalização (inspirado em Welfling 1973; Mainwaring e Scully 1995; Mair 1996;

Kuenzi e Lambright 2001; e Lindberg 2007). A análise empírica confirmou estes pressupostos identificando três configurações possíveis.

(1) Sistemas partidários com elevados níveis de institucionalização e que envolvem os maiores níveis de democraticidade e de participação eleitoral (e.g. Botswana e Cabo Verde, que são casos de institucionalização adequada); (2) sistemas partidários com elevados níveis de institucionalização mas que se conjugam com os níveis mais baixos de democraticidade e de participação eleitoral (e.g. Moçambique e Gâmbia, que são casos de hiperinstitucionalização); e, finalmente, (3) sistemas partidários com os mais baixos níveis de institucionalização mas com níveis intermédios de participação e de democraticidade (e.g. Zâmbia e Lesotho, que são casos de institucionalização inadequada). Em termos globais as configurações (2) e (3) são as mais frequentes, indicando assim que os sistemas partidários africanos enfrentam importantes dilemas de institucionalização.

Ainda na fase quantitativa procurámos responder à segunda questão de investigação. Para esse efeito recolhemos um conjunto de explicações que têm vindo a ser utlizadas para compreender a evolução das instituições políticas em África (Bayart 1989; Bratton e van de Walle 1997; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 2003) e a mudança dos sistemas partidários em novas democracias (para a América Latina: Roberts e Wibbels 1999; para a Europa pós-Comunista: Tavits 2005; para África: Riedl 2008 e Ferree 2010; e para comparações mais globais: Mainwaring e Torcal 2005 e Mainwaring e Zoco 2007).

Com bases nestes estudos foi possível identificar seis explicações principais – estrutura social, institucionalização ao longo do tempo, desenho institucional, características dos partidos e dos sistemas partidários, situação da economia e participação eleitoral – que testámos numa análise de regressão do grau de ISP. Os resultados demonstraram que a clivagem religiosa, a estabilidade do regime, o financiamento partidário, o sistema eleitoral e a fragmentação do sistema partidário explicam diferentes graus de ISP no contexto africano.

Partindo destes resultados iniciámos então a fase qualitativa deste estudo com o objetivo principal de explicar que mecanismos sublinham as diferentes trajetórias de institucionalização. Os casos selecionados, Moçambique e Zâmbia, foram escolhidos por variarem no grau e qualidade de institucionalização, mas também nas variáveis independentes que entraram no modelo quantitativo, nomeadamente no tipo de sistema eleitoral e no modelo de financiamento partidário. Para além de discutir os mecanismos associados a estes desenhos institucionais esta fase incluiu variáveis explicativas adicionais. Nomeadamente, a transição para a democracia, entendida enquanto *critical juncture* que cria possibilidades para a

alteração de trajetórias institucionais, as relações entre os partidos (padrões de coligação) e as relações entre os partidos e os cidadãos (a sua natureza ideológica ou clientelar).

Os estudos de caso demonstraram, em primeiro lugar, que os efeitos institucionais são também moldados por fatores endógenos, nomeadamente pela estrutura do sistema partidário. Assim, a fórmula eleitoral de representação proporcional utilizada em Moçambique reforça um sistema que se caracteriza à partida por baixos níveis de fragmentação e pelo desenvolvimento de um partido dominante, enquanto que a fórmula maioritária aplicada na Zâmbia resulta em níveis de fragmentação mais elevados porque os partidos são enfraquecidos por cisões, fações e defeções, e porque existe uma forte competição eleitoral ao nível subnacional. No que diz respeito ao financiamento partidário, em Moçambique os critérios favorecem os partidos que têm assento parlamentar e logo o partido dominante, enquanto na Zâmbia a ausência de regulação tem acentuado episódios de conflito intrapartidário assim como a emergência de partidos liderados por empresários proeminentes.

Em segundo lugar, que o processo de transição deixa marcas importantes no sistema partidário. Em Moçambique a dupla transição para a paz e para a democracia encapsulou o regime em torno dos ex-beligerantes, que tiveram uma grande margem de manobra para negociar os termos do acordo de paz assim como para escolher os desenhos institucionais que lhes seriam mais favoráveis no novo sistema político. Na Zâmbia, pelo contrário, a transição, movimentada "a partir de baixo", implicou mudanças institucionais mais reduzidas mas resultou em maiores níveis de fragmentação, uma vez que o movimento de abertura democrática agregou vários grupos sociais cujos interesses acabaram por colidir entre si.

Por fim, no que diz respeito às relações entre os partidos, verificámos que em Moçambique os padrões de coligação seguem uma estratégia sobretudo nacional, enquanto na Zâmbia o enfoque é tendencialmente subnacional. Nas relações com os eleitorados em Moçambique predomina um padrão mais clientelar, ao passo que na Zâmbia prevalece um padrão mais programático. Esta diferença faz sentido se tivermos em conta que em Moçambique a institucionalização tem sido moldada por um partido dominante fortemente estruturado pela sua relação com o estado, e que tem sido capaz de desativar as principais linhas de clivagem política e de se reinventar politicamente, enquanto na Zâmbia a fragmentação do sistema partidário e os episódios de faccionalismo e personalismo têm polarizado a competição política para além de diminuir os níveis de institucionalização.

Palavras-chave: Institucionalização do sistema partidário, causas, mecanismos, Moçambique, Zâmbia.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis conducts a comparative study of party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is structured on the concept of institutionalization, which was originally proposed by Samuel Huntington (1965) and which, particularly since Mainwaring and Scully (1995), has gained traction in the research agenda of political science and comparative politics.

Theoretically, it argues that institutionalization entails a two-fold variance: one in terms of degree and the other in terms of quality. The former is linked to the idea of linearity (or non-linearity) and the latter to that of scope. In addition, it also argues that institutionalization is explained by exogenous factors, namely, the historical, structural, and institutional settings within which party systems operate and endogenous factors, namely, party and party system characteristics and networks linking the various actors within the system.

Empirically, it focuses on 19 Sub-Saharan African countries with regular lower house elections up until 2011 and then takes a closer look at the cases of Mozambique and Zambia, which vary in the degree and quality of institutionalization, with the former being highly and overinstitutionalized and the latter weakly and inadequately institutionalized (the most common configurations in the continent).

The research developed here is relevant for at least three reasons. Firstly, it subjects existing conceptions of party system institutionalization (here after PSI) to a rigorous scrutiny and it suggests more fruitful ways of analyzing it. Secondly, it focuses on Sub-Saharan Africa, which seems to be facing a puzzling scenario as far as party system development is concerned, with few cases of linear development over time and many of steadiness and even political decay. Moreover, a complex set of relationships between PSI, electoral participation, and democratic performance seems to exist, with highly institutionalized party systems having low levels of popular support and poor democratic practices (just to mention one of the many possible configurations). This of course raises many dilemmas of PSI in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, which are addressed in the case study analysis. Thirdly, it treats PSI as a dependent rather than an independent variable. This is important, as the majority of studies in this field have been more concerned with how PSI predicts democratic performance than with the sources and mechanisms of its variance form a cross-sectional and longitudinal perspective.

Following this introductory chapter, we lay out the questions that structured this research and present the outline of the thesis.

From research problem to research questions

Samuel Huntington's (1965; 1968) pioneering studies defined institutionalization as the process whereby the organizations and procedures of a political system or polity became more valued and stable over time. This concept was part of a larger research agenda through which the author sought to address one major problem in the social sciences: political development in changing societies.

Taking institutionalization as equivalent to political development, Huntington broke with the more or less established view that political institutions developed linearly over time and that institutionalization was necessarily compatible with all facets of modernization. In the counter-flow of the then dominant theories, Huntington sustained that development and decay (thus non-linearity) were possible outcomes of institutional change and that different qualities of institutionalization could emerge as results of the interplay between economic and political modernization and the strength of political institutions (Huntington 1965, 393-194). Thus, the relevance of this concept rested on the possibility it created to study several compelling questions in Political Science, namely, "Why some polities or political systems develop into being more stable than others?" and "What is the interaction between macro changes in society, such as political and economic modernization, and the strength, stability, or weakness of political institutions?" Huntington's (1965; 1968) seminal works addressed these central problems and placed institutionalization at the core of this exercise.

To date, this debate has remained lively and dynamic both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it has been nuanced by the emergence of the "new institutionalisms", a group of approaches «developed in reaction to the behavioral perspectives that were influential during the 1960s and 1970s» which sought to «elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes» (Hall and Taylor 1996, 936). Its several approaches, each in its own way, have provided an explanatory narrative that help to understand political institutions' change or stability in contemporary times (Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman 2006; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a).

Empirically, the Third Wave of democratization has created new opportunities to revisit the concept of institutionalization and to use it to not only to classify political institutions' trajectories in new democracies but also to understand how similar or different these are from the ones found in more established democracies. Particularly, since Mainwaring and Scully (1995), several scholars have applied the concept of institutionalization to compare party systems in Third Wave democracies, focusing on post-Communist Europe, Latin America,

and Africa (Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010, among many).

The studies that focused on Sub-Saharan African countries have highlighted the low levels of PSI, as well as its non-linear evolution over time (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Basedau 2007; Bogaards 2008; Riedl 2008). Indeed, more than twenty years since the African wave of democratization started, hallmarked by the popular protests that defeated the nearly twenty years (1972-1991) of Mathieu Kérékou's authoritarian rule and the end of Apartheid in South Africa (Diamond and Plattner 1999), party systems remain either institutionalized or deinstitutionalized from the outset of multipartism (Lindberg 2007) or exhibit a non-liner trajectory of development (Bogaards 2008).

Persisting characteristics of African party systems are the high levels of electoral and legislative volatility, the loose linkages with constituencies and civil society organizations, and the low legitimacy accorded to elections and political parties (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Basedau 2007; Riedl 2008).

It is within this literature that this thesis is framed. The major problem it addresses, however, is the one inherited from Huntington and that concerns all institutionalists, which is of explaining why some institutions come to be more stable, autonomous, and valued over time while others eventually decay. This is the major umbrella that covers our three research questions:

1. To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?
2. Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?
3. What mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI?

In the following section, we explain how we dealt with these questions and structured our study.

Framing the analysis of party system institutionalization

The field of studies about institutionalization (whether applied to parties, party systems, or to other political institutions) has grown with several controversies at its core. Scholars have been at odds with how many dimensions, indicators, and elements are necessary to empirically measure it. This debate will be addressed at greater length in Chapter I; for now,

we summon the main points of that discussion as means to justify our own conceptual choices.

The studies that applied Huntington's and Mainwaring's conceptualizations have perceived institutionalization as a multidimensional concept encompassing both structural (stability) and attitudinal (value) elements and suitable for the analysis of individual (parties) and systemic properties (party systems) in the various arenas of a polity (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Basedau 2007; Riedl 2008). Those diverging from it showed preference for the structural element, privileged national party systems, as unit of analysis and focused on a single arena of competition (government or legislature) (Mair 1996; Lindberg 2007; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010). There are things to be gained and lost with any of these conceptualizations. The first delivers a more complete measurement of institutionalization and yet it falls short at addressing its internal complexity (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Levitsky 1998). The second encompasses less conceptual ambiguities, but the scope of the concept is somewhat minimalist because it is centered on one single arena of party competition.

To answer the first research question, "To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?" we stood half-way between these two approaches. Building on Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b), we have unpacked the concept while at the same time increasing its scope. More precisely, we propose a partly new framework for analysis that focuses solely on structural institutionalization and having national party systems as units of analysis. It is measured by eleven indicators, which are clustered into three dimensions. The first dimension, stable patterns of interparty competition, is measured by electoral volatility, legislative seats' volatility, total percentage of votes won by new parties, alternation in government, and share of seats for the most voted party. The second dimension, stable roots in society, is measured by the share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970, and 1980 and by the share of seats for independent candidates. Finally, the third dimension, organizational continuity, is measured by the legislative and electoral strength of merging and splitting political parties.

As we show later in Chapter III, this measurement combines indicators suggested by Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), and Lindberg (2007); yet, its final outlook is innovative, as it covers arenas of party competition – governmental, parliamentary, electoral, and organizational – that have never been combined under the same model. In this sense, it is more complete than previous measures that took institutionalization as structural phenomena (for example, Lindberg 2007;

Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010) and it is less exposed to the conceptual ambiguities that are associated with those equating different levels and elements under the same measurement (for example Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001).

After measuring the degree of PSI, our approach deals with the scope of institutionalization; more concretely, it considers the extent to which institutionalization is accompanied by higher or lower levels of electoral participation and democraticity. Considering this two-fold variance expresses our concern with institutionalization not only as a matter of degree (even if this attribute is given more salience throughout the thesis), but also as a matter of quality. In fact, there is added valued in distinguishing cases where there are high levels of institutionalization, electoral participation, and democraticity from those where there is discontinuity in these features. For this exercise, we go back to the first studies about institutionalization to test three possible outcomes: adequate institutionalization, inadequate institutionalization (Huntington 1965, 1968), and overinstitutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975).

The second research question, "Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?" remains understudied, as the majority of studies either focused on (i) the measurement of PSI or (ii) used it as a predictor for democratic stability or performance. Indeed, one of the most consensual propositions emerging from this literature is that parties and party systems are essential conditions for democracy and that their level of institutionalization shapes the prospects that a stable democracy will emerge. Nevertheless, a lot remains to be written about the causes of PSI, particularly in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa, from a cross-sectional and longitudinal perspective, despite recent inputs (Riedl 2008; Ferree 2010). To contribute to this still-evolving debate, we relied on the abundant literature that has focused on the sources of party system change – understood as stability or institutionalization – in Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999), post-Communist Europe (Tavits 2005), or in both old and new democracies (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Taken as a whole, these studies suggest six main explanations for PSI, which we test in this thesis: social structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party systems characteristics, economic performance, and electoral participation.

The third research question, "What mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI?" takes two mechanisms into consideration: environmental and relational. Environmental mechanisms are about the external conditions within which the party systems develop, whereas relational mechanisms address political actors and their interpersonal networks; for example, whether they develop patterns of cooperation, coercion, and coalition, *inter alia* (Tilly 2001). Environmental mechanisms will comprise some of the variables used to test the

institutional explanation of PSI (electoral system and party funding/finance) and a new one anchored on the literature of regime transition (path to democratic transition). Relational mechanisms are explored on an interparty level (party coalitions) and on an extraparty level (party-citizen linkages) and are theoretically justified in the literature that features neopatrimonialism and its web of informal practices as the general framework within which African political institutions have evolved (Bayart 1989; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 2003; Riedl 2008).

These three questions are successively analyzed trough a mixed methods design called *explanatory sequential design*, which starts with a quantitative strand and follows up on specific results with a qualitative strand. The first and the second research questions are analyzed in the quantitative strand. The sample for this phase includes 19 Sub-Saharan African countries that have held competitive and regular lower house elections up until 2011 (for a total of 102 elections). The analysis draws on raw electoral statistics to measure PSI and some independent variables. All together, this strand will tell us how far party systems in Africa have institutionalized (differences in terms of degree and quality) and explain variance in institutionalization.

The qualitative strand centers on the third research question. To show the environmental and relational mechanisms at work in the process of institutionalization, we have selected two countries that represent a wide range of variation not only in terms of PSI but also in terms of the relevant explanatory variables: Mozambique and Zambia. Data for this strand results from a series of fieldwork activities conducted in Mozambique between October and November 2012 and in Zambia between March and June 2013, including semi-structured interviews with political elites, journalists, members of civil society organizations, and academics (a total of 35 in Mozambique and 28 in Zambia) and documental research (electoral and party laws, media coverage). This strand will discuss the results of the quantitative strand while adding new elements in the analysis for a more comprehensive investigation of institutionalization.

What is new about this research?

The present investigation is innovative for several reasons. Firstly, it contributes to the theory of institutionalization by addressing its puzzles one at a time and by delivering a partly new measure of PSI that easily travels across different political systems and countries. Secondly, it adds new empirical data for African party systems, which have been less frequently analyzed

when compared to other recently democratized regions, namely Latin America and post-Communist Europe. Thirdly, it suggests indicators to measure arenas of competition usually neglected in the measures of PSI applied to the African context (stability at the government and organizational level). Fourthly, both the method employed (mixed method), and the outputs generated (the construction of a dataset assembling time series and cross-sectional political data) can foster comparisons not only within the African continent but also in other regions of the world. This is particularly relevant, as lack of data usually figures among the factors discouraging the study of certain topics in African countries. Finally, it suggests a new institutional feature, party funding/finance, as relevant to understanding PSI.

Outline of the thesis

This thesis is organized in six chapters and a concluding section. Chapter I presents the state of the art about the concept of institutionalization, covering the main studies produced within this research field since Huntington's pioneering article (1965). Within this debate, relevance is given to Huntington (1965; 1968) for insightfully detaching institutionalization from several aspects of modernization and for providing a typology for different qualities of institutionalization and to Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973) for delivering the first models of party and PSI, with the latter exclusively dedicated to African states. The studies of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1998; 1999) have also been influential and are the basis of numerous studies about PSI in Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Riedl 2008; Basedau 2007).

Chapter II features the methodology adopted in this research. It starts by introducing the research questions, the framework for analysis, the hypotheses, and the mechanisms of PSI. It continues describing the sequential mixed methods research adopted, explaining step by step how the data was collected and how the cases for each strand of analysis were selected. The chapter also presents the historical and the network institutionalisms as useful approaches to the study of African politics, as they allow studying political institutions as simultaneously formal and informal structures that are both a product of history and of contingency (Olsen 1968; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Ansell 1998).

Chapter III presents the framework for analysis, specifying the theoretical and methodological underpinnings of our PSI measure. Drawing on the works of Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg

(2007), three dimensions are suggested: stable patterns of interparty competition, stable roots in society and organizational continuity. After measuring each of these dimensions a complementary analysis is made to identify what varieties of PSI exist in the sample. This chapter then closes with a comparison across different PSI measures.

Chapter IV tests six explanations of PSI: social structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party systems characteristics, economic performance, and electoral participation. It starts by reviewing each of these explanations in order to justify the hypotheses that follow from them. Then, it explains how the independent variables are measured, shows descriptive statistics (univariate and bivariate) for all independent variables, and ends with a regression analysis of PSI.

Chapter V presents the framework for the comparative study of the mechanisms of PSI in Mozambique and Zambia. It presents the mechanisms of PSI and then it provides a historical description of both countries as means to contextualize the main political parties, political institutions, and political outcomes since the outset of independence.

Chapter VI conducts the analysis of the mechanisms which underlie PSI, starting with the environmental ones – path to democratic transition, electoral system, and party funding/finance – and then addressing the relational ones – party coalitions and party-citizen linkages. The analysis shows that the moment of transition has formative effects on the way the upcoming party systems work, whereas the effects of political institutions seem to be modeled by the strength of the political parties and by how dispersed or concentrated the political competition is around certain lines of cleavage. The analysis of relational mechanisms gives support to the idea that there is a loose programmatic linkage between political parties and their constituencies; however, this is truer for Mozambique than it is for Zambia.

Finally, the concluding section summarizes the main findings of this study and raises further implications for a future research agenda.

CHAPTER I – RESEARCH ON INSTITUTIONALIZATION

This chapter presents the concept of institutionalization and it is organized as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the classical work of Samuel P. Huntington (1965; 1968) who first developed this concept in Political Science. In this regard, particular relevance is given to the way he defined institutionalization as a non-linear process that is autonomous from several aspects of economic and political modernization – e.g. urbanization, rationalization, mass mobilization and democratization –, and which is suitable for the analysis of organizations and procedures of modern, traditional or transitional political systems. Section 1.2 features the first studies about institutionalization and the dilemmas it encloses, namely its different outcomes, levels and dimensions of analysis. Section 1.3 presents the second wave of studies regarding institutionalization, which emerged following the Third Wave of democratization and which took parties and party systems as the main units of analysis. In this context, Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal framework is of chief relevance since it became one of the most influential works having been, fully or partly, employed in the study of several post-1974 party systems. Despite being widely used, it has also been criticized and pushed forward in light of important theoretical contributions such as the ones delivered by Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b). Section 1.4 critically reviews of what is already known and which questions remain unanswered in the study of PSI in Africa. Section 1.5 summarizes the main theoretical and empirical challenges within this research field while proposing a new research agenda that takes institutionalization as a dependent variable.

1.1 The concept of institutionalization: Huntington's classical definition

> In view of the crucial importance of the relationship between mobilization and participation, on the one hand, and the growth of political organizations, on the other, it is useful for many purposes to define political development as the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures (Huntington 1965, 393).
>
> Only by measuring institutionalization will we be able to buttress or disapprove hypotheses about the relation between social, economic and demographic changes on the one hand, and variations in political structure on the other (Huntington 1965, 405).

Despite its recent popularity, the concept of institutionalization is far from novel. Its origins can be traced back to, at least, forty years ago and more concretely to the works of Samuel P. Huntington, who introduced this concept into contemporary Political Science in his 1965 seminal article «Political Development and Political Decay». In this work, institutionalization

is, for the first time, identified as a unique political outcome and as a relevant conceptual tool to understand order and change in societies; particularly in those areas of the world undergoing profound political changes since the end of the Second World War – Africa, Asia and Latin America. Theoretically different from political and economic modernization and not necessarily equated with democracy, the concept of institutionalization is here presented as the true content or manifestation of political development; the latter being defined by the degree to which the organizations and procedures of a specific polity are institutionalized at a certain point in time. Thus, for Huntington, the institutionalization of a political system, «of any sort, not just modern ones» (Huntington 1965, 393), is also understood as the institutionalization of its organizations and procedures.

To operationalize this conceptualization, he proposes four measurements of institutionalization, each along a continuum: adaptability-rigidity, complexity-simplicity, autonomy-subordination, and coherence-disunity. The first dimension – adaptability – expresses the capacity of institutions to resist to challenges over time and it opposes rigidity, which represents a characteristic of newer institutions. Possible indicators of adaptability are: chronological age, for «the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence, the higher the level of institutionalization»; generational age, for «as long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, as long a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt»; and number of leadership successions and functional changes as «an organization which has adapted itself to changes in its environment and has survived one or more changes in its principal functions is more institutionalized than one which has not» (Ibid., 395).

The second dimension is complexity. Contrary to simplicity, it involves «both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits». It can be measured by the number and diversity of organizational subunits and the number and diversity of functions performed by the organizations. Autonomy, the third dimension, has subordination as its opposite type. This dimension indicates the «extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior» (Ibid., 401-402) and it can be measured by personnel controls (e.g. co-optation, penetration, purging) and the degree to which the organization manages its own material resources. The final dimension of an institutionalized political system is coherence, which contrasts with internal disunity and which is measured by the ratio of contested successions (Ibid., 403).

According to this framework, the more adaptable, complex, unified and coherent the organizations and procedures of a given polity, the more highly institutionalized the polity (Ibid., 394-404). This assumption does not necessarily imply that societies evolve from lower to higher degrees of institutionalization linearly. In fact, one of Huntington's central argument is that the process of political development or institutionalization (the two concepts are often used interchangeably) is far from being linear and that institutions can «decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature» (Ibid.,393). For this reason, any conceptualization of political development should be reversible entailing «[...] the circumstances under which political decay is encouraged» (Ibid., 392). Those circumstances are to be found, he argues, on the on-going relationship between the political structures – whether they are of traditional, transitional, or modern nature – and the process of modernization itself (Ibid.). In *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Huntington deepens this initial approach and delivers a more refined definition of institutionalization as «the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability» (Huntington 1968, 12). Furthermore, he shows how, depending on the degree of mobilization and development of a given polity, different qualities of institutionalization can arise: no-institutionalization, adequate institutionalization and inadequate institutionalization. To sum up, institutionalization emerges from Huntington's studies as a multidimensional concept measured by four criteria and an array of indicators that express both structural (stability) and attitudinal (value) elements, which are suitable for the analysis of any kind of political system, organization or procedure. As such, this conceptual framework anticipates the main challenges experienced in this field of studies from the onset of its formation to the present days. This will be clarified throughout this chapter, but, for now, we highlight three virtuosities of Huntington's pioneer studies.

First of all, they went against the mainstream conceptualizations found in sociological literature of the 1960s and 1970s that equated political development with the process of modernization of a given polity. This can be traced to the sociological tradition of Max Weber (1947) and Shmuel Eisenstadt[1] (1964), but also to the studies of several political sociologists, as for example Shils (1960a, 1960b, 1960c), Binder (1964) and Taylor (1972), who identified political development with certain political aspects of modernization. In fact, at that time political development was being identified with four different processes (Huntington 1965, 386-387): rationalization (legal-rational or modern systems of institutions); nationalism and

[1] In *Institutionalization and Change*, this author asserts that «the institutionalization of any social system means that certain norms, sanctions and organizations must be set up, and that policies through which these norms can be up-held and applied to a relatively large and complex variety of social situations must be implemented (Eisenstadt 1964, 245).

national integration (firmly delimited ethnic basis for the political community); democratization (pluralism, competitiveness, equalization of power and similar qualities) and mobilization or participation (mass mobilization). Against this background, Huntington argued that political development and modernization should be treated as independent processes since they involved different sequences of change. For instance, whereas political modernization implied «the rationalization of authority, the differentiation of structures, and the expansion of political participation» (Huntington 1968, 93), political development expressed the level of institutionalization of political organizations and procedures (Huntington 1965, 394).

Second, Huntington shows very clearly that when one equates political development with modernization the scope of the concept is limited to the analysis of modern nation-states being therefore «impossible to speak of a politically developed tribal authority, city-state, feudal monarchy, or bureaucratic empire» (Ibid., 393). Hence, his proposal of freeing the concept of political development or institutionalization from modernization is crucial to the extent that it enables the study of political systems of any sort, not just modern ones.

Third, Huntington went beyond mere theorization and proposed the first model for measuring the level of institutionalization of political systems, organizations and procedures. Even if he fell short of attaining this objective, as sustained by some authors cited in the next section, his is the first effort made to develop a comparative framework for the study of institutionalization and he clearly contributed to set the marks and boundaries of a new field of studies in Comparative Political Science.

1.2 The first studies on institutionalization

Following Huntington's seminal framework, several scholars began to apply the theory of institutionalization to the study of a variety of political organizations in the following decades. The growing interest in this topic raised a series of debates about its theoretical, but mostly, its empirical definition. The relevance of institutionalization was, however, far from being contested. In fact, one year after Huntington's «Political Development and Political Decay», Pennock (1966), argued that:

> Whether political and governmental structures are formal or informal, incorporated in the legal structure or not, it is of greatest importance that they should be institutionalized; and the process of institutionalization is as surely part of development as are specialization of function and

> differentiation of structure. It is when certain forms and procedures become the accepted ways of doing things that they become effective instruments of stability and of legitimation (Pennock 1966, 418)

Along the same lines, Polsby (1968) recognizes that «for a political system to be viable [...], for it to succeed in performing tasks of authoritative resource allocation, problem solving, conflict settlement, and so on, on behalf of a population of any substantial size, it must be institutionalized [...]» (1968, 144). Despite agreeing on the general value of this concept, this author develops a rather different framework in his study of the United States House of Representatives Congress, in which he includes only one of Huntington's criteria (complexity), while the others (boundaries and universalistic and automatic internal decision making) are new. In his words, an institutionalized organization is:

> 1) […] relatively well-bounded, that is to say, differentiated from its environment. Its members are easily identifiable, it is relatively difficult to become a member, and its leaders are recruited principally from within the organization. 2) The organization is relatively complex, that is, its functions are internally separated on some regular and explicit basis, its parts are not wholly interchangeable, and for at least some important purposes, its parts are interdependent. There is a division of labor in which roles are specified, and there are widely shared expectations about the performance of roles. There are regularized patterns of recruitment to roles, and of movement from role to role. 3) Finally, the organization tends to use universalistic rather than particularistic criteria, and automatic rather than discretionary methods for conducting its internal business. Precedents and rules are followed; merit systems replace favoritism and nepotism; and impersonal codes supplant personal preferences as prescriptions for behavior (Polsby 1968, 145).

It followed that the House of Representatives would have become institutionalized over time if it had become more bounded, more complex, and more universalistic and automatic in its internal decision making process. This conceptualization actually inspired several studies; since for instance, Chaffey (1970) used it in the comparative analysis of the Montana House of Representatives and the Wisconsin Assembly (the lower house in each state), and Canon (1989) applied it to the study of leadership in the United States Congress. Outside the North American context, Leonardi, Nanetti, and Pasquino (1978, 162) analyzed the institutionalization of the Italian parliament in rather different terms; they considered: «[...] (1) the autonomy of the representative assembly in the formulation of public policy *vis-à-vis*

such other political forces as political parties, the bureaucracy, state economic enterprises, and interest groups; and (2) the existence of a consensus on Parliament's internal decision-making rules». Shifting from national to international political organizations, Keohane (1969) takes the United Nations General Assembly as the unit of analysis and conceives institutionalization as:

> the process by which the international organization becomes differentiated, durable, and autonomous. Differentiation refers to the development of organizational distinctiveness from its environment, or, as S. N. Eisenstadt puts it, "the development of specific collectivities and roles. Durability can be defined as the tendency of an organization to persist over time. Autonomy implies that the organization's norms and patterns of behavior significantly affect the outcomes of its political process (Keohane 1969, 861-862).

Differently from the studies mentioned above, in the sense that it goes beyond the simple measurement of institutionalization, Brass (1977) researched the relationship between PSI and government stability in Indian states. In his formula [PSI = (W/C)-(L/V)]:

> PSI for each election equals the ratio of seats won by all parties that have won at least one seat in the state's legislature in any election since 1952 (W) to the number of seats contested by such parties (C) minus the ratio of the number of security deposits forfeited by the candidates of those parties (L) to C (Brass 1977, 1396).

As a result, «[...] states whose party systems are dominated by parties that persist over time, that regularly win a number of seats, and that know their areas of strength well enough not to field candidates who lose their security» will have higher degrees of PSI, which, in turn, are linked with higher levels of government stability. In the context of this first wave of studies, Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973) merit attention due to their development of the first models of party and PSI. In Janda's study we find an emphasis on the individual aspect of institutionalization (political parties). Although generally agreeing with Huntington's definition of institutionalization as a process entailing both value and stability, this researcher disagrees with the proposed ingredients for its measurement as, for instance, a «party could be highly institutionalized and yet lack independence of other groups (Huntington's 'autonomy')» (Janda 1970, 19). In his view, an institutionalized party is «[...] one that is reified in the public mind so that 'the party' exists as a social organization apart from its momentary leaders, and this organization demonstrates recurring patterns of behavior valued by those who identify with it». Such capacity could be measured according to six variables:

year of origin, frequency of name changes, organizational discontinuity (measured by the number of splits and mergers), leadership competition (whether there is an unambiguous identification of legitimate party leadership at the national level and change of personnel in top leadership positions over time), legislative instability (measured by the fluctuations in the proportion of seats held over time) and electoral instability (whether political parties are stable competitors in elections). This approach differs substantially from the one delivered a few years later by Cotter and Bibby (1980), in the sense that, in this case, the institutionalization of a national party system is seen as «a process involving changing roles of party chairmen national committee members, and staff; the development of staff continuity; the elaboration of programmatic activity and division of labor; the development of regular financing; and rule elaboration» (1980, 2).

Welfling's (1973) investigation, in turn, was the first to focus on the study of African party systems. In our opinion, this is the most interesting model within this first wave of studies as Welfling devoted a lot of attention to conceptualizing institutionalization as well as to justifying the dimensions that can operationalize it. Firstly, she sets a general system perspective that is the basis for her definition of institutionalization as «the process of crystallizing (i.e., defining, creating, developing, maintaining) social institutions, and the extent or degree of institutional characteristics at any time» (Welfling 1973, 11). Secondly, her definition places emphasis on political institutions, while for Huntington, institutionalization related to organizations and procedures. Thirdly, in approaching the institutionalization of parties in the African context, she made a clear distinction between individual parties and party systems, since political parties as individual organizations may be institutionalized, but that may not be the case for their operation in a party system (Ibid., 17). Furthermore, she identifies four dimensions of an institutionalized party system: stability, adaptability, boundaries and large scope. Given that institutions are necessarily characterized by structure – stable regular patterns of interaction among components – stability and adaptability are necessary and complementary aspects of any social institution. Regarding boundaries, they are proposed in substitution to Huntington's notion of autonomy: whereas the latter implies closure, in which the system is independent of its units in the environment, the former refers to the delineation and definition of the system. Boundaries are permeable and permit considerable interaction with and dependence upon environment. Finally, scope refers to the effects or impacts of institutionalization on the environment. The significance of both Janda's and Welfling's models has to do with the effort made to develop concrete indicators for the comparative analysis of parties and party systems as separate entities. Some

of these indicators have been used in more recent studies (e.g. seats of independent candidates and electoral instability, splits and mergers), and are particularly influential in our own framework for analysis (to be developed in Chapter III).

Table 1.1 – Models for the study of institutionalization

Author	Criteria/dimensions	Indicators
Polsby (1968) US House of Representatives	Boundaries	Percentage of first term leaders; the establishment of boundaries; increase in terms served by incumbent members; years served in congress as the first speaker
	Complexity	Growth in the autonomy and importance of committees; growth of specialized agencies of party leadership and general increase in the provision of various emoluments; and auxiliary aids to members in the form of office space, salaries, allowances, staff aid, and committee staffs
	Universalistic Automated decision making	Growth of seniority as a criterion determining committee rank; and the growth of the practice of deciding contested elections to the House strictly on the merits
Keohane (1969) United Nations General Assembly	Differentiation	Polsby's (1968) criteria for boundaries
	Durability	The universality of membership (particularly with respect to states that exclude themselves from the organization); the rank and number of representatives sent by governments; the number and intensity of challenges to the organization's right to exist; and the willingness of governments to financially support the organization
	Autonomy	Distinctiveness of organizational norms and values; personnel controls; control of material resources; impact of organizational norms on political processes
Janda (1970) Political parties	Party institutionalization	Year of origin; name changes; organizational discontinuity; leadership competition; legislative instability and electoral instability
Welfling (1973) Party systems	Stability	Legislative instability; splits; mergers and name changes
	Adaptability	Electoral discrimination (1 if an election was postponed); legal single party (1 if there was a legal single party; the more years a party is the only legal party, the less adaptable the system); and behaviors which destroy entities or prevent their creation: arrests, partial bans, bans and refusing registration
	Scope	Vertical scope: electoral participation Horizontal scope: the national orientation
	Boundary	Percentage of seats held by independents

Source: Author's own elaboration.

It is to be noted that Table 1.1 presents a summary of the most acknowledged empirical studies comprised in this first wave of studies. Despite the variety of organizations studied as

well as the plethora of indicators and dimensions put forward, there is a general prevalence of multidimensional and structural approaches of institutionalization. Indeed, the great majority of works here discussed seems to be more concerned with developing indicators that measure organizations' stability and durability, whereas the process through which organizations come to be valued, that is considered legitimate, is largely overlooked.

1.2.1 Conceptual dilemmas of institutionalization

This first wave of studies was also marked by important theoretical contributions that discussed the implications and the limitations of Huntington's theory of institutionalization. Kesselman's (1970) «Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France», Ben-Dor's (1975) «Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual Theoretical Analysis», Brown's (1977) «Dilemmas of Institutionalization», and Groth's (1979) «The Institutional Myth: Huntington's Order Revisited» were all instrumental in deepening our understanding of what is actually going on under the umbrella of institutionalization.

Kesselman's (1970) main contribution had to do with the review of Huntington's ratios between mobilization (social and economic) and development (the growth of political institutions to accommodate, channel, and contain increased participation) by adding a fourth variant of institutionalization: overinstitutionalization. Huntington foresaw three possible outcomes out of the interaction between mobilization and development (Table 1.2). In the first – no-institutionalization – neither participation or development had occurred and institutions were not autonomous or adaptable (this is the case of traditional societies). In the second – inadequate institutionalization – political development was outstripped by social and economic mobilization, that is, the erosion of the political order resulted from the breakdown of the institutionalization process and the capture of the political arena by nonpolitical institutions (social forces, usually the army). In this scenario institutions were autonomous, but not adaptable (transitional polities). Finally, in the third – adequate institutionalization – political development adequately accommodated increased participation and thus institutionalization is satisfactory; political institutions were both autonomous and adaptable (civic polities). Overinstitutionalization, the fourth scenario proposed by Kesselman, differs from inadequate institutionalization, because it «[...] refers to a "clutter" of institutions, to the fact that institutions are so strong and integrate participation so successfully that change is stifled» (Kesselman 1970, 26).

Table 1.2 – Varying relationships between mobilization and development

Mobilization	Development: -	Development: +
-	(1) Traditional Polities	(4) Postindustrial Societies- Political constraint (Overinstitutionalization)
+	(2) Transitional Polities- Political decay (Inadequate institutionalization)	(3) Civic Polities- Political order (Adequate institutionalization)

Source: Kesselman (1970, 25)

Ben-Dor (1975), in turn, summarizes in six points the main theoretical and methodological problems with Huntington's conceptualization. Even though he does not suggest any definition or measurement of institutionalization, he conducts a serious scrutiny of this concept that is extremely useful for anyone interested in applying the concept of institutionalization to the study of political organizations. The first problem he identifies is the lack of a clear distinction between institutions and organizations (Ben-Dor 1975, 311). The second problem concerned the fact that Huntington's definition of institutionalization as «the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability» encompassed both an attitudinal and a structural dimension. This is problematic for while the «stability of organizations is a structural trait that can be explained by any number of variables [...] 'procedures acquiring value' is a distinctly behavioral process (if so desired, this may be regarded a trait of political culture)». Moreover, this statement could imply that «if a given organization is stable (presumably meaning that it endures over a lengthy period of time) it must be valued (presumably not only by its members but also by major segments of the relevant outside population) and vice versa». Nonetheless, stability and being valued can be contradictory (Ben-Dor 1975, 311-312) given that:

> challenges of modernization are such that in order for organizations to be valued, they may be called upon to introduce major innovations, including innovations of a magnitude threatening the stability of the organization. In this sense, if constant innovation indeed characterizes modernization, valuing organizations may indeed mean danger to their stability, while stability may mean that the organization may no longer be valued (Ibid. 313).

The third problem is the interplay between different levels of analysis. Huntington's criteria of institutionalization apply to the political system as such, but also to political organizations and procedures, and this introduces a micro-macro duality (Ben-Dor 1975, 315). The fourth

problem derives from a possible mismatch between his four criteria of institutionalization: «organizations may lack adaptability but may at the same time increase their autonomy; they may lack autonomy but develop a good deal of complexity and so forth. Obviously sometimes the four criteria go together, and sometimes they do not» (Idem.). The fifth problem is that he does not describe how institutions become valued and, finally, the sixth is that he neglects the different outcomes of institutionalization, namely asymmetrical institutionalization and overinstitutionalization. Slightly differently from Kesselman (1970), Ben-Dor (1975) states that overinstitutionalization can occur in contexts where participation is silenced by institutional development, or if institutions were built (and strengthened) prior to socio-economic modernization. Therefore, «overinstitutionalization may bring about a strange asymmetry, whereby the political system is strong out of all proportion to other social systems, even though the latter may even be more highly valued» (Ibid., 319). Moreover, overinstitutionalization can lead to asymmetrical institutionalization. This means that institutionalization may be strong on the macro level and weak on the micro level, and vice versa; or it can be strong along one or two of the four dimensions and weak on the others. Focusing on the interaction between the individual and the systemic face of institutionalization, Brown (1977) adds that overinstitutionalization can result from structural dilemmas between the individual and the institution, which require a balance between spontaneity and stability. Depending on the extent to which the equilibrium between these two poles is achieved, two scenarios can emerge: «At the extreme society may be characterized by overinstitutionalization which crushes the individual and causes him to revolt, or it may be characterized by a breakdown of institutional structures which leaves him in a state of psychological confusion and cultural chaos» (Brown 1977, 141).

Within this group of studies, Groth (1979, 204) is the most critical of Huntington's proposal. Defending the Weberian approach of institutionalization, he points out five problems in Huntington's thesis. First, the definition linking organization and institutionalization is vague, since the different indicators that measure it are quite arbitrary and «are not related to one another in any precise, or even roughly calculable fashion» (Ibid., 205). Second, the moral inferences from the characteristics of organization – the more complex, autonomous, adaptable and durable the better – raise crucial questions of whether a society would be better served by «[...] a stronger or a weaker presidency? A stronger or weaker legislature? More centralization of less centralization of power? [...]» (Ibid., 210). Third, the dichotomy of politics between developed nation-states and undeveloped ones reduces the variety of processes that take place within these two groups (Ibid., 212). Fourth,

the connection between political organization and political institutionalization is insufficient in face of empirical evidence of several organizations, such as parties and social movements, which have attempted to institutionalize and failed (Ibid., 226). Finally, the theory of institutionalization, power and order does not take contingency into account: «In particular, the episodic qualities of its leaders, the virtues and vices of its political class and people cannot be dispensed with or 'factored out' of the political equation by any organizational devices» (Groth 1979, 233). These mechanisms are more valued in the Weberian approach, according to which «[...] regardless of the nature, amount or quality of change which any society may have experienced, acute conditions of crisis and conflict – whether economic, social, cultural, military, or otherwise – are generally likely to increase the proportion of system management through patrimonial – charismatic as opposed to institutional means» (Groth 1979, 233-234).

These studies indicate several problems one should be aware of when applying the concept of institutionalization to the study of political organizations of any sort; but to a certain degree, they also refine it. In fact, inasmuch as they draw attention to the different phenomena enclosed under the label of institutionalization, as well as to its conceptual and empirical dilemmas, they also leave a prescription of how to make it a stronger and more tangible concept.

1.3 The institutionalization of party systems

Following this initial interest, the studies of political institutionalization virtually disappeared[2]. In fact, it was only with the beginning of the Third Wave of democratization that the curiosity around this field re-emerged. In the mid-1990s, scholars brought institutional analysis back into the research agenda of social sciences and, this time, they used parties and party systems as the main unit of analysis, whereas during the 1960s and 1970s the theory of institutionalization had been applied to a variety of political organizations. This new series of studies was inaugurated by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) in *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, a book that contested the existing models of party system analysis and proposed a new framework, taking institutionalization as the main criterion for classifying party systems. In the sequence of this work, further improved by Mainwaring (1998; 1999), an impressive number of studies has sought to

[2] Panebianco's (1988) *Political Parties Organization and Power* is among the few studies published during the 1980s.

measure the degree of institutionalization of party systems[3] and to account for its actual or potential impact on the prospects for democratization. As in the first wave of studies, the growing interest on this topic stimulated an intense debate about both the definition and the measurement of institutionalization. Yet, some conceptual ambiguities remain and it is still unclear how many characteristics should be part of it and how its constituent elements are related to each other. The next two parts of this section summarize the studies about party and PSI around two broad umbrellas: the first lays out the studies that have evolved around one dimension only and the second the ones that have adopted a multidimensional conceptualization of institutionalization.

1.3.1 Party system institutionalization as a one-dimensional concept

Although institutionalization was introduced in Political Science as a multidimensional concept (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968), several scholars have approached it as a one-dimensional concept, that is, as susceptible of being equated with one of its most fundamental sets of interactions, the ones that create stability. Mair's (1996) study of party system stabilization in Western Europe is a good example of this. Taking stability as a replacement for institutionalization and focusing on the most important arena of party competition (i.e. government), Mair distinguishes three different variables to measure the level of structural stabilization, namely: alternation of government or the extent of change in party composition of government over time; governing formula, that is, the degree of familiarity in cabinet composition over time; and access to government, meaning the extent to which political parties in the system have clear possibilities to participate in government over time. This framework has been advanced in more recent studies such as the ones of Casal Bértoa and Mair (2010), Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010), and Casal Bértoa (2011), who have delivered concrete indicators to measure each of these three dimensions. In these studies alternation in government is measured by the Index of Ministerial Volatility (IMV), which is an adaptation of Pedersen's index of volatility to cabinet composition (it considers the percentage of ministers gained and lost by each party from one government to the next). Governing formula is measured by an Index of Familiar Alternation (IFA) that takes into account different combinations of governing parties. Lastly, access to government is measured by an Index of

[3] For studies on African countries, see Kuenzi and Lambright (2001 and 2005), Lindberg (2007), Basedau (2007) Bogaards (2008); on Eastern and Central European countries, see Bielasiak (2002), Meleshevich (2007), Lewis (2008), Jurek (2010), Enyedi (2005), Enyedi and Casal Bértoa (2010), Casal Bértoa (2011); on Latin American countries, see Roberts and Wibbels (1999), on Asian countries, see Stockton (2001).

Closure (IC) which just takes into consideration the percentages of ministries belonging to "old governing parties", i.e. those parties which have already been constituent part of a previous government (Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2010)[4].

Building upon the same principle, that is, that stable interactions among political parties are the most relevant dimension of party systems, Lindberg (2007) measured the degree of PSI of 21 African electoral democracies employing 10 indicators that express legislative (in)stability (see Table 1.3). Overall, he concluded that institutionalization had not occurred over an extended period of time, and that more stable party systems are found in countries where very few (sometimes only one), but strong political parties take over the electoral and the legislative arenas (e.g. Botswana, South Africa and Namibia). This approach differs substantially from the one previously developed by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), both on the number of dimensions and observations included.

Globally speaking, the one-dimensional approaches of institutionalization have broadly privileged the structural element over the attitudinal one, featuring stability – at the legislative or the governmental level – as the primary criteria of institutionalization. The relevance given to the structural element is made even more evident if we take into account the number of studies that have focused on the topic of stabilization without directly linking it with institutionalization. These studies include, among others, Bartolini and Mair (1990) on the stabilization of Western European party systems, Roberts and Wibbels (1999) on the origins of electoral instability in Latin American countries, Bogaards (2008) on the relationship between the number of political parties and electoral instability in Africa, and Tavits (2005) and Bakke and Sitter (2005) on the development of stable patterns of party support in post-Communist European countries.

One-dimensional approaches of institutionalization have the advantage of being more parsimonious and straightforward. Yet, because they have tended to focus in only one arena of competition (either parliament or government) they seem to obscure what is going in the other arenas of the polity. In the following section we present the multidimensional approaches to the study of PSI.

[4] Method to compute IFA: a) if the very same combination of parties has already governed together, IFA=100 (i.e. total familiarity); b) if an entirely new combination of forces constitutes the government, IFA=0 (i.e. total innovation); and finally, c) if only part of the parties in a cabinet has shared responsibilities in a previous government, the IFA will be equal to the percentage of ministries belonging to the "familiar" part. For a comprehensive explanation of the rules of calculation of each of these indexes, see Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010).

1.3.2 Party system Institutionalization as a multidimensional concept

In 1995, Mainwaring and Scully broke with existing models of party system analysis and suggested the level of institutionalization as the foremost criterion to understand differences in party system development in Third Wave democracies. Although institutionalization had been applied to the study of party systems in the past – Wefling (1973); Duvall and Welfling (1973a); Duvall and Welfling (1973b); Ozbudun (1981) – the more recent and more mainstream approaches continued to use the number of parties (Duverger 1959; Rae 1967; Laakso and Taagepera 1979) as the basic element for the classification of party systems. In this context, Sartori (1976) was one of the few that went beyond the quantitative criteria of party system categorization to propose a qualitative dimension, which focused on the patterns of interactions between political parties – ideological distance. His definition of the party system as the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition (Sartori 1976, 44) remains one of the most prominent conceptual proposals in contemporary Political Science, having inspired several authors [e.g. Mair's (1996) typology of closed and open structures of competition and, more particularly, Mainwaring and Scully (1995)]. While acknowledging relevance of the two criteria put forward by Sartori (1976) – number of parties and ideological distance –, Mainwaring and Scully sustain that they should be accompanied by a third one – the degree of institutionalization. Concomitantly, an institutionalized party system would display: stability in the rules and the nature of interparty competition; stable roots in society; legitimacy of major political parties and elections; and organizationally strong parties. This seminal framework would later be developed by Mainwaring (1998) and applied to the study of Brazil (Mainwaring 1999). Particularly in this last study, this researcher re-examined the existing frameworks for the analysis of party systems, and proposed a paradigm shift considering the variance in the level of institutionalization, the capacity of the elites and of the state to reshape party systems from above, as well as the adequacy of Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) traditional cleavages model to explain party system formation and development in post-1974 countries. Partly inspired by Huntington (1965), Mainwaring defines institutionalization as «[...] the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted» (Mainwaring 1999, 25). This process is relevant to understand how a political system works as:

> the belief that a given ensemble of procedures and organizations will endure shapes expectations, attitudes, and behavior. In particular, party-system institutionalization means that

> actors entertain clear and stable expectations about the behavior of other actors, and hence about the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior (Mainwaring 1999, 25).

In this study, four dimensions of PSI (which were first presented in Mainwaring and Scully 1995) were applied to the study of Brazil: (i) stability in patterns of interparty competition (measured by legislative and presidential volatility); (ii) rootedness in society (measured by difference in share of votes across presidential and legislative elections, widespread ticket splitting, percentage of respondents who report having a party preference, percentage of recent lower-chamber vote for parties founded by 1950, and years since founding of parties with 10% of the lower-chamber vote); (iii) legitimacy of parties and elections (measured by survey questions inquiring on sympathy towards parties, whether respondents approve dissolution of parties and parliaments, percentage that prefer one party system, whether respondents believe that democracy could exist without political parties); and, finally (iv) party organization is measured by party discipline or congruence between deputies and the party leader, proportion of individuals switching parties, and how far campaigns are individualistic. Over the years this model has been widely used and revised by Mainwaring[5] (with Torcal 2005; and Zoco 2007), as well as by other authors who sought to apply his model from Latin America to other regions of the world.

Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) developed a comparative PSI index to measure the level of PSI in 30 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa using all criteria proposed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) except for party organization, which, in their view, addressed party rather than PSI. For stability of interparty competition and stable roots in society, Kuenzi and Lambright tested the indicators suggested by Mainwaring and Scully. Notwithstanding, to measure the legitimacy of parties and elections, they proposed completely new indicators, namely: 1) whether any major party boycotted the election; 2) whether losers accepted the results; and finally, 3) whether the election was deemed free and fair. Their comparative analysis concluded that African party systems exhibited weaker levels of institutionalization when compared with Latin American countries. An additional finding determined levels of institutionalization to be higher in long-standing democracies, especially those with dominant party systems, with the top five countries ranked in their index of PSI being ruled by

[5] In Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), a huge comparison is conducted between party systems in democratic and semi-democratic less-developed countries. The authors focus solely on three issues - high electoral volatility, weak ideological linkages, and personalism - «[...] because of the difficulties of obtaining comparable valid empirical information for all four dimensions» (2005, 6) suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995). In Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), the focus is placed only on electoral volatility which is used as an indicator for the analysis of the stabilization of party systems.

dominant parties: Botswana (Botswana Democratic Party - BDP); Gambia (Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction - APRC); Namibia (South-West African People's Organization - SWAPO); South Africa (African National Congress - ANC); and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front – ZANU-PF).

Basedau's (2007) four-fold framework for the analysis of party systems and democratization in 28 African countries was also influenced by Mainwaring (and Scully) as the following quote denotes:

> a) all relevant political parties should enjoy strong and stable roots in society; b) political parties should have high levels of bureaucratic organization and cohesion (low or moderate factionalism) as well as a sufficiently competitive and participatory mechanism of electing leaders; c) the party system should display low volatility between consecutive elections and stable patterns of competition (low floor crossing, low 'death and birth rate' of political parties); finally, d) the party system should be accepted as and actually be the key decision making forum in the political arena as a whole, being paramount to potential veto actors such as the military or powerful individuals ('Big Men' or 'political entrepreneurs') (Basedau 2007, 110).

Picking only one indicator per dimension, Basedau (2007) measured stability of interparty competition as the Pedersen's volatility index, stable roots in society as average party age, and legitimacy of parties and elections as the percentage of voter turnout. Concerning the fourth criterion of institutionalization – that required political parties to have high levels of bureaucratic organization – this researcher identified a series of indicators «such as the number of card-carrying members, funds, (paid) full-time party officials, number and maintenance of party offices throughout the country» but he does not measure them due to lack of data (Basedau 2007, 121). All three indicators were individually measured and then combined into an aggregated Total Institutionalization Score (TIS) that ranges between 1 (low TIS) and 3 (high TIS). After distributing the countries in a contingency table according to level of institutionalization and democratic performance (measured by Freedom House average scores), Basedau (2007) discovers a pattern in which more institutionalized countries figure among the most democratic ones.

In fact, the results reveal that five out of the eight free countries included in the sample are highly institutionalized (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia and South Africa), while one (Sao Tome and Principe) presents medium TIS and two (Benin and Mali) present low TIS. Regarding the thirteen partly free countries, the overwhelming majority is weakly

institutionalized (Burkina Faso, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Gambia, Niger, Nigeria, Zambia); whereas only three have a medium TIS (Gabon, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia). Of the nine non free countries only one has high TIS (Cameroon); the remaining exhibit medium (Central African Republic, Equatorial-Guinea, Guinea and Togo) or low (Chad Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritania and Zimbabwe) TIS (Basedau 2007, 111). On the basis of this analysis, this researcher concludes that party systems with strong roots in society, high stability and uncontested legitimacy of political parties are the most favorable for democracy. Previously, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) had also shown that there is a positive association between party system characteristics (legislative volatility, the average age of parties, and the effective number of parliamentary parties) and the level of democracy in African countries. In this sense, both these studies consider PSI as a requisite of democratic performance.

Riedl (2008) also applied the criteria established by Mainwaring and Scully to the African sample, even though with slight modifications. For stable roots in society, she added new indicators, namely, percentage of currently represented parties competing in first elections and average age of parties that received at least 5% of the vote in most recent legislative elections. For legitimacy of parties and elections, Riedl used Kuenzi and Lambright's three criteria. Moreover, she also took into consideration whether an elected government was disrupted by military intervention during its legal tenure. Her final ranking for 23 countries placed South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Tanzania as the most institutionalized party systems, and Madagascar, Mali, Benin, Lesotho and Zambia as the least institutionalized ones.

Kuenzi and Lambright's (2001) model was also the source of inspiration for our first studies of PSI in Lusophone Africa (Sanches 2008; Sanches 2011). It allowed to us to feature unique, and until that moment, unexplored features about the party systems in Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe, since the early 1990s. Only recently we opted for a slightly different version of PSI in which we focused only on the structural element of party systems (Sanches 2013).

Moving out to studies that have analyzed party systems in other Third Wave regions, we find that Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) influence remains strong. Lewis (2008), for instance, has evaluated the level of PSI in Central and Eastern European drawing on stability of interparty competition (expressed by electoral volatility); stable roots in society (measured by percentage of population close to a political party); and legitimacy towards the political parties and the electoral process (expressed by the proportion of respondents that value democracy, think that parties are necessary for the political system and also expressed by trust

in political parties). Croissant and Völkel (2010), in turn, although maintaining the four-fold scheme suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), have substituted several indicators[6] by new ones, producing the following list: vote volatility and seat volatility (for stability patterns of inter-party competition); party identification and party distance (for party roots in society); party indispensability, party confidence, clean election and real vote choice (for legitimacy of parties and elections); and lastly, party age and party continuity (for party organization).

Yet, other studies have drawn inspiration from other models rather than from Mainwaring and Scully's (1995). Meleshevich's (2007) rested upon two conditions – autonomy and stability – to measure PSI in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine. Partly as in Huntington (1965), he defined autonomy as the degree of independence a party system has from other social institutions as well as from external environments, and operationalized it as the extent of partisan basis in the executive and legislative recruitment, and as the uniformity of parties' electoral support across regions. As far as stability is concerned, it refers to regularity in parties' patterns of interaction, and it is measured by the level of electoral volatility and new parties' vote share. Other than this, Meleshevich (2007, 111) also pointed out four crucial factors to explain variance in the level of PSI: «(1) the role of ruling Communist elites during the initial stage of the party-system formation; (2) the type of executive-legislative relations; (3) laws that regulate the electoral process and activities of political parties; and (4) the influence of the parties of power on political institutionalization». Alternatively, Rose and Munro (2009), and later Rose and Mishler (2010), put forward an interactive model of institutionalization[7] that encompassed four criteria: (1) laws – the extent to which election laws are stable; (2) elite commitments – the extent to which political elites have durable commitments to a party; (3) voter demands – the extent to which voters have durable commitments to a party; and (4) learning – a process of elite and mass learning after the founding election. This proposal is innovative in the extent to which it has devoted more attention than the preceding ones, into assessing the scope of PSI more than simply measuring its indicators.

Moreover, within this research field we find several studies focusing on the analysis of political parties instead on that of party systems, or even on both simultaneously. Despite the fact that party institutionalization is not our main interest here, it is important to exemplify how some dimensions/indicators have migrated from one level to the other across different

[6] They kept electoral volatility and party age only.
[7] Rose and Munro (2009) analyzed Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Russia, while Rose and Mishler (2010) studied only Russia.

studies. Focusing on parties as organizations, Panebianco (1988) defines institutionalization vaguely as «the way the organization 'solidifies'» (Ibid., 49) and suggests two scales to measure it: «(1) that of the organization's degree of autonomy *vis-à-vis* its environment, and (2) that of its degree of systemness, i.e. the degree of interdependence of its different internal sectors» (Ibid., 55). In this framework «autonomy is reached when the organization can directly control exchange processes with its environment»; whereas a high degree of systemness «implies a great deal of interdependence among the subgroups assured by the centralized control of organizational resources and exchanges processes with the environment (Ibid., 56). Both dimensions are related «for a low degree of systemness often implies little autonomy and vice versa» (Ibid., 57).

Dix (1992), in turn, employed Huntington's adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence to the analysis of Latin American political parties. Later, Stockton (2001) replicated Dix's (1992) and Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) frameworks to measure political party institutionalization and PSI in South Korea and Taiwan. More recently, Basedau and Stroh (2008) combined the approaches of Huntington (1965), Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Randal and Svåsand (2002b) to create a new conceptualization of party institutionalization along four dimensions: (i) external stability, was equated with "roots in society", (ii) internal stability dimension with "party organization", (iii) external value-infusion with "autonomy" and internal value-infusion with "coherence". These four dimensions were unfolded into 15 indicators and measured across 48 political parties of nine African countries (Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Tanzania, and Zambia).

Following similar theoretical lines, Yardimci-Geyikci (2013) defines organizational development and strong roots in society as dimensions of his conceptualization of party institutionalization. The first dimension is operationalized by membership strength, membership density for individual parties, territorial comprehensiveness and financial resources of parties, while the second dimension involves electoral volatility, party identification and trust in political parties (Yardimci-Geyikci 2013, 4).

Table 1.3 – Models for the study of PSI

Dimensions	Mainwaring and Scully (1995) Mainwaring (1998, 1999)	Kuenzi and Lambright (2001)	Basedau (2007)	Meleshevich (2007)
Stable patterns of interparty competition/ stability	Electoral volatility	Electoral volatility	Electoral volatility	Electoral volatility; new parties' vote share
Stable roots in society	Difference between presidential and legislative elections; widespread ticket splitting; % of respondents who report having a party preference; % of recent lower-chamber vote for parties founded by 1950; years since founding of parties with 10 % of the lower-chamber vote	Share of seats for parties founded until 1970s	Average party age	-
Legitimacy of parties and elections	Sympathy index towards parties; whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments; % that prefer one party system; whether respondents believed that democracy could exist without political parties	If any major party boycotts the election; if losers accept the results; if the election was deemed free and fair	Turnout of registered voters	-
Party organization	Party discipline or congruence between deputies and the party leader; proportion of individuals switching parties; and the extent to which campaigns are individualistic	-	-	-
Autonomy	-	-	-	Degree of partisan basis in executive and legislative recruitment; uniformity of parties' electoral support across regions

Source: Author's own elaboration.

Table 1.3 – Models for the study of PSI (continuation)

Dimensions	Riedl (2008)	Lewis (2008)	Mair (1996), Mair and Casal Bértoa (2009) Enyedi and Casal Bértoa (2010)	Lindberg (2007)
Stable patterns of interparty competition/ stability	Electoral volatility	Electoral volatility	Ministerial volatility Index of Familiar Alternation Index of Closure	Number of parties in legislature; number of new parties; share of new parties in legislature; number of parties voted out of the legislature; share (%) of parties voted out due to losing in legislative elections; share of seats in the legislature occupied by the largest party; share of seats in the legislature held by the runner-up; and legislative seat volatility
Stable roots in society	% of currently represented parties competing in first elections; presidential-legislative difference; average age of parties that received at least 5% of the vote in most recent legislative elections (as % of age since democratization)	% of population close to a party	-	-
Legitimacy of parties and elections	The opposition boycotted the elections; the losers did not accept the results; whether the elections were deemed irregular (not free and fair) by international observers; and whether an elected government was disrupted by military intervention during its legal tenure	% of respondents that value democracy and think that parties are necessary for the political system; trust in political parties	-	-
Party organization		-	-	-
Autonomy	Degree of partisan basis in executive and legislative recruitment; uniformity of parties' electoral support across regions	-	-	-

Source: Author's own elaboration.

These studies have been mentioned to make the point that a migration of indicators and dimensions between party and PSI frequently takes place. In this sense, our objective was not so much to review the body of literature that has focused on political parties instead of on party systems but to call attention to the fact that institutionalization in both cases is distinct and that it can sometimes diverge. For this reason, we concur with authors like Randall and Svåsand (2002b) and Levitsky (1998) who assert that the best thing to avoid ambiguities is to separate these two levels, that is to measure them separately and then to investigate how they relate to each other. This will be briefly addressed in the following section and at a larger length on Chapter III. Now, revolving the multidimensional approaches to the study of PSI, this section has shown that Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) original scheme has turned into one of the most influential works so far, and to this extent is has substantially contributed to the revival of a research field that seemed to be forgotten after Huntington's 1965 essay. As Table 1.3 shows, Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) four criteria of institutionalization have been partly or fully applied to the study of post-1974 party systems in all four continents, thus proving their ability to cross distant regions. That being said, it is worth underlying that stability (of interparty competition) stands out as the most consensual dimension, being systematically measured by the index of electoral volatility, while the remaining dimensions have been measured variously, frequently according to the data available for each pool of countries.

1.4 What do we know about the sources and the mechanisms of party system institutionalization in Africa?

Scholarly work about PSI in Africa has mainly revolved around two questions: (i) how institutionalized are party systems at a certain point in time?; and (ii) to what extent can the degree of PSI predict higher levels of democratic performance? Apart from Welfling (1973), Riedl (2008), and to some extent Ferree (2010), the majority of studies mentioned in the previous section measured the degree of PSI as a means to predict varying degrees of democratic performance. Let us point out some examples.

Kuenzi and Lambright's (2001) first study essentially focused on the measurement of institutionalization, but the second one – «Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes» – went further in exploring the relationship between institutionalization and democratization. Here, they used three party system characteristics –

legislative volatility, the average age of parties, and the effective number of parliamentary parties – to explain variance in the level of democracy (measured by Freedom House scores) in 33 African regimes. The results of the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression they conducted revealed that low levels of both volatility and fragmentation predicted higher levels of democracy. By exploring the relationship between his TIS and democratic performance (also measured by Freedom House scores), Basedau (2007) also identified an association between higher levels of TIS and democracy. Another group of studies, particularly of Lindberg (2007) and Bogaards (2008) has equally contributed to this debate, but in different terms. Lindberg (2007) compared the degree of legislative (ins)stability in 21 African countries and, in the end, delivered a typology of stable/fluid/destabilized party systems; whereas Bogaards (2008), even though measuring a diverse selection of indicators,[8] was more concerned with the varying degrees of electoral volatility in dominant party systems.

One underlying finding of all these studies suggests an unclear relationship between time and institutionalization (or stabilization). Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) found higher levels of institutionalization in older democracies (e.g. Botswana and Mauritius), while Bogaards (2008) noted that in «[...] contrast to what Tavits (2005) found for Eastern Europe, but in line with Mainwaring and Zoco's (2007) findings for third-wave democracies worldwide, no general trend towards stabilization over time is discernible», as for example:

> the four countries with a longer tradition of multiparty elections show stark contrast. The only two long-standing African democracies, Botswana and Mauritius, display a stable level of electoral instability between the last elections, whereas the two countries with a tradition of unfree multiparty elections, Senegal and Zimbabwe, exhibit a strong rise in volatility (Bogaards 2008, 118).

On the same topic, Lindberg (2007) concluded that African party systems were either institutionalized or non-institutionalized from the onset of multipartism, and thus that institutionalization as such had not occurred over time. The question of whether time *per se* leads to higher levels of institutionalization is, therefore, still relatively open.

Ferree's (2010) and Riedl's (2008) studies detach from this group insofar as they focus on party system characteristics – stability and institutionalization, respectively – as dependent variables and inquire on their social, economic and institutional roots. Ferree's (2010)

[8] Other indicators used descriptively were: vote share winner, seat share winner, incumbent vote change and vote on new parties.

analysis on the sources of electoral volatility in Africa, tests the «hypothesis about how the size and distribution of groups shape volatility levels». The results showed that «countries with one, and only one, majority group should have less volatility than countries with no majority group or countries with multiple nested majority groups» (Ferree 2010, 778). Riedl's (2008) mixed methods study covering a sample of 23 African countries and then focusing on Ghana, Senegal (both highly institutionalized), Benin and Zambia (both weakly institutionalized) also provides interesting explanations about differentials in PSI levels. Her analysis reveals that whether the incumbent had control over the transition process matters more for PSI than the historical legacy (colonial background), the type of electoral system, the state of the economy or the strength of social cleavages.

Within a literature concerned not so much with institutionalization or stabilization but with the development of democratic political institutions in Africa it is possible to find interesting explanations about varying degrees of political performance. In fact, the persistence of the "Big man rule" (Diamond 2008; van Cranenburgh 2008), the high levels of ethnic fragmentation or the consummation of state resources by the ethnic kin in office (Salih 2001; Posner 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Moyo 2009), the historical legacies (Njoh 2000; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005a; Chiriyankandath 2007; Riedl 2008) and the overall lack of resources (Teshome 2009) have all been cited, at some point, to explain Africa's weak formal political institutions.

In this sense, even though only a handful of studies have focused on PSI (or stability) as a dependent variable, there is a wide literature on which we can rely on to elaborate our explanations and hypotheses of PSI (as described in Chapter IV).

1.5 Balance

> We have to ask how useful a concept (institutionalization) can be when not only is it multi-dimensional but its different dimensions are in tension with one another. It might be argued that it was more sensible to discuss the different dimensions separately rather than embrace them in one conceptual package. All we can suggest here is that most interesting and fruitful concepts in political science are multi-dimensional and riddled with ambiguities and tensions: if this objection was consistently applied, the discipline would have a severely depleted tool-kit (Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 8).

From its emergence in the 1960s until more recent times, the study of political institutionalization has been accompanied by theoretical and empirical ambiguities. The truth

is that, the dilemmas that stood out of the first pool of studies are still being currently debated and seem to expand as more (and sometimes conflicting) dimensions and indicators of institutionalization are put forward. The growing interest on this topic has highlighted, however, two major problems, particularly in what regards the analysis of party systems.

The first problem derives from the existing plethora of models identifying different dimensions and indicators of institutionalization. As a result of that abundance, a dilemma arises on whether to focus on the individual vs. systemic level of organizations, or on structural vs. attitudinal behaviors. At the same time, some studies propose a multidimensional framework for the analysis of PSI (e.g. Huntington 1965, 1968; Welfling 1973; Mainwaring and Scully 1995); others reduce complexity by equating PSI with its most fundamental set of interactions: the ones that create stability (Mair 1996; Lindberg 2007; Mair and Casal Bértoa 2010; Casal Bértoa 2011). In addition, while some studies focus solely on the structural element of institutionalization, others also take into account how institutions become valued or legitimatized. Those that have followed the one-dimension-stability approach clearly equate institutionalization with the stabilization or routinization of certain rules (Barley and Tolbert 1997). However, those preferring multidimensional models have tended to lump both elements under the same definition (e.g. Huntington 1965, Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999) without providing clear explanations of how they may individually vary. Furthermore, the treatment of the attitudinal element has been rather problematic. As displayed in Table 1.3, the indicators suggested so far vary widely from survey questions, such as sympathy towards and trust in political parties, citizens' value of democracy and of political parties, to the analysis on whether political parties accepted the electoral results or boycotted the elections. Wolinetz (2006) has argued that some of these indicators say more about the attitudes toward democracy than about the institutionalization of party systems. Apart from the measurement problem, there are further implications with respect to measuring both elements of PSI in the same framework.

According to Levitsky (1998), the two notions of institutionalization – as value infusion and as routinization of certain rules of the game – comprehend very different organizational phenomena. Whereas the first is about the process by which an organization becomes valued and acquires a life of its own at any given time (Huntington 1968, 15-16), institutionalization as behavioral routinization:

> takes as the unit of analysis not the organization as a whole but rather specific patterns of behavior within the organization. Analysts who use these definitions focus on 'the rules of the game' that shape social interaction and they define institutionalization as the process by which such rules or patterns become routinized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998, 81).

Yet, because an organization may be infused with value without being internally routinized, value infusion and routinization should be analyzed as distinct organizational phenomena that do not necessarily occur together. «For this reason scholars may be better off distinguishing more clearly between the two types of institutionalization treating them as distinct concepts» (Ibid.).

Randall and Svåsand (2002b) also defined institutionalization as having both a structural and an attitudinal component, which, in turn, encompassed an internal and external dimension. In what concerns the internal dimension, the structural component referred to the relationship between parties themselves (systemness), while the attitudinal counterpart implied that parties accepted each other as legitimate competitors (value infusion). Regarding the party system's external relationships with other parts of the polity, the structural dimension is especially concerned with the interaction of the party system with the state (decisional autonomy), and the attitudinal dimension relates to the public attitudes towards the party system, to the degree of trust in parties as institutions and to the commitment to the electoral process (reification) (Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 7-12).

For Randall and Svåsand (2002b), the study of institutionalization requires a separate analysis of both these dimensions as well as a disjunction between the institutionalization of (individual) political parties and of party systems since they are two different phenomena. Actually, scenarios are possible where, despite having territorially comprehensive structures, political parties are unable to develop stable patterns of competition. It may also be the case that parties are capable of changing alliances, labels or ideology, but are unable to modify the existing set of systemic rules and procedures; therefore creating *uneven* PSI (Randall and Svåsand 2002b). All these issues pose several challenges to anyone interested in the study of political institutionalization, namely of whether to treat it as a one-dimensional or a multidimensional concept, as a result of how political organizations crystallize certain rules or become valued, or as an expression of individual or systemic behaviors.

The second problem is that scholars have been more concerned with how PSI predicts differentials in democratic performance than with the identification of the causes and the mechanisms of its variance. It is more or less established that parties and party systems are

necessary conditions of democratic performance (Crotty 1993; Randall and Svåsand 2002a; Lapalombara 2007) and that their level of development (institutionalization or stabilization) crucially shape the prospects for democratization. Studies focused on Latin America (Dix 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995), post-Communist Europe (Enyedi 2006; Tavits 2005; Kreuzer and Pettai 2011), Southern Europe (van Biezen 2000b), and Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Basedau 2007) have all contributed to construct that view. Even if cases of non-linear relationship were also found, there remains a general proposition about the relevance of PSI, particularly in new democracies.

This thesis addresses these two problems. Regarding the first (the problem of measurement) it seeks to provide a more fruitful framework for the analysis PSI; one that combines the advantages of one-dimensional and multidimensional models and that observes more arenas within the polity. Moreover, it argues that the quality of institutionalization is important to understand the actual scope of political institutions in new democracies. This means considering the different interplays between the degrees of PSI, electoral participation and democraticity.

Regarding the second problem, this thesis proposes treating PSI as a dependent variable. This matters since there is not as much of systematic work about the sources and mechanisms of varying degrees of institutionalization, both from the longitudinal and the cross-sectional perspective. Randall and Svåsand (2002b) have accurately drawn attention to this gap, referring to party institutionalization:

> The strong assumption in the democratization literature that party institutionalization is a vital ingredient of democratic consolidation has not been accompanied by any extended examination of the notion of party institutionalization itself (Randall and Svåsand 2002b, 8).

To the extent that this statement remains current and that it can be extrapolated to this study it suggests that more attention should be given to PSI as a dependent variable. Building on the above, the next chapter presents the questions and the methods that structured this research.

CHAPTER II – METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapter we summarized the main findings produced within the sub-field of studies about institutionalization, political parties and party systems, from the 1960s onwards. From this literature three relatively open questions emerge. The first question pertains to the problem of measuring institutionalization. After more than four decades of research, the list of dimensions and indicators necessary to quantify the degree of institutionalization remains contested, while the different units and levels to which the concept can be applied have been too narrowly addressed. The second and the third questions – about the causes and mechanisms of PSI, respectively – arise from the recognition of a literature bias. Although knowledge is fairly consolidated as to the level of institutionalization of newly-formed party systems and on how it may shape the prospects that a stable democracy will emerge, little is known about the sources and the mechanisms of institutionalization. As referred in the Introduction, the main purpose of this dissertation is to investigate these three research questions in the context of contemporary Sub-Saharan African party systems. Throughout six sections, this chapter details how this research was developed. Section 2.1 introduces the research questions and explains their relevance and complementarities. Section 2.2 proposes the historical and the network institutionalisms as the theoretical approaches of this study. Section 2.3 briefly summarizes the hypotheses and the mechanisms of PSI. Section 2.4 presents the research design (mixed methods design) and justifies the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. Section 2.5 features the cases selected for each strand of the analysis. Finally, section 2.6 details the sources consulted and makes some notes regarding the process of data collection.

2.1 Research questions

This dissertation deals with three main research questions. First, to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? Second, why do the levels of PSI vary across countries and time? Third, what mechanisms underlie the different patterns of PSI? These questions are sequentially analyzed given that it is only by defining and measuring PSI that it becomes possible to investigate the sources and the mechanisms of its variance.

The first question – to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? – encloses the problem of defining and measuring institutionalization. It may not be an original question, in the sense that it has been dealt with in the past (Welfling 1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007); however it remains crucial in two aspects. On the one hand, there is a need to revise the existing measures in light of important theoretical contributions that call attention to a conflict between levels, elements and dimensions of institutionalization; on the other hand as more

and more elections take place it becomes necessary to update the level of institutionalization of African party systems. As previously demonstrated, scholarly work has produced several definitions, dimensions and indicators of institutionalization since Huntington's (1965, 1968) seminal studies (see summary in Table 1.3). Over the years, his theoretical definition remained largely accepted – even if partly reviewed (e.g. Mainwaring 1999; Randall and Svåsand 2002b) – while his four-fold typology has been more contested. Indeed, controversies persist on whether to treat institutionalization (i) as a one-dimensional or multidimensional concept, (ii) as a structural or attitudinal phenomenon, or both, and (iii) applicable to study of individuals or systems. We begin by clarifying our positions over each of these dilemmas with the choice of the theoretical definition.

In this study, institutionalization is defined as «the process by which a practice or organization becomes well established and widely known, if not universally accepted» (Mainwaring 1999, 25). This Huntington-based definition encompasses both a structural (*stability*) and an attitudinal (*legitimacy*) element, which have been treated variously within this research field. While much attention has been devoted to the study of structural institutionalization, either alone or in combination with the attitudinal element, the latter has never been autonomously assessed. Furthermore, the way it has been measured is rather dubious. Even though several indicators[9] have been suggested to quantify it, they fail to actually express how far party systems create a distinct culture or value-system (Randall and Svåsand 2002a, 13) that provides for cohesion and long term stabilization and durability[10]. The structural element has been measured more consistently across models (see Table 1.3); however its assessment may also prove problematic when combined or equated with attitudinal institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995). In fact, before Ben-Dor (1975), Levitsky (1998) and Randall and Svåsand (2002b) have sustained that both elements deserve a distinct empirical approach as they relate to distinct organizational phenomena.

Building upon these contributions we have assembled a set of indicators that measure the structural institutionalization of party systems, only. Lacking comprehensive data prevents us from accurately measuring the attitudinal element, which is, thus, not analyzed in this

[9] As depicted in Table 1.3, according to Mainwaring (and Scully 1995, and alone 1998, 1999) legitimacy of parties and elections can be measured by surveys questions such as: sympathy index [scale ranging from 1 (less sympathy) to 10 (greatest)] towards parties, whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments, etc. The Afrobarometer includes some of these questions; however the data is not available for all countries/years covered in this study. The first round of surveys started in 1999 and included 12 countries.

[10] Basedau's (2007) option for turnout is problematic as this is an indicator of political mobilization (Huntington 1965, 1968). Kuenzi and Lambright's (2001) indicators, on the other hand, are more an expression of the attitudes towards democracy (Wolinetz 2006; Casal Bértoa 2010) (see full list of indicators in Table 1.3).

study, although its relevance is acknowledged. Additionally, based on Huntington's understanding of institutionalization as a multidimensional concept we propose a three-fold framework for the analysis of PSI, which combines indicators put forward by Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995)[11], Mair (1996) and finally Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007) who have specifically measured institutionalization in party systems of Sub-Saharan Africa. The first dimension is stable patterns of interparty competition and is measured by (1) *electoral volatility*, (2) *legislative seats volatility*, (3) *total percentage of votes won by new parties*, (4) *alternation in government* and (5) *share of seats for the most voted party*. The second dimension is stable roots in society, and is measured by the (6) *share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970 and 1980* and by (7) *share of seats for independent candidates*. The third dimension is *organizational continuity* and is measured by the (8) *legislative* and (9) *electoral strength* of (10) *merging* and (11) *splitting political parties*. This third dimension has never been measured in the way here proposed, despite suggested in the earlier models of Janda (1970) and Welfling (1973). As we shall see in more detail in Chapter III, the inclusion of indicator (4) and the way indicator (6) is computed is also innovative *vis-à-vis* preceding measures of PSI.

To calculate these eleven indicators we use the results of systematic and competitive lower house elections, held in Sub-Saharan Africa until 2011[12]. Given that the units of observation are national elections, the measure here proposed is applicable to the study of national party systems. The specification of the unit (party systems) and the level (national) of analysis is critical in the study of institutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975; Randall and Svåsand 2002b) since there is a temptation to fall into the ecological/individual fallacy (Landman 2005, 50-52). In the present research we would incur in this fallacy if from the level of institutionalization of national party systems, the level of institutionalization of individual political parties and of subnational party systems was also inferred. In addition to the unit and the level of analysis, it is important to take into consideration that political parties operate across different arenas – electoral, legislative, governmental, and societal – within a polity, and thus that the degree of PSI might vary across these different arenas. Furthermore, institutionalization is said to vary not only in level but in quality (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975), depending on how its interaction with other processes

[11] This seminal work has been taken further mainly by Mainwaring, either alone (1998 and 1999) either in co-authorship (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007).
[12] We stopped in 2011 to allow fieldwork activities in the countries/case studies selected to start in 2012 and 2013.

occurs. All these aspects will be developed at greater length in Chapter III. Hence, for now, we summarize the basis of our framework for analysis in four premises:

- (i) institutionalization is a multidimensional concept (e.g. Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999); clustering both attitudinal and structural behaviors that should be separately assessed (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002b);
- (ii) the institutionalization of parties is different from that of party systems (e.g. Welfling 1973; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Casal Bértoa 2010);
- (iii) the institutionalization of party systems varies across the different territorial levels (national and subnational) and the different arenas of competition (electoral, legislative, governmental) within a polity (Bardi and Mair 2008);
- (iv) institutionalization varies in level and in quality; therefore it is possible to identify patterns of adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975).

Reconciling these principles, our framework for analysis can be characterized as a *multidimensional structural measure of institutionalization* which applies to *national party systems* observed across the *electoral*, the *parliamentary*, the *governmental* and the *interparty/organizational* arenas.

The second stage of our study researches the causes of PSI variance. As stated earlier this question remains quite unexplored after more than forty decades of research, particularly in the case of African countries. So far, the literature about party system development has provided several evidences of the distinctive nature of party systems emerging after 1974. These have been commonly portrayed as having higher levels of volatility and fragile links with civil society, whereas political parties suffer from low organizational capacity and are highly dependent on state resources (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwarin 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Lindberg 2007; Salih and Nordlund 2007). While these labels have been consistently reinforced, little is known about what is going on behind them. Even though the sources of party system stability (usually measured by electoral or legislative volatility) have been analyzed in numerous studies[13], the question of what explains weaker levels of institutionalization, or more broadly put «what explains the

[13] Some examples are: Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007), among others.

variation in the level of institutionalization across countries and time?» has attracted much less interest. This dissertation offers a contribution to abridge this gap as it focus on PSI as a dependent variable and examines how far differences in the timing of political events, level of competition as well as in the structural, institutional and economic settings explain the panorama of African party systems.

In the final stage of this study the attention is placed on the mechanisms of PSI. But what do we mean by mechanisms and how do we move from mechanisms to processes? Tilly (2001, 25-26) provides very clear-cut answers to these questions. He defines mechanisms as «a delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations», and processes as «occurring combinations or sequences of mechanisms». Concomitantly, he identifies three sorts of mechanisms: environmental, cognitive, and relational. Quoting at length:

> Environmental mechanisms are externally generated influences on conditions affecting social life; words such as disappear, enrich, expand, and disintegrate – applied not to actors but their settings – suggest the sorts of cause-effect relations in question. Cognitive mechanisms operate through alterations of individual and collective perception, and are characteristically described through words such as recognize, understand, reinterpret, and classify. Relational mechanisms alter connections among people, groups, and interpersonal networks; words such as ally, attack, subordinate, and appease give a sense of relational mechanisms Tilly (2001, 24).

Building on Tilly's conceptual framework, the relevance of this question is three-fold. Firstly, to add a micro perspective to the study of institutionalization by discussing the patterns observed at the macro level in case studies. Secondly, to understand what are the environmental and relational mechanisms that underlie the process of institutionalization; thus we leave aside the cognitive element as we do not have enough information to assess it[14]. Moreover, as Barley and Tolbert (1997) have argued, we also believe that this is the most effective way to analyze the scripts and the lines of action of political organizations; therefore we consciously emphasize «the behavioral and the structural rather than the cognitive and the cultural. Although we believe such an approach has value because it enables systematic empiricism, it does so at the cost of relegating interpretations to the background.

[14] Cognition has been described as «the capacity of human beings to acquire and store knowledge, communicate it and use it for behavioral purposes» (Martens 2004). This condition is very difficult to assess, especially in a study like this, where the type of quantitative and qualitative (semi-structured interviews, party documents etc.) data collected focuses more on the institutional and the structural conditions of PSI than on how the individuals' search for knowledge is mobilized into – or promotes – greater PSI.

Consequently, our approach is far less sensitive to the role that cognitions and interpretive frames play in institutionalization (Barley and Tolbert 1997, 18). Thirdly, to explore the mechanisms of concurrent explanations of PSI, which are either omitted, or poorly assessed, at the quantitative strand. We are particularly thinking of the strategies developed by political parties to promote changes in existing distributions of power and on the effect of informal political practices – clientelism and patronage – on institutional change. Furthermore, the focus on the mechanisms of PSI is relevant because it brings together the two faces of institutional change: on the one side the model or schema of resources and interactions that defines the possible paths for the political action of self-reflective actors and on the other side the interpretive processes that make a certain pattern self-sustaining or not (Clemens and Cook 1999).

2.2 The theoretical approach: Institutionalism and African Politics

One thing that the institutionalists agree is that institutions matter, and although they have all sought to explain the main puzzle of institutional change or stability that have tended to emphasize different things (Schmitter 2009). Whether institutionalists focus on structure, agency, choices, path dependency, actors' calculations and strategies they have endorsed and developed a considerable variety of approaches in which one can rely on to study political institutions (March and Olsen 1984; Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999; Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman 2006; Mahoney and Thelen 2010a).

Given that institutionalization is a political outcome that expresses how far organizations, procedures or practices have become valued and stable over time it makes sense to frame it along the lines of the new institutionalisms. More precisely, this research is anchored in two theoretical approaches which derive from the new institutionalisms[15]: historical and network institutionalism. Together they enable the study of the two sides of political institutions, formality and informality, which are at the core of this dissertation. The historical institutionalism is the principal framework, it defines institutions as «the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political economy», ranging «from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behavior or bank-firm relations (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).

[15] For a thorough discussion see *inter alia*: Immergut (1998), Thelen (1999), Hall and Taylor (1996), Hay and Wincott (1998) and Rhodes, Binder, and Rockman (2006).

Different from rational choice theories that analyze political institutions and events as a result of choices made by rational actors under conditions of interdependence, and organizational theories that focus on how individual rationality is bounded by preexisting organizational scenarios and procedures (Immergut 1998, 12-15), historical institutionalism holds the premise that political processes are structured by collective actors such as political institutions and state structures, which bear their own history and express particular political interests, i.e., structures of power. In this sense, political institutions, political authorities, political culture and the structure of political opportunities not only crucially shape the mobilization and the organization of interests, but also the individuals' belief that certain lines of action are possible. In fact, political actors, here conceived as "self-reflective actors", can reinvent the structure of interests and power within which they operate (Immergut 1998, 18-21), and this is facilitated during the so called *critical junctures*. These are «often understood as periods of contingency during which the usual constraints on action are lifted or ease» (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 7), therefore opening up opportunities for historic agents to alter trajectories of development.

Even though historical institutionalism has been frequently used in Political Science and Comparative Politics, it has been less applied in the African context due to «a widespread epistemological reservation in African Studies about the use of an institutionalist approach towards African politics» (Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh 2011, 22). This position is essentially motivated by the view that African politics is mainly driven by informal institutions. Against this position Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh (2011) argue that historical institutionalism should be used without suspicion as «[...] a substantial degree of formal institutionalization has taken place in Africa». Moreover, because historical institutionalism defines institutions as both formal and informal, it facilitates the «institutionalist approach to African politics that is often perceived as being dominated by informality», without creating a theoretical dichotomy (Erdmann, Elischer, and Stroh 2011, 23).

Therefore, historical institutionalism perfectly suits the general goals of this study as it allows an institutional approach to the study of party systems in Africa without creating a conflict between formality and informality. More than enabling a tradeoff between the different faces of political institutions, it is flexible enough to (i) combine with the macro-comparative approach when we propose the institutional design as one of the most interesting explanations of institutionalization and it proves relevant (ii) when we examine the environmental and relational conditions affecting the different paths of institutionalization,

where informal networks as well as strategic choices in *critical junctures* in the countries' history gain relevance.

In this theoretical framework, the role of the network institutionalism is secondary. In fact, it is invoked as a way to conceptually structure the study of the mechanisms of PSI (party coalitions party-citizens linkages). Networks are «stable or recurrent pattern of behavioral interaction or exchange between individuals organizations» (Ansell 1998, 75). These interactions are considered to be complex and highly differentiated (in resources and constraints) and are likely to generate patterns of exchange, solidarity, mutual obligations, reciprocity, coalitions (Ansell 1998) or else clientelism and personalism, which are frequently associated to the African context (van de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; *inter alia*). In this sense, this approach will allows a more operative analysis of informality in African party systems and it combines well with historical institutionalism, which already foresees a complementarily with other institutionalism (Immergut 1998; Thelen 1999).

2.3 Hypotheses and mechanisms of party system institutionalization

While the first research question does not imply the test of any hypotheses, since it strictly deals with the problem of measuring institutionalization, the second question demands such a specification as it is explanatory by formulation. Otherwise, the third research question requires the identification of the mechanisms of PSI that will be compared across the cases studies. In the previous chapter we noted that only a handful of studies focused on institutionalization as a unitary dependent variable (e.g. Riedl 2008; Casal Bértoa 2012). Indeed, the trend within the wider literature of party system development has been to focus on the origins of party system stabilization rather than on institutionalization. Same examples are Tavits (2005; 2006; 2007), Horowitz and Browne (2005), and Casal Bértoa (2011) for post-Communist Europe; Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin America; Croissant and Völkel (2010) for East and South Asia: Ferree (2010) and Riedl (2008) for Sub-Saharan Africa, and Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) and Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) for cross-regional comparisons.

Riedl's (2008) and Ferree's (2010) research are very relevant for the purposes of our study. Focusing on African party systems as dependent variables both authors have distanced themselves from the approaches of Kuenzi and Lambright (2001, 2005) and Basedau (2007), which treat institutionalization or its individual dimensions as predictors of democratic performance. Riedl (2008) has specifically analyzed why party systems in African

democracies formed and functioned so differently, relying on explanations such as the authoritarian legacies and the centrality of patronage. Ferree (2010), for its part, studied the origins of electoral volatility in Africa carrying out a macro-comparative analysis using pooled time-series cross-sectional data. Her analysis featured the size and configuration of politically salient ethnic groups as the foremost predictors of party system stabilization.

The present research aims at contributing to this recent debate about the sources of party system development[16] in Africa. To this end it will consider the main hypotheses that been tested in the study of other Third Wave party systems, but it will encompass new hypotheses and variables as well. Building on Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) we aggregated our hypotheses around six main explanations: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party system characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8) and electoral participation (H9). Each one will be extensively reviewed in Chapter IV, thus only a brief summary is provided now.

Ethnic fragmentation has been widely presented as an explanation for interparty competition in Africa, given that it is relevant for party identification and voting behavior (Salih 2001; Norris and Mattes 2003). It usually figures as the main social cleavage in Africa (Erdmann 2007a); and has been associated to lower levels of stability (Salih and Nordlund 2007). Hence, more fragment societies are expected to have lower levels of PSI (H1).

While it has been argued that party system characteristics such as electoral volatility will stabilize over time (Bartolini and Mair 1990), more recent studies focusing on Third Wave countries have demonstrated that the mere passing of years since (semi)democratic transition may not be enough to structure party systems (Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Riedl 2008). In the African context, mixed findings indicate that older democracies such as Botswana and Mauritius may have more stable party systems (Kuenzi and Lambright 2001, 462), but also that there is not a linear development over time (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008). Given this mixed scenario, two hypotheses are tested. One considers time as the number of years since (semi)democratic transition, while the other as the number of years the regime has remained unchanged. This second time perspective is relevant for while the majority of countries here analyzed may have introduced multiparty elections in the beginning of the 1990s; some have experienced important reversals in more recent years and have changed the nature of the regime (e.g. Lesotho, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Zambia). Thus, we anticipate that (H2) time as the number of years since (semi)democratic

[16] This wider label is used to encompass both the studies of party system stability and PSI.

transition will bear no significant effect on institutionalization, while (H3) the number of years a polity has stayed unchanged will increase the degree of PSI.

A number of institutional features can condition the nature of interparty competition. We consider two. The first is the existence of regulated funding of political parties and of rules encouraging finance transparency and accountability. According to Salih and Nordlund (2007, 21) political parties' development in the African continent has been strongly affected by the following variables: the extent to which parties are dependent on government resources; the impact of an underdeveloped private sector on civil society organizations' and on the relationship between civil society and political parties; the extent to which parties perceive state capture as a source of elite enrichment; the extent to which parties rely on the elite as resource-seekers and the weakness of African opposition parties. In the context of post-Communist European countries, Booth and Robbins (2010) confirmed that campaign finance and donation restrictions can effectively thwart PSI or stability. In this sense, we anticipate that PSI will be higher where provisions for public funding and party finance are more widely regulated (H4).

The second is the form of government. A few studies – Shugart and Carey (1992), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and van Cranenburgh (2011) – have called attention to the high risks of presidentialism, or of the concentration of high presidential powers for the stability of political institutions. In the extent to which these conclusions can be extrapolated to the analysis of party systems, they seem to suggest that the higher the presidential power the lower the degree of PSI (H5).

Endogenous features such as fragmentation and party institutionalization are also relevant to understand how party systems evolve. Bartolini and Mair (1990), Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005) and Ferree (2010) have demonstrated that an increased number of competing political parties increases party system instability, therefore PSI is likely to be lower where fragmentation is higher (H6). Party institutionalization, usually measured as the average party age (Roberts and Wibbels 1999; Tavits 2005), is also seen as a predictor of PSI variance with the assumption being that the older the political parties within a polity are, the higher the level of PSI (H7); this is expected to occur because political parties with stronger and more durable roots in society are, in principle, more capable of changing or defending the existing rules of competition.

Now considering economic explanations; according to Bartolini and Mair (1990) short-term factors such as the voters' perceptions of the economy influence vote shifts, thus, increasing party system instability. The majority of studies mentioned in this section tested

the effect of economic performance. For instance Tavits (2005) has found a negative effect of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on party system stabilization but a positive effect of inflation; whereas Ferree (2010) found no statistically significant effect of economic growth (measured as the growth rate of per capita income between the first election year and the year before the final election year) on electoral volatility in Africa. Otherwise the regression coefficient found by Ferree (2010) indicated that an increase in per capita income would actually decreased stability. We test the hypothesis that comes out as more consensual in the literature, that is, levels of PSI will decrease when a country's economy performs worst (H8).

Finally, changes in the levels of electoral participation, resulting from the extension of voting rights, emergence of new parties or improvements in balloting processes are also likely to affect party system development (Bartolini and Mair 1990). Where changes in electoral participation are higher, voter instability increases; hence PSI is expected to be lower (H9)

These nine hypotheses are tested with help of a regression analysis and the results are presented in Chapter IV (Section 4.4) following a more extensive review of each of these hypotheses.

The purpose of the third research question is to refine the story being told by the quantitative data analysis. To this end, we rely on a whole new set of methodological tools appropriate for smaller-N analysis. The cases are selected according to the *diverse case method*, which is known for maximizing cross-unit variance in key variables, as we explain later (Gerring 2004; Seawright and Gerring 2008). The case studies will be compared across two types of mechanisms: environmental and relational.

Environmental mechanisms include political institutions that emerged as relevant predictors of PSI in the quantitative analysis; but there is more. Building on the principles of historical institutionalism, attention is also given to *critical junctures* (Hogan 2006) in the countries' history and to how those moments shaped choices, cleavages and both formal and informal institutions. The path to democratic transition naturally emerges as a crucial moment with far reaching effects in the nature of competition of the upcoming political systems (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Riedl 2008). With regards to relational mechanisms, scholarly work consensually shows that neopatrimonial practices such as tribalism, clientelism and patronage, inherited from the pretransition period, remain the general framework within which African political institutions (van de Walle 1994; Bratton and van de Valle 1997; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Riedl 2008). Chapter V will open with a discussion of these mechanisms, before conducting the comparative case study analysis.

2.4 Methods and research design

To analyze the research questions, hypotheses and mechanisms of PSI a mixed methods design called *explanatory sequential design* (Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell 2006) is adopted. Before explaining in which step of the research the different methods – quantitative and qualitative – are combined, we explain next what is at stake when applying a mixed methods research design.

2.4.1 Mixed Methods: Definition and relevance

The term mixed methods design emerged in the 1980s[17] and roughly describes a distinct design in social sciences that mixes both quantitative and qualitative data collection in the same study (Creswell 2006b). It became increasingly influential since the 1990s, as scholars faced complex research problems that required answers «beyond simple numbers in a quantitative sense or words in a qualitative sense» (Creswell 2006b, 21). In fact, they were better assessed by a combination of both methods:

> A combination of both forms of data provides the most complete analysis of problems. Researchers situate numbers in the context and words of participants, and they frame the words of participants with numbers, trends, and statistical results. Both forms of data are necessary today (Creswell 2006b, 21).

Supporters of this design Fearon and Latin (2008, 759) sustain that mixed methods have the advantage of combining «the strength of large-N designs for identifying empirical regularities and patterns, and the strength of cases studies for revealing the causal mechanisms that give rise to political outcomes of interest». Without using the term mixed methods, Schmitter (2009) also praises the fact that more and more students are mixing qualitative and quantitative methods in the field of comparative politics. The most common practice, he states, frequently starts with:

> an initial large N comparison wielding relatively simple quantitative indicators to establish the broad parameters of association, followed by a small N analysis of carefully selected cases with sets of qualitative variables to search for specific sequences and complex interactions to

[17] Creswell et al. (2003) provide an extensive review of the historical foundations of mixed methods designs as well as a list of terms that elsewhere have been used to describe the combination of both quantitative and qualitative data in the same study (also in Creswell 2006a, 56-59).

> demonstrate causality (as well as the impact of neglected or 'accidental' factors) (Schmitter 2009, 36).

Previously, Ragin (1987) has demonstrated that the gap between qualitative and quantitative methods was partly artificial and that for certain questions and units of analysis it was possible to bring them together. Without denying that they entail different research strategies[18], Ragin (1987) sustains that they are also surprisingly complementary. Case studies can be extremely useful tools to assess whether the arguments proposed to explain empirical regularities are plausible (Fearon and Laitin 2008, 758). With this being said, mixed methods designs are more than just a combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods.

Creswell et al. (2003) argue that four principles must be considered in the selection of a mixed methods design, namely the «nature of data collection (e.g., whether data is gathered concurrently or sequentially), the priority each form of data receives in the research report (e.g., equal or unequal), and the place in the research process in which "mixing" of the data occurs such as in the data collection, analysis, or interpretation phase of inquiry» (Creswell et al. 2003, 212). From here, a more elaborate definition of mixed methods design is also provided:

> A *mixed methods study* involves the collection or analysis of both quantitative and/or qualitative data in a single study in which the data are collected concurrently or sequentially, are given a priority, and involve the integration of the data at one or more stages in the process of research (Creswell et al. 2003, 212).

From the combination of these four principles, six types of mixed methods designs are possible: *convergent parallel design*, *explanatory sequential design, exploratory sequential design, embedded design*, *transformative design and multiphase design* (Creswell 2006, 69-70). In each of these types there are different ways in which the quantitative and the qualitative strands of the study relate to each other[19]. Figure 2.1 provides a clear-cut example of quantitative and qualitative strands in a mixed methods study. As schematized, the research

[18] Quantitative or variable-oriented designs allow «testing propositions derived from general theories» and «assessing probabilistic relationships between features of social structures […]» while qualitative and case-oriented methods, «emerge from one of the central goals of comparative social science that is to explain and interpret the diverse experiences of societies, nations, cultures and other significant macro-social units» (Ragin 1987, 54-55).

[19] «A strand is a component of a study that encompasses the basic process of conducting quantitative or qualitative research: posing a question, collecting data, analyzing data, and interpreting results based on that data» and mixed methods studies includes at least one quantitative strand and one qualitative strand». (Creswell 2006, 63)

starts with a quantitative question that is researched with quantitative data and methods and proceeds to the qualitative strand where both the data and the methods applied to generate the results are qualitative (Creswell 2006, 63-64). The structure of our research is very much similar to this one. We explain how in the next section.

Figure 2.1 - Example of quantitative and qualitative strands in a mixed methods study



Source: Creswell (2006a, 64).

2.4.2 Applying an Explanatory Sequential Design: Embedded methods and techniques

In this study, data will be collected *sequentially*, that is, we start with the collection of quantitative data and then proceed with the qualitative data collection; *priority* is given to the quantitative data collection since it largely determines what gaps will be filled in with the qualitative data. The combination or *integration* of methods occurs from the onset of the study, in the definition of the research questions and throughout the process of analyzing and interpreting the results. Looking at the scheme displayed by Figure 2.2, the sequential design of the study is straightforward. Therefore the very nature of the research questions justifies the choice for an explanatory sequential design.

> The explanatory design is a mixed methods design in which the researcher begins by conducting a quantitative phase and follows up on specific results with a second phase [...]. The second, qualitative phase is implemented for the purposes of explaining the initial results in more depth, and it is due to this focus on explaining results that is reflected in the design name. [...] The overall purpose of this design is to use a qualitative strand to explain initial quantitative results [...] (Creswell 2006, 81-82).

The basic procedures of data collection and analysis are the following. To investigate the first research question, a rich amount of election data was compiled on countries from Sub-Saharan Africa. Results of lower house elections constituted the elemental data to compute the indicators of stable patterns of interparty competition and rootedness in society. However, to operationalize organizational continuity an intensive work of qualitative data collection was

conducted, since the type of information required was not systematized in any type of quantitative source. First, we searched for records of parties' splits[20] and mergers in monographs and encyclopedias that offered a description of political parties in Africa, as well as in the websites of political parties and non-profit organizations that supported or monitored the development of political parties in Africa[21]. Afterwards we weighted the electoral and legislative strength of all episodes of merger and split using the election data previously collected. In this sense, we relied both on quantitative (election results) and qualitative data, since written records of mergers and splits were translated into quantitative items.

To examine the hypotheses of PSI, a series of quantitative indicators were collected. For the most part it was possible to rely on information from free online data sources (e.g. World Bank and Polity IV; see Section 2.5); however some variables were created by us (e.g. shifts in voter turnout and average party age). All the data collected in this phase was then stored in a file, which featured, for each country*election: (i) all indicators of PSI, (ii) a composite index of PSI and (iii) all independent variables. The structure of this dataset is technically known as Time-series–cross-section (TSCS), which calls for the use of appropriate statistics methods – pooled time-series cross-section regression. This type of data is «characterized by repeated observations (often annual) on the same fixed political units (usually states or countries)» (Beck 2001, 271). In other words, it means that for each cross sectional unit (i) there is a given number of time periods or observations (T_i). For example, in our dataset there are 83 country*election observations for the 19 countries observed between 1966 and 2011.

Despite being very popular, TSCS data and analysis have been subjected to several criticisms (Blaikie 1993; Kittel 1999; Kittel 2006; Cartwright 2002). Cartwright (2002) has even called this a "crazy methodology" for placing the study of social and political phenomena at the country-level. In the same line, Kittel (2006) indentifies a few problems in the use of TSCS of data for statistical analysis, namely: «the insufficient robustness of findings from cross-country statistical analysis», the «cross-country differences at the level of the concepts, definitions or measurement», and finally the level of analysis itself. Social macro-phenomena, he sustains, are not aggregated from "typical" individual behavior, but are the result of a multidimensional interaction between individuals or between groups within a collectivity and, therefore, they are too dependent on specific social constellations and

[20] We counted as splits those situations resulting from factionalism, involving the main party cadres; therefore episodes of individual defection or switch in between parties were not counted as splits.

[21] Sources will be listed later but just to mention a few: Nohlen et al. (1999), the Encyclopedia of the South of Sahara, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) (http://www.eisa.org.za/EISA/about.htm) and party official websites when available.

historical situations to be able to produce predictable regularities at the macro-level (Kittel 2006, 651-666). Despite these shortcomings, Kittel does not think that scholars should stop using macro-quantitative comparative research designs. In his opinion the user of TSCS methods should be very careful and conscious about its limitations and specially use them for descriptive purposes as they «can be useful devices for *describing* non-evident regularities» (Kittel 2006, 662). In face of this controversial debate, it even makes more sense to complement quantitative data collection with qualitative data collection, and furthermore to interpret the results of the quantitative analysis in light of the evidence provided by cases studies.

The third question about the mechanisms of PSI offers this possibility as it discusses and complements the results of the quantitative level. In fact, although the quantitative analysis tests the main hypotheses suggested by the literature, there are variables which are not directly observed that can also account for divergent processes of PSI; for example, the extent of informal practices in politics and parties' strategies and expectations towards systemic opportunities and constraints. Indeed, only through in-depth case studies and qualitative data collection it is possible to assess the impact of such relational mechanisms on institutionalization. These variables are of chief concern for the purpose of our study as for several authors, including those that defend the institutional approach to the study of African politics, informal rules and procedures (e.g. clientelism and personalism) strongly shape the development of formal institutions in Africa (van Cranenburgh 2003; Posner and Young 2007; Riedl 2008).

As schematized in Figure 2.2, all these research activities are developed within the framework of an *explanatory sequential design* that starts with the measurement of PSI in Sub-Saharan Africa, proceeds with the test of the explanations of PSI (social structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party system characteristics, economic performance and electoral participation) in a pooled time-series cross-section regression and finally concludes with the discussion and the refining of statistical results in two case studies, where a series of fieldwork activities were conducted.

Figure 2.2 – Explanatory sequential design for the analysis of PSI



Source: authors' adaptation of Creswell (2006b, 64).

2.5 Selection of cases

> Returning to pears and apples are they comparable or not? Yes, they are comparable with respect to some of their properties, i.e., the properties they share, and non-comparable with respect to the properties they do not share. Thus, pears and apples are comparable as fruits, thing that can be eaten, as entities that grow in trees; but incomparable, e.g., in their respective shapes (Sartori 1991, 245-246).

This study is framed within the research field of Comparative Politics. At each strand of analysis it uses concepts applicable to more than one country with the aim of making larger inferences about the institutionalization of party systems in Africa. For the quantitative strand, the N used is larger since the main interest is to test the theoretical hypotheses about institutionalization in a concrete pool of countries. In the qualitative strand, the number of cases is necessarily lower given that the purpose is to refine the "story" being told by the data. In this sense, different research questions require different comparative methods. The following two parts of this section outline the comparative method used to select the cases for both the quantitative and the qualitative strand.

2.5.1 Case selection for the quantitative strand

To be selected for this strand of the analysis, Sub-Saharan African countries had to combine four criteria. Firstly; *continuous elections*, with a minimum threshold of three consecutive lower house elections, so we could capture some PSI variation over time. Secondly; *regular cycle of elections* that was not interrupted by episodes of political instability or major armed conflicts, since in those cases parties and party systems are profoundly affected (e.g. some parties are banned or dissolved and formal rules are frequently changed with the draft of new constitutional laws). Thirdly; *competitive elections*, meaning that: (a) more than one political party is allowed to run for elections; and (b) there are (minimum) legal provisions that guarantee political rights and civil liberties. Lastly, *full data on all indicators of PSI*, that is, no missing data in what regards the dependent variable. This fourth criterion is relevant because if PSI is our political outcome of interest we want to make sure that we have systematic data collected about it, so that the results can be applicable to all countries*years included in the analysis.

These four criteria were observed in the then 49 states of Sub-Saharan Africa for the election period between 1966[22] and 2011. For the most part we did not have problems in verifying them. Continuous, competitive and regular cycle of elections were possible to confirm with information from African Elections Database, IPU PARLINE Database on National Parliaments[23], Center for Systemic Peace (provides extensive data about major political conflicts in world) and National Election Commissions. To capture whether there were (minimal) legal provisions protecting political rights and civil liberties at the moment of the election, we used Freedom House time series ratings and selected countries with average scores below 5.0 (threshold for partly free), for the entire period of the analysis. The reason why we use average ratings instead of annual scores is because the latter have been subjected to some criticisms (Basedau 2007; Steiner 2012), concerning both the subjectivity of the assessments and a possible US-bias. According to Basedau (2007, 113-114) while Freedom House indices adequately show tendencies they might be less precise with regard to the exact values per year. In this sense, averages can be a good tool to handle this problem because, for each country, they capture the trend of development for the entire period analyzed. The fourth criteria mainly depended on the process of data collection and on how far it was possible to

[22] The Gambia introduced multiparty elections in 1966, Botswana in 1969, and Mauritius in 1976. For this reason the time frame starts in 1966. Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) also start from this year going up until 1999.
[23] Both projects have very useful and extensive archives about elections in Africa, and generally use official sources. African Elections Database covers all types of elections (the degree of detail varies across countries and elections) while the IPU Parline only parliamentary elections.

aggregate data for all elections per country. From the universe of 49 eligible countries, 30 were excluded because they did not meet one or more criteria, while 19 were included. The countries presented in Table 2.1 all have in common the fact that they share the four criteria specified for selection. Nevertheless, they vary in a few dimensions of electoral competition and party system format, as will be further detailed.

First, the number of multiparty elections covered for each country differs. The largest group of countries (includes Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania) is observed four times; Cape Verde, Ghana, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia are observed five times, Senegal, Benin and Sao Tome and Principe are observed six times and, finally, Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia are observed nine times[24]. Botswana, Mauritius and The Gambia, the countries with the highest number of elections covered, introduced multiparty elections almost immediately after gaining independence from Britain, in 1966, 1968 and 1965 respectively. Nonetheless, while the first two remained uninterrupted multiparty democracies until the present day The Gambia experienced a few steps backs. For 29 years (1965-1994) the country had a multiparty setting but, in 22 July 1994, a coup d'état led by Colonel Yahya Jammeh ousted President Dawda Jawar from power. In the aftermath, the 1970 Constitution was suspended, military rule installed and political parties banned until 2001, when democratic practices were readopted (Saine 2002, 168-169).

Differently from these three cases; in the generality of African countries multiparty elections were introduced in the beginning of the 1990s, as result of major changes in the international order, namely the collapse of the communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the end of the Cold War and the start of the Third Wave of democratization. At the domestic level, the economic and the political failure of the one-party states and the increasing contestation of civil society groups and masses (national conferences in Togo, Benin, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Niger and Republic of Congo and union mobilization in Zambia) also contributed to open the window of multipartism (Bratton and

[24] This variance makes our TSCS dataset unbalanced (Wooldridge 2009). Unbalanced datasets – i.e., in which we do not have the same number of observations across all units – are very common in social sciences, since it is very difficult to guarantee that the same group of units or individuals is followed across time without any lost. Since all consecutive, competitive elections were covered for each country we cannot speak of missing observations. Nevertheless, because the number of multiparty elections held can have an effect on the level of PSI, some statistical precautions must be taken into consideration (e.g. inclusion of lagged dependent variables in the regression model). This point shall be discussed again in Chapter IV.

van de Walle 1997; Chabal 1998; Diamond and Plattner 1999; Young 2012)[25]. In fact, for decades since independence, African peoples lived under civil or military authoritarian regimes, in which political participation and pluralism were severely repressed. Some countries also experienced major episodes of armed conflicts (protracted civil wars or interstate wars) in the immediate postcolonial period. It was only in the late 1980s' that most African leaders decided to adopt political liberalization measures that would ultimately lead to the realization of the first multiparty elections, ever or in decades, in the country's history. In fact, by the end of 1997, only four out of the then 48 states of Sub-Saharan Africa had not held multiparty elections (Bratton 1999). Despite the different moments in which multiparty elections were introduced, all those that have been observed within this sample are continuous, that is, no major political instability affected their natural cycle. In the case of Nigeria, which is particular in this regard, six elections occurred since the first multiparty elections of 1992 (1998, 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011); however because the 1998 balloting was annulled, as all parties participating were affiliated with the government and true opposition was prevented from participating, only the elections held between 1999 and 2011 were considered. Furthermore this decision was supported by the fact that the 1999 elections were held under a completely different political framework[26], in which new political parties emerged and a new Constitution was drafted (Falola and Heaton 2008; Omotola 2010).

Second, the overall status of civil rights and political liberties (here measured by the *Freedom House* ratings) differs substantially across countries. As Table 2.1 displays, the highest scores (= less free democratic regimes) are found in Burkina Faso (4.2), Nigeria (4.1), Guinea-Bissau (4.0), Tanzania (3.9) and Zambia (3.8), whilst the lowest scores (= freer democratic regimes) are found in Cape Verde (1.7), South Africa (1.7), Mauritius (1.8), Sao Tome and Principe (1.8), Botswana (2.2) and Benin (2.2). The remaining eight countries score between 2.6 and 3.7. Seven countries are in the group of free democracies, which are characterized by higher degrees of civil rights and political liberties, while 12 countries are in the group of partly free democracies. It is possible to say that, in the long run, only a limited number of countries display a stable and unidirectional development towards democratization (e.g. Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana and Seychelles). In fact, although maintaining

[25] From a different angle Doorenspleet (2004) argues that transitions to democracy must be thought of in light of structural dimensions such as the state's level of economic growth, whether there are democratic neighbor countries, and the state's role in the world-system.

[26] The Provisional Ruling Council promulgated a new constitution, before the May 29, 1999 and included provisions for a bicameral legislature: the National Assembly, consisting of a 360-member House of Representatives and a Senate with 109 members. The executive branch and the President retained strong federal powers.

the multiparty elections basis, the majority of countries here analyzed either experienced important setbacks (e.g. Guinea-Bissau, The Gambia and Nigeria) or revealed few improvements from the onset of the democratic transition as far as civil liberties and political rights are concerned (e.g. Mozambique, Zambia, Burkina Faso and Malawi).

Third, on average 67% of the electorate cast their votes. In the majority of countries (N = 12), turnout is lower than average, with the most extreme cases being Senegal (49,3%), Burkina Faso (49,7%) and Mozambique (59,1%). In Nigeria (61,4%), Ghana (61,8%), Benin (62,7%), Zambia (63,2%), Lesotho (65,0%), Tanzania (65,3%), Botswana (66,0%), The Gambia (66,8%) and Cape Verde (62,7%) elections mobilize about 2/3 of the electorate. Conversely, higher rates of political mobilization are found in Mauritius (83,8%), Seychelles (83,6%), South Africa (82,5%), Namibia (77,9%), Malawi (73,0%), Guinea-Bissau (70,3%) and Sao Tome and Principe (69,2%).

Fourth, there is some variance in the party system formats, even though "dominant" is the most widespread type. According to Sartori (1976) dominant party systems are those in which a single party wins more than 50% of the seats in three consecutive elections[27]. Out of the 19 countries selected, ten fall into this category: Botswana, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa and Tanzania. Other cases such as Ghana (where NDC won more than 50% of the seats in two consecutive elections: 1992 and1996), Zambia (from 1991 to 2011) and Senegal (from 1983 to 1998) have had experiences of party system dominance but recently changed towards two-party and multiparty frameworks.

Cape Verde, otherwise, had a classical two-party system for years, but recently acquired a dominant feature. Until 2006, the dynamics between PAICV and MpD perfectly fitted into Mair's (1990) definition of a two-party system as a system in which two parties of equivalent size compete for office and where each has more or less equal chance of winning sufficient electoral support to gain an executive monopoly (Mair 1990 420-422). The MpD won the 1991 and the 1995 elections; while the PAICV won the 2001 and the 2006 elections; however, in 2011, the PAICV was again the winner of the election with over 50% of the seats. Since the PAICV won three consecutive elections, the party system gained a dominant mark.

[27] Other definitions are proposed by Doorenspleet (2003) who states that is possible to speak about a dominant party after a single re-election; and (Ware 1996) for whom a predominant party system is one in which a party regularly wins enough parliamentary seats to control government alone.

Table 2.1 – Political profile of the 19 Sub-Saharan African countries selected

#	Country	Election years	No. of elections	FH scores[(a)] (average)	Turnout[(b)] (average)	Party system format	Main Parties
1	Benin	1991, 1995, 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011	6	2.2	62,7	Multiparty	PRD - Parti du Renouveau Democratique; RB - Renaissance du Bénin; PSD - Parti Social Democrate; FARD-Alafia - Front d'Action pour le Renouveau la Démocratie et le Développement; ADD - Alliance pour une Dynamique Democratique
2	Botswana	1969, 1974,1979,1984, 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009	9	2.2	66,0	Dominant	BDP - Botswana Democratic Party; BNF - Botswana National Front
3	Burkina Faso	1992,1997, 2002, 2007	4	4.2	49,7	Dominant	CDP - Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès; ADF-RDA - Alliance pour Démocratie et la Fédération-Rassemblement Démocratique Africain; PDP-PS - Parti pour la Démocratie et le Progrès-Parti Socialiste
4	Cape Verde	1991, 1995, 2001, 2006, 2011	5	1.7	67,2	Two party - Dominant	PAICV - Partido Africano da Independência de Cabo Verde; MpD - Movimento para a Democracia
5	Gambia, The	1966, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007	9	3.7	66,8	Dominant	PPP - People's Progressive Party; APRC - Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction
6	Ghana	1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008	5	2.6	61,8	Quasi Dominant - Two party	NDC - National Democratic Congress; NPP - New Patriotic Party
7	Guinea-Bissau	1994, 1999, 2004, 2008	4	4.0	70,3	Multiparty	PAIGC - Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde; PRS - Partido da Renovação Social; RGB-MB - Resistência da Guiné-Bissau - Movimento Bafatá
8	Lesotho	1993, 1998, 2002, 2007	4	3.3	65,0	Dominant	LCD - Lesotho Congress for Democracy; BNP - Basotho National Party; ABC - All Basotho Convention
9	Malawi	1994, 1999, 2004, 2009	4	3.3	73,0	Multiparty	UDF - United Democratic Front; MCP - Malawi Congress Party; Aford - Alliance for Democracy; DPP - Democratic Progressive Party
10	Mauritius	1976, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010	9	1.8	83,8	Multiparty	MMM - Mouvement Militant Mauricien; MSM - Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien; PT - Parti Travailliste; PMSD - Parti Mauricien Social Democrate
11	Mozambique	1994, 1999, 2004, 2009	4	3.5	59,1	Dominant	Frelimo - Frente de Libertação de Moçambique; Renamo - Resistência Nacional Moçambicana

Table 2.1 – Political profile of the 19 Sub-Saharan African countries selected (continuation)

#	Country	Election years	No. of elections	FH scores[(a)] (average)	Turnout[(b)] (average)	Party system format	Main Parties
12	Namibia	1989, 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009	5	2.4	77,9	Dominant	SWAPO - South-West African People's Organization; DTA - Democratic Turnhalle Alliance; CoD - Congress of Democrats
13	Nigeria	1999, 2003, 2007, 2011	4	4.1	61,4	Dominant	PDP - People's Democratic Party; ANPP - All Nigeria People's Party (previously APP - All People's Party); AD - Alliance for Democracy
14	Sao Tome and Principe	1991, 1994, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2010	6	1.8	69,2	Multiparty	MLSTP-PSD - Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe-Partido Social Democrata; PCD-GR - Partido da Convergência Democrática - Grupo de Reflexão; ADI - Acção Democrática Independente
15	Senegal	1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2001, 2007	6	3.3	49,3	Dominant - Multiparty	PS - Parti Socialiste du Sénégal; PDS - Parti Démocratique Sénégalais
16	Seychelles	1993, 1998, 2002, 2007, 2011	5	3.1	83,6	Dominant	PL - Parti Lepep (previously SPPF - Seychelles People's Progressive Front); DP - Democratic Party; SNP - Seychelles National Party
17	South Africa	1994, 1999, 2004, 2009	4	1.7	82,5	Dominant	ANC - African National Congress; DA - Democratic Alliance; IFP - Inkatha Freedom Party
18	Tanzania	1995, 2000, 2005, 2010	4	3.9	65,3	Dominant	CCM - Chama Cha Mapinduzi; Chadema - Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo; CUF – Civic United Front (Chama cha Wananchi)
19	Zambia	1991, 1996, 2001, 2006, 2011	5	3.8	63,2	Dominant - Multiparty	MMD - Movement for Multiparty Democracy; PF - Patriotic Front; UPND - United Party for National Development

Source: Author's own elaboration with data from: [(a)] Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org). The average is calculated for the period of analysis of each country (e.g. for Zambia, the average is for the period from 1991 to 2011). Countries rated between 1.0 and 2.5 are "free" and countries rated higher than 2.5 and lower than 5.0 are "partly free". The highest the score the least free is the democratic regime in a given country. [(b)] International IDEA Voter Turnout Website (http://www.idea.int/vt/). The average turnout for the entire sample is 67,3%.

In the remaining cases we find two types of multiparty systems. The first type depicts situations of two-and-a-half-party systems where two major parties, with more or less equal size coexist with a smaller party (Blondel 1968)This is the case of Guinea- Bissau where the PAIGC and the PRS (the major parties) coexist with RGB-MB or other minor parties/alliances; or of Senegal since 1998 where the PS and the PDS are the main parties but are occasionally challenged by minor parties with whom they enact electoral coalitions. The second type is one in which there are many relevant parties with real chances of winning elections but no party comes close to a majority status, over the long run (Doorenspleet 2003, 175). We find this second type in Benin, Malawi, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and Zambia (since 2011).

Now let us observe the reasons why 30 countries had to be excluded from this study. Their profile is presented in Table 2.2. The largest group (N = 17) is composed of countries that: (i) score higher than 5.0 in the Freedom House ratings; and/or (ii) have experienced major episodes of armed conflict. Within this group, five countries are excluded for both reasons – Central African Republic, Republic of Congo, Burundi, Sierra Leone and Angola.

In Central African Republic civil violence started in 2003, when former Army Chief of Staff Francois Bozize launched a coup attempt that culminated in the overthrow of President Patasse and the takeover of the capital. Despite the attempts of conflict resolution armed clashes are recurrent (Crisis Group 2008). In the Republic of Congo, after the multiparty elections of 1992 that marked the regime change, the country experienced a civil war that opposed partisans of Pascal Lissouba, the first democratically elected president, to partisans of Denis Sassou-Nguesso (elected in the 1997). The war ended in 1999 with the signature of agreements between the government and part of the rebel groups (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999; Magnusson and Clark 2014). In Burundi, ethnic warfare involving Tutsis and Hutus broke out after the 1993 elections and lasted until 2000 when the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed. This agreement and subsequent cease-fire agreements paved the way for the holding of democratic elections in 2005 (Crisis Group 2007). Finally, Angola experienced a problematical transition to peace and democracy, which only succeeded in 2002, following twenty seven years of civil war. The conflict opposed the government party *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA) to the *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), and ended with the signature of Luena Memorandum of Understanding after the failed attempt of the first conflict resolution agreement – the Bicesse Accords (Almeida and Sanches 2011).

Table 2.2 – Countries not included in the analysis

FH scores higher than 5.5 and/or experienced major armed conflicts in between electoral periods (N = 17)			**Did not held three consecutive multi-party elections (N = 7)**			**Missing data (N = 6)**	
Country	**FH scores (average)**	**Description**	**Country**	**FH scores (average)**	**Description**	**Country**	**FH scores (average)**
Central African Republic	4.7	Civil war between 2003-2007	Sierra Leone	3.3	Two multiparty elections held	Mali	2.5
Congo (Brazzaville)	5.0	Civil war between 1992-1999	Liberia	3.6	Two multiparty elections held	Madagascar	3.4
Ethiopia	5.0		Uganda	3.6	Two multiparty elections held	Comoros	4.3
Togo	5.2		Sudan	7.0	Only one multi-party election held	Niger	4.2
Djibouti	5.2		Eritrea	6.1	No elections held	Gabon	4.6
Congo (Kinshasa)	5.3		Somalia	6.8	No elections held	Kenya	4.6
Chad	5.4		Swaziland	5.4	Elections without multiparty competition		
Cameroon	5.5						
Rwanda	5.5						
Guinea	5.5						
Cote d'Ivoire	5.5						
Mauritania	5.6						
Burundi	5.6	Civil war between 1993-2005					
Zimbabwe	5.6						
Angola	5.9	Civil war between 1992-2002					
Equatorial Guinea	6.7						
Sudan	7.0						

Source: Author's own elaboration, using online data from *Freedom House* (http://www.freedomhouse.org) and *The Centre for Systemic Peace* (http://www.systemicpeace.org/).

The second largest group (N = 7) is composed of countries that did not record a minimum of three multiparty elections. Eritrea did not held any election after the 23-25 April 1993 Independence Referendum**.** Somalia fragmented and engaged in civil war following the departure of President Siad Barre in early 1991. Elections never took place and since 2000 a transitional parliament has been responsible for nominating the president. Swaziland held elections between 1964 and 2011, although only the first three were multiparty elections; since 1978 elections are organized, but they are non-partisan.

Uganda has organized four parliamentary elections and two referendums, since the 1994 Constituent Assembly Election. Until 2005, political parties could not compete in the elections, not only due to a legal rule but also due to the citizens' wish. Indeed, in the 2000 referendum, when questioned about the nature of the regime, 90,7% of the citizens voted in favor of a "movement political system" instead of a multiparty regime. Five years later, a new referendum took place, and to the question «Do you agree to open up the political space to allow those who wish to join different organizations/parties to do so to compete for political power?» 92,4% responded "yes". The following two elections – 2006 and 2011 elections – were organized under multiparty framework. Sierra Leone and Liberia have only held two elections since the end of the civil wars in 2001 and 2003, respectively (see African Elections Database).

Lastly, there is a group of six countries that could have been included in this study as they complied with the first three criteria stipulated for case selection, but had to be excluded due to the lack of data. Indeed, for the cases of Mali, Madagascar, Comoros, Niger, Gabon and Kenya despite the multiple contacts established and the intensive search developed, it was impossible to obtain the official map of results for all elections. More specifically, the data missing was related to the number of votes per party at the national level. Without this information it is not possible to create several indicators of PSI, namely electoral volatility, votes of new parties and the share of votes of merging and splitting political parties.

2.5.2 Case selection for the qualitative strand

How do we define the qualitative path of analysis? Which criteria should be used to select the cases for in-depth study? These are the most fundamental questions in the transition from the quantitative to the qualitative strand, and answers to them are far from consensual. For Fearon and Laitin (2008), the usual approaches of selecting the cases that confirm or infirm the theories and predicted causal mechanisms or that suit a preferable narrative can have

important costs, insofar as they may possibly sacrifice representativeness and introduce bias in the analysis. In this sense, they consider that the most reasonable and unbiased way to select the cases in the context of mixed methods design is to sort all eligible cases numerically, and then to use a random number generator to select which one(s) will be studied (Ibid., 761-776). In our view although this is a guarantee of neutrality it may also sacrifice important research goals such as theory building. Seawright's and Gerring's (2008) *diverse case method* can be a good alternative here.

This method's primary objective is to achieve maximum variance along relevant dimensions, and with a wider range of variation representativeness is increased in the sample of cases chosen. In this sense «the diverse case method probably has stronger claims to representativeness than any other small-N sample (including the typical case)» (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 301). It requires:

> selection of a set of cases – at minimum, two – which are intended to represent the full range of values characterizing X, Y, or some particular X/Y relationship. The investigation is understood to be exploratory (hypothesis seeking) when the researcher focuses on X or Y and confirmatory (hypothesis testing) when he or she focuses on a particular X/Y relationship (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 300).

As previously mentioned in this strand of the analysis we seek to discuss and to refine the findings delivered by the quantitative strand; this means that the research carried out here is confirmatory instead of exploratory. Indeed, although new dimensions are introduced in the analysis, their purpose is more to discuss and fill the gaps left open by the previous strand than to raise or seek new hypotheses.

Mozambique and Zambia are the two cases selected for the qualitative strand. This choice was based on several factors (see Table 2.3). First, early measurements of PSI suggested that these two countries could be potentially good for in-depth comparative analysis. Even though they were selected in a preliminary stage, mainly to allow fieldwork activities to take place in the end of 2012 and early 2013, further quantitative analysis continued to corroborate our choice. In fact, as the following chapter reveals, both cases illustrate an asymmetric party system development. While the former is a clear example of high and overinstitutionalization, that is, of high levels of PSI occurring at the cost of low electoral participation and democraticity; the latter exemplifies weakly and inadequately

institutionalized party systems, where the lower levels of institutionalization are accompanied by (slightly) better degrees of participation and democratization.

Table 2.3 – Mozambique and Zambia: historical, political and economic overview[28]

	Mozambique	**Zambia**
Date of Independence (former colonial power)	25 June 1975 (Portugal)	24 October 1964 (Britain)
Nature of post-colonial regime	One-party rule (Frelimo): 1975-1992	Multiparty: 1964-1972 One-party rule (UNIP): 1972-1991
Armed Conflict	Colonial war: 1964-1975 Civil war between Frelimo and Renamo: 1977-1992	No episodes of armed conflict
Multiparty general elections	1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009	1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011
Form of government	Semipresidential*	Presidential
Electoral system	Proportional Representation for parliament Two round majority for presidency	First-past-the-post for parliament Simple majority for presidency
Ethnic fragmentation[1]	0.7	0.8
Party system format	Dominant (Frelimo): 1994-to the present	Dominant (MMD): 1991 - 2011 Multiparty (PF, MMD, UPND): 2011- to the present
FH status[2]	3.5: 1994-2009 Partly free	3.8: 1991-2011 Partly free
GDP growth[3]	7,5% : 1994-2009	6,1: 1991-2011

Sources: [1]Alesina et al. (2003); [2]Freedom House (http://www.freedomhouse.org); [3]World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/).

*Semipresidentialism with a strong President who is also the Head of Government.

Second, these two cases are chosen due to the nature of the party system. Until very recently both Mozambique and Zambia were dominant party systems (Zambia changed to multiparty system in 2011), despite operating in rather different ways. In Mozambique, the Frelimo, an anti-colonial movement founded in 1962, has been the major political party in the political arena since the country's independence in 1975. Ever since, Frelimo has governed the destinies of the country without ever being removed from power by any other political force. Between 1975 and1992 it was the sole legitimate political force, ruling the country under a Marxist-Leninist ideology (adopted in 1977) that allowed no differences of race and ethnicity, repressed traditional authorities and prohibited the existence of other political forces

[28] Mozambique's and Zambia's Maps are featured in Appendix B.

(Newitt 2002, 196-198). The nature of the regime was, from the outset, contested by the neighboring countries and by the Renamo, a guerrilla movement formed in the aftermath of the independence with the support of the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organization. The Renamo started a civil war against the Frelimo government in 1977 which ended in 4th of October 1992 with the signature of the General Peace Agreement (GPA) in Rome (Rupiya 1998). Through the inclusion of seven Protocols, the GPA established the rules of ceasefire and disarmament, reinstated the changes predicted in the constitutional amendment of 1990, namely the lift of the ban on political parties and the protection of a series of political and civil rights, and included guidelines for the first multiparty elections in 1994. Despite these changes, the outcome of the elections brought no change to the political system: the Frelimo won all elections between 1994 and 2009 (national and sub-national: local and provincial), whereas the Renamo and other minor political parties have been systematically voted for opposition.

Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, became independent from the United Kingdom on 24 October 1964. Since then and up until 1991 it was ruled by Kenneth Kaunda and his United National Independence Party (UNIP); first in a multiparty setting, and from 1972 onwards under a one-party rule. In 1991, Zambia became the first English-speaking African country to re-introduce multiparty politics. The general elections of 1991 signaled the first alternation in government in the story of the country, giving electoral victory to Frederick Chiluba and his MMD (Krennerich 1999b, 939-940). Between 1991 and 2011 the country had a dominant party system in which the MMD was the main political contender. However, after two decades of dominance the MMD, which had been losing votes since 2001, was peacefully replaced by the PF in the following of 2011 general elections (see Table 2.3).

While in Mozambique Frelimo's electoral and parliamentary strength went on increasing election after election, in Zambia MMD's dominance decreased election after election at the same time as the party was challenged by internal contestation, namely in 2001. In this year, several defections and splits occurred within the MMD as a reaction to President Fredrick Chiluba intent of running to a third term. The Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD), the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), the Heritage Party (HP) and the PF are some examples of parties that were formed by senior party cadres and government members of the MMD (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003; Momba 2003; Momba 2006).

The third and final reason to compare Zambia and Mozambique is the variation in a set of structural and institutional characteristics that are partly assessed in the quantitative analysis of the sources of PSI and which will potentially benefit the analysis of the

environmental and relational mechanisms of PSI. As Table 2.3 demonstrates, Zambia and Mozambique are distinguished by colonial background (Portugal vs. Britain), type of electoral system (proportional vs. majoritarian) and form of government (semipresidential vs. presidential). But there are also important similarities as they are two partly free democracies, characterized by high levels of ethnic, religious and linguistic fragmentation, and that in recent years have experienced positive rates of GDP growth.

2.6 Data collection and sources

This section describes the sources and the type of data collected at each stage of the research. Concerning the first research question, to compute the nine indicators that measure the PSI index we relied on the results of lower house elections in terms of vote share per party at the national level for the time frame between 1966 and 2011. In Appendix A the list of sources consulted for each country*election is provided. National Election Commissions' websites were our primary source since they provide official results, which are, in principle, more reliable and detailed than those found in other sources. However, in some countries, the National Election Commission did not have a website or when it had the information made available was very scarce (results were provided only for the last lower house election). Therefore, a series of non-official sources were also consulted, namely: African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/); Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (www.eisa.org.za), IPU PARLINE Database on National Parliaments (http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp) and Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. There are some differences in the quality of the data collected per country. For the most part the results were available only at the national level, while the subnational distribution of votes and seats was frequently missing. Moreover, for the same country, it was possible to find comprehensive information and detailed data on some elections and less detail for others.

Still regarding the first research question, a series of secondary sources were consulted to measure the organizational continuity of the party systems. In fact, before using electoral data to compute the indicators of electoral and legislative strength of merging and splitting groups, it was necessary to identify and count the number of mergers and splits occurred in the years between elections, per country. For this purpose, the following sources were valuable: *Political Handbook of the World* (all years from 1975 to 2000), *Africa South of the Sahara* (all years from 2000 to 2011) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa

(www.eisa.org.za). Occasionally, party's websites were also consulted either to obtain more data or as a way of cross-checking the data collected.

For the second research question, the data was mainly retrieved from free online data sources. In H1, *time* is measured as the number of years since the first multiparty election; in H2, *polity durability* expresses the number of years since the last change in the authority/regime characteristics; the data is from Polity IV (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). In H3, *turnout change* is the measured by the difference in turnout in two consecutive lower house elections; the data is from IDEA Voter Turnout Database (http://www.idea.int/vt/). In H4, *ethnicity* is measured with Alesina et al. (2003) Fractionalization Data (http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1).

Presidential form of government (H5) is measured by a dummy variable where 1= presidentialism and 0=otherwise. Countries were classified according to Shugart's (1999) and Elgie's (2004) definitions of parliamentary, semipresidential and presidential regimes. *Fragmentation* (H6) is measured by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP); party institutionalization is measured by *party age* (H7) as Mainwaring and Scully (1995). *Party funding/finance* (H8) is measured by an additive index that varies between 0= weakly regulated party funding/finance and 11= highly regulated party funding/finance. The data is from IDEA's Political Finance Database (http://www.idea.int/political-finance/index.cfm). Economic performance (H9) is measured by *GDP* (as annual growth rate) and *inflation* (as annual percentage of average consumer prices), which were retrieved from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/) and the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database (http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm), respectively.

Finally, the third research question, on the mechanisms of PSI, is mostly researched with qualitative data – namely archival and documental resources and semi-structured interviews – collected during fieldwork in Mozambique and Zambia. In both cases, the research activities were financed by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), the Gulbenkian Foundation Fellowships for PhD Students and the Institute of Social Sciences – University of Lisbon. Moreover, they were developed in coordination with Universities in both countries, with which it was possible to establish an affiliation link as Visiting Researcher. Fieldwork in Mozambique lasted three months (September, October and November of 2012) and benefited from the support of the researchers at the Center for

African Studies and at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration from University Eduardo Mondlane (www.uem.mz/). The main results were:

- Semi-structured interviews: from the total of 48 contacts realized, 35 resulted in interviews, thus the response rate was about 73%, which is frankly positive. Twenty political elites (from 11 different political parties); ten members/leaders of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs); three journalists and three academics were interviewed in total[29] (see Table 2.4). This sample resulted from a snowball process following the initial contacts provided by researchers and colleagues at the University[30]. Additional contacts were gathered during two meetings co-organized by the Mozambican delegations of the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) (http://www.nimd.org/page/mozambique) and the Association of European Parliamentarians with Africa (AWEPA) (http://www.awepa.org/programmes/mozambique-programme/)[31].
- Documental and archival research consisted in: 1) collecting and analyzing all relevant political news published by *Jornal de Notícias*[32] two months before and after the elections of 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009, in order to identify the main issues of interparty competition in election times; 2) assembling party laws and ideological documents; the Center of Documentation of the Center for African Studies had comprehensive data (e.g. manifestos, statuses, ideological programs) for the parties that participated in the first multiparty election, although it was impossible to find documents for the subsequent years, as the majority of parties do not have organized archives or even an office; in fact, Frelimo was the only party providing longitudinal party documents; 3) collecting further electoral statistics and legislation, which were largely available at the Center of Documentation of the National Election Commission.

[29] Interview Guide is in Appendix C and full list of interviewees in Appendix D.

[30] The author would like to thank the availability and dedication of Professors Teresa Cruz e Silva, Isabel Casimiro and Carlos Serra from the Center of African Studies, and Professors José Jaime Macuane, João Pereira and Domingos do Rosário from the Department of Political Science and Public Administration and Claudia Almeida, friend and colleague for the unconditional support and practical advices.

[31] Over twenty political parties participated at the National Conference about Peace Consolidation and Political Parties /*Conferência nacional sobre a consolidação da paz e os partidos políticos*, held 23-24 October 2012 in Maputo, and the Round Table 2013 Local Elections – Legal issues, opportunities and challenges for the political parties/*Eleições Autárquicas de 2013 Questões Legais, Oportunidades e Desafios para os Partidos Políticos*, which took place on May 2013.

[32] This newspaper was available at the Historical Archives of Mozambique.

Fieldwork in Zambia had the backing of the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Zambia (http://www.unza.zm/) and lasted four months (March, April, May and June of 2013) for two main reasons. In the first place we did not have any previous contact with any researcher there (apart from the formal contacts established to get affiliation as Visiting Researcher), thus we anticipated more challenges, since the political landscape was rather unfamiliar and ways to get interviewees more uncertain. In the second place, there were some pending interviews in Mozambique that we wanted to conduct if there was a possibility for a second round. In this sense we spent ten additional days in Mozambique. The results of the fieldwork in Zambia were also satisfactory:

- Semi-structured interviews: from the total of 41 contacts made, 28 led to interviews; the response rate was only slightly lower (68%) than in Mozambique (see Table 2.4). The interviews were distributed as follows: twelve political elites (of 12 different political parties); eleven members/leaders of NGOs; three journalists and two academics[33]. The sampling process was also snowball.
- As in Mozambique documental and archival research consisted in: 1) analyzing political news published in the background of the 1991, 1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011 general elections; the newspapers covered were *Post* and *Daily Mail*[34]; 2) assembling party laws and manifestos; which was quite a challenge; exception made to the main political parties (MMD, PF, UPND, UNIP); and, finally, 3) collecting complementary electoral statistics and legislation at the Electoral Commission of Zambia.

Table 2.4 – Interviews conducted in Zambia and Mozambique

Groups	Mozambique	Zambia
Political Elites (Parties' Presidents /Vice-Presidents/Senior cadres)	20	12
Members/Leaders of NGOs and religious groups	10	11
Journalists	3	3
Academics	3	2
Total (N)	***35***	***28***
Number of contacts (N)	***48***	***41***
Response rate (%)	***73***	***68***

Having layout the overall structure of this study we move on to the quantitative strand and address the first research question in the following chapter.

[33] Interview Guide is in Appendix C and full list of interviewees in Appendix D.
[34] These were available at the National Archives of Zambia, and at the Library of the National Assembly.

CHAPTER III – MEASURING PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized? This question has already been answered in the past. We argue, however, that the type of measurement used for that purpose does not fully tap into the different arenas and properties of systemic institutionalization. Thus, throughout Chapter III this question is approached once more, taking into account the application of a partly new multidimensional measure of institutionalization to national party systems of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries which have held consecutive and competitive lower house elections between 1966 and 2011. The chapter is organized in four sections. Section 3.1 outlines the theoretical and methodological basis of our measure – specifying, once more, the levels, arenas, dimensions and elements of this concept. Section 3.2 features the framework for analysis which is inspired in the works of Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007), and that consists of three structural dimensions measured along eleven indicators. Hence, the first dimension – stable patterns of interparty competition – is measured by electoral volatility, legislative seats' volatility, total percentage of votes won by new parties, alternation in government and share of seats for the most voted party. The second dimension – stable roots in society – is measured by the share of seats for parties founded in 1960, 1970 and 1980 and by the share of seats for independent candidates. Lastly the third dimension – organizational continuity – is measured by the legislative and the electoral strength of merging and splitting political parties. Section 3.3 presents the descriptive results for each indicator of PSI and Section 3.4 displays an additive index which summarizes the results of our findings and reveals trend of PSI across country and time as well as its different outcomes. Finally, Section 3.5 compares our findings to the ones produced by other measures of PSI that have also been applied to the study of party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa.

3.1 Party system institutionalization: The framework for analysis

The first research question – "to what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?" – is not a new one. In fact, it has been answered in the past by Welfling (1973) and more recently by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Basedau (2007), Lindberg (2007) and Riedl (2008). These studies are relevant since they have tested existing frameworks and have put forward new dimensions and indicators to compare party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Even if focusing on different time periods and covering different sets of countries they have disclosed important features about how party systems in contemporary Africa work, both from a longitudinal and from a comparative perspective (see Chapter I). Furthermore, they

have revealed interesting aspects regarding the relationship between institutionalization, time and democratization. More precisely, they have noted that time *per se* may not lead to higher levels of institutionalization given that some African party systems seem to be institutionalized from the onset of multipartism or seem to develop in a non-linear fashion. Despite the clear contribute of these studies; they still reflect some of the dilemmas that have permeated this field of studies since the 1960s. Indeed, a conflict between the levels, the elements and the dimensions of institutionalization is still visible, and it goes beyond the studies just mentioned. In what follows, we briefly recover this debate to explain how we tackled each of these dilemmas and to justify the proposal of a new measurement of institutionalization. Later we, argue about its advantages *vis-à-vis* other measurements.

3.1.1 Theoretical and methodological foundations

The levels and arenas of analysis. In *Parties and Party Systems* (1976) Sartori provided one of the most enduring and often-cited definitions of parties and party systems. He defined political parties as functional, representative and expressive agencies that develop a set of tasks (of social and institutional nature) linking the citizens to a government (Sartori 1976, 24-28) and party systems, as «the system of interactions resulting from interparty competition» (Sartori 1976, 44). This distinction is highly relevant for political analysis and particularly for this study. As previously noted, in several studies that follow Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) seminal framework, party institutionalization and PSI are usually measured interchangeably; that is, we find dimensions and indicators that measure both the institutionalization of parties (e.g. party organization) and of party systems (e.g. stability of interparty competition) in the same model. Kuenzi and Lambright's (2001) adaptation of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) is a clear example of this situation. To measure stable roots in society they use a systemic indicator – share of seats for parties founded until 1970 – combined with an individual one – average age of parties. This is relevant if one takes for granted that in a competitive party system which is institutionalized, there is stability and continuity among political alternatives, or that individual political parties are likely to be institutionalized where there are stable patterns of party support (Randall and Svåsand 2002). Nevertheless, these inferences from the ecological to the individual level, and vice versa, cannot be assumed without appropriate research. Indeed, party institutionalization may either be mutually supportive or at least compatible with PSI or be at odds with it. In fact, there are cases of continuity between these two poles, but there are also cases of *uneven* party system

development (Randall and Svåsand 2002b). The relationship between the institutionalization of individual parties and PSI is, thus, highly complex and difficult to tackle, and it becomes even worse when both levels are mixed under the same framework. In light of this, Randall and Svåsand (2002b) sustain that the best thing to do is to conceptually disconnect these two poles and then to verify the conditions under which there is continuity or rupture between them. While this debate has had several contributors since the 1960s (e.g. Welfling 1973; Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009), it is remains crucial, for it frames our choice for a systemic approach. A systemic approach of institutionalization is one that goes beyond the individual political parties *per se* and takes into account patterns of behavior or interactions that allow certain rules of the game to become routinized or entrenched (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009). In Mair and Bardi's (2008) words, this implies moving from the *set of parties* approach, which is linked to the traditional numerical classification of party systems, to the *system of parties* approach, which is «[...] less evidently concerned with the number of parties as such and more with their patterns of interaction» (Bardi and Mair 2008, 152). This being said, where can we search for patterns of behavior or interactions that express the systemic crystallization of certain rules of the game? Political parties, it is known, operate across different arenas (electoral, parliamentary and governmental) and territorial levels within a polity (subnational and national). As a result parties' interactions can be discovered along the different arenas within a polity, with varying degrees of depth (Bardi and Mair 2008). In this sense, it is possible that:

> a party system as such may not exist in the electoral arena, where the set of parties approach would offer a more accurate depiction, such a system may nevertheless exist in the parliamentary or governmental arenas, where identifying the pattern of interactions between the parties would prove an essential key to understanding (Bardi and Mair 2008, 154).

According to Smith (1989, 349-350), a definition of party system must be based on the kind of interaction (cooperation or hostility) taking place between political parties, but also on the level of the political system in which it occurs, as patterns of interaction can result in subnational or national party systems. Together, these studies suggest that it is not enough to clarify whether we opt for an individual or a systemic approach. It is then also necessary to define both the territorial levels and the arenas within the polity that shall be observed.

The number of dimensions and indicators. The majority of studies reviewed in Chapter I tend to follow a multidimensional approach of PSI. This is, in our opinion, the most appropriate approach to study a multilayered concept such as this one. What seems to be missing, however, in some studies, especially in those focusing on African party systems, is the observation of certain arenas of institutionalization. For instance, competition for government has never been measured in this region, despite being considered one of the most fundamental arenas of interparty competition (Sartori 1976; Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010). The same can be said about the organizational component. It is, in fact, considered in Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) original framework, but Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) exclude it from their analysis, under the argument that it was linked with party – instead of party system – institutionalization. Basedau (2007) also left this dimension out of his study not because he identified a conflict between levels, but because of the lack of data available (e.g. concerning the number of card-carrying members, funds, (paid) full-time party officials). Given the theoretical and empirical difficulties to approach this dimension, we found Janda's (1970) seminal conceptualization of organizational continuity (measured by the number of splits and mergers) and Welfling's (1973) revision and application of these indicators to African party systems extremely relevant and valid. Based upon their proposals, we have included the organizational component as well as the governmental arena in our study, the latter also considered in Mair's (1996) approach.

The elements. The choice between structural institutionalization, attitudinal institutionalization or both has also proven critical. The great majority of studies focus either on the structural element alone (e.g. Mair 1996; Mair 1997; Casal Bértoa 2009; Enyedi and Casal Bértoa 2010; Lindberg 2007) or lump the two together (e.g. Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Basedau 2007). The attitudinal element has never been analyzed autonomously and, in fact, it has been measured more ambiguously. For example, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) suggest indicators such as sympathy index towards parties, whether respondents approved of dissolution of parties and parliaments, or whether they believed democracy could exist without political parties (see Table 1.3). Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Riedl (2008) take into consideration whether elections were free and fair, if parties accepted the results, or if they boycotted the elections whereas Basedau (2007) uses only electoral turnout. Even though we have done the same in past studies (Sanches 2008; Sanches 2011) we now reckon as these indicators say more about parties' attitudes towards the rules of the democratic regime and mass mobilization than about PSI itself

(Wolinetz 2006). As a result, in this study we focus solely on the structural element given that the kind of data we have is not sufficient to measure the attitudinal one. We do this bearing in mind that these two elements of institutionalization should be measured separately as they refer to distinct organizational phenomena (Levitsky 1998; Levitsky 2009; Randall and Svåsand 2002b).

Building upon this debate, we propose a partly new multidimensional framework of PSI that measures the structural institutionalization of national party systems across the most relevant arenas of competition. Its elaboration is partly based on studies of Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007). It is, however, more precise and complete than the preceding ones because (i) it addresses some of the dilemmas enclosed in the study of institutionalization; (ii) and it observes, for the first time, the governmental, the parliamentary, the electoral and the organizational arenas, including a wider range of observations/elections per country. Moreover, despite the changes introduced, our measure allows some degree of comparison since it includes some of the indicators that have been integrated in previous measures.

3.2 Party system institutionalization: From dimensions to indicators

Indicators are insufficient approximations of a concept and are assumed to be subject to several sources of error (systematic or random errors). Such a shortcoming leads many scholars, who deal with concept measurement, to adhere to the principle of multiple operationalism (Campbell 1969; Welfling 1973; Crano and Brewer 1986). For the present study this means that, by adopting multiple indicators, the measurement error is reduced since each indicator will have nonoverlapping sources of error, i.e., each will miss the mark to some extent but will miss it in different ways (Crano and Brewer 1986, 12). The following parts of this section feature the three dimensions – stable patterns of interparty competition; stable roots in society; and organizational continuity – and the eleven indicators of our PSI model.

3.2.1 Stable patterns of interparty competition

Stable patterns of interparty competition was the first criterion identified by Mainwaring (1999) drawing on Sartori's (1976) idea that patterns of interaction among political parties represented the core attribute of party systems. It stands out as quite consensual to all models discussed in Chapter I how far party systems display stable patterns of interparty competition

either at the electoral, parliamentary or governmental-levels. We suggest five indicators to measure stable patterns of interparty competition – electoral volatility, legislative seats volatility, percentage of votes won by new parties, alternation in government and share of seats for the most voted party. The first three indicators have already been measured in African party systems; they can be traced to Welfling's (1973) seminal framework, in Kuenzi and Lambright's (2001) adaptation of Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and in Lindberg's (2007) recent approach. The two latter indicators are here measured for the first time and derive from Mair's (1996) study, which classifies party systems according to whether competition for government is open or closed. In this sense, it is the first time that these five indicators are combined under the same model and systematically measured until 2011. They capture extrasystem interactions, that is, those which ensue from the different arenas – electoral, parliamentary and governmental – within which parties operate. PSI is expected to be higher where the patterns of interaction are stable, that is, at lower levels of electoral and legislative volatility, where there is a small number of votes cast on new political parties, where there is wholesale or non alternation and where the most voted party wins a large proportion of seats. Now let us explain how each indicator was operationalized.

Following Pedersen's (1983) formulation, electoral volatility is computed by adding the net change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next, then dividing it by two. For example, in a three-party system, if Party A wins 45% in one election and 50% in the next, while Party B sees its share drop from 30% to 20%, and C increases its share from 25% to 30, then V = (5+10+5)÷2, or 10. When parties merge, split, or run in different alliances between elections, Bartolini and Mair's (1990) rules of calculation are followed[35]. Electoral volatility is widely used (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Tavits 2005, inter alia) as an indicator of party system stability; nonetheless it may not be sufficient to indicate changes at the legislative level and/ or to capture instability (Wolinetz 2006; Lindberg 2007; Robins 2010). This is why legislative seats volatility and percentage of votes won by new parties (both measured by Lindberg 2007) are also included as indicators of this first dimension. Legislative seats volatility is simply the adaptation of Pederson's index of

[35] Bartolini and Mair (1990, 311-322): 1) defend that when two or more parties merge to form a new party, or when one or more parties merge with an existing party, the relevant electoral volatility is computed by subtracting the vote of the new party from the combined vote of the merging parties in the election immediately preceding the merger; 2) when a party splits into two or more parties, the relevant electoral volatility is computed by subtracting the combined vote of the new parties from that of the original party in the election immediately preceding the split, 3) when the name of the party changes, volatility is computed as if it were the same party and 4) If parties split or merge during war periods, during which elections are suspended, and the new party or parties compete in the first post-war election, they are treated as new parties.

volatility to seat change between parties in successive elections. Thus, the net change in percentage of seats gained or lost by each party, from one election to the next is added, and the result obtained is then divided by two. The percentage of votes won by new parties is computed by adding the net share of votes obtained by new parties at the legislative level. "New" political parties are the ones that did not hold parliamentary seats in previous elections but were able to elect candidates in the most recent election. For example, in election 1 party A wins 50 seats; party B 30 seats, and party C fails to elect candidates; and in election 2 Party A wins 45 seats, Party B gets 25 seats and party C 10 seats; then Party C is considered a "new" party in the legislature and its share of votes is scored as the percentage of votes won by new parties.

The two remaining indicators – alternation in government and share of seats for the most voted party – are an approximation to Mair's (1996) conceptualization of open and closed structures of competition in which party systems are considered to be closed or institutionalized if (1) alternations of governments are either total or none, (2) governing alternatives are familiar, and (3) access to government by new parties is limited. In a number of studies, Mair (1996; 1997), Casal Bértoa and Mair (2010) and Casal Bértoa and Enyedi (2010) have revised and refined this conceptual framework around three operational indicators of PSI – Index of Government Alternation (IGA), Index of Familiar Alternation (IFA) and Index of Closure (IC). These indicators have been tested in the analysis of new democracies in East Central Europe, but cannot be replicated in this study since we lack comprehensive information about cabinet's composition. For the total of 102 elections here covered, we managed to assemble data (cabinet composition with all ministers per party) for only about 50% of cases. As a result, we opted for alternative indicators. Alternation in government is measured dichotomously (1 = wholesale alternation, either total or none; 0 = partial alternation) as suggested by Mair's (1996) original framework, while access to government is measured by the share of seats for the most voted party. This indicator has also been used by Lindberg (2007), and it expresses the extent to which new parties have access to government: the higher the proportion of seats of the largest party, the lower the chances for newcomers[36].

[36] Lacking data prevented us from measuring whether or not there was a shift in the governing formula. Other indicators namely presidential volatility (also considered by Mainwaring 1998; Mainwaring 1999 and Kuenzi and Lambright 2001) were not included, as they could not be measured in parliamentary regimes (e.g. Botswana, Mauritius, Lesotho, and South Africa).

3.2.2 Stable roots in society

For Mainwaring and Scully (1995), even though stable roots in society and stable patterns of interparty competition are analytically distinct, they are closely related for, where parties are deeply rooted in society; most voters support the same party over time and across different kinds of elections. In this sense, both criteria are likely to exhibit continuity. To measure this dimension two indicators are employed: share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970, and 1980, and share of seats for independent candidates.

Share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970, and 1980 is a revised version of Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) indicator percent of recent lower-chamber vote for parties founded until 1950 and builds upon the changes introduced by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), which put the threshold in 1970 due to the late formation of political parties in Africa. There are, however, important changes in the way we have created this indicator, which have to do both with the years of observation and the process of calculation. Firstly, instead of summing the seat share for all parties founded until a particular year (1950 or 1970), we take into account the proportion of seats in three different periods until 1980. This allows us to (i) include more political parties, given that in certain countries some of the main political parties were formed in mid or late 1970s[37]; and (ii) to account for the dramatic political changes the continent underwent since the end of the Second World War. According to Johnston and Lee (2003), it is possible to differentiate three waves of African governance from the 1950s to the 1990s. The first phase occurred between the 1950s and the 1960s when the majority of countries achieved independence and was characterized by one party rule, intolerance of opposition and by charismatic leaders who fought for independence. The second wave started in the 1970s when brutal dictatorships collapsed in some countries (Uganda, Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea), while others experienced parliamentary elections (Senegal, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Botswana and Mauritius) or regressed into authoritarianism after brief experimentation with democracy (Nigeria and Ghana). The Third Wave began between the late 1980s and early 1990s with the collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked the end of the Cold War and acclaimed multiparty democracy in many African countries (Johnston and Lee 2003). The period differentiation is hence important, because these sequences of change

[37] To mention a few examples in Mozambique the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) was formed in 1976, in Sao Tome and Principe the *Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe* (MLSTP) was formed in 1972, in Tanzania the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) was founded in 1977 and in Senegal the *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) was formed in 1974. All these political parties are strong competitors within the current party systems; they hold considerable shares of votes and seats in lower house elections (for instance the CCM is Tanzania's ruling party in since 1995).

have had an important impact on the process of party formation in Africa. Furthermore, the way this indicator is calculated allows weighting the antiquity of political parties differently; for instance, party systems in which political parties formed until 1960 gain the largest proportion of seats are, in principle, more institutionalized than the ones in which the largest share of seats is assembled by parties formed until 1970 or 1980.The second indicator is share of seats for independent candidates. According to Mainwaring (1998), where citizens are attached to a party, independent candidates rarely win high office. In new democracies with inchoate party systems independent office-seekers are likely to succeed, however (Mainwaring 1998, 74). Even though already suggested in 1973 by Welfling, only recently have scholars started to systematically use share of seats of independent candidates as an indicator of institutionalization (Moser 1999; Protsyk and Wilson 2003; Thames 2007). Following from the above, we posit that the lower the share of seats for independent candidates, the higher the level of PSI.

3.2.3 Organizational continuity

The last dimension is organizational continuity, a name borrowed from Janda[38] (1970), who developed this concept – as the number of mergers and splits – to measure how far political parties had endured as stable organizations. Departing from this conceptualization, Welfling (1973) developed a version of these indicators that applies to party systems, which basically weighs mergers and splits in terms of seat share. This operationalization is the basis for the one we use, even though some minor changes have been introduced. The first change is that we also calculate the electoral strength of merging/splitting groups; given that these groups can be weak at the electoral level but strong at the legislative level (for instance due to the mechanical effects of electoral systems). The second change is related to the fact that we calculate these scores annually while Welfling considers the legislative strength two elections away or before the split/merge. We included all parties that, in between elections, have been involved in mergers and splits and created the indicators as follows: when one or two minor parties merge with a major party, the indicator equals the combined electoral or legislative strength (percentage of votes and seats) the parties held before the merger. For instance, in election 1 Party A runs alone and gets 10 % of votes and 0,1% of seats and in election 2 Party A is dissolved to join Party B who wins 60% of votes and 0,6% of seats in that election. The

[38] The author is deeply grateful to Professor Kenneth Janda who kindly replied to all enquiries about the way this indicator was computed in his seminal work of 1970.

indicator will be equal to the strength of Party A before the merger that is 0,1% legislative strength and 10% of electoral strength. As far as splits are concerned, the reasoning is the same, the legislative and electoral strength of the party after the split are scored. For example, if Party B breaks away from Party A, the proportion of votes and seats obtained by Party B in the following election, is scored as the legislative and electoral strength of splitting political parties. When two or more fairly equal parties merge to create a new entity, all individual votes and seats are combined into the same score.

3.2.4 Building a composite index of party system institutionalization

Table 3.1 displays the dimensions and the indicators of our PSI index. Moreover, it features how the original values of each indicator – mostly measured in terms of vote or seat share – are standardized into dichotomous or continuous scores.

Table 3.1 – Scoring and indexing PSI

Dimensions	Indicators	Measurement
(i) stable patterns of interparty competition	1. Electoral volatility 2. Legislative seats volatility 3. Total percentage of votes won by new parties	3.0 = 0-10 2.5 = 11-20 2.0 = 21-30 1.5 = 31-40 1.0 = > 41
	4. Alternation in government	1 = Wholesale (total or none) 0 = Partial
	5. Share of seats for the most voted party	3.0 = > 61 2.5 = 51-60 2.0 = 41-50 1.5 = 31-40 1.0 = > 41
(ii) stable roots in society	6. Share of seats for parties founded by 1960, 1970 and 1980	3.0 = 80-100 2.5 = 60-79 2.0 = 40-59 1.5 = 20-39 1.0 = <19
	7. Share of seats for independent candidates [(a)]	3.0 = 0-10 2.5 = 11-20 2.0 = 21-30 1.5 = 31-40 1.0 = > 41
(iii) organizational continuity	8. Electoral strength of merging groups 9. Electoral strength of splitting groups 10. Legislative strength of merging groups 11. Legislative strength of splitting groups	3.0 = 0-10 2.5 = 11-20 2.0 = 21-30 1.5 = 31-40 1.0 = > 41

Notes: [(a)] Coded "3" if independents are not allowed to compete in lower house elections.

Sources: Welfling (1973), Mainwaring and Scully (1995), Mair (1996), Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Lindberg (2007).

This measurement is similar to the one developed by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) which was later applied to African countries by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001). With the exception of alternation in government, which is dichotomous, the measurement process basically consists in applying an ordinal scale ranging from 1 (low institutionalization) to 3 (high institutionalization) to intervals of values of each indicator. Taking electoral volatility as an example, values ranging between 0-10 are scored 3 (high institutionalization), whereas values higher than 41 are scored 1 (low institutionalization). This double measurement makes it possible to compare the countries using either the original values of each indicator, or the standardized scores from 1 to 3. Furthermore, it allows the creation of an additive index of PSI. In the next section the results for all individual indicators of PSI and for the additive index are presented.

3.3 Party system institutionalization in Sub-Saharan Africa: Main Results

3.3.1 Electoral volatility

While in long-established democracies episodes of high volatility are rare or brief, among Third Wave democracies, these tend to persist over time (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). This being said, there is also a great variation in the levels of electoral volatility among regions spanned by the Third Wave of democratization. Robert and Wibbels (1999) found a value of 21,4 of electoral volatility in 16 countries of Latin America, whereas the corresponding value among 15 Eastern European democracies reaches 25,6, according to Tavits (2005). In the 19 African countries, included in the present study, the average volatility is 25,1, but the variation between countries is large. As Figure 1 shows, eleven countries score below this average, while eight present higher values of electoral volatility. The lowest scores are found in Cape Verde (10,1), where the PAICV has won the last three legislative elections (2001, 2006, 2011) with a majority of votes cast; Botswana (10,2), where the BDP has systematically won all elections since 1966; and in Namibia (13,1) and South Africa (13,2), where SWAPO and ANC, respectively, have been able to secure more than 60% of seats since the first multiparty election.

Overall, more stable patterns of interaction are observed in countries where only a small number of parties are able to structure electoral choices. In addition to the countries mentioned above, this is also the case of Mozambique and Tanzania, ruled by Frelimo since 1994 and CCM since 1995, respectively. The most interesting case within this pool of

countries is Mauritius with an average electoral volatility of 15,8. Mauritius is a multiparty system with four relevant parties, since 1976: MMM, PT, PMSD and MSM. These political parties have run together and against each other on several occasions, and have alternatively taken part in minority coalition governments. For instance, after running in separate alliances in 1995, the MSM and the MMM combined strengths and competed together for the 2000 and 2005 elections. Nevertheless, this alliance did not hold for the 2010 election as both parties integrated different alliances. In this fluid scenario, electoral volatility is lower than expected because, despite changes in the governing formula, shifts at the electoral level are small as the major parties are aligned in two broad electoral alliances.

Figure 3.1 – Average electoral volatility



Countries with the highest levels of electoral volatility are Benin (49,4), Zambia (46,6), Guinea-Bissau (41,3), Lesotho (36,5), The Gambia (35,2), Malawi (31,6), Senegal (30,1) and Sao Tome and Principe (25,4). In Benin, an average of 12 political parties and/or alliances gets parliamentary representation after national elections. Most voted parties are PRD, RB, FARD-Alafia and, more recently (since 2007), the coalition *Force Cauris pour un Bénin Émergent* (FCBE)[39]. In the case of Zambia, volatility is higher than expected given that the MMD has won all elections between 1991 and 2001. In the general elections of 1991 and 1996, MMD's domination was overwhelming (the party won over 80% of parliamentary seats). In 2001, however, MMD was seriously challenged, as internal contestation increased

[39] Is a coalition of about twenty small political parties, which support President Yayi Boni; it was formed in the background of the 2007 elections: http://www.afrique-express.com/afrique/benin/politique/benin-assemblee-nationale.html (accessed 22-04-14).

and opposition political parties, namely UPND, UNIP and PF, which was the most voted party in the general elections of 2011, gained visibility.

In the multiparty system of Guinea-Bissau, PAIGC, PRS and RGB-MB share nearly the totality of the 100 seats of the National Assembly since the first multiparty election in 1994. Apart from the 1999 election, which was won by the PRS, the PAIGC has been the most voted party in all legislative elections held in the country, having reached more than 50% of seats in 2009. Lesotho's party system underwent major changes in more recent years. The 1993 and 1998 elections presented the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) as a party without rivals, since it won 100% and 99% of seats, respectively. Notwithstanding, after experiencing a major break – which led to the emergence of the LCD –, the equilibrium of power changed. Even though the LCD has won all elections since 1998, the parliament has become more fragmented for at least nine parties managed to elect parliamentarians in the 2002 and 2007 polls. In Malawi, as well as in Sao Tome e Principe, the party system has been competitive from the onset of multipartism, no party has attained a majoritarian status and there have been sizeable transfers of votes between political parties.

3.3.2 Legislative seats volatility

This indicator is likely to be influenced by other factors rather than just the patterned relationships between political parties. In fact, the type of electoral formula and the changes in the electoral law can also play an important role. In majoritarian systems differences between electoral volatility and legislative seat volatility are expected to be higher since the degree of disproportionality in the way votes are converted into parliamentary seats is higher than in proportional representation systems (Lijphart 1994). Furthermore, changes in the electoral laws (e.g. electoral formula or district size) or in the configuration of certain political institutions (e.g. assembly size) may influence the allocation of seats. For example, in Lesotho, a complete substitution of the electoral formula occurred in 2002 (from majoritarian to mixed) and in Mozambique the 5% election threshold was abolished in 2004. Regarding the assembly size, five countries have kept it unchanged since the onset of multipartism – Mozambique (200 seats), Namibia (72 seats), Sao Tome and Principe (55 seats), South Africa, (400 seats) and Zambia (150 seats); whereas six countries (Cape Verde, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria and Seychelles) have seen no changes to assembly size after the second multiparty election. In the eight remaining countries changes in the size of the assembly have been frequent, even if minimal – e.g. Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius.

Figure 3.2 presents the average seats volatility, per country, since the first multiparty election. The majority of countries (N = 11) are below the average observed in the sample (25 seats). As expected, on the one hand, the dominant party systems of Botswana (5 seats), Seychelles (6 seats), Cape Verde (7 seats) and Namibia (10 seats) record the lowest values in number of seat changes. On the other hand, and proving that indicators of legislative and electoral volatility capture different types of change within the party system is the case of The Gambia that combines high values of electoral volatility (35,2) and low values of seat volatility (10 seats). Between 1966 and 1992, the PPP was the most voted party in The Gambia, occupying more than half of parliamentary seats; major electoral shifts principally involved the opposition parties – the National Convention Party (NCP) and the United Party (UP). In 1997 a new party system was voted out of the election and three new political parties – the APRC, the United Democratic Party (UDP) and the National Reconciliation Party (NRP) – were chosen by 96% of the voters. From 1997 and until the latest election (2007), the APRC emerged as the new dominant party wining at least 70% of seats in every election. Despite the changes taking place from 1997 onwards, The Gambia's party system retained its main defining characteristic – one major party coexists with several minor parties that hardly get parliamentary representation. The seats volatility is smaller than expected because only a residual number of seats is actually changing. The rules of the electoral system can also play a role here. The Gambia's majority formula generates important differences in the process of converting votes into parliamentary seats. For instance, in 2007 the APRC got 59,8% of the votes and 87,5% (42 seats) of the seats, while the UDP elected 4 candidates after being voted by 21,9% of the electorate.

On the opposite side, the highest values of seats volatility are found in Nigeria (72 seats), Malawi (67 seats), South Africa (51 seats), Zambia (51 seats), Ghana and Lesotho (both with 39 seats). The most interesting case in this pool of countries is South Africa, where the ANC maintains a more or less stable share of seats across elections, consecutively winning at least 60% of the 400-National Assembly seats, while a sizeable group of smaller parties (of which the Democratic Party – DP and the Inkatha Freedom Party – IFP are the most relevant ones) try to get the remaining 35% to 40% of the seats.

Figure 3.2 – Average legislative seats volatility



3.3.3 Percentage of votes won by new parties

This indicator provides information on whether new political parties entered the parliament after the last election and scores their total share of votes. New political parties may either be newly formed parties, or more or less established parties that after being left out of the parliament in a previous election achieved parliamentary representation in a subsequent one. Figure 3.3 reveals that, in more than half of the countries (N = 10) new parliamentary parties receive less than 12,2% of the votes cast. Indeed, competition is structured by stable and familiar competitors, whereas opposition parties barely achieve representation. In these party systems, newcomers find it hard to break through and parliamentary representation seems only virtually possible. This is the scenario in the Seychelles (0%), Tanzania (0,8%), Mozambique (1,3%), Botswana (3,6%) and Cape Verde (3,6%). In the Seychelles, which present the most difficult context for new political parties, the SPPF – *PL* since 2009 – is the strongest political party, wining all elections by qualified majority of votes and seats from the onset of multipartism. The few remaining seats have so far been divided between two familiar competitors; the *Parti Démocratique Seychellois* (PDS)[40] and the SNP. Apart from these, no other party has been able to gain parliamentary representation. In Tanzania, the CCM has formed one-party cabinets after each election, while three other minor parties are voted for

[40] Senegalese Democratic Party.

parliamentary opposition – the National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), Chadema and the CUF - Chama cha Wananchi. In Mozambique, competition is mostly between Frelimo, the dominant party, and Renamo, the major opposition party. Since 1994, only one third party reached parliament without taking part in a coalition – the *Movimento Democrático de Mozambique* (MDM)[41]. This party emerged as a breakaway from Renamo, only a few months before the 2009 national elections and was voted by 3,9% of the electorate. Closed patterns of competition are also found in Botswana and Cape Verde, where electoral outcomes are frankly stable from one election to the next. In this group of countries, parties are long-lasting, and citizens know what parties stand for. Opportunities for new parties are restricted, not legally, but rather as a result of the turnover.

Figure 3.3 – Average percentage of votes won by new parties



On the contrary, the electoral market is more open and unpredictable in eight countries: Nigeria (13,0%), Burkina Faso (13,8%), Guinea-Bissau (15,7%), Malawi (20,9%), The Gambia (25,8%), Lesotho (26,7%), Benin (28,1%) and Zambia (29,2%). In these polities, major parties can suffer big losses, while new or more established opposition parties can score large gains. A perfect example of this is Lesotho where in the 1993 elections the BCP won all parliamentary seats and in 1998 got none. In fact, in these elections, the LCD – formed in 1997 after a split within the BCP – won 79 of the 80 parliamentary seats and the BNP won the remaining seat. Both BCP and BNP were elected in the following election (2002) while seven

[41] Democratic Movement of Mozambique.

other parties – including the BCP – managed to elect a minimum of one and a maximum of five candidates[42].

3.3.4 Alternation in government

Figure 3.4 presents the patterns of alternation in government per country and election. The results are broken down into three categories: non alternation, partial alternation and wholesale alternation.

Figure 3.4 – Patterns of alternation in government



The overall figures are very telling insofar as they show that structures of competition for government are relatively closed: 56 of the 83 elections observed have not produced any alternation in power, while wholesale alternation has happened only eight times and partial alternation 19 times. As mentioned before in this chapter, there has never been alternation in power in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Seychelles, South Africa or Tanzania. Indeed, the same party has systematically won all elections since the founding multiparty elections, with sufficient margin to form one-party cabinets. Wholesale alternation has occurred once in the history of Cape Verde (1996/2001), The Gambia (1987/1992), Senegal

[42] The other parliamentary parties are: Lesotho People's Congress (LPC), National Independent Party (NIP), Basutoland African Congress (BAC), Basotho Congress Party (BCP), Lesotho Workers Party (LWP), Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) and National Progressive Party (NPP).

(1998/2001) and Zambia (2006/2011) and twice in Ghana (1996/2000 and 2000/2004). These twelve countries are obvious examples of closed structures of competition having been persistently characterized by none or wholesale alternation.

In contrast, the remaining cases display more open structures of competition. Benin has the most open party system, with partial alternation in government, in all elections since 1991. In Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau and Mauritius, the majority of elections have also resulted in the formation of cabinets that combine both new and incumbent parties. In Lesotho and Burkina Faso, partial alternation in government has happened once, but the overall picture is of non alternation. Finally, Malawi has experienced non alternation (1994/1999), partial alternation (1999/2004) and wholesale alternation (2004/2009).

3.3.5 Share of seats for the most voted party

On average, the most voted party in lower house elections in our sample wins about 67% of the seats at stake. This share is more than sufficient to sustain a one-party cabinet with substantial parliamentary support. In this context, political parties other than the wining party have very limited chances of breaking through the threshold of government. The question of which party governs is, thus, far from being open both for political parties and for voters as these tend to massively cast their votes on one single party. Previous sections have already shown this is usually the historically established party, which granted enough votes and seats, can safely exclude other political parties from national government. This broad description applies to the overwhelming majority of countries. As Figure 3.5 reveals, in eight countries the most voted party assembles more than 67% of seats with the most obvious cases of closure being Seychelles, The Gambia, Botswana, and Tanzania, where the most voted party wins, on average, at least 80% of the seats. Similarly, above the aggregate average are South Africa (67,4%), Burkina Faso (69,4%), Mauritius (70,6%), Namibia (75,4%), Senegal (75,9%) and Lesotho (77,9%).

Below the aggregate average but still winning a considerable proportion of seats are the most voted parties of Mozambique and Nigeria (64% of seats on average), and to a lesser extent Guinea-Bissau, Zambia, Cape Verde and Ghana (with at least 50% of seats). Competition for government appears to be more open only in three countries which are, in descending order, Benin, Malawi and Sao Tome and Principe, where the most voted party receives 37%, 45% and 49% of the seats respectively, on average.

Figure 3.5 – Average seat share for the most voted party



According to Mair (1996) what is new about party systems emerging after the Third Wave of democratization, namely those in post-Communist Europe:

> is their lack of closure and hence their lack of *systemness* [...]. Not only is the format of these new systems highly unstable, in that the parties as organizations are often inchoate and loosely constructed, but so too are the modes of competition and the nature of cross-party alliances and coalitions, a feature that also continues to characterize even many of the older party systems of Latin America. Seen from this perspective, the long-term process by which party systems may eventually become consolidated can also be seen as a long-term process by which the structure of competition becomes increasingly closed and predictable (Mair 1996, 96).

The majority of countries here analyzed could not diverge more from this description as they have been characterized by long term stability and great predictability in the patterns of competition for government.

3.3.6 Share of seats for parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980

On average, parties founded until 1960 win about 20% of the seats in the last lower house election, whereas more recently formed political parties, that is, those founded until 1970 and 1980 collect, respectively, 11% and 17% of the parliamentary seats. Thus, despite the fact that

multiparty elections opened a window of opportunities for the establishment and development of new political parties, a large part of political competition is still structured by political parties formed before the introduction of the major political reforms towards multipartism, between the late 1980s and the early 1990s. This being said, there is also a great variability across and within countries. As Figure 3.6 displays, Botswana, Mozambique, Seychelles, Senegal and Namibia, are the most extreme cases of electoral closure. In Botswana, one of the oldest democracies in Africa, nine parliamentary multiparty elections have taken place since the country gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1966. The BDP, formed in 1962, has won all parliamentary elections by a landslide (gaining, on average, 82% of the parliamentary seats) leaving only a small fraction of seats to be distributed between the other competitors. Among these one finds the BNF, founded in 1962 (elected representatives in all nine elections. The best electoral result was in 1994 when the party got 13 seats), the Botswana People's Party (BPP) founded in 1960, (elected representatives in 1969, 1974, 1979 and 1984) and finally the Botswana Independence Party (BIP), founded in 1964 (elected one representative in 1969, 1974 and 1989). In Mozambique, Frelimo (founded in 1962) and Renamo (founded in 1976) win on average 98% of the seats in lower house elections. Nevertheless, this share is not equally distributed between these two competitors. In fact, since 1994, party politics in Mozambique has been marked by an increasing dominance of Frelimo and continuous shrinking of the opposition parties, especially of Renamo. After a relative equilibrium in the 1994 and 1999 general elections, Renamo began losing its relevance both in the electoral and in the legislative arenas, suffering in addition two internal crises which led to the birth of the *Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento* (PDD)[43] and the MDM.

This combination of old political parties with one-party dominance is also observed in the Seychelles, Namibia and Tanzania, where ruler parties SPPF/PL (founded in 1978), SWAPO (founded in 1958) and CCM (f. 1977) win, on average, respectively, 81%[44], 72%[45] and 82% of the seats In Senegal, the two most relevant parties are the PS and the PDS, founded in 1949 and 1974, accordingly. The PS was the most voted party in the elections of 1983, 1988, 1993 and 1998, whereas the PDS, leader of the *Coalition Sopi*[46], won the 2001 and the 2007 elections. The presence of parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980 is also

[43] Party for Peace, Democracy and Development
[44] The DP (founded in 1964) receives most of the remaining seats either alone or in coalition with the SNP (founded in 1994).
[45] The other parties winning parliamentary representation are the DTA (f. 1977), the National Unity Democratic Organization of Namibia (NUDO) and the Republican Party (RP) founded in 1964 and 1977, respectively.
[46] SOPI "Wolof for Change" Coalition aggregates over 40 smaller parties.

considerable (average seats gains higher than 46%) in the parliaments of Mauritius (68%), The Gambia (64%), South Africa (62%) and Cape Verde (46%).

Figure 3.6 – Average percentage of seats obtained by parties founded until 1960, 1970 and 1980



Note: average percentage of seats gained by parties founded until 1960 = 21%, for parties founded until 1970 = 11% and for parties founded until 1980 = 17%.

Ghana and Nigeria are the only cases of complete absence of historical political parties in the electoral and parliamentary arena. In the case of Ghana, President Jerry Rawlings, announced, less than a year before the 1992 elections that the ban on political parties[47], which had been imposed in 1981 would be lifted on 18th May 1992. This measure was part of his plans towards a return to civilian rule and included several measures of political liberalization: such as holding a referendum on 28th April to adopt a new Constitution and holding presidential and parliamentary elections (see IPU Parline country sheet[48]). In the 1992 elections, Rawlings and his NDC remained in power having been replaced in 2000 by the opposition leader John Kufuor and the NPP. The Nigerian party system, in turn, had been suspended after the military takeover led by General Sani Abacha in November 1993. In October 1995, a three-year transitional program to restore civilian rule was announced and, in

[47] During the post-colonial period several political parties have emerged in Ghana: the National Alliance of Liberals (NAL), the Progress Party (PP), the People's Action Party (PAP), the United Nationalist Party (UNP), and the All People's Republican Party (APRP), all of which ran for the 1969 elections; while the liberal Popular Front (PFP), the United National Convention, and the left-wing People's National Party (PNP), formed by followers of late President Kwame Nkrumah, ran for the 1979 elections.

[48] http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2123_92.htm.

September 1996, the party system which had been suspended was re-established by the Armed Forces Provisional Revolutionary Council. Yet, only parties approved by the government were entitled to nominate candidates to public office. In the 1999 parliamentary poll, three parties, namely the PDP, the AD and the APP, fielded candidates for the 360 House of Representatives seats and 109 Senate seats.

In Benin, the *Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin* (PRPB) was the only legally recognized political organization until 1990, when Mathiéu Kérékou convened the National Conference of Active Forces to start the process of democratic transition. The PRPB was dissolved before the first parliamentary election in 1991 but the *Parti Communiste du Bénin* (PCB)[49] a clandestine party, active since 1977, was able to stand for elections and to win 1,2% and 7,2% of the seats in 1991 and 1995, respectively. Finally, the party systems of Guinea-Bissau, Malawi and Sao Tome and Principe are the ones offering wider possibilities for political parties founded after 1980. In fact, in these parliaments more than half of the seats are secured by political parties formed in the 1990s.

3.3.7 Share of seats for independent candidates

As displayed in Table 3.2, the election of independent candidates is rather sporadic in the 19 African countries here considered. In fact, although independents are allowed to run in legislative elections, in the great majority of countries – Botswana, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, Seychelles, and Zambia – they hardly ever get elected. Malawi (13,5%), The Gambia (4,6%), Zambia (2,9%), Ghana (0,6%) and Botswana (0,2%) are the sole cases in which independent office seekers were ever elected; yet only in the case of Malawi, were they able to conquer a sizeable share of seats.

Table 3.2 – Election of independent candidates

Country	# of elections	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Malawi	3	2,1	21,4	13,5	10,1
Gambia, The	8	0	14,3	4,6	4,8
Zambia	4	0,7	6,7	2,9	2,6
Ghana	4	0	2	0,6	1,0
Botswana	8	0	1,8	0,2	0,6

[49] Communist Party of Benin.

Malawian independent candidates received 2,1% (N = 4) of the seats in 1999, 21,4% (N = 40) in 2004 and 17,1% (N = 33) in 2009. In The Gambia, with the exception of the 1977 and 1987 elections, independents are regularly elected. Their seat gains range between 14,3% (in 1982) and 2,1% (in 2007). On the opposite side, independent candidates are not allowed to compete in legislative elections in nine countries, namely Benin, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania. Overall, the results seem to contradict Mainwaring's expectations that independent office-seekers would be likely to succeed in new democracies (Mainwaring 1998, 74). This premise derived mostly from the analysis of Latin American party systems in which populism and personalism seemed to weaken the institutional features of party systems allowing more independent candidates to proliferate. In this sample of 19 countries, however, the structures of competition are far more closed and electoral competition is dominated by firmly rooted political parties.

3.3.8 Mergers

Mergers are an important aspect both of interparty and intraparty competition as they result from the decision of one party to dissolve itself and join a different party (of equal or different size) or to create a completely new entity. Thus, an accord between the merging parts is required. In the majority of countries displayed in Figure 3.7 episodes of merger[50] usually happen in a situation in which a small party – both electorally and parliamentary – is absorbed into a stronger political party, but there also cases in which small parties of more or less equivalent size merge to create a new entity. In Mauritius [e.g. *Renouveau Militant Mauricien* (RMM) was absorbed into MSM in 1994, Kamahuru and Chama Cha Wananchi merged to form CUF in 1992)], Nigeria [e.g. AC formed in 2006 via the merger of the AD, the Justice Party (JP), the Advance Congress of Democrats (ACD), and several other minor political parties] and South Africa [e.g. Freedom Front Plus (FF+) results from a merger between Afrikaner Eenheidsbeweging (AEB), the Freedom Front (FF) and the Conservative Party (CP) in late 2003, and has absorbed several other minor parties] political parties that dissolved and joined an existing party or combined with other parties to create a new entity, were already so

[50] As detailed in Section 2.4 of Chapter II (Methodology), a series of written and online sources were consulted to count the number of mergers and splits. Even though the collection of data resulted from intensive qualitative research, we acknowledge that information for some countries/parties might be missing. However we are confident in our results given that all splits or mergers affecting the relevant parties, that received considerable votes or that attained parliamentary representation were covered. Thus, even if the number of mergers and splits is not 100% right the weighting of these events at the systemic level is largely acceptable.

weak that the fact that they ceased to exist meant little change at the parliamentary and electoral levels.

The several mergers which have occurred in Botswana also fit into this description: in 1994, the BIP merged with the Botswana Freedom Party (BFP) to form the Independence Freedom Party (IFP); in 1999, the IFP merged with the United Action Party (UAP) to form the Botswana Alliance Movement (BAM) and finally, in 2004, the New Democratic Front (NDF) merged with the Botswana Congress Party (BCP). These events represented little change at the systemic level since, before the merger, the BIP and the BFP had only 2,5% and 0,5% of the votes and did not have parliamentary representation and the IFP and the UAP combined about 3% of the votes. Thus, regardless of the number of mergers these party systems are more characterized by the continuity in the patterns of interparty competition.

Figure 3.7 – Mergers: total and average share of votes and seats



Burkina Faso is almost an outlier when approaching this indicator. Here merging groups seem to have had significant share of votes and seats before deciding to combine strengths. The emergence of the CDP in 1996 is illustrative of this situation. This party resulted from a merger between the previous ruling party the *Congrès Organisation pour la Démocratie Populaire - Mouvement du Travail* (OPD-MT)[51] and several other minor parties. Before the merger, they gathered about 60% of overall votes, with the OPD-MT alone gathering 49% of these. This was a major merger involving the disappearance of 13 political parties and the

[51] Organization for Popular Democracy – Labor Movement.

emergence of a new political party – the CDP –, which has won all elections between 1997 and 2007.

3.3.9 Splits

Postcolonial politics in Africa was characterized by one-partyism. Therefore, it is common to find several opposition parties that are either splinter groups or have been formed by ex-members of the former ruling party. Notwithstanding, it is hard to argue, for instance, that the MpD from Cape Verde is a split from the PAICV simply because some of the members that have joined the MpD in 1991 had also served in the PAICV one-party cabinets between 1975 and 1990; or that the PCD-GR from Sao Tome and Principe is a split from MLSTP because it integrates some of its former members. In this sense, when counting the number of splits we considered those episodes that resulted from factionalism (involving the main party cadres) rather than the ones resulting from individual defections.

As Figure 3.8 shows, splits are more widespread across countries than mergers. This being said, there are also cases in which splits have occurred but encompassed little change at the electoral and legislative levels.

Figure 3.8 – Splits: total and average share of votes and seats



In this sense, the fate of splinter groups largely depends on the degree of openness or closure of the party system. For instance, on the one hand, Botswana and Burkina Faso record

four and five party splits, respectively, but their systemic impact is rather modest if not null (average percentage of seats gained is 1,6% and 0,6%, respectively). On the other hand, Namibia and Lesotho recorded major splits which have had an important impact in their party system. In Namibia, the splits occurred in 1999 (Congress of Democrats - CoD split from SWAPO), in 2004 (Republican Party – RP split from Democratic Turnhalle Alliance – DTA) and in 2009 (Rally for Democracy and Progress – RDP split from SWAPO) and represented average earnings of 5% either at the electoral or at the legislative level. In Lesotho, the splits of 1998 (BCP split in two, one was LCD) and 2002 (Basutoland African Congress – BAC split from BCP, and Lesotho People's Congress – LPC split from LCD), represented average gains of 34,1% at the electoral level and 21 seats at the parliamentary level.

It is a sign of higher institutionalization if stable patterns of interaction occur between political parties that have firmly established structures. The same is to say that PSI implies a commitment to an organization and to some minimal collective goals (especially winning elections). If the parties within the system are organizationally and ideologically instable, their ability to change or otherwise to promote the entrenchment of certain rules of competition is limited. This analysis has shown that despite the number of mergers and splits there is a certain level of organizational continuity in African party systems. Merging and splitting political parties are, for the most part, unable to change the *systemic constraints* imposed on them by stable competitors.

3.4 Varieties of party system institutionalization: Countries, time and quality

This section analyzes the results of PSI in three ways. Firstly, it displays aggregate values of PSI since the first multiparty elections per country. This will outline which countries are more or less institutionalized until 2011. Secondly, it reveals how PSI has evolved across time. The analysis provides aggregate averages for the sample observed in each electoral period. Thirdly, it conducts a cluster analysis to test Huntington's (1965; 1968) and Ben-Dor's (1975) models about the different interplays between institutionalization, political mobilization and change in society.

Figure 3.9 features average values of PSI per country, since the first multiparty election; they vary between 23.2 (Benin) and 31.0 (Botswana). As suggested by the analysis of individual indicators, higher levels of institutionalization are found in party systems in which fewer political parties (one or two major parties) dominate the electoral, the legislative and the governmental arenas. This is the case of Botswana (31.0), Namibia (30.7), Cape Verde (30.1),

Seychelles (29.9), Mozambique (29.6), South Africa (29.2), The Gambia (28.8), Tanzania (28.6) and Senegal (28.4). Aggregate differences between these countries are rather minimal given that they are characterized by stable and very well established political parties which have been successful competitors across the different arenas within which they operate, and that have been systematically able to create stable and closed patterns of competition, thus narrowing the chances of new competitors. Moreover, we find rootedness in society and organizational continuity in these party systems with merging and splitting political parties delivering minimal systemic impact.

At the opposite end, the lowest institutionalization levels in the sample are found in the party systems of Benin (23.1), Zambia (24.4), Malawi (24.5), Lesotho (25.3), Burkina Faso (25.5), Guinea-Bissau (25.8), Nigeria (26.7), Sao Tome and Principe (27.1), Ghana (27.1) and Mauritius (27.7). In these ten countries, party systems are more open to new challengers. Independent office seekers and smaller political parties have higher chances to gain parliamentary representation and political parties that eventually decide to merge with or to split from other political parties have more systemic relevance. Furthermore, there has been alternation in government in all these countries and, in some cases, changes in the governing formula.

Figure 3.9 – PSI average scores per country



Note: Cronbach's Alpha = 0,734

Figure 3.10 reveals that PSI scores have unfolded irregularly across time. Until year 3 (mid 1980s), PSI reaches its highest values but it should be noted that only three countries are observed at that stage: Botswana, The Gambia and Mauritius. From the 1990s (year 5) onwards, as new countries introduce competitive and regular elections, the levels of PSI follow a decreasing trend with slight oscillations. This superficial look at the data – at the aggregate level – seems to support what previous studies have suggested about the relationship between time and PSI in Africa: that there is no general trend towards party system stabilization (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008). This finding raises an interesting hypothesis which we will take into account in the analysis of the sources of PSI.

Figure 3.10 – PSI average scores per year of observation



Apart from differences across country and time, it is also important to unpack the concept of institutionalization, in light of its relationship with other contemporary political phenomena, namely mass mobilization and democratization. Huntington (1965, 1968) and Ben-Dor (1975) foresaw four possible outcomes resulting from the relationship between these processes: no-institutionalization, inadequate institutionalization, adequate institutionalization and overinstitutionalization. To empirically test this typology we have conducted a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis[52] with three variables: PSI Index, percentage of turnout in lower house elections (as a measure of mass mobilization) and Freedom House (FH) scores (as a

[52] This method is the most indicated one for small-N datasets. It allows the examination of various solutions (that is, the number of clusters that will be analyzed) and suits to both quantitative and qualitative data (the combination of both is not possible, however). Clustering was made with the *furthest neighbor* method, according to which the distance between two clusters is the distance between their two most distant members. Since we were testing an existing typology the number of clusters (N = 3) was theoretically defined, but it was also supported by the *ward method*. We also resorted to other clustering techniques to be sure whether the three clusters solution was consistent (one or two countries shifted between clusters, but the three-fold solution remained). The category *no-institutionalization* is not tested, as it is associated with traditional societies.

measure of overall status of democracy). We have calculated averages for each of these three variables basically resuming our dataset to 19 observations. The results display three different clusters (Tables 3.3 and 3.4).

The first cluster assembles cases that record the lowest degrees of PSI (mean = 24.6) along with intermediate levels of both turnout (mean = 68,8%) and democratic performance (mean = 3.3). Five countries are grouped here: Benin, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia. They exemplify cases of inadequate institutionalization, as the party system is not able to sustain and promote change in society while encouraging mass mobilization. In other words, since political participation is not accompanied by concomitant expansion in the strength of political institutions, there is political decay and, in some cases, political disorder. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, the weakness of formal political institutions may have contributed to the capture of the political arena by nonpolitical institutions, namely the army. Since 1994, several attempted or successful coups have occurred, endangering the stability of state agents and the lives of hundreds of civilians. In 1999 and 2002, two coups were led by General Asumane Mane. In 2001, many former military officers and paramilitary officers were detained in connection with the reported coup plot (namely deputy chief of army staff Almane Alam Camara and ex-navy chief Mohamed Lamine) and in 2003 another coup – led by General Verissimo Correira Seabra – took place. More recently (2004, 2005 and 2012), several armed actions have threatened the stability of the regime leading, among others to the ousting of the Head of State, as for example President Kumba Yalá in 2005 (Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009).

The second cluster is composed of eight countries four of which have experienced alternation in government at least once (Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritius and Sao Tome and Principe) and four, which have been ruled by the same political party since the first lower house election (Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa). This latter group challenges Pridham's (1990) premise that democratic consolidation implies transfer of power between parties in government and opposition, while at the same time raising issues about vertical accountability (Doorenspleet 2003; Diamond and Morlino 2004; Bogaards and Boucek 2010). Nevertheless, these four cases differ substantially from other dominant party systems here analyzed – e.g. Nigeria, Mozambique, or Burkina Faso – in the extent to which, Botswana Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa have a better combination of levels of institutionalization, political freedom and mobilization. These countries can be categorized as of adequate institutionalization since the highest levels of institutionalization are coupled with

the highest levels of mass mobilization and the best FH ratings, *vis-à-vis* the other two clusters.

Table 3.3 – Results of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis: PSI, Electoral Participation and Democratization

Cluster	N	PSI Index		Turnout (%)		FH scores	
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation
1	5	24,6	1,0	68,8	6,6	3,3	0,7
2	8	29,1	1,6	73,8	7,5	2,2	0,5
3	6	27,9	1,5	55,8	6,9	3,8	0,3
Total	***19***	***27,6***	***2,3***	***66,8***	***10,4***	***3,0***	***0,9***

Table 3.4 – Qualities of institutionalization

Countries	Inadequate institutionalization	Adequate institutionalization	Overinstitutionalization
Benin	X		
Botswana		X	
Burkina Faso			X
Cape Verde		X	
Gambia, The			X
Ghana		X	
Guinea-Bissau	X		
Lesotho	X		
Malawi	X		
Mauritius		X	
Mozambique			X
Namibia		X	
Nigeria			X
Sao Tome and Principe		X	
Senegal			X
Seychelles		X	
South Africa		X	
Tanzania			X
Zambia	X		
Total	***5***	***8***	***6***

Finally, the third cluster assembles those countries, which are also highly institutionalized (27.9), but that at the same time exhibit the lowest rates of turnout (57,2%) and the highest FH scores (means less free) (3.7): Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania. These six countries face the critical problem of creating stable party systems while increasing their scope and promoting change in society. These are overinstitutionalized party systems, in which institutionalization outstrips mobilization and political change, thus bringing about a problem of inertia as political institutions are

autonomous and strong, but not sufficiently adaptable (Ben-Dor 1975). Apart from Senegal, which is probably less well represented in this cluster, all other countries have dominant party systems headed by an asymmetrically strong political party that has proved unable to further the process of democratization in its several arenas, particularly in what regards political participation.

3.5 Balance: comparing measures of party system institutionalization

In this chapter, a partly new framework for analysis is proposed in order to measure the institutionalization of African party systems. To what extent has it arrived to similar or different conclusions *vis-à-vis* other models of institutionalization? Despite emphasizing distinct dimensions and indicators and covering different sets of countries and electoral years, it is possible to find certain commonalities between previous models proposed in the literature to measure PSI in Africa and this one. Table 3.5 features the ranking of PSI of the most popular studies to date. Starting with the countries that have been analyzed in all models there is a group of five, which is consistently ranked as stable or highly institutionalized – Botswana, Cape Verde, Namibia, and South Africa – while two – Zambia and Benin – usually figure amidst the weakly institutionalized. At the same time, there is a great variance in the way countries like Senegal, Seychelles, Malawi or Nigeria, among others, are placed across models. Certainly, some of this variance can be explained by the different time frames and indicators covered for each country; there remain, however, some important differences between them. Taking the steady case of Seychelles as an example we make our point clearer.

The Seychelles is highly ranked in our PSI index, but it is less well classified by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and it stands out as fluid in Lindberg's model (2007). We have seen throughout this chapter, however, that in the Seychelles one single political party (SPPF/PL) wins, on average, 80% of the parliamentary seats at stake since the first lower house election in 1993, making this one of the least favorable settings for new political parties, merging and splinter groups. Based upon these structural indicators we argued that Seychelles is a clear case institutionalized party system. This assumption was supported by the analysis of eleven indicators that solely measured the patterns of interparty competition across several arenas within the polity – electoral, organizational, legislative and governmental. Because of its scope our measure is better at depicting what is going on in African party systems, and because there is not confusion between levels and elements, the outcomes are easier to interpret and straightforwardly indicate what the structural features of PSI are. Lindberg

(2007) has only focused on legislative stability, while Kuenzi and Lambright (2001), Basedau (2007) and Riedl (2008) have combined different levels and elements of institutionalization in their models, hence equating party institutionalization, voter turnout and attitudes towards democracy with the institutionalization of party systems. In this sense, even though we have kept some of the indicators proposed in these models (for example electoral and legislative volatility), we have eliminated those we found conceptually problematic (party age, legitimacy of party and elections), and added others that have never been measured in African countries (alternation in government, legislative and electoral strength of merging and splitting parties).

Table 3.5 – PSI in Africa: comparing models

Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) PSI rank (N = 30)	**Lindberg (2007) LS rank (N = 21)**	**Basedau (2007) TIS rank (N = 28)**	**Riedl (2008) PSI Rank (N=23)**	**Sanches (2011) PSI Rank (N = 19)**
1. Botswana	**Stable party (*)**	**High**	1. South Africa	1. Botswana
2. Gambia, The	Botswana	1. Botswana	2. Botswana	2. Namibia
3. Namibia	Cape Verde	2. Cape Verde	3. Namibia	3. Cape Verde
4. Senegal	Djibouti	3. Mauritius	4. Senegal	4. Seychelles
5. South Africa	Ghana	4. Namibia	5. Mozambique	5. Mozambique
6. Zimbabwe	Malawi	5. South Africa	6. Cape Verde	6. South Africa
7. Cape Verde	Mauritius	6. Cameroon	7. Ghana	7. Gambia, The
8. Malawi	Mozambique	**Medium**	8. Tanzania	8. Tanzania
9. Côte d'Ivoire	Namibia	7. Sao Tome and Principe	9. Sierra Leone	9. Senegal
10. Mauritius	Nigeria	8. Gabon	10. Mauritius	10. Mauritius
11. Central African Rep.	South Africa	9. Sierra Leone	11. Sao Tome	11. Ghana
12. Seychelles	Tanzania	10. Ethiopia	12. Kenya	12. Sao Tome and Principe
13. Sao Tome and Principe	**De-stabilized**	11. Central African Rep	13. Niger	13. Nigeria
14. Burkina Faso	Kenya	12. Eq. Guinea	14. Guinea Bissau	14. Guinea-Bissau
15. Congo	Senegal	13. Guinea	15. Malawi	15. Burkina Faso
16. Kenya	**Fluid**	14. Togo	16. Burkina Faso	16. Lesotho
17. Madagascar	Benin	**Low**	17. Gambia	17. Malawi
18. Benin	Burkina Faso	15. Benin	18. Lesotho	18. Zambia
19. Eq. Guinea	Lesotho	16. Mali	19. Zambia	19. Benin
20. Gabon	Madagascar	17. Burkina Faso	20. Nigeria	
21. Ghana	Mali	18. Comoros	21. Benin	
22. Mauritania	Sao Tome and Principe	19. Congo	22. Madagascar	
23. Zambia	Seychelles	20. Djibouti	23. Mali	
24. Djibouti	Zambia	21. Gambia, The		
25. Togo		22. Niger		
26. Cameroon	(*) countries are ordered alphabetically within each category.	23. Nigeria		
27. Lesotho		24. Zambia		
28. Mali		25. Chad		
29. Niger		26. Côte d'Ivoire		
30. Comoros		27. Mauritania		
		28. Zimbabwe		

Another advantage of our measure *vis-à-vis* predecessors is that it clearly detaches the processes of institutionalization, mass mobilization and political change as recommended by

Huntington (1965, 393). He argued that only by separating these processes, would it be possible to analyze the reciprocal interactions between the on-going processes of modernization, on the one hand and the strength, stability, or weakness of political structures, on the other hand. This reciprocal interaction, in turn, resulted in different qualities of institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975) as the Cluster Analysis has helped us to demonstrate in the African sample. In this sense, our analysis has revealed that party systems vary not only in level but also in quality of institutionalization.

In the following chapter we use our measurement of PSI as a dependent variable in a regression analysis, by means of which the main explanations of party system development in Third Wave democracies are tested.

CHAPTER IV – SOURCES OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION

In the previous chapter the level of PSI was defined and measured in 19 Sub-Saharan African countries for lower house elections held between 1966 and 2011. The descriptive analysis showed that party systems varied both at levels of institutionalization and across different formats of party system. Thus, if we were only to compare party systems on the basis of the number of parties, we would be assembling under the same label party systems – either dominant, two-party or multiparty – with varying degrees of institutionalization. An additional finding revealed that party systems could be distinguished not only in terms of level but also in terms of the quality of institutionalization for while some party systems were adequately institutionalized others were inadequately institutionalized or overinstitutionalized. Building upon these results, this chapter focuses on the following question: "why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?" Since Mainwaring and Scully (1995), scholars have become increasingly interested in the topic of institutionalization, especially in its operational measurement. Yet, less attention has been devoted to the analysis of its sources and mechanisms. This chapter contributes to bridging this gap with the help of a pooled time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) regression analysis of the sources of PSI. It is organized in five sections. Section 4.1 starts from literature on party system development to test six explanations of PSI which unfold in nine hypotheses: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8) and electoral participation (H9). Section 4.2 indicates the variables that will be used to test each hypothesis while referring to measurement and sources. In Section 4.3 a descriptive analysis of all variables is conducted and, finally, in Section 4.4 the results of the TSCS regression analysis are discussed. This analysis has innovative aspects, in that it includes a new hypothesis, namely party funding/finance and suggests an alternative way to model the effect of more mainstream explanations (for example, time and ethnicity), while controlling for rival explanations (for example president turnover and type of electoral system). Finally, Section 4.5 summarizes what has been achieved by this chapter.

4.1 Explaining party system institutionalization

While institutionalization has emerged as one of the most interesting political questions since the inception of the Third Wave of democratization (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Mainwaring 1998, 1999), the systematic analysis of its causes has attracted less interest. In fact, when assessing the causes of party system change or stability, whether from a regional or cross-regional perspective, scholars tend to rely on one indicator (electoral volatility) or dimension (stability) rather than on institutionalization as a unitary concept. Some examples that have been extensively referred to throughout this dissertation are related to the works of

Roberts and Wibbels (1999), Tavits (2005), Mainwaring and Torcal (2005), Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and Ferree (2010). In most of these studies, a great effort has been made to identify the sources of party system stabilization across countries and time while testing the applicability of Western-based hypotheses, which seem to establish a linkage between social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), contingent factors (e.g. policy distances, the number of parties competing, electoral participation, short-term economic performance) and the varying degrees of electoral volatility/ party system stabilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990). This chapter builds on the findings produced within this field of literature to study the sources of PSI in Africa. Despite focusing on one indicator of institutionalization (namely stability) these studies, and several others we refer to in the subsequent parts of this section, propose an interesting research agenda that is far from being fully assessed in the case of African countries and which we will carry out. Using our PSI index as a dependent variable we test six explanations of PSI, partly as Mainwaring and Zoco (2007). Thus, we propose social structure, institutionalization over time, institutional design, party and party system characteristics, economic performance and electoral participation as predictors of PSI.

The next six parts of this section address each one of these explanations along with the hypotheses that derive from them. Within institutional design a new hypothesis is tested for the first time in the African sample: the extent of regulated party funding/finance. This is done while other hypotheses (for example fragmentation, ethnicity and economic performance) and competing explanations (president turnover and electoral system) are also considered. Moreover, the way the relationship between certain variables and PSI is modeled is innovative. Particularly in what regards institutionalization over time, the model includes time as the passing of years since the first multiparty election and time as the number of years a polity has lasted unchanged. The analysis carried out about ethnicity is also original in the sense that it includes a combined index of ethnic fractionalization while also controlling for the individual effects of linguistic, religious and ethnic fractionalization. In this sense, this analysis provides for a new approach to old hypotheses while including a new hypothesis and controlling for a quite distinct and comprehensive set of alternative variables.

4.1.1 Social structure

African societies are characterized by different layers of linguistic, religious and ethnic fragmentation. According to Erdmann (2007a; 2007b), this is the most essential social

cleavage in Africa, when it comes to explain party formation and voting behavior. Thus, its inclusion in this study is more than natural.

«There are roughly 1000 tribes across Sub-Saharan Africa, most with their own distinct language and customs» (Moyo 2009, 32). They have persisted since pre-colonial periods, despite undergoing changes that have to do, for instance, with a new spatial distribution during the colonial and immediate postcolonial period (Migdal 1988; Thomson 2004). Furthermore, they played a leading role in the process of national and state building and continued doing so in the new multiparty framework. In light of this, several studies have discussed how the African party systems – unlike Western European countries where party systems were mainly structured along the functional dimension[53] – were largely influenced by territorial dimension, from which the ethnic and regional divides emerge (Hodgkin 1961; Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Manning 2005). Hodgkin's (1961) seminal study classified the earliest party formations in Africa in four groups: 1) inter-territorial parties, which transcended the frontiers of single states; 2) territorial parties which take as their field of operation a given colonial or independent territory and the population contained within its frontiers; 3) regional, ethnic, or tribal parties with limited range of influence to a particular region or a particular community based on ties of history, culture, religion or kinship and finally 4) "dwarf" parties that were restricted to the inhabitants of a particular locality. From the 153 major political parties operating in Africa between 1945 and 1960, more than 60% were territorial political parties, while 15% were ethnically or regionally-based parties. The ethnic and territorial sources of Africa's contemporary parties and party systems can thus be traced to the first wave of party formation and mass mobilization in the continent (1945-1960).

In line with Hodgkin, Manning (2005) argues that new parties and party systems emerged mainly from already crystallized territorial and ethnic cleavages, and out of the elites' urgent need to compete in the new multiparty setting. The introduction of multiparty elections, however, brought some limitations, albeit formal, and to some extent cosmetic, to the mobilization of these type of cleavages in party competition. In fact, several countries included legal bans on particularistic, regional and ethnic-based political parties (Bogaards

[53] The functional dimension results from the industrial revolution and expresses two types of conflict: (i) the conflict between land interest and the rising class of industrial entrepreneurs and (ii) the conflict between owners and employers on the one hand and tenants, and workers on the other hand. The functional oppositions can only develop after some initial consolidation of the national territory. Therefore, it is required that the nation building process is completed, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1990, 99).

2007; Bogaards, Basedau, and Hartmann 2010)[54] in their constitutions or party regulations, even if, in practice, only few countries actually used these provisions and denied registration or banned existing parties (Hartmann and Kemmerzell 2010). Regardless of the extent to which these bans are actually being implemented, their simple formal existence has implications for political competition. Salih (2003) makes a point that these provisions could have led many political parties to strategically adopt names that reflect some ideological orientation – e.g. liberal, democratic, social, socialist, or conservative – instead of a territorial or ethnic preference, despite the fact that their true political offer is anchored in ethnic and territorial issues and ideology plays a limited role in party politics (Salih 2003, 27-28).

In the same vein, Norris and Mattes (2003) conducted a comparative quantitative study on 12 African states[55] using Afrobarometer data and found out that ethnicity strongly influenced party identification and voting behavior. Using a different methodology, in the sense that the study is based upon a range of country-specific case-studies (Sudan, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Ethiopia), Salih (2001) reaches similar conclusions. More specifically, the backing of an ethnic group – the dominant ethnicity – plays an important part in the electoral victory of certain political parties. While highlighting the role of ethnicity, these studies also point to other relevant factors, namely political parties' ability to enact strategic alliances in constituencies of smaller ethnic groups (Salih 2001), the rural-urban cleavage, the role of age and the impact of education (Norris and Mattes 2003). Elsewhere, the presence of such social cleavages has been considered relevant for the stabilization of political systems as they solidify the ties between parties and the public, thus increasing the predictability of political outcomes (Tavits 2005, 287). This line of argument follows the seminal study by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) about the basis for the stability of West European party systems. Nonetheless, in the African continent, cleavages are not primarily functional but territorial instead; and higher levels of ethnic fractionalization have been associated with higher levels of political instability and to the weakness of political institutions (Horowitz 1985; Noyoo 2000; Alesina *et al.* 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Salih and Nordlund (2007, 26) defend that «ethnic mobilization, whether for political party formation, electoral campaigns or patronage, is commonplace and, when combined with economic disparity and inequitable access to

[54] Bogaards, Basedau and Hartmann's (2010, 611) study tells us that « [...] it is the group of less democratic regimes that actually ban political parties, at least partially as a strategy to control the opposition. Or, in countries which have witnessed an alternation of authoritarian and (more) democratic periods, such as Nigeria, [...] that ethnic party bans are implemented by outgoing military regimes and much less so in the new democratic dispensations».

[55] The twelve states are: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Zambia, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi and Mali.

political power, could (and has actually) become a source of long-drawn-out conflicts, with far reaching destabilization effects». Lastly, Ferree's (2010) study is also revealing in that it shows that «African countries with a single majority ethnic group have systematically lower volatility levels than countries with no majority ethnic group or countries with multiple nested majority groups» (Ferree 2010, 779). Taken together, these studies lead us to *H1: PSI will be lower where levels of ethnic fractionalization are higher.*

4.1.2 Institutionalization over time

The relationship between time and institutionalization has proved challenging in numerous analyses of Third Wave party systems. While some analysts (Converse 1969; Bartolini and Mair 1990) argue that party systems will become more stable over time as voters come to identify with certain parties, more recent research shows that party systems in less-developed countries rarely experience a linear pattern of development (Bielasiak 2002; Mainwaring and Torcal 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007). Mainwaring and Zoco's (2007) broad comparison between new and old democracies in Europe and Latin America, did not confirm the hypothesis of gradual strengthening of party identification (Converse 1969) or of stabilization of the electoral competition over time (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967). It is true that their analysis did not include African countries, yet the descriptive remarks made so far tend to highlight a pattern of non-linearity (Bogaards 2008) and in some cases of non-institutionalization (Lindberg 2007) from a longitudinal perspective. Adding to this discussion, Ferree (2010) has sustained that the time of birth of the democratic polity «cannot explain variations amongst new democracies as all of these have come into being at the end of the twentieth century» (Ferree 2010, 772). Although sustaining that «the institutionalization of a party system is a process that takes time», Rose and Mishler (2010, 802) also acknowledged that «institutionalized party systems can become 'protected by mechanisms that restrict and moderate the impact of new parties', including such cartel mechanisms as state funding» (Ibid.). For post-Communist countries Tavits (2005) found that, rather than being linear, the relationship between time and stability was positive during the first few years of democratic experience and turned to negative in more recent years. All these studies suggest multifaceted relationships between time and institutionalization (or stabilization).In the African case, however, the two studies here mentioned (Lindberg 2007; Bogaards 2008) suggest that time plays a limited role on the institutionalization of party systems given the non-linear patterns of development found. In this sense we expect that *H2: Time (as the*

number of years since the first multiparty election) has no significant effect on institutionalization and that there is a decreasing trend in the more recent years.

A second "time" perspective is the number of years a polity has stayed unchanged. Indeed, while the majority of countries here analyzed may have introduced multiparty elections in the beginning of the 1990s, some have experienced important reversals in more recent years and/or have altered the nature of the regime[56]. Other studies reveal that changes in the political institutions of a given society impact the long term stabilization of Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and Western European party systems (Bartolini and Mair 1990). All this leads us to *H3: institutionalization will increase if the polity is durable.*

4.1.3 Institutional design

Neopatrimonialism and its web of informal networks – personalism, clientelism and tribalism – are usually associated with politics in Africa. On the one hand, numerous studies have underlined neopatrimonialism as the foremost institutional legacy from the pretransition authoritarian regimes in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 2003; Riedl 2008; Young 2012). On the other hand, research about formal political institutions is more modest, and particularly recent. In this context, the works of van Cranenburgh (2003, 2008, 2011) are very relevant and telling in so far as she shows how the institutional context, namely the choice for presidential, semipresidential or parliamentary forms of government may affect the survival, but also the quality and the performance of democratic regimes. Notwithstanding, several other studies have contributed to map the institutional landscape of African polities. For example, Posner and Young (2007), Prempeh (2008), Lobo and Neto (2009) and Neto and Lobo (2012) focused on the form of government and on the length of presidential powers, while Lindberg (2005) and several contributors of the book *Votes, Money and Violence Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Basedau, Erdmann, and Mehler 2007) focused on the electoral institutions and party systems.

This section follows in the steps of these studies, therefore suggesting that the institutionalization of party systems can be determined by the institutional context within

[56] Just to mention a few examples: Lesotho experienced serious political violence in the wake of the 1998 elections. The events required the establishment of The Interim Political Authority (IPA) which became something of a parallel Parliament until 2002 when fresh elections took place. In Guinea-Bissau, alleged or *de facto* coup d'état led by the military constantly undermine the development of stable and durable political institutions from the onset of mulipartism. For instance, in 2003, President Yala was overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Verussuni Correia and, in 2009 and 2008; members of cabinet were killed or exiled for suspicion of staging a coup (See Polity IV country reports of Lesotho and Guinea-Bissau)

which it develops. Even though, at this point, we are mainly thinking about formal political institutions, we acknowledge that political institutions are bound both by formality and informality (Hall and Taylor 1996). Thus, later in this dissertation when we focus on the mechanisms of PSI, we will seek to encompass the informal dimension of institutionalization in our analysis. For now we focus on the design of formal institutions at the central level considering regulated party funding/finance and form of government.

The issue of party funding has been debated for a long time in Political Science covering several countries from all continents (van Biezen 2000; van Biezen 2004; van Biezen and Kopecký 2007; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Bermann and Daintith 2006; Ohman 2012), including Africa (Pottie 2003; Bryan and Baer 2005). In the context of new democracies, particularly, it is believed that financial resources are determinant to sustain a democratic party system, as political parties need resources to be able to physically exist (e.g. office, staff, recruitment of officials) and to develop their activities (e.g. socialization and mobilization of voters) (Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Yet, this is not consensual. In fact, in a much wider discussion it is possible to find different points of view on whether public or private funding should be made legal and on when whether it should be given in a particular moment (election campaigns) or as a means to sustain political parties' activities outside the electoral period (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 89-90).

Proponents of public funding usually defend that political parties should be treated as public utilities, subjected to wide regulations and endowed with funds, given that funding provides a living space to the opposition political parties and enables the representation of minority groups – women and youth – in the political sphere. Those who disfavor public funding think that grassroots participation should be encouraged and that political parties' sustainability should result from their ability to mobilize their members (about this debate see among several, Fambom 2003; Saffu 2003; Austin and Tjernström 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In new African democracies, however, the majority of the citizens are poor; hence mobilizing mass membership on the basis of income may prove useless. Moreover, because political parties are shaped from above, resulting from factionalism and personalism (Manning 2005), they lack societal and territorial implantation and face several difficulties to become financially self-sufficient, principally where state funding is lacking or is poorly regulated. As result, in most African countries, political parties (especially those in opposition) end up relying «on a small core group of individuals, businessmen and women, and foreign donors, party-to-party networks and fraternal organizations for funding their activities» (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 91). This can have far reaching effects on the nature of

linkage between parties and their constituencies, which may be furthermore framed by personalistic and clientelistic relationships. In the context of post-Communist European countries, Booth and Robbins (2010) confirmed that campaign finance and donation restrictions can effectively thwart PSI. In this sense *H4: PSI will be higher where provisions for party funding/finance are more extensive.*

The effects of the form of government in the way a given political system functions are quite established known. For instance, Stepan and Skach (1993, 17) argued that parliamentary systems are more virtuous for democracy, as they support single-party coalition majorities, minimize legislative impasses, and discourage political society's support for military coups; whereas presidential regimes are more prone to conflicts, discourage the formation of durable coalitions, maximize legislative impasses, and stimulate political society to call periodically for a military coup. Lijphart (2004) equally disfavors presidentialism as it inherently limits possibilities for power sharing, whilst van Cranenburgh (2011, 444-445) calls attention to the risks of high levels of presidential power for the survival of democracy. Differently, Shugart (1999, 53) has argued that the assumption that parliamentarism is a superior form of government for purposes of "consolidating" new democracies, is erroneous by the simple fact that «parliamentary democracies are located in the most-developed regions of the world and most presidential democracies are located in Latin America or other less-developed regions» which:

> tend to be especially large and complex societies, highly unequal in their income distribution, and with great regional disparities. These are countries that may be expected to have difficulty sustaining democracy, whatever its constitutional form, but presidentialism may actually be more suitable for most of them (Shugart 1999, 53).

As far as semipresidential regimes, the findings are mixed as well. While some authors such as Pasquino (1997) argue that it is positive to democratization, others sustain that it must be avoided in new democracies as the inherent potential for conflict between the president and the prime minister may damage the prospects for successful democratization (Lijphart 2004; Valenzuela 2004). With a different nuance Elgie (2005) and later Elgie and Moestrup (2007) defend that the problem might actually reside on the nature of presidential power; as countries:

> with both a highly personalized presidential-like system and countries where there was a very clear balance of power between the president and prime minister would be worse than that of countries with a system in which the prime minister was the main actor. Highly presidentialized semi-presidential systems are likely to encourage political croneyism and arbitrary presidential action. Countries with a balance of presidential and prime ministerial powers may experience gridlock, especially during periods of cohabitation. By contrast, semi-presidential countries in which the prime minister is the dominant actor in the executive might be expected to operate more efficiently, with the president acting as a figurehead and/or as someone who intervenes at times of crisis as a way of trying to stabilize the situation (Elgie and Moestrup 2007, 243-244).

This position has also been sustained by Lobo and Neto (2009) and Neto and Lobo (2012) in their analysis of semipresidentialism in Portuguese speaking countries. In what concerns the effects on party systems, Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) argue that presidential forms of government bring more harm to institutionalization *vis-à-vis* the other variants, because of the personalizing vote for the head of government. In fact, they are found to be more vulnerable:

> to political outsiders with anti-party proclivities. The incentives to develop party organizations and to build enduring ties between parties and voters might be weaker, leading to higher electoral volatility. In contrast, in parliamentary systems the assembly elects the head of government, making parties the gateway to controlling executive power. Presumably, the incentives to building strong linkages between parties and voters should be stronger in parliamentary systems, leading to lower electoral volatility (Mainwaring and Zoco 2007, 162).

Based on this study, Ferree (2010) also controlled for the effect of presidentialism in her study of electoral volatility in African countries. She found no significant effects (but a negative association) when analyzing the data from a pooled time-series cross-sectional perspective. Yet, when she used average values of volatility per country (thus only cross-sectional) presidentialism proved a strong correlate (with positive association). To the extent to which these studies can be applicable to the study of electoral volatility and of PSI in new democracies, they seem to suggest that: *H5: levels of institutionalization will be lower in presidential regimes.*

4.1.4 Party and party system characteristics

This section considers endogenous factors, namely fragmentation (number of competing political parties) and party institutionalization (average age of political parties)[57]. The number of political parties alone (Duverger 1959), or accompanied by other criteria (Dahl 1966; Blondel 1968; Sartori 1976), has been a universal element to classify party systems and to establish differences across countries. It has profound impacts on the political system as a whole (representation, nature of public policies, government stability, *inter alia*) and it strongly influences the kind of rules of competition which will emerge and the likelihood they will endure in the future. According to Pedersen (1983) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), electoral volatility is influenced by the number of parties in competition, as « [...] the probability that each individual voter will vote for the same party in two consecutive elections will decline as the number of different available options increases», hence limited political offer is expected to diminish the level of volatility, therefore increasing the level of institutionalization and stabilization. This proposition remains uncontested as several studies confirm the positive relationship between volatility and the number of political parties [see, among several: Crewe (1985) for Western European countries; Remmer (1991) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin American countries; Birch (2001) and Tavits (2005) for post-Communist European countries; and Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and Ferree[58] (2010) for African countries]. Building upon these findings we expect that, *H6: PSI will decrease as the number of parties in the political system increase.*

Also commonly associated with party system development is party age, which is often used as an indicator for the institutionalization of individual parties (Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Tavits 2005). This association makes sense as according to Huntington's (1965, 395) original conceptualization, «the longer an organization or procedure has been in existence the higher the level of institutionalization». In the same line Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Mainwaring (1998; 1999) argue that the older the age of political parties, the stronger their

[57] Other properties of party systems are the degree of polarization and the cleavage structure. It is, however, extremely difficult to make a reasonable measure of these concepts with the existing data (party documents such as statuses, programs and electoral manifestoes are often unavailable). Moreover, political parties in Africa hardly use labels such as right or left to define themselves; being mainly defined by a territorial and ethnic dimension as Manning (2005) and Erdmann (2007) demonstrate. In some cases, they adopt labels like socialist, democrat, liberal, conservative, workers in their names, even if party politics is not based in those ideologies (Salih 2003).

[58] Ferree (2010) finds a strong correlation between the Effective Number of Political Parties and volatility although she argues «it is unlikely that the standard explanation for this relationship (policy polarization) explains the correlation in Africa» (2010, 778).

roots in society and the level of systemic institutionalization[59]. The inclusion of party age is, therefore, relevant because it allows testing whether the institutionalization of individual parties reinforces that of party systems. As several authors point out (Randall and Svåsand 2002b; Wolinetz 2006), the relation between the system and its parts is far from being equivalent. In fact, a party system may consist of individual parties at drastically different levels of institutionalization but it may also be the case that the systemic and the individual elements strengthen mutually in the course of time. This last premise has proven to be right in several studies: Tavits (2005) found a positive linearity between the average age of political parties and the level of PSI in post-Communist Europe, whereas Meleshevich (2007) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999) also confirm this hypothesis in their model of party system development in Post-Soviet and Latin American countries, respectively. As for the African countries, there seems to be a puzzling scenario in which historical parties coexist with more temporary party formations (that appear and disappear from one election to another) that are often weakly organized and lack internal democracy (Lynch and Crawford 2011; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In this sense, we expect more stable patterns of interaction to emerge where parties have endured, therefore *H7: PSI will increase with increased average age of parties.*

4.1.5 Economic performance

Observing the developing societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America, during the 1960s Huntington (1965, 1968) noted that despite their levels of modernization (e.g. rapid urbanization, Gross National Product (GDP) growth, mass media circulation and electoral participation) they had made little progress towards many of the goals identified with political development at that time (e.g. democracy, stability, structural differentiation, achievement patterns, national integration). In fact, «instead of a trend toward competitiveness and democracy» there had been «an 'erosion of democracy' and a tendency to autocratic military regimes and one-party regimes» (Huntington 1965, 391). He therefore, concluded that rapid modernization produced political decay and recommended political scientists to assess modernization and political development separately.

This debate about the economic sources of political development arose in the 1960s and amplified as the wave of democratization spread throughout other regions of world, during the

[59] We note however that Mainwaring and Scully (1995) use this indicator as a measurement of systemic institutionalization while we use it as a measure of party institutionalization, as Tavits (2005) and Roberts and Wibbels (1999).

1990s. Indeed in several studies mentioned in the previous sections, indicators of economic development (such as GDP, inflation, urbanization, unemployment) were incorporated in the analysis of party system development. According to Bartolini and Mair (1990) short-term factors such as voters' perception of the economy influence vote shifts, thus increasing party system instability. As hypothesized on the basis of the literature on economic voting, poor economic performance can have negative effects on governing parties (Remmer 1991; Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and enhance electoral volatility together with democratic accountability (Bellucci, Lobo, and Lewis-Beck 2012). This proposition is applicable to the cluster of consolidated or advanced democracies, but it reaches beyond these as economic variables (GDP and inflation) are found to be strong statistical correlates of stabilization in new democracies of Eastern Europe (Tavits 2005) and Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999). In the sample of African countries, however, Ferree (2010) found a similar association, but the effect found was not statistically significant. Based on these studies, we formulate that *H8: The better the economic performance the higher the level of institutionalization.*

4.1.6 Electoral participation

Recent analyses of electoral participation in Africa have mainly focused on finding the driving factors of voter turnout, or on identifying what is behind citizen's choice for incumbent or opposition parties. It is known, for instance, that institutional variables such as the type of electoral formula and the concurrency of presidential and legislative elections have significant effects on electoral turnout (Kuenzi and Lambright 2007). Furthermore, it is also generally accepted that individual and demographic variables such as party identification, support for democracy and age (Kuenzi and Lambright 2010), influence individuals' propensity to vote. Additional explanations have highlighted the relevance of ethnicity to explain citizens' support for the governing party and overall voting behavior in Africa (Salih 2001; Norris and Mattes 2003; Erdmann 2007a; Erdmann 2007b), whereas more sophisticated arguments have suggested that citizens' evaluations of the state of the national economy and of the government's policies are relevant in their decision to cast their votes on the incumbent or on the opposition party (Lindberg 2013). Within this emerging literature, little is known about the effects of turnout in party system development, even though this has been found to play a key role in its long term stabilization (Bartolini and Mair 1990).

According to Bartolini and Mair (1990), changes in the level of electoral participation (measured by voter turnout) constitute an important component of any explanation of

differentials in party system stability (measured by electoral volatility) in Western democracies. In their view, the relationship between these two measures is far from being a «[...] simple linear relationship in which each percentage increase in turnout is associated with a given percentage increase in volatility [...]» (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 175). In fact, their findings suggest three possible associations: (i) between the «[...] enfranchisement of major blocks of new voters [...]» and high volatility; (ii) beyond a certain threshold of changes in turnout – either of increases or decreases – and volatility and (iii) and between the incidence of elections characterized by high levels of turnout and variance in volatility levels across the different countries in the different phases. While some exceptions to these patterns were found, […] the bulk of cases demonstrate the existence of a clear relationship in which high incidence of change in levels of participation is associated with a high mean of level of volatility» (Bartolini and Mair 1990, 185). In this sense, *H9: The higher the changes in voter turnout – both an increase or a decrease – the lower the degree of PSI.*

Having outlined the main hypotheses that will be tested in this study the following section proceeds with the description of how each variable was measured. The sources used will be also indicated.

4.2 Independent and control variables: Measurement and data

The hypotheses listed above will be examined with the help of a regression analysis of PSI in 83 lower house elections of 19 Sub-Saharan African countries[60]. Thus, apart from PSI scores, our dataset includes a series of indicators to measure each independent and control variables. In this section we will present the precise way in which these variables were constructed. The full list of variables is presented in Table 4.1.

Social structure is measured by Alesina et al. (2003) ethnic fractionalization index (http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1). The advantage of using this dataset is that it includes individual scores for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization. Thus, it allows testing the combined and individual effect of the components of ethnic fractionalization. Other interesting complements to ethnicity could be the urban vs. rural divide (Tavits 2005), the union's density or the size of the informal sector (Roberts and Wibbels 1999); yet, lacking comprehensive data prevents us from replicating these variables.

[60] 102 elections were observed in total, but one electoral year is lost in the calculation of the indicators of PSI.

To test the explanation of institutionalization over time we use two variables: time measured as the years since the first multiparty elections and polity durability measured as Polity IV "durable" variable, which indicates «the number of years since the last substantive change in authority characteristics»[61] (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm). This differentiation matters since according to Roberts and Wibbels (1999) and Bartolini and Mair (1990), changes in the nature of political institutions can potentially affect the level of party system stabilization. Contrary to the first "time" variable, we expect this second one to have a more substantial effect on institutionalization, for where the contours of the polity are more stable political parties are likely to establish more stable patterns of interaction since they know the rules of competition and what they stand for.

Institutional design is measured with two variables. The first accounts for provisions guaranteeing and regulating party access to funding and is measured by an additive index that varies between 0= weakly regulated party funding/finance and 11= highly regulated party funding/finance. To create this index we used IDEA's Political Finance Database (http://www.idea.int/political-finance/index.cfm), which has global data on party funding. The data is not temporal, but it is very rich since it covers more than 40 items. From this pool we have selected 11 items[62], which are clustered in three dimensions, namely party funding/finance, regulations of spending; and reporting, oversight and sanctions. Since all items are coded "yes" or "no", what we did was merely assigning the score "1" when the answer to the item was "yes" and the added all scores into an additive index.

The second is the country's form of government, which is measured with a dummy variable for presidentialism. To create this variable, we first classified the countries according to their forms of government. The definition of presidential and parliamentarian regimes is quite consensual and straightforward «if the cabinet depends exclusively on the confidence of

[61] Polity IV codebook describes DURABLE as follows: Regime Durability: The number of years since the most recent regime change (defined by a three point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or less) or the end of transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (denoted by a standardized authority score). In calculating the DURABLE value, the first year during which a new (post-change) polity is established is coded as the baseline "year zero" (value = 0) and each subsequent year adds one to the value of the DURABLE variable consecutively until a new regime change or transition period occurs. Values are entered for all years beginning with the first regime change since 1800 or the date of independence if that event occurred after 1800(http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2012.pdf).

[62] The 11 items/questions are: 1. Are there provisions for direct party funding/finance to political parties? 2. Are there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for political parties? 3. Are there provisions for free or subsidized access to media for candidates? 4. Is there a ban on vote buying? 5. Are there bans on state resources being used in favor or against a political party or candidate? 6. Are there limits on the amount a political party can spend? 7. Are there limits on the amount a candidate can spend? 8. Do political parties have to report regularly on their finances? 9. Do political parties have to report on their finances in relation to election campaigns? 10. Do candidates have to report on their campaigns finances? 11. Is information in reports from political parties and/or candidates to be made public?

the majority of the assembly», we have a «system of parliamentary cabinets»; «if cabinets are accountable to the president – who, therefore, may dismiss them or individual ministers for strictly political reasons – we have a system of presidential cabinets [...]» (Shugart 1999, 56-57). Nonetheless, the most hybrid variant, semipresidentialism, has been defined variously. Some use both normative and constitutional dispositions do define it (Duverger 1990), whereas others focus on the length of presidential powers and on the analysis of different subtypes of semipresidentialism, therefore discussing the relevance of the presidential, parliamentary and semipresidential trichotomy (Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003; Lijphart 1997). To deal with the ambiguity of the existing definitions of semipresidentialism, Elgie (2004) proposes a new definition based on two constitutional dispositions: (i) a popularly elected fixed-term president and (ii) a prime minister and cabinet that are collectively responsible to the legislature. This conceptualization is more operative than the previous ones because it is minimal and purely constitutional. In this sense it minimizes the variance that occurs when more subjective criteria (notably the length of the presidential powers) are also considered in the definition of the regime.

Regarding party and party system properties, fragmentation is measured as Laakso's and Taagepera's (1979) Effective Number of Electoral Parties (ENEP) in terms of vote share[63]. This is probably the most popular measure of party system fragmentation and it has been used in numerous studies about party system development in Third Wave democracies (Tavits 2005; Ferree 2010). Party institutionalization is measured by party age, which is calculated as the average age of political parties with 10% of the votes in the last lower house elections[64]. Imagine the following vote distribution for an election taking place in 1999: Party A wins 50% of votes; Party B 20%; Party C 15%; Party D 5% and other parties receive the remaining 10% of votes. To compute this indicator only Party A, B and C would be considered, since they won at least 10% of the votes. If party A was founded in 1950, party B in 1960 and party C in 1970 then, the average age of political parties with 10% of votes in 1999 would be = (49+39+29)÷3 = 39 years. This formula has been suggested by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and has already been applied to African countries by Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) and, more recently, by Riedl (2008) who lowered the threshold to 5% of the votes.

[63] For party system fragmentation Roberts and Wibbels (1999) use Remmer's (1991) indicator which is computed as follows: take the percentage of the vote obtained by the top two parties in the previous election, and subtract it from 100, so that higher scoring will be associated with greater fragmentation.

[64] Due to the majoritarian nature of African political institutions and the resulting low party system fragmentation the 10% thresholds allows to include the main competitors of the political arena.

To test the effect of economic performance on PSI, we consider GDP annual growth (%) using World Bank data (available online at http://data.worldbank.org/; accessed 05-08-2011), and inflation, consumer prices (annual %); using the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook data (available online at http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm; accessed 30-01-2013) [65]. Electoral participation is measured as change in voter turnout, which expresses the differences in turnout in two consecutive lower house elections.

Table 4.1 – Independent and control variables: measurement and data

Explanation	Variable: Indicator (data source)
1. Social Structure	**Ethnicity**: ethnic fractionalization index; 0 = homogeneity, 1 = heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 2003)
2. Institutionalization over time	**Time:** years since the first multiparty election **Polity durability**: years since last change in the authority/regime characteristics (Polity IV Database)
3. Institutional design	**Party funding/finance**: 0 = weakly regulated party funding/finance, 11 = highly regulated party funding/finance (IDEA Political Finance Database)
	Presidentialism: 1 = if presidential, 0 = otherwise (categorized as Shugart 1999; Elgie 2004)
4. Party and party system characteristics	**Fragmentation**: ENEP (author's own calculation as Laakso and Taagepera 1979)
	Party institutionalization: party age (author's own calculation as Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kuenzi and Lambright 2001)
5. Economic performance	**Short-term economic performance** GDP annual growth (%)(World Bank) Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (International Monetary Fund – IMF)
6. Electoral participation	**Turnout change:** change in voter turnout (IDEA Voter Turnout Database)
Controls	**Lagged dependent variable of PSI** (calculated in STATA)
	Number of Presidents
	Dummy for majoritarian electoral system/ 1 = majoritarian electoral system, 0 = otherwise (Norris 1997; Nohlen, Thibaut, and Krennerich 1999; IPU PARLINE Database on National Parliaments and ACE Electoral Network)
	Individual components of ethnic fractionalization: ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization; 0 = homogeneity, 1 = heterogeneity (Alesina et al. 2003)
	Dummy for quality of PSI: 1 = adequate institutionalization, 0 = inadequate institutionalization and overinstitutionalization

[65] Alternative indicators are unemployment rates, consumers' confidence in the economy, purchase power, but these are not available for the entire period of analysis.

In addition to these independent variables, we have incorporated several control variables in our analysis as suggested by the literature. As Table 4.1 also shows, we control for (i) the type of electoral system, (ii) the number of presidents elected during the election period covered, (ii) the individual effect of the components of ethnic fractionalization and, finally (iii), the different qualities or types of PSI (adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization). The general hypothesis about the role of electoral systems is that majoritarian systems are good for government effectiveness and accountability, while proportional systems promote greater fairness to minority parties and more diversity in social representation. This assumption stems from studies that focused on Western countries (Lijphart 1994; Blais and Massicotte 1996; *inter alia*), but also in African countries (Lindberg 2005). Despite this general proposition, several other studies have shown that especially in new democracies, and divided societies such as the Africans ones, the effects of electoral systems (namely conflict resolution, representation, fragmentation and stability) are largely contingent or context-dependent. For example, according to Reilly and Reynolds (1999):

> where ethnicity represents a fundamental political cleavage, particular electoral systems can reward candidates and parties who either act in a cooperative, accommodatory manner to rival groups; or they can punish these candidates and instead reward those who appeal only to their own ethnic group. However, the "spin" which an electoral system fives to the system is ultimately contextual and will depend on the specific cleavages and divisions within any given society (Reilly and Reynolds 1999, 6-7).

In similar ways, Bogaards (2007) has argued that the old controversy around proportional or plurality elections loses most of its relevance in ethnically divided societies because of the territorial concentration of ethnic groups. Ferree (2010), however, found no significant effect of the electoral rules, namely of district magnitude over the degree of party system stability in Africa. Since there is not a consensual hypothesis about the role of electoral systems we include it as a control rather than as an independent variable.

Considering the number of presidents a country has had since the first multiparty election also seems relevant to us, since the interruption of president tenure by death, impeachment, resignation or unlawful removal from office, can potentially entail party system instability. This is more evident in presidential regimes – and to lesser extent semi-presidential regimes – since the president holds powers of cabinet formation and dismissal

and competition for government is primarily determined by the results of the presidential elections.

Following Posner's (2001; 2005) cautionary notes regarding the use of ethnicity as a unitary concept exclusively, without considering its different layers, we control for the components of ethnic fractionalization individually[66]. Finally, in light of the findings presented in the previous chapter, we control for whether the association between the main independent variables and the dependent variable holds when we contrast adequate to inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems.

Finally, we introduced a lagged dependent[67] variable which apart from delivering a temporal dynamics over the data, allows us to control some of the shortcomings usually associated with TSCS data, namely the independence of observations and serial correlation. Several approaches were used to treat this kind of data[68] , but the one introduced by Beck and Katz (1995) and Beck (2001), namely the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs), is considered as the "de-facto-standard" approach precisely because it allows dealing with both homoscedasticity and serial correlation:

> In particular, for OLS to be optimal it is necessary to assume that all the error processes have the same variance (homoscedasticity) and that all of the error processes are independent of each other. The latter assumption can be broken down into the assumption that errors for a particular unit at one time are unrelated to errors for that unit at all other times (no serial correlation) and that errors for one unit are unrelated to the errors for every other unit (no spatial correlation) (Beck and Katz 1995, 634).

With Beck and Katz's (1995) PCSEs, the assumption of equal variance of errors is not violated and it is also possible to deal with serial correlation by fitting lagged values into the model. In our data serial correlation could occur if the current level of PSI is strongly influenced by its past value. Thus, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable allows for

[66] Posner (2001, 2) argued that «[...] under the umbrella term 'ethnic', communal conflict can take many forms. Sometimes competition takes place along religious lines. At other times competing groups are distinguished from one another by language. At still other times in-group/out-group distinctions are made on the basis of tribal affiliation, clan membership, geographic region of origin, or race. Within a single country, each of these distinctions may serve, in different situations, as a potential axis of social differentiation and conflict». This "fluidity" particularly applied to the Zambian case where the author found out that the relevant ethnic axis at the local level was the tribe while at national level language (Posner 2005).

[67] With the creation of a lagged variable we include not only the current level of PSI but the past (lag) level of PSI as an independent variable.

[68] Namely OLS regression with cluster-robust standard errors, first differencing, random effects and fixed effects (for a comprehensive discussion see Wooldridge 2000; Allison 2009; Cameron and Trivedi 2009).

controlling this effect. Even though there are some problems with the use of lagged variables, they remain, for the most part, highly recommended. Achen (2001), one of the supporters of Beck and Katz's approach, sustains that the specification with the lagged variable is always preferred even if the values and the direction of the coefficients change drastically. Similarly, Keele and Kelly (2006) note that, although «the lagged dependent variable is inappropriate in some circumstances, it remains an appropriate model for the dynamic theories often tested by applied analysts». Beck and Katz OLS with PCSEs can be estimated in STATA with the command *xtpcse*, while the lagged dependent variable must be computed manually and enter the model along with the other independent variables[69].

4.3 Independent and control variables: Descriptive analysis

In this section, descriptive statistics for the independent and control variables are featured. We start by displaying the results of basic univariate statistics (mean and frequencies) and continue with the analysis of bivariate associations between the independent variables and the dependent variable (see Tables 4.2 and 4.3).

Beginning with social structure, the average ethnic fractionalization is 0.6 (this index varies from 0-1), with more layered societies being the former British colonies of Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. Nigeria, Africa's most populous country, is composed of more than 250 ethnic groups (among which Hausa and Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3,5%, Tiv 2,5%). The dominant religious views are Muslim (50%) and Christian (40%) and the official language is English (but there are over 500 indigenous languages; e.g. Hausa, Yoruba, Igbo, and Fulani) (see Nigeria CIA Factbook sheet). Zambia's population is mainly constituted by Africans (99,5%) (73 ethnic groups including Bemba, Tonga, Chewa, Lozi, Nsenga, Tumbuka, Ngoni, Lala, Kaonde, Lunda, and other African groups); between 50%-75%, of the population is Christian and 24%-49% is Muslim and Hindu. There are eight official languages (Bemba, Nyanja, Tonga, Lozi, Lunda, Kaonde, Luvale and English) and several other dialects (see Zambia CIA Factbook sheet). On the opposite side, the Creole societies of Sao Tome and Principe, Cape Verde and Seychelles are the least fragmented ones. Sao Tome and Principe is mostly constituted by *mestiços*, *forros* (descendants of freed slaves), *tongas* (children of *serviçais* born in the islands), and Europeans (primarily Portuguese) and the overwhelming majority of the population is

[69] To create the lagged dependent variable from the original variable named *PSIindex* we used the following command*: generate* PSIindexlag = PSIindex *[_n-1]*.

Catholic (70%) and speaks Portuguese (official language) (see Sao Tome and Principe CIA Factbook sheet). The Cape Verdean population is mainly Creole (71%) and African (28%), pertains to Roman Catholic religion, and speaks Creolo (a blend of Portuguese and West African words) and Portuguese (official language) (see Cape Verde CIA Factbook sheet). The Seychellois people are a mixture of French, African, Indian, Chinese, and Arab. They are mostly Roman Catholic (82,3%), and 91,8% speak Creole and English (official language) (see Seychelles CIA Factbook sheet)[70].

On average, the number of years since the introduction of multiparty elections is 14 years, whereas the durability of polities is 12 years (see Table 4.2). While for some countries these values are identical, in several others they vary and this variance has two sources. In the first place, we find differences which result from the way time and polity durability were calculated. For instance, Botswana and Mauritius are the two longest lasting democracies in Africa. They introduced multiparty elections in the aftermath of independence and remain uninterrupted democracies hitherto, thus both polities are durable. Yet, there is a difference in the number of years of the two variables. This happens because, while "time" counts the years from the onset of multipartism, "durable" starts counting from the first year after independence (1967 for Botswana and 1969 for Mauritius). Secondly, and most importantly, we find differences which result from a discontinuity in the rules of the polity; namely in Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia. We next provide two examples.

In Guinea-Bissau, elections and democratic tasks have been interrupted by several episodes of intense political conflict between the Head of State and the military junta, and peace has been threatened on several occasions (Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009). In the wake of the first multiparty elections in 1994, civil war broke out after the army chief of staff, General Ansumane Mané, was dismissed by President Joao Bernardo Vieira in June 1998. The Abuja peace accord signed on 1 November 1998 put an end to five months of rebellion and presidential and legislative elections were scheduled for March 1999. In February 1999, a temporary government of national unity headed by Prime Minister Francisco Fadul took office and three months later another action led by General Mane, ousted President Vieira. The military junta named National Assembly Speaker Maladan Bacai Sanhá Interim President and established a timetable for the return of democratic governance. In the 1999/2000 elections, Kumba Yala was declared Head of State (in the second round)

[70] An additional source about ethnicity is the *Encyclopedia of the South of Sahara*.

only to be overthrown in a bloodless coup led by General Verussuni Correia Seabra on 14 September 2003. Guinea-Bissau's return to constitutional rule was completed in July 2005 with the holding of presidential elections won by Joao Bernardo "Nino" Vieira. Rivalry between President Nino Vieira and the head of the Armed Forces, General Baptista Tagme Na Wai, resulted, however, in the assassinations of both men on consecutive days (see Sangreman et al. 2006; Azevedo 2009; Guinea-Bissau IPU Parline and Polity IV Country Report 2010[71].). More recently, a military conflict (in 2010) and two coups, one attempted and another effective (in 2011 and 2012, respectively) have occurred.

In Lesotho, political order has also been destabilized by several violent revolts since the first general election between 27 and 29 March 1993. The post electoral crisis in 1993-94, as well as in 1998, resulted from discontentment of the opposition parties in face of the government's general fraud and electoral malpractice. In both contexts a more violent form of contestation took place, namely disgruntled army factions also joined opposition parties in military actions. Unlike what happened in 1993-94, in 1998 the King did not take an active role in the opposition campaign, and violence was only effectively controlled with the intervention of troops from Botswana and South Africa and with the LCD's compromise to organize a new poll within 18 months. In order to pave the way for these elections, an Interim Political Authority (IPA) was established in December 1998. It consisted of two members from each of the country's twelve main political parties, and it was empowered to make significant reforms in the political system by functioning as a parallel government. The elections of 2002 were again won by the LCD, only this time without violent reaction to the results (see Lesotho IPU Parline and Polity IV Country Report 2010[72]). Conversely, countries like Namibia, Seychelles, Cape Verde and Mozambique have been characterized by stable polities from the onset of multipartism. It should be noted, though, that stable does not mean absence of political conflict, but simply that the political conflict did not result in changes in authority patterns, which is what Polity IV "durable" measures.

Considering the institutional variables; semipresidential regimes are the most frequent form of government (N = 9), followed by the presidential (N = 6) and the parliamentary forms (N = 4)[73]. This distribution largely reflects the regional situation, as more than half of the

[71] http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/GuineaBissau2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013).
[72] http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Lesotho2010.pdf (accessed on 09-02-2013).
[73] In Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia, elections for the presidency and the parliament were always held in concurrency. During shorter periods this was also the case of The Gambia (until 1996), Guinea-Bissau (until 2004), Senegal (until 1988) and Seychelles (until 1998). In all other cases – except for Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa which are parliamentarian – the two elections are held separately.

states in Sub-Saharan Africa are semipresidential (Elgie 2007). This institutional landscape has been linked with the colonial background of the countries. In fact, van Cranenburgh (2003) has shown that countries with British background tended to follow, in most cases, the Westminster parliamentary model; while those with French background were mostly inspired by the prototype of the French Fifth Republic, consequently adopting semipresidential regimes with strong presidents. An institutional resemblance is also found among former Portuguese colonies that adopted semipresidential regimes (Lobo and Neto 2009; Neto and Lobo 2014).

In the majority of countries (for instance Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe and Tanzania) the forms of government have been largely stable since they were introduced. In a few cases, however, there have been attempts to amend certain dispositions. The case of Senegal is one of complete change. The country had a presidential regime until 7 January 2001 when it adopted a semipresidential constitutional framework. In other countries, changes (attempted or successful) have mostly aimed at extending the presidential mandate (Vencovsky 2007). For example, Presidents Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso and Sam Nujoma of Namibia were able to secure constitutional amendments that allowed them to stand for a third term in office, and they eventually won the subsequent election (Vencovsky 2007, 17), while the Presidents of Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), Malawi (Elson Bakili Muluzi) and Zambia (Frederick Chiluba) were less fortunate since they saw their attempts of constitutional amendment blocked by the parliament and they also faced contestation from civil society (Vencovsky 2007, 18-19). In Sao Tome and Principe, the National Assembly started a process of constitutional amendment aimed at reducing the powers of the president and at strengthening the powers of the government and the parliament in 2001 (Seibert 2009). Part of the revised Constitution was approved in 2003 in the aftermath of long political crisis between the incumbent President Fradique Menezes, who wanted to hold a popular referendum on the new constitutional text, and the political parties represented at the parliament, which considered that there was no need of submitting constitutional amendments to referendum (Ibid.).

Laws regulating parties' access to funding/finance are more or less widespread in the sample. As Table 4.2 displays, Benin (11) and Cape Verde (10) are the countries where dispositions for public funding, regulations of spending; and reporting, oversight and sanctions are more detailed. Countries with no public funding at all – Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, Senegal and Zambia – still have minimal provisions regarding free or subsidized access to media for political parties, bans on vote buying and on state resources

being used in favor or against a political party or candidate. The section in which regulation seems to be missing is on reporting spending as, in almost half of the countries, there are no provisions demanding the periodical report of finances – some examples are Botswana, Cape Verde, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles and Zambia.

Regarding party system fragmentation, the average number of electoral parties (ENEP) for the 19 countries analyzed is 3, which is a strikingly low number, especially when compared to other recently-democratized countries. In the case of post-Communist Europe, there are, on average, 28 effective parties competing in parliamentary elections (Tavits 2005). Thus, this aggregate indicator alone seems to confirm the distinctive nature of African party systems in what concerns its low levels of fragmentation (e.g. Salih 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Carbone 2005). Yet there is some cross-country variation. The overwhelming majority of the countries (N = 14) are below the observed average, with more extreme cases being Seychelles and The Gambia, where the mean ENEP is approximately 2. Only five countries score above this figure. These are the following, in ascendant order of fragmentation: Sao Tome and Principe, Malawi, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau and Benin. The latter has the most fragmented party system with average ENEP of 9.

Concerning party age, the results indicate that African political parties are fairly old (mean = 24 years) when compared with the ones competing in post-Communist elections (mean = 7 years) (Tavits 2005). Older political parties are found in the Seychelles (25 years), Cape Verde (30 years), Malawi (30 years), Senegal (32 years), Namibia (35 years), Mozambique (36 years), Mauritius (41 years) and South Africa (50 years). The latter's, ANC is the oldest political party in Africa. Founded in 1912, it was the major contributor to the end of the apartheid regime and, since 1994 it is the country's dominant party. In Mauritius, the major political parties are also the oldest ones, namely the PT, the PMSD and the MMM founded, respectively in 1936, 1955 and 1969. These parties have been able to elect representatives in nearly all elections since 1976 and had the opportunity to lead the country, by turns and in coalition governments as well. In the remaining 11 countries, the age of political parties ranges between three years (Burkina Faso) and 24 years (Lesotho). Burkina Faso is the country with the youngest political parties in the parliament with the CDP and the ADF-RDA, having been founded in 1996 and 1998, respectively.

Economic performance is operationalized by variables that portray the state of the economy at the time of election (GDP and inflation). The interpretation of the results must, however, be inserted in the long term. It is known that in most African countries the «[...] policy focus of the post-independence years» was «[...] state control of the 'commanding

heights': to ensure balanced growth and income equality» (Kayizzi-Mugerwa 1999, 275). Notwithstanding, the failure of this model and the economic crisis of the 1970s led many countries to adopt structural adjustment policies in the early 1980s, which in many cases signified wide privatization of state owned companies and the contraction of public spending (Ibid.). After this period, and with the democratic opening, the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa have done much better in several indicators that measure human welfare (infant mortality, literacy, school enrollment etc.) and economic development (GDP per capita, annual growth) (Sender 1999). Despite the fact that the poorest countries in the world are situated in this continent, World Bank data shows that the economy is performing better than in the first years of independence and, generally, resisting the 2008 world crisis. In fact, between 1995 and 2012, GDP averaged 5% in Sub-Saharan African countries (Kaberuka et al. 2011, 17).

The 19 countries in our sample also record an annual GDP growth of 5%. Performing better than this average are the economies of Senegal (5,1%), Sao Tome and Principe (5,3%), Malawi (5,4%), Namibia (5,6%), Ghana (5,6%), Seychelles (5,8%), Zambia (6,1%), Botswana (6,5%), Cape Verde (6,8%), Tanzania (6,8%), Mozambique (7,5%) and Nigeria (7,9%). In the remaining seven countries, the GDP average growth per year is lower than 5%. South Africa, the continent's biggest economy[74], has the lowest GDP growth rates (mean = 1.7%), when compared to other economies in the southern region of Africa (e.g. Tanzania and Mozambique), even though this situation has improved since 1994. According to du Plessis and Smit (2007):

> South Africa's real economic growth rate averaged 3,1 percent (1,1 percent in per capita terms) during the period 1995-2004 [...]. This represented a substantial improvement on the 0,8 percent average growth rate (- 1.3 percent in per capita terms) registered in the decade from 1985-1994. Although this was a welcome improvement, South Africa's growth performance remained relatively low by world standards [...] (du Plessis and Smit 2007, 3).

Neighbor Nigeria, in turn, has the fastest GDP growth, being also one most developed economies in Africa (average GDP per capita is 1046.414 US$). The GDP increased from 1,1%, in 1999 to nearly 7% in 2011 and reached its peak in 2003 (10%). The main booster of

[74] The average GPD per capita in the period covered is 4512,042 US$. In 2010 South Africa was invited by the BRIC countries to join the group.

the economy is the oil industry; the country was rated the 12th largest producer of petroleum products in the world in 2012.

Regarding inflation rates, the mean value is 10% annual change. Fourteen countries have lower percentages while five have higher ones. Within the first group, rates are inferior to 4% in four countries (Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Seychelles) whilst in the remaining cases inflation ranges between 4,1% (Benin) and 9,7% (Lesotho). Rates above 10% are found in Nigeria (10,1%), Zambia (20,5%), Malawi (21,5%), Ghana (24,7%) and Sao Tome and Principe (28,0).

Electoral participation, as the percentage of voter turnout, has been mentioned before in this dissertation. In Chapter II we saw that countries like Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Senegal had the lowest turnout averages (below 60%) in lower house elections, while electorates of Mauritius, Seychelles and South Africa, figured amid the most participative ones (above 80%). In Chapter III, we coupled levels of institutionalization, democratic performance and turnout in a Hierarchical Cluster Analysis that delivered three outcomes of institutionalization: adequate, inadequate and overinstitutionalization. In this chapter, we focus on turnout changes from one election to the next. Table 4.2 shows that five countries – Mauritius (2,2%), Seychelles (3,9%), South Africa (5,2%), Lesotho (7,8%) and Benin (8,6%) – have a relatively stable share of voters across elections (less than 10% change), whereas nine countries exhibit changes from 11% to 16%. These are, in ascending order, Botswana, Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia. Finally, five countries register more than 16% of change in voter turnout – Guinea-Bissau (16,1%), Senegal (16,2%), Namibia (18,1%), Mozambique (19,9%) and Ghana (20,1%).

Table 4.2 also includes data for the number of presidents, the type of electoral system and the quality of PSI, which are the control variables. Since the latter has already been extensively analyzed in the previous chapter (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4) we will focus solely on the first two variables. Starting with the number of presidents, we find that in some countries there is limited turnover – Burkina Faso (1), The Gambia (2), Mozambique (2), Namibia (2), Seychelles (2) and Tanzania (2) – while in others there has been more alternation in the position of the Head of State – Ghana (4), Lesotho (4), South Africa (4), Zambia (4), Guinea-Bissau, (6) and Mauritius (6). In Burkina Faso, Blaise Compaoré has been the country sole Head of State since December 1991 after successfully changing the Constitution to be able to run for a third mandate. Blaise Compaoré seized power in 1987 after a coup d'état in which Captain Thomas Sankara, who had established a Marxist–Leninist regime in 1983, was killed

(Grotz 1999), thus he has been in power for more than 20 years now. In Mozambique Frelimo's leaders Joaquim Chissano (1994-2005) and Armando Guebuza (2005- to present) were elected for two consecutive terms each. In Namibia Sam Nujoma (1990-2005) and Hifikepunye Pohamba (2005 -to present) have succeeded in presidency. As his counterpart in Burkina Faso, Sam Nujoma was also able to change the Constitution so as to be allowed to compete in the subsequent election.

In Sao Tome and Principe the relationship between the president and the cabinet has been hostile from the outset of the first multiparty elections in 1991 (Seibert 2009). In fact, between 1991 and 2004 five political conflicts resulted in the dismissal of the prime minister – these occurred in 1992, 1994, 2001, 2002 and 2004 (Ibid.). The presidents' position has also been threatened. Since 1991, the country has known three Heads of State, Miguel Trovoada (1991-1995; 1995-2001), Fradique Menezes (2001-2003; 2011) and Manuel Pinto da Costa (since 2011) who have occasionally been challenged by the military (in 1996 and in 2003).

Zambia' context is rather different as, unlike in Sao Tome and Principe; there has never been a situation of cohabitation between president and cabinet, since the same party controls both the presidency and the parliament. The first democratically elected president was Frederick Chiluba (1991-2002). When his attempt to run for a third mandate failed, he backed Levy Mwanawasa who had been his Vice-President until 1994 and had lost the run to party presidency in 1996. Levy Mwanawasa was elected in the 2001 election and his tenure lasted until his death in 2008. Subsequently, Rupiah Banda served his first term as acting president (29 June 2008 – 2 November 2008) and his second term as popularly elected president after the 30 October 2008 election. In the following general elections, held in 2011, Michael Sata was elected president, in a contest that also marked the first alternation in power in 20 years.

In Malawi, one president also died in office, Bingu wa Mutharika, who had been nominated by previous president Elson Bakili Muluzi (in office between 1994-2004) as his successor. Mutharika's first term in office was between 2004 and 2008 and the second between 2008 and 2012. When he died, Joyce Banda, who had served alongside Mutharika as Vice-President for DPP, was sworn president, following constitutional provisions that stipulated that when the president dies the Vice-President must automatically assume power. This was not a pacific succession as Joyce Banda seized power as the leader of the People's Party; a party she formed after having been expelled from DPP in 2011.

Table 4.2 – Summary statistics for the independent variables

	INDEPENDENT VARIABLES										CONTROL VARIABLES		
	Time (years)	Polity durability (years)	Turnout change (average, %)	Ethnicity (0-1)	Form of Gov.	ENEP (average)	Party Age (average, years)	Party funding/ finance (0-11)	GDP growth (average, %)	Inflation (average, %)	No. Presidents	Electoral system	Quality of PSI
Benin	20	20	8,6	0,7	PR	9	9	11	4,1	4,1	3	PR	Inad.
Botswana	40	43	11,2	0,5	PAR	2	23	6	6,5	9,6	4	MAJ	Adeq.
Burkina Faso	15	17	12,7	0,7	SPRE	3	6	7	3,9	1,7	1	PR	Over
Cape Verde	20	20	11,4	0,2	SPRE	2	30	10	6,8	5,3	3	PR	Adeq.
Gambia, The	41	27	14,5	0,6	PR	2	14	4	1,9	9,7	2	MAJ	Over
Ghana	16	7	20,1	0,7	SPRE	2	10	7	5,6	24,7	4	MAJ	Inad.
Guinea-Bissau	14	4	16,1	0,7	SPRE	4	21	8	3,9	3,1	6	PR	Inad.
Lesotho	14	5	7,8	0,4	PAR	3	24	6	3,7	9,7	4	MAJ & MIX	Inad.
Malawi	15	15	15	0,7	PR	4	30	3	5,4	21,5	3	MAJ	Inad.
Mauritius	34	42	2,2	0,5	PAR	2	41	5	4,7	6,6	6	MAJ	Adeq.
Mozambique	15	15	19,9	0,7	SPRE	2	36	8	7,5	6,3	2	PR	Over
Namibia	20	19	18,1	0,7	SPRE	2	35	3	5,6	8,1	2	PR	Adeq.
Nigeria	19	12	15,7	0,8	PR	3	12	8	7,9	10,1	3	MAJ	Over
Sao Tome and Principe	19	19	12,2	0,1	SPRE	3	19	5	5,3	28	3	PR	Inad.
Senegal	14	20	16,2	0,5	SPRE	3	32	5	5,1	3,3	3	MIX	Over
Seychelles	18	18	3,9	0,2	PR	2	25	7	5,8	2,7	2	MIX	Adeq.
South Africa	15	15	5,2	0,8	PAR	2	50	4	1,7	4,6	4	PR	Adeq.
Tanzania	15	15	12,3	0,8	SPRE	2	24	9	6,8	6,5	2	MAJ	Over
Zambia	20	10	15,7	0,8	PR	4	20	4	6,1	20,5	4	MAJ	Inad.

Notes: Acronym for form of government: PAR = Parliamentary, SPRE = Semipresidential and PR = Presidential; Acronym for electoral system: PR = Proportional, MAJ = Majoritarian and MIX = Mixed; abbreviation for quality of PSI: Inad. = Inadequate institutionalization, Adeq. = adequate institutionalization, Over. = overinstitutionalization.

Regarding the electoral system for the lower house elections, the great majority of countries employ either majoritarian (N = 8) or proportional (N = 8) electoral formulas, while three countries only – Senegal, Seychelles and Lesotho – adopted mixed electoral formulas. In Lesotho, the only country that presents a complete change in electoral laws in the period analyzed, a mixed formula was adopted in 2002, substituting the first-past-the-post plurality formula, introduced in the 1965 elections. A combination of majoritarian institutions is found in The Gambia, Malawi, Nigeria and Zambia, where presidentialism is accompanied by majoritarian electoral formula, thus creating an incentive for the centralization of political power (van Cranenburgh 2003).

We close this section with the results of the bivariate analysis between the dependent and independent variables and the lagged dependent variable. They are presented in Table 4.3. Although the correlation matrix simply gives an association between two variables, without controlling the effect of other variables, it can provide a preliminary reading about our data. The strongest correlations are found between PSI and polity durability (corr. coef. = 0.3681), PSI lagged (corr. coef = 0.4638) and ENEP (corr. coef. = -0.5786). The correlation coefficients indicate that PSI increases when polities are stable for longer periods, and when its past value is also positive (PSI lagged). Conversely, lower levels of PSI are strongly associated with higher levels of fragmentation (ENEP). Moderate-to-low correlations are found between PSI and ethnic fractionalization (corr. coef = -0.2748), party age (corr. coef = 0.2311) and presidentialism (corr. coef = -0.2374). The association between PSI and the remaining independent variables – time, turnout change, party funding/finance, GDP and inflation – is low.

The results also display the bivariate correlations between the independent variables. Naturally, there is a strong correlation between time and polity durability (corr. coef = 0. 6541), since in some countries time and polity durability are the same while in others there is a difference between the two mainly due to changes in the nature of the polity. This is not problematic, however, as the individual effect of each variable is controlled in the regression analysis. Moreover, polity durability is associated with party age (corr. coef = 0.4192), party funding/finance with ENEP (corr. coef = 0.3788) and ENEP with the lagged dependent variable (corr. coef = -0.4865). This indicates that more durable polities are linked with older parties and that party funding/finance is more detailed in more fragmented party systems, what can make sense as competition for resources is higher in those contexts.

Table 4.3 – Correlation matrix: bivariate associations between dependent and independent variables

	PSI	Time	Polity dur.	Turnout change	Ethnicity	Presi.	ENEP	Party age	Party fund.	GDP	Inflation	PSI lagged
PSI	1											
Time	0.1768	1										
Polity durability	0.3681	0.6541	1									
Turnout change	-0.0925	-0.1508	-0.3419	1								
Ethnicity	-0.2748	-0.0509	-0.2010	0.1691	1							
Presidentialism	-0.2374	0.1075	-0.1400	-0.0071	0.1639	1						
ENEP	-0.5786	-0.0493	-0.1180	-0.0249	0.2311	0.2935	1					
Party age	0.2311	0.1061	0.4192	-0.2361	-0.0452	-0.3125	-0.2360	1				
Party funding/finance	-0.1020	-0.1296	-0.0741	-0.0503	-0.0485	-0.0803	0.3788	-0.2426	1			
GDP	0.0618	-0.1889	-0.0824	0.1568	-0.0465	-0.1429	-0.0721	-0.0409	0.1825	1		
Inflation	-0.0132	-0.2611	-0.1908	0.2232	-0.0894	0.1433	-0.1247	-0.1788	-0.2740	-0.1766	1	
PSI lagged	0.4638	0.1735	0.3130	0.1975	-0.1571	-0.1416	-0.4865	0.2375	-0.1656	0.1540	-0.0649	1

4.4 Sources of party system institutionalization: Analysis and results

Table 4.4 presents the results of three linear regressions with PCSEs (see full models in Appendix E). Model 1 includes all main independent variables and Models 2 and 3 add the lagged dependent variable to deal with serial correlation in the data and the control variables. All models provide some support for the theoretical explanations tested (*R* square = 46,2%, 52,1% and 55,9%, respectively). Model 1 features three statistically significant correlates of PSI. More stable polities are significantly related to highest levels of PSI (coef. = 0,103; *p* = 0,026), time, however, does not strongly increment the levels of PSI (the coefficient is negative, yet not significant). Also positively associated to institutionalization is party funding/finance (coef. = 0,152; *p* = 0,010), being that countries with more extensive provisions regulating party finances are associated to higher levels of PSI. The ENEP (coef. = -0,870, *p* = 0,000), conversely, is significantly associated to lowest levels of PSI indicating that more fragmented party systems are likely to be weakly institutionalized. Ethnicity and the remaining institutional and economic variables are not significantly related with PSI in this first specification.

With the introduction of the lagged dependent variable and the control variables – number of presidents, dummy variable for majoritarian electoral system and the separate index of religious fractionalization (Model 2) – one year of observation is lost, as previously mentioned (Section 4.2). Some changes in the size of the effects are evident but, overall, the

regression coefficients of ENEP, party funding/finance and polity durability remain statistically significant. There are also some interesting novelties which are worth pointing out.

Table 4.4 – Sources of PSI: Results of the linear regression with PCSEs (I)

	MODEL 1	***MODEL 2***	***MODEL 3***
Ethnicity	-1,206	2,390*	5,396**
Time	-0,0260	-0,00414	-0,00443
Polity durability	0,103**	0,109**	0,0936*
Party funding/finance	0,152***	0,0949*	0,130**
Presidentialism	0,00678	-0,401	-0,0949
ENEP	-0,870****	-0,999****	-0,924****
Party age	-0,00238	-0,00770	-0,00462
GDP	0,00814	0,0770	0,0704
Inflation	-0,00106	0,0159	0,0151
Change in voter turnout	0,00795	-0,0187	-0,0157
PSI lagged		0,0806	0,0422
Number of Presidents		-0,0934	-0,196
Electoral system (1= majoritarian)		-1,144**	-1,014*
Religious fractionalization		-2,271**	-3,836**
Adequate institutionalization (=1)			1,815**
_cons	29,15****	27,30****	26,48****
Observations	**83**	**82**	**82**
R square	***0,4623***	**0,5213**	**0,5599**

Notes: PCSE = Panel Corrected Standard Errors. Values correspond to regression coefficients.

Significant at *p<0,10, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01, **** p<0,001

The type of electoral system is, after all, a strong predictor of differentials in PSI in the sample, with countries with majoritarian formulas being significantly associated to lower levels of PSI (coef. = -1,144; p = 0,023). Ethnicity (composite index of ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization) also bears a relevant influence (coef. = 2,390; p = 0.086) when we control for the individual effect of religious fractionalization (coef. = -2,271; p = 0,047). Nevertheless, while the first changes into having a positive effect on PSI from Model 1 to Model 2, religious fractionalization on its own has a negative effect upon it. This apparent contradiction remains even when we repeat the analysis without the lagged dependent variable, which can sometimes be responsible for unclear changes in the size and direction of association between independent and dependent variables (Achen 2001; Keele and Kelly 2006).

To clarify this puzzle, we ran two additional models (Model 4 and 5 in Table 4.5) with individual indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious fragmentation, which revealed that while the two former have a positive effect on PSI the latter bears a negative effect upon it.

Table 4.5 – Sources of PSI: Results of the linear regression with PCSEs (II)

	MODEL 4	***MODEL 5***
Ethnic fractionalization	1,044	0,817
Linguistic fractionalization	0,443	0,517
Religious fractionalization	-2,749****	-2,359**
Time	-0,0299	-0,0218
Polity durability	0,107**	0,0908
Party funding/finance	0,126*	0,140**
Presidentialism	-0,666	-0,605
ENEP	-0,822****	-0,914****
Party age	0,00241	0,0000776
GDP	0,0622	0,0446
Inflation	0,00936	0,00883
Change in voter turnout	-0,00646	-0,0170
PSI lagged		0,107
_cons	28,94****	26,32****
Observations	***82***	***82***
R square	***0,4974***	***0,4934***

Notes: PCSE = Panel Corrected Standard Errors. Values correspond to regression coefficients.

Significant at *p<0,10, ** p<0,05, *** p<0,01, **** p<0,001

Besides this, the results also reveals that religion is the only component of ethnicity holding a statistically significant effect on all models estimated, and this occurred without major shifts in the main independent variables as Table 4.5 shows. These results support Posner's (2001; 2005) viewpoint that it can be deceptive to measure all components of ethnicity under the same umbrella for it is possible that one dimension of the ethnic cleavage can emerge as politically salient instead of another, in different contexts within and across countries. This can be an indication that the religious divide is more harmful to the institutionalization of party system than the linguistic and the ethnic divides in contemporary Africa.

Going back to the models presented in Table 4.4, we now discuss the results of Model 3 in which we controlled for the quality of PSI by introducing a dummy variable for adequate institutionalization having inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems as omitted variables. Briefly reviewing these categories, which have been examined in Chapter III (Section 3.3), adequate institutionalization labels cases in which party systems adequately

accommodated increased participation and political change. In our sample this description fits the countries with the highest levels of voter turnout, democratic performance and institutionalization (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa). Overinstitutionalization, the opposite category, labels cases in which participation and political change are silenced by a strong party system. Countries under this label combine the lowest levels of voter turnout and democratic performance with high levels of PSI (Burkina, The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania). Finally, the intermediate category – inadequate institutionalization – defines party systems that are too weak to encourage mass mobilization and promote political change. Thus, the lowest levels of PSI are combined with medium levels of voter turnout and democratic performance (Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe and Zambia).

The results of Model 3, which control for the quality of PSI, leave things basically the same, except for minor changes in the level of significances. Adequate institutionalized party systems have a positive correlation with highest levels of institutionalization *vis-à-vis* inadequate and overinstitutionalized party systems (coef. = 1,815; p=0,019). This may sound tautological, but it is not, for our analysis in Chapter III revealed cases of overinstitutionalized party systems coupled with elevate scores of PSI (e.g. The Gambia, Mozambique and Tanzania). Given these results, let us summarize the main findings.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter we sought to explain the sources of PSI variance across countries and time, testing six major explanations: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8) and electoral participation (H9). The results of the linear regressions with PCSEs (which explain between 46% and 56% of the variance found in the sample) provide some support for the theoretical explanations based on social structure, endurance of the polity and institutional design. In fact, countries with more durable polities, with the lowest levels of party system fragmentation, with extensive regulations for party funding/finance and with higher levels of ethnicity are associated to higher levels of PSI. The results also indicate, however, that the religious divide is the most prominent feature within ethnicity affecting the levels of PSI; with higher levels of religious fractionalization decreasing the level of PSI. Therefore, religion emerges as the cleavage with a larger potential of social differentiation and conflict in the sample. This makes sense if we consider that

religion is a singular social cleavage insofar as it is associated with differences among civilizations (hence implying different ways of understanding the world and social relationships) and it requires exclusivity (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002).

Models 4 and 5 clearly show that, while the linguistic and the ethnic divides have a positive, even if not statistically significant, effect on PSI the religious divide has a negative and strong effect on PSI. Recent studies, which have explored the relationship between ethnicity and economic development in Africa, have also arrived to similar conclusions. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2002)[75] found that religious polarization was better at explaining slow economic growth than ethnolinguistic fragmentation. Moreover, when both indexes entered the model together, ethnolinguistic fragmentation became insignificant, while the religious polarization remained a statistically significant predictor of poor economic performance. More recently, Kodila-Tedika and Agbor (2013) partly corroborated this result by finding out that religion had important effects on the development process through its effects on economic investment.

The fact that the religious divide emerges as crucial in our analysis, but also in the studies here quoted is particularly relevant since African societies are mostly known for their ethnic diversity, while religion, class and language tend to be more salient in the Western world (Horowitz 1985). Its relevance in our analysis opens this debate into considering the particular context within which these social cleavages are activated as well as their momentary and strategic mobilization by political actors. Macro-level changes also play a role here. Using time-series data from the World Christian Data base Kodila-Tedika and Agbor (2013, 2) insightfully note that Sub-Saharan Africa's religious landscape «has undergone profound changes from a monolithic African traditional religious society to an increasingly polarized religious society». More precisely, since the 1950s Christian and Muslim population have shown a dramatic increase from about 50% to 85% (combined) while traditional religions lost their followers (down from about 60% to 13% within the same period). This is a significant change that can also account for the saliency of the religious divide in relation to the others, in contemporary African societies.

Overall, the models displayed in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 reveal that, ENEP, party funding/finance and polity durability are strong predictors of PSI as they exhibit consistently strong correlations with PSI, even when we control for the quality of the model (fitting a lagged dependent variable) or for alternative explanations, such as the type of electoral

[75] Also in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)

system, president turnover and quality of institutionalization or when we run additional estimations with individual indexes for ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalization (Table 4.5). In this sense H1, H3, H4 and H6 are confirmed.

In the group of the control variables we find that the type of electoral system is also relevant in explaining variance in PSI, with majoritarian formulas being more correlated to lower levels of institutionalization than proportional representation and mixed formulas. This is a general finding for the total of 83 elections*countries observed in this study, but as usual there are outliers. For instance, in the case of Botswana the finding does not apply, however if we consider elections held in Zambia, Lesotho (until 2002) and Malawi it does make sense. This result relevance is two-fold. Firstly, it indicates that the type of electoral system matters for PSI in Africa. Secondly, it encloses an interesting puzzle since majoritarian formulas are usually associated with higher levels of stability, at least at the government level[76]. Therefore, it will be interesting to explore the effects of electoral institutions in our two case studies since Zambia's first-past-the-post elections create higher levels of fragmentation and weaker levels of institutionalization than Mozambique's proportional representation system. This analysis will take place in Chapter VI where we additionally show that the structure of the party system and the salience and/or activation of territorial cleavages (ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional) are important to understand how the mechanical effects of the electoral institutions (proportionality and fragmentation) actually work; but before that, the next chapter presents the framework for the comparison of the case studies.

[76] As Norris (1997) clearly puts it: «The aim of plurality systems is to create a "manufactured majority", that is, to exaggerate the share of seats for the leading party in order to produce an effective working parliamentary majority for the government, while simultaneously penalizing minor parties, especially those whose support is spatially dispersed. In "winner take all", the leading party boosts its legislative base, while the trailing parties get meager rewards. The focus is effective governance, not representation of all minority views.

CHAPTER V – THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION IN MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA: MECHANISMS AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Chapter IV tested key theoretical explanations in the analysis of the sources of PSI in African countries that held competitive and regular lower house elections until 2011. The results of the regression analysis consistently indicated polity durability, party system fragmentation, party funding/finance, religious fractionalization and electoral system as the foremost determinants of PSI. Economic variables, however, proved to bear a limited effect on the variance found in the sample. To the extent to which PSI has been measured and broadly explained, the two first research questions of this dissertation have been answered. Thus, following the scheme of the mixed method design here employed – explanatory sequential design – it is time to move forward to the qualitative strand in which the last research question – what mechanisms underlie variance in PSI? – is analyzed. As described in Chapter II, the main objective of this phase is to discuss the results delivered by the quantitative strand, carrying out a comparative analysis of two case studies – Mozambique and Zambia –, taking into consideration two types of mechanisms: environmental and relational ones. To set off and frame this part of the thesis, this chapter is organized around three main sections, which will facilitate the in-depth qualitative analysis in the following chapter. Section 5.1 displays the whole comparative scheme for the study of the mechanisms of PSI. In Section 5.2 Mozambique and Zambia are placed in the broad political context and the main highlights of party politics before and after multipartism are featured. Finally, Section 5.3 presents the main conclusions drawn from the analysis presented in this chapter.

5.1 Mechanisms of party system institutionalization

Providing answers to the question «what mechanisms underlie variance in PSI?» is the third goal of this dissertation. After an initial quantitative strand in which PSI was measured along three structural dimensions and explained in a medium-size sample, the study of this multilayered phenomenon is sealed with a qualitative strand by means of which the mechanisms of PSI are analyzed in two countries: Mozambique and Zambia.

This stage of the research is anchored in an all new set of methodological tools – case study methods –, whose purpose is to understand a larger class of units through the in-depth analysis of few units (Gerring 2004; Seawright and Gerring 2008). Case study methods are best known for their «orientation toward comprehensive examination of historically defined cases and phenomena» and for addressing «one of the central goals of comparative social science, that is to explain and interpret the diverse experiences of societies, nations, cultures

and other significant macrosocial units» (Ragin 1987, 53). In the context of an *explanatory sequential design*, case studies allow discussing the main results of the quantitative strand by telling the story behind the data. This is mainly done through the intensive collection and thorough analysis of various types of data (bibliographical, documental and archival sources and semi-structured interviews) covering the more prominent variables and dimensions observed in the previous strand; but it goes further than that. In fact, unobserved or new variables and dimensions can be included in order to refine the findings or the gaps left open by the quantitative analysis. We are, particularly, thinking on the *critical junctures* (Hogan 2006), during which major institutional changes are possible (e.g. path to democratic transition) and on relational features (e.g. clientelism, patronage, ideological or programmatic linkages between political parties and their constituencies), which are suggested by the literature as relevant both theoretically and empirically (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2003; Gyimah-Boadi 2007; Riedl 2008). These variables did not enter the quantitative analysis, because the elements we wanted to highlight regarding these – strategies, negotiations and informal networks – are better assessed qualitatively than quantitatively. Yet, this does not seem to be problematic, for Ragin (1987) has argued that theory can be used «to aid historical interpretation and to conduct the identification of important causal factors» (Ragin 1987, 54-55). Therefore, not all variables need to be suggested by or included in the quantitative strand.

This section features the mechanisms of PSI that will be comparatively analyzed in Mozambique and Zambia. They are of two types; environmental and relational. Environmental mechanisms are the model or schema of resources that embody the interactions and the lines of action of self- reflective strategic actors (Clemens and Cook 1999; Tilly 2001). As such, they regard the informational, structural and institutional context within which a party system develops. The relational mechanisms, however, concern political actors and their interpersonal networks (Tilly 2001). The same is to say that they regard the interactions (e.g. of cooperation, coercion, strategic coalition, patronage, clientelism and personalism) that unfold between the individuals or the collective actors within a particular arena on the basis of their resources.

The focus on environmental and relational mechanisms is justified by the type of data collected for this strand of the analysis (documental and archival sources and semi-structured interviews), but mostly by their theoretical and empirical value. In fact, these are meaningful dimensions of African politics, which is frequently assumed to be bound by contextual features and informal networks (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Salih and Nordlund 2007).

We focus on three environmental mechanisms, partly suggested by the quantitative analysis – path to democratic transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – and consider the relational mechanisms that shape the interactions: (i) between the political parties inside the system (party coalitions); and (ii) between the political parties and their constituencies. Drawing on scholarly work about the nature of the State, consensually qualified as neopatrimonial (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle 2003), the origins and the elements of intra-party competition, namely territorial cleavages, factionalism and lack of programmatic or ideological differentiation (Salih 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Erdmann 2007a; Gyimah-Boadi 2007) as well as party-citizen linkages in Africa (Osei 2012; Tobolka 2014), we expect that patron-client relationships will compose a large part of intra and extra party networks.

To research these mechanisms, we selected cases using Seawright and Gerring's (2008) *diverse case method*. This method is appropriate when the primary objective is the achievement of maximum variance along relevant dimensions that explain a certain political outcome. Mozambique and Zambia are ideal for this analysis and their choice is supported by, at least, three reasons. In the first place, they are different in the level and quality of PSI. On the one hand, we have Mozambique which has a highly but overinstitutionalized party system, in such ways that the party system cannot reinvent itself and promote change in society, while encouraging political participation. On the other hand, there is Zambia that is weakly and inadequately institutionalized and faces the problem of having weak political institutions, which are unable to channel higher levels of political participation into the political arena (detailed in Section 3.3, Chapter III). In the second place, they differ in several environmental features: Mozambique is semipresidential (not a consensual categorization[77]), with proportional representation (PR) formula for parliament and a two-round majority for presidency, and it adopted provisions regulating party finances and public funding from the onset of multipartism; whereas Zambia is one of the strongest presidential systems in Africa, being that the majority formula, first-past-the-post (FPTP) is used both for presidential and parliamentary elections. Moreover, Zambia is one of the few countries in Africa that does not have regulated public funding or any legal framework for party finance whatsoever. The variation across these institutional devices, which are partly inherited from the previous

[77] Because of its strong presidential powers (the president is, simultaneously, the Head of State and Head of Government) Mozambique's form of government has been categorized variously. It has been classified as presidential (van Cranenburgh 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright 2005), president-parliamentary (Shugart 2005), but also as semipresidential, with strong presidential powers (Macuane 2009; Manning 2007; Elgie and Moestrup 2007b; Neto and Lobo 2014).

colonial regimes (Portuguese and British), is relevant as previously indicated by the quantitative analysis. Thus, the third reason that supports this choice of cases is that it allows discussing the results of the previous strand of analysis in what regards two of the most relevant institutional features in the African sample – the party funding/finance and the electoral system.

Indeed, converging with the scholarly work about the value added of resources and funding for party and party system development, our analysis has shown that levels of institutionalization are higher in countries where public funding is granted and rules of party finance are widely regulated (Fambom 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Booth and Robbins 2010). This is particularly relevant in contemporary Africa where political parties mainly originate from above, out of factionalism and personalism, and therefore lack mass membership and territorial implantation and opposition parties face huge difficulties to ride a campaign and to "stay alive" outside the electoral period (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 83-84). The analysis of Mozambique and Zambia allows discussing the value of party funding/finance in the process of PSI, going beyond the mere legal framework, which was the emphasis of the previous chapter.

Regarding the influence of electoral institutions in African party systems, the studies are less conclusive. As previously noted, although electoral institutions may have similar mechanical effects to other places in the world (Lindberg 2005), they are found to be rather secondary in what regards delivering more or less stable party systems (Ferree 2010). As the relationship between electoral institutions and party systems is unclear, and sometimes considered secondary, the former was included in the regression model merely as a control variable. Surprisingly enough, the results showed that party systems with majoritarian electoral formula are less institutionalized. Yet these formulas are known for creating lower levels of parliamentary fragmentation and higher levels of stability at the government level. This finding created an interesting puzzle which, once again, can be satisfactorily researched in the two case studies, insofar as Mozambique's PR elections have produced a more stable party system than Zambia's FPTP system.

The path to democratic transition is also relevant for this analysis. Although not included in the quantitative strand, it is relevant in light of the transitology literature, which presents it as a critical moment of institutional crafting around which political cleavages (old vs. new elites, old vs. new political parties, old vs. new ideologies) are formed. Thus, the strategies developed and the choices made during this period are relevant for the institutional outlook of the upcoming regime. As previously argued, it is not problematic to include new

variables at this stage of the analysis. In fact, one of the advantages of conducting a mixed methods study is the possibility of collecting and adding new sources of information to discuss or ameliorate the gaps left either by the quantitative or the qualitative method. Once again, because Mozambique and Zambia differ in this dimension, the analysis of PSI benefits. Indeed, while the first had a two-fold war-to-democracy transition in which only the former belligerents took place, the latter experienced a transition to democracy with large input from civil society. We argue that these different modes of transition and the political decisions made during this period had important consequences for the nature of interparty competition in the upcoming political systems. In Mozambique, the political scenario remained polarized around the formerly warring political parties, even if an asymmetry eventually arose between them. Conversely, in Zambia, the broad-based nature of the contestation against the outgoing authoritarian regime – with inputs from civil society organizations, intellectuals, and students *inter alia* – resulted in a more pulverized party system, in which parties are frequently challenged by relational issues that often take the form of defections and splits.

Relational mechanisms, however, are not as divergent across cases as environmental ones. In fact, there is a consensual assumption that informality and personalism tend to influence intra and extraparty networks in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Salih and Nordlund 2007). Thus, our point in including relational mechanisms is not so much to establish great differences across the cases, but to analyze the web of informal networks that underlie the process of institutionalization in each case, while trying to access which relations are more prominent.

5.1.1 Environmental and relational mechanisms in review

As mentioned above, the path to democratic transition (structural), the electoral system, and the party funding (institutional) are the three environmental mechanisms that will be compared in Mozambique and Zambia. We now provide a brief literature review of each of them.

Path to democratic transition. The 1990s were fertile in studies about the nature and the agents of the Third Wave of democratization[78]. One underlying assumption of these studies was that the mode of transition – either pacted or revolutionary, with pressure from below or

[78] About Latin America, Eastern and Southern Europe see Mainwaring, Valenzuela, and O'Donnell (1992); Przeworski (1991); Linz, Stepan, and Gunther (1995); and Munck and Leff (1997). For a revision of some of these studies, see Munck (1994) and Epstein et al. (2006) for a cross-regional comparison see Anderson (1999)

conducted by the elite – influenced the probability that a more stable democracy would emerge (McFaul 2002, 213). Yet, this literature has also been inconclusive, due to the high variability of context-dependent factors, which have to do with how political actors calculate their odds at each point of the negotiation process[79]. It is not our purpose to review the entire body of literature addressing this topic, but simply to single out the most relevant studies from a cross-regional perspective so that we can apply the right categories to the study of Mozambique and Zambia.

Typologies for the mode of transition are numerous. Centering in Latin American and in new European democracies, Mainwaring (1989) distinguished scenarios of *transition through transaction,* in which the authoritarian regime chooses to continue opening the political system due to the high cost of staying in power or as a means to momentarily address a crisis; *transition through regime defeat*, in which the regime simply collapses and *transition through extrication*, in which the «authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains strong enough to dictate important terms of the transition» (Mainwaring 1989, 21-28). In the same pool of countries, Linz and Stepan (1996) distinguished four main different paths to democracy[80]: *reforma pactada/ ruptura pactada* (negotiated reform/negotiated rupture), *defeat in war* (or war-related collapse), *interim government regime after regime termination not initiated by regime* (coup by nonhierarchical military, armed insurgents, or mass uprising and regime collapse) and *extrication from rule by hierarchically led militar*y (Linz and Stepan 1996, 57-60). In the African context, Bratton and Van de Valle (1997) employed three criteria – if protest occurred, if there was political liberalization, and if the country completed a democratic election – to identify five basic transition paths: *liberalization following political protests*, *liberalization without democratization*, *democratization without protest*, *failure to democratize* and *precluded transition* (when neither protest or liberalization had occurred) (Bratton and Van de Valle 1997, 119). Their analysis showed that, even though the majority of the African states (28 of the 42 considered) experienced a transition sparked by popular protest and embarked in liberalization reforms, few completed the process of democratic transition (16 of 42). The different outcomes and paths towards democratization resulted from the nature of pretransition regime, with more competitive and participative regimes experiencing smoother and more successful transitions.

[79] For instance Bermeo (1999) shows that in many transitions processes including Portugal and Spain, the elites' calculations of the strength of the radical protesters proved to be more relevant for the course of the events than the actual pressure they put in at the negotiation table.

[80] Linz and Stepan (1996) identify seven variants in total. The three missing variants are labeled "regime specific paths" (57-60).

Focusing on a single type of transition, Jarstad and Sisk (2008a) edited a book entirely dedicated to war-to-democracy transitions, in which several African countries, including Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo are included. For Jarstad (2008), four dilemmas arise in this type of transition: *horizontal* (the relationship between the elites of warring parties and democratic political parties are placed in a trade-off between inclusion and exclusion); *vertical* (entails the choice between efficacy and legitimacy; for the sake of legitimacy, involvement of the people in all phases of the peace process is desirable, but for the sake of efficacy, certain negotiations need to be held in secret); *systemic* (refers to the issue of ownership; local versus international control of the processes of democratization and peacebuilding) and, finally, *temporal* (trade-offs between short-term and long-term effects on democratization and peacebuilding) (Jarstad and Sisk 2008b, 11; Jarstad 2008).

Even though Carothers (2002) has argued that the "transitions paradigm" is no longer a useful framework to understand political developments in contemporary World[81], we build on Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and van de Walle (2002) to argue that, at least in Africa, what happened during the transition period is highly relevant to understand the nature of the incoming political system. This assumption goes beyond the mode of the transition *per se*. In fact, it encompasses several aspects, which are difficult to encapsulate in the categories enumerated above. Since the moment of transition opens a window of opportunities for institutional crafting, negotiations held at that point and, more specifically, the main actors who initiated and controlled the different phases of the process are both of great significance (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995). Mozambique had a double transition from war to peace and to democracy, which was sealed with the *Acordo Geral de Paz*/ General Peace Agreement signed in Rome on 4th October 1992, between the former belligerents (thus, a *war-to-democracy or war-related transition*). Zambia, in turn had a negotiated transition, with the input coming from below. The incumbent authoritarian regime enjoyed some leeway in the beginning, but eventually acquiesced to negotiate a reforming agenda with the opposition movement (thus, *negotiated reform*). In the first case, the nature of transition polarized the political space around the warring past; and in the second, it created a challenge for the ruling

[81] Carothers (2002, 6) argues that: «The transition paradigm has been somewhat useful during a time of momentous and often surprising political upheaval in the world. But it is increasingly clear that reality is no longer conforming to the model. Many countries that policy makers and aid practitioners persist in calling "transitional" are not in transition to democracy, and of the democratic transitions that are under way, more than a few are not following the model».

party to appease the different social movements and groups that had contributed to oust the authoritarian regime.

Electoral system. According to Duverger (1959), electoral institutions exert both mechanical and psychological effects on the party system. The mechanical effects are the ones associated with the set of rules that dictate how votes are translated into mandates; with devices such as the election threshold, electoral formula and size of district being able to generate higher or lower levels of party system fragmentation and disproportionality. The psychological effects express how the rules of the electoral system influence not only voters' but also political parties' behaviors. Aspects such as strategic voting and political parties enacting coalitions or targeting specific campaign issues express psychological mechanisms. This model has been elsewhere discussed and reassessed (Grofman and Lijphart 2003; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005). Sartori (2003), for instance, argued that the mechanical and the psychological effects of the electoral institutions are only indirect, for they are modeled by the structure of the party system. Thus, more or less structured party systems would be more or less capable of using the devices of the electoral system to gain a majority. From a different angle, Benoit (2004, 366-367) sustained that, because «electoral laws are quintessentially distributive institutions, improving the share of one group at the direct expense of another», an approach on their *origins* rather than on their *consequences* is crucial. Therefore, considering whether or not each party participating in the choice of the electoral system emphasized a more individual or general interest or whether the consequences and alternatives were considered at all, is relevant to understand the electoral system's change or persistence over the years. Similarly, Colomer (2005) had sustained that Duverger's laws might be actually upside down as political actors will tend to choose or to keep the electoral systems that are more advantageous for them. For instance, while smaller parties are likely to prefer proportional systems and higher-size electoral districts, major parties will tend to favor majoritarian formula and small district magnitudes, as each of these combinations maximizes their chances of winning elections (Colomer 2005). Or else, dominant and large parties are more inclined to choose plurality formulas and concurrent elections than small parties (Negretto 2006). Chapter VI will show that the structure of the party system and the extent to which political competition is dispersed or otherwise concentrated at the constituency level mediates the direct effects of electoral institutions in Mozambique and Zambia.

Party funding/finance. The analysis of party funding/finance is anchored in the quantitative phase of this study which demonstrated that countries with regulated public funding and with wider provisions for finance disclosure were associated to higher levels of PSI. For the sake of redundancy, we recover only the main points of that discussion. First, institutionalization is hampered by the lack of resources and funding, especially on the side of opposition political parties, which face tremendous difficulties to raise the necessary funding to pay for office, staff, communication facilities and all the other requirements for their performance. Second, ruling parties from the pretransition regime or parties that emerged in the new democratic setting are in a privileged position to build on state resources to create and expand their patrimony and achieve some financial self-sufficiency. Third, even though funding has several advantages – leveling the playing field, favoring the representation of more disadvantaged groups, enabling political parties to regularly present themselves in elections times and to put down roots in society, not only organizationally, but also socially –, its effects can be skewed by the nature of political competition (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Pottie 2003; Bryan and Baer 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007).

Indeed, the case study analysis will show that where there is a strong asymmetry between incumbent and opposition parties (Mozambique), relational and institutional mechanisms will eventually result in a "cartelization of resources" that favors the former *vis-à-vis* the latter. Therefore, high and overinstitutionalization will be reinforced by public funding. In less structured party systems (Zambia) in which the political market is more open and susceptible to the short-term mobilization of political issues or resources in campaigns, the absence of funding leaves political parties more vulnerable to personalism and influence peddling. Thus, weaker and inadequate institutionalization is also reinforced.

Relational mechanisms have to do with interpersonal or intercollective networks (Tilly 2001). Networks can be defined as «a set of relationships between individuals, groups, or organizations», which can take the form of cooperative exchange, friendship or mutual obligation, for example (Ansell 1998, 76). According to the "network institutionalism", networks «mobilize information, social influence, resources, and social capital in highly differentiated ways» and «provide variegated access to resources, information, and support» (Ansell 1998, 76). Their study is, hence, fruitful to identify patterns of connection behind political outcomes.

Two realms are considered as far as relational mechanisms are concerned: interparty, that is, between the parties in the system, and extraparty that is between the parties and their

constituencies. In the first case, we focus on party coalitions; which are relational mechanisms based upon a combination of individual resources that can potentially alter the crystallized patterns of competition at the systemic level; and, in the second, we focus on the linkage between the parties and the citizens relying on a very recent, but compelling literature on this theme (Osei 2012; Tobolka 2014).

In both situations (intra and extra-party), the purpose is to identify the most common patterns of interaction between the elements of the political system. Scholarly work about the African context indicates that beyond the process of democratization, neopatrimonial practices such as tribalism, clientelism and patronage, inherited from the pretransition period, constitute the general framework within which African political institutions have evolved (for a thorough discussion see among several already mentioned: Bayart 1989; Bratton and van de Valle 1997; van de Walle 2003; Le Vine 2000; Lindberg 2001; Diamond 2008)[82]. This network of practices has been utilized to describe the nature of political authority in Africa as one essentially «based on giving and granting of favors, in a endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the highest reaches of the central state» (van de Walle 2001, 51). This institutional legacy in combination with territorial cleavages (ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional divides) have contributed to the emergence of party systems from above, to the ethnicization of politics in varying degrees, and to an underlying lack of politicization, in which party systems are "invaded" by numerous ideologically weak and personalized political parties which short existence (changing labels, dissolving or merging with other parties) create higher levels of systemic instability (Manning 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005a; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003; van de Walle 2003). Moreover, because political parties often «perceive state capture for the control of the resources and personnel of the state as a source of elite enrichment»; politics itself becomes a means to an end, devoid of any idea of protecting public interests *vis-à-vis* private gains (Salih and Nordlund 2007, 21). Therefore, patron-client relationships based upon reward and exchanged favors are expected to prevail in these contexts, while programmatic linkages will be less dominant [see: Tobolka (2014), for the cases of Zambia, Togo and Burundi; Osei (2012) for the cases of Ghana and Senegal].

[82] In neopatrimonial regimes, the chief executive maintains authority through personal patronage, rather than through ideology or law. The relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system and leaders occupy bureaucratic offices less to perform public service than to acquire personal wealth and status. The distinction between private and public interests is purposely blurred. The essence of neopatrimonialism is the award given by public officials for personal favors, both within the state (notably public sector jobs) and in society (for instance, licenses, contracts, and projects) (Bratton and Van de Valle 1994, 458; Lindberg 2001, 185-186).

We end this section with Table 5.1 that summarizes the mechanisms that will be compared across the cases.

Table 5.1 – Mechanisms of PSI

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Environmental</th><th colspan="2">Relational</th></tr>
<tr><td>Structural</td><td>Path to democratic transition</td><td>Interparty: party coalitions</td><td rowspan="3">Clientelistic or
Ideological/programmatic</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">Institutional</td><td>Electoral system</td><td rowspan="2">Extraparty: party-citizen</td></tr>
<tr><td>Party funding/finance</td></tr>
</table>

As detailed in Chapter II, in this analysis we combine multiple sources of data, namely detailed electoral results, party laws, Afrobarometer data (for example on individuals' attitudes towards political parties) and finally, semi-structured interviews. In the next section, more layers are added to this analysis as the historical contextualization of each case takes off.

5.2 Mozambique and Zambia in the broad historical context

Early party formations in Africa, such as fronts, congresses and similar movements, developed in the context of the independence struggles that took place in the continent during the 1950s and 1960s (Hodgkin 1961). In many countries, such as Mozambique and Zambia, the movements that headed the resistance against colonialism and eventually took part in the independence negotiations with the metropolis, were also the ones gaining control over, and later fusing with, the state in the post-independence era. Yet, their role does not end there. In fact, countless studies (Doorenspleet 2003; Salih 2003; Bogaards 2004; Bogaards 2008; Carbone 2007; Bogaards and Boucek 2010) indicate that competitive elections throughout the 1990s have mainly originated party systems in which the former ruling party remains dominant. This is precisely the case of Mozambique but not that of Zambia, where the former anti-colonial movement was replaced in the elections that marked the transition to democracy and virtually disappeared from competition thereafter.

Despite the changes towards multipartism, the majority of African countries did not experience a decisive break with the authoritarian past. In fact, most cases have "hybrid" regimes «trapped in the twilight of democracy and dictatorship» (Basedau 2007, 107) or might be otherwise labeled as *neopatrimonial hybrid regimes* due to the pervasiveness of informal rules in the political realm (Erdmann and Engel 2006). Patterns of electoral competition are also influenced by the pretransition institutional framework. For instance, the nature of Zambia's dominant party system until 2011, with an interaction between

predominance and fragmentation as well as the ethnic-regional pattern of vote, is a continuation of the party system that emerged during the First Republic (1964-1972). In Mozambique, 15 of the 19 years of one-partyism, were lived under a civil war between the government and the guerrilla group; and the truth is that this polarization remains visible hitherto.

In this sense, we build on the principles of the historical institutionalism to argue that the choices and decisions made when political institutions were formed have enduring effects (Peters 1999, 210) and influence their possibilities of change even during *critical junctures* notably the transition moment), when major changes are more likely to occur (Hogan 2006). Because only through History it is possible to demarcate and contextualize political parties, institutional choices and continuities or ruptures between regimes, this section is entirely devoted to the historical contextualization of Mozambique and Zambia. To this end, the section is organized diachronically in two parts: the first part will look upon the nature of politics in the pretransition period and the second one will focus on the multiparty period.

5.2.1 Independence and one-party rule

In 1951, when Mozambique became an overseas Province of Portugal[83], anti-colonial movements were being formed almost everywhere in the then British and Francophone colonies and leading their countries to independence throughout the 1960s. Left out of this wave of independencies the then Portuguese colonies – Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe – would experience a late process of decolonization due to the resistance of the Portuguese dictatorial regime – *Estado Novo*/ New State – to concede self-determination to the colonies. Therefore, while the majority of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were building the foundations of an independent state, the former Portuguese colonies were just in the beginning of their struggle. In the case of Mozambique, although proto-nationalist clandestine groups, mostly composed of intellectuals, were secretly assembling inside and outside the country[84], effective struggle only started in 1962, when Eduardo Mondlane brought together three nationalist groups[85] in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to

[83] Law no. 2048 11 June 1951, stipulated that the then Portuguese colonies in Africa, were to be treated as overseas provinces, and thus as an extension of the national territory.

[84] José Luís Cabaço, who took part in these clandestine meetings, reported to us that the Portuguese administration was very repressive, reason why the party was founded outside of the Mozambican territories.

[85] The *União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique*/ National Democratic Union of Mozambique (Udenamo); the *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique Independente*/ National African Union of Independent Mozambique (Unami) and the *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique*/ Mozambique African National Union (Manu).

form the *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*/ Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo), the first concerted Mozambican opposition to *indirect rule* (Florêncio 2008). In 1964, similarly to its counterparts in Angola (MPLA) and Guinea-Bissau (PAICG[86]), the Frelimo launched an armed struggle against the colonial regime, which ended in 1974 in the aftermath of the *Revolução dos Cravos/* Revolution of Carnations in Lisbon, which overthrew the New State on 24th April and precipitated the end of colonialism.

In September of the same year, the Portuguese transitional government and the Frelimo (under Samora Machel's leadership) joined to sign the Lusaka Accords. The Frelimo was the only Mozambican political group taking part in these negotiations[87]. No public consultation or polls were organized (Krennerich 1999a; Brito 2009). After nine months, Frelimo's transitional government appointed Joaquim Chissano as Prime Minister, the independence Constitution was proclaimed by the party's Central Committee on 25th June 1975, and Samora Machel became the first President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. Thereafter, the Frelimo installed a single-party socialist regime in which the president of the party was automatically declared President of the Republic and the supreme legislative body – the *Assembleia Nacional Popular*/ People's National Assembly – was indirectly elected through mass meetings organized throughout the country (Krennerich 1999a, 648).

In the Third Congress held in February 1977, the Frelimo refashioned itself as a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party with the mission to lead, organize, and educate the masses and emerged as a powerful instrument for the destruction of capitalism. This phase also marked Frelimo's evolution from "liberation front" [88] to political party, and the development of mass democratic organizations to ensure the party's control over the territory and the society[89]. These measures eventually meant the slow disappearance of the *Grupos*

[86] MPLA = *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*/ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; PAIGC = *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*/ African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde.

[87] It is worth nothing that Frelimo was the only anti-colonial movement recognized as legitimate both by the then Organization of African Unity (today African Union) and the United Nations. After the 25th of April, Portugal naturally recognized Frelimo as the country's governing party.

[88] Frelimo's first congress was held between 23rd-28th September 1962, and structured the front under the principles of democratic centralism (Frelimos' Statuses 1962). In the Statuses of 1977 the front presents itself for the first time as a vanguard party.

[89] Mass organizations were or reformulated: *Organização da Mulher Moçambicana*/ Organization of the Mozambican Woman (OMM), founded in 1973; the *Organização da Juventude Moçambicana*/ Mozambique's Youth Organization (OJM), founded in 1977 and the *Organização dos Trabalhadores Moçambicanos*/ Organization of Mozambican Workers (OTM), created in 1983. In the same line, representative groups of key sectors of the social life were created, namely the *Organização Nacional dos Professores*/ Teacher's National Organization (ONP) e the *Organização Nacional dos Jornalistas*/ Journalists' National Organization (ONJ).

Dinamizadores/ Dynamizing Committees (GD), which were the former grassroots structures of the party[90] (Rupiya 1998; Brito 2009; Krennerich 1999b; Carbone 2005).

Complementarily, the Frelimo government set into motion ambitious reforms, which involved nationalization, "villagization"[91] and policies to reduce the influence of the church and to restrict political opposition (Carbone 2005, 424). Indeed, Frelimo's project for the construction of a modern independent state meant the dissolution of regional, religious and ethnic differentiation, its legitimation as the sole legitimate party, the exclusion of rural inhabitants and traditional chiefs (*régulos*) and the dismantlement of traditional systems of power, which were seen as compromised with Portugal's *indirect rule* (Granjo 2007; Florêncio 2007)[92].

Despite the centralization of power, Frelimo's government faced several sources of destabilization that partly originated from the pre-independence years. In fact, during the 1960s, Mozambique had been a major player in the liberation struggle of the Front Line States[93] and hosted insurgency movements which posed a threat to Ian Smith's rule in Rhodesia and to the Apartheid regime in South Africa. This position led white Rhodesians, South African Special Forces and Malawians to form and back a guerrilla movement, the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana/* Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). which launched a civil war against Frelimo's government in 1977 (Morgan 1990; Manning 1998; Weinstein 2002; Hirsch 2009; Emerson 2014). Though externally formed, the Renamo was able to gain internal legitimacy during the war years by calling for the support of traditional leaders and rural inhabitants, which had been marginalized by Frelimo's modernization policies (Carbone 2003; Manning 2008). Country-wide divisions between government-controlled (Southern Provinces mainly Maputo and Gaza) and Renamo-controlled areas (Central Provinces of Manica, Sofala, Zambezia, Tete and the Northern Province of Nampula) emerged and crystallized during the 15 years of war whose upshot was largely influenced by a

[90] The GD were composed of party militants and sympathizers and they were hierarchically dependent of the district level of the party; as grass roots structures of the party they performed a series of political and administrative functions (Brito 2009).

[91] Frelimo's set an ambitious program of compulsory villagization of the country side which basically consisted in the creation of *aldeias comunais*. This meant the forced dislocation of large sectors of the population away from their homesteads. This has been mainly interpreted as an attempt of the regime to exert political control over the territory than to actually foster collective agriculture, as it claimed (Manning 2002, 59-62; Seibert 2003, 266-268).

[92] Several studies show, however, that religious organizations as well as the population of rural zones were key political actors in the post colonial history of the country in what regards the rituals of healing and social reintegration in the aftermath of the war (Florêncio 2008; Granjo 2007).

[93] Which included Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

combination of both external (international and regional) and internal factors in the late 1980s (Rupiya 1998; Hirsch 2009).

Externally, the end of the Cold War meant the withdrawal of international support to the belligerents as during the years of civil war the Frelimo relied on military and financial aid from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist countries, while the Renamo was supported by the Reagan Administration (Rupiya 1998, 22). Support at the regional level also shifted once Zimbabwe, one of the strongest allies of the Mozambican government[94], achieved its independence in 1980 and the Nkomati Accords were signed with South Africa in 1984. These accords formalized both a non-aggression pact between the two countries, and South Africa's withdrawal of support to Renamo's guerrilla activities[95]. Internally, natural causes, namely the drought and the famine from the early 1980s (around ten thousand Mozambicans were estimated dead in 1983); the exhaustion of the troops; the severe economic conditions, which led the United Nations to raise US $330 million for assistance to the country in 1987 (Armon, Hendrickson, and Vines 1998, 83-84), and church leaders' public calls[96] for a negotiated end to the war, were determinant for the beginning of peace negotiations. In the same period, the Renamo held its First Congress which took place in Gorongosa between the 7th-9th June, 1989. In the course of this Congress Dhlakama presented himself as ready to effectively negotiate «with Frelimo and with potential external supporters». In addition, during the Congress he consolidated his control over the movement's external representation and reaffirmed its commitment to multiparty democracy and a market economy, which had been introduced in the 1981 Program and Manifesto (Manning 1998, 180).

The Nairobi Talks between the government and the Renamo were held in 1989 and inaugurated a round of meetings, initially facilitated by the church but in which various mediators took part[97]. These Talks would eventually result in the signature of the General

[94] Quoting Gonçalves (1998): «Although the first Zimbabwean troops were officially deployed in the Beira Corridor' in 1982, guerrillas of Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwean National Liberation Army (ZANLA) had operated out of Mozambique since the early 1970s and there is evidence that some never left. This arrangement stemmed from an alleged agreement between Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and Mozambique's Frelimo government reached prior to Zimbabwean independence» (Gonçalves 1998, 20).

[95] South Africa's withdrawal, however, was not immediate, since it continued supporting the Renamo for a while (Rupiya 1998).

[96] The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) and the Catholic Church had key role in the Mozambican peace process. In 1984 the CCM created a Peace and Reconciliation Commission and began to explore ways for dialogue. From 1988 onwards the CMM and the Catholic Church combined strengths to seek dialogue with both the Government and the Renamo (Armon, Hendrickson, and Vines 1998).

[97] The Catholic Archbishop Dom Jaime Gonçalves played a key role in contacting the Sant' Egidio community in Rome. Additional mediators/ observers were: the United Nations and the Governments of the United States of America, Italy, France, the United Kingdom and Portugal.

Peace Agreement (GPA) between the two former belligerents on 4th October 1992. Along its seven protocols, the GPA included several resolutions allowing for a United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ[98]) and for the inclusion of the Renamo as a legal political party with full rights to participate in the political life of the country. The first multiparty elections were initially scheduled for October 1993, but due to several technical problems, the actual date of the elections was postponed to 27th-29th October 1994.

The post-independence history of Zambia, formerly Northern Rhodesia, had different highlights. To start with, there was no pre-or-postcolonial armed conflict. Much of the protest against the British *direct rule* (Rasmussen 1974) was largely non-violent, despite recurrent episodes of social unrest – e.g. the villagers' resistance to colonial administration in the Gwembe Valley in 1958 and the serious outbreaks of indiscipline among the students in 1960 and among the rural inhabitants between July and August 1961 (Rasmussen 1974, 41-43; Scarritt 1979, 23; Musambachime 1987). Unlike what happened in Mozambique, where the Frelimo was the main anti-colonial force and it negotiated alone the process of independence as well as its position as the post-independence ruling party, in Zambia two main movements – the United National Independence Party (UNIP) and the African National Congress (ANC) – gathered the popular protest against British *direct rule* and participated in the pre-independence elections along with other contestants (Bull 1968; Rasmussen 1969; Rasmussen 1974; Tordoff 1988; Momba 1989).

The ANC (formerly African Congress – AC) was the first nationalist movement in Northern Rhodesia. It was founded in the end of 1940s at a time when the first trade unions were also emerging in the Copperbelt Province (Mulenga 2012). The ANC was «itself something of a coalition of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, the working class, and the rich peasants» or "kulaks" from Southern Province, home of the *Tonga* ethnic group (Momba 1989). The ANC established «the aim of gaining recognition and acceptance of the African people by the settler/colonial Establishment of the day, and for the right of Africans to become part of that Establishment» (Bull 1968, 495). It suffered its first break in 1958, when a number of opponents of President Harry Nkumbula left the party to found the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC), in turn banned in 1959 (Rasmussen 1969, 408; Rasmussen 1974, 42). A second break led Kenneth Kaunda to found the UNIP in 1959, which was mainly composed of people from the Northern, Luapula and Eastern provinces (Bemba-speaking areas). Its socialist rhetoric contrasted with the ANC's defense of the rich peasants'

[98] ONUMOZ's mandate started on 16th December 1994 and formally came to an end on 9th December 1994 http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm.

interests. In the pre-independence period, the UNIP «quickly became the dominant political party, in large part because of the attractiveness of its program (immediate self-government and elections based on universal suffrage), its organizational effectiveness, and the quality of its leadership» (Rasmussen 1969, 409). As a result of the political effervescence lived during this period – via party and popular protest – three political parties competed in the pre-independence Legislative Council Election of 20th-21st January 1964 – the UNIP, the ANC and the National Progressive Party (NPP). The results showed an overwhelming dominance of the UNIP, which won 69% of the vote cast and 55 of the 75 seats at stake.

The independence also required the national territory's unification in face of the separatist ambitions of the Barotseland (Western Province). The Barotseland, home of the *Lozi* ethnic group, had always enjoyed a semi-autonomous status provided with own political structures – the *Litunga*, the paramount chief of the *Lozi* being the highest in hierarchy –, and even a prototype of a national flag. As a separate British protectorate, the Western Province only became part of Zambia with the signing of The Barotseland Agreement on 19th May 1964 which safeguarded limited self-governance rights to the Barotseland people[99]. Six months after the signature of this Act (between the Zambian government, the *Litunga* and the British representative of the Commonwealth Relations and the Colonies), Zambia was recognized as an independent state by means of the United Kingdom parliament act of 24th October 1964. Kenneth Kaunda, leader of the UNIP, who had been named Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia after the 1964 elections, became the first President of Zambia. Ever since, direct parliamentary and presidential elections have taken place every five years (1968, 1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988). The parliamentarians were elected under a plurality system, FPTP in single-member-constituencies (SMC)[100] and, from 1973 onward, the UNIP leader would automatically become the sole presidential candidate (Krennerich 1999b, 942). Although the UNIP was the main dominant party in the post-independence period, Zambia had three Republics since independence (First: 1964-1972; Second: 1973-1991; Third: 1991-onward), each with a different profile[101].

The First Republic (1964-1972) endowed with an independent Constitution, encompassed significant departures from the British Westminster model since it established a

[99] Thanks to this agreement the *Litunga* enjoys far reaching powers over the province when compared with chiefs in other zones (Mwiinga 1994).

[100] For a short definition: The FPTP system is the simplest form of plurality/majority system, using single member districts and candidate-centered voting. The voter is presented with the names of the nominated candidates and votes by choosing one, and only one, of them. The winning candidate is simply the person who wins the most votes; in theory he or she could be elected with two votes, if every other candidate only secured a single vote (retrieved from: http://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/es/esd/esd01/esd01a).

[101] About the dynamics of the one- party state see also Pettman (1974) and Gertzel, Baylies, and Szeftel (1984).

predominantly presidential system (Krennerich 1999b, 939). In April 1967, President Kenneth Kaunda adopted Humanism[102] (combination of human values and leftist views) as the formal ideology to be spread throughout the country and he even created the Ministry of National Guidance in March 1969 to that end (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 145-146). During the First Republic, the ANC was UNIP's main rival but, as described above, its appeal was rather sectional instead of national and there was never a prospect of alternation in power as revealed by the 1968 general elections (Tordoff and Scott 1974; Krennerich 1999b). After this election, competition was severely restricted. In fact, the UNIP government banned the United Party (UP) - established by Lozi-speakers after breaking away from the UNIP in 1967; in August 1968, it prohibited the organization of the ANC and it banned the United Progressive Party (UPP) in February 1972[103]. Soon after, President Kenneth Kaunda announced that Zambia would become a "one-party participatory democracy" (Tordoff and Scott 1974, 108-109) and on 13th December 1972, he inaugurated the Second Republic with a new Constitution for the country and the party, both promulgated in 1973. These laws «[...] transformed the political system by giving UNIP the sole right to organize and to act as a political party and by stipulating the supremacy of the party over the government» (Krennerich 1999b, 940). The following general elections (1973, 1978, 1983 and 1988) were held in a one-party framework.

Through legal restrictions, the UNIP was able to get rid of its main opponents, but political antagonism within the ruling party remained as the party seemed unable to carry out successful economic policies at the national level, thus raising complaints from all quadrants – from party veterans to mineworkers (Rasmussen 1974; Larmer 2006)[104]. Moreover, the government never «managed to bring the Christian churches, trade unions and various other civil society organizations [...], such as the Law Association or the Economic Association of

[102]«Zambia Humanism is another brand of African socialism. (…) The essence of Zambian Humanism revolves around the importance of humankind, the restoration and the preservation of people's dignity and self-respect (…).The main characteristics of Zambian Humanism include the principle of "inclusiveness," which means that in the political, economic, and social relationships among people, nobody is neglected. (…) Communalism is also basic to Humanism. This is manifested in ownership of land and property. The traditional African restraints enjoined by the norms of hospitality, self-reliance, and respect for human dignity combine to produce an egalitarian society in which people are valued for their own sake (for their own personal qualities?). Zambian Humanism rejects capitalism, since it entails an exploitative economic system based on individualism and competition; a social system characterized by class conflict; and a political system based on several parties representing different class interest». (Idoye 1988, 72)

[103] This party had been founded by Simon Kapwepwe, former Vice-President of both the UNIP and the country.

[104] There were also some sources of destabilization coming from the neighboring countries. Between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, Adamson Mushala led the only significant internal armed rebellion against the postcolonial Zambian state, supported by South Africa. While making no substantial military gains, Mushala succeeded in destabilizing the North-Western Province, the site of his insurgency, and in creating an atmosphere of fear and paranoia among local and national leaders of the ruling party (Larmer and Macola 2007). (quote one Zambia many stories larmer e macola).

Zambia (EAZ)» and the students under complete control (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 6). Despite having little autonomy, these social groups were able to challenge the regime on specific issues such as education and labor policies, particularly in face of the economic decline experienced since the mid-1970s (Rakner 2003, 12). According to Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003), the socio-economic decline combined with the failed attempts to implement FMI's structural adjustment program (1985-87), caused serious legitimacy problems for the ruling party, which faced strong contestation from the trade union leadership of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 10; Momba 2003, 45). It is worth nothing that the trade union movement represented the major force of civil society comprising 80% of the total formal work force. Given the depressed economy, they almost naturally clashed with the government, which was in direct control of the mining industry. In late December 1989, ZCTU Chairman Frederick Chiluba came forward with the challenge of multipartism and democracy (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 6-10).

Under strong social protest, President Kenneth Kaunda finally announced that a referendum on whether to continue the one-party system would be held. Further pressure, however, led Kaunda to call off the referendum and to appoint a commission to draft a new multiparty Constitution (Krennerich 1999b, 941). The new Constitution became effective on 24th August 1991, it opened Zambia's Third Republic and it reintroduced multiparty elections, which were held for the last time in 1968. Elections for both the presidency and the National Assembly were held on 31st October 1991.

5.2.2 Regime change: The multiparty framework

Mozambique and Zambia record continuous, concurrent elections for presidency and parliament from the outset of multipartism in 1994 and 1991, respectively. This section presents the main national trends, as displayed by the electoral results, while describing the overall context within which the elections were carried out in both countries (from Tables 5.2 to Table 5.6). Relevant testimonies of political and social elites interviewed during fieldwork are also used to enrich the contextual description. As in the previous section, Mozambique is featured first and Zambia afterwards.

Mozambique's transition to multipartism started in 1990 with the amendment of the Constitution[105] paving the way for a semipresidential regime with direct and competitive elections for presidency and parliament. Alternative political parties were, for the first time, allowed to register and compete in elections, while a series of political and civil rights (e.g. freedoms of strike, association, speech and press) guaranteed a freer environment for citizen's participation in the political life of the country. These provisions were again reinforced in the GPA protocols which also incorporated a package of peacebuilding measures to minimize the risks of a double transition from war-to-peace-and-to-democracy. Regarding institutional features, the GPA had slight departures from the 1990 Constitution, particularly in what concerned the nature of the electoral system. It became established that the 250-seats[106] of the National Assembly – now renamed *Assembleia da Repúbica* – would be elected under a proportional formula (D'Hondt), with closed list ballot (with 5% entry threshold) and the president would be elected under a two-round majority system[107].

The first elections for parliament and presidency were held between 27th and 29th October 1994, after having been delayed one year due to technical problems. Since then, three additional polls occurred in 1999, 2004 and 2009, when for the first time citizens were also asked to choose the members of the Provincial Assemblies. Although in a multiparty framework, the Frelimo and the Renamo continued to be the most important competitors; even if with unequal levels of electoral support. Indeed, since 1994, the bipolar scenario that emerged in the years of civil war has been challenged by an increasing predominance of the Frelimo, which won all elections conducted in the country both at the national and sub-national level. Furthermore, only a third political party was able to elect members of parliament (MPs) without ever taking part in a broad electoral alliance, the *Movimento Democrático de Moçambique*/ Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM).

Globally speaking, the political parties that contested these elections fell into two broad categories: parties linked to the liberation struggle – the Frelimo and the Renamo; and parties relying on the mobilization of regional factors for their political subsistence (Pereira

[105] The Constitution came into force on 30th November 1990 and the GPA was ratified by the National Assembly Law No. 13/92 of 14th October 1992. In between this period several documents were issued, namely: the Joint Communiqué of 10th July 1990 in which the Government and the Renamo declared mutual commitment/goodwill to start peace talks, the agreement of 1st December 1990, which arranged for a partial cease fire and the Party Law of 1991 (Law No. 7/91, 23rd January), which established the first provisions for the formation and actuation of political parties.

[106] 11 constituencies (one for each Province and two for Maputo – city and province) elected 248 MPs and two additional constituencies - for Expatriates in Europe and Africa - elected 1 MP each; for a combined 250 seats.

[107] The Frelimo-led 1990 Constitution defined a majoritarian electoral system, but this changed during the GPA's negotiations with the PR system defended by the Renamo being established as the electoral formula for the parliamentary elections (Brito 2010).

and Shenga 2005, 53). The MDM can be included in this latter category, since it has an urban and regional appeal (Provinces of Maputo and Sofala). In what regards ideology, the MDM seems to express rightist ideals, even though it is difficult for its leaders to find a consensual label for the party[108]. During this period, other political parties gained seats in parliament under electoral coalitions, as, for example, the *União Democrática*/ Democratic Union (UD) and the Renamo-led *União Eleitoral*/ Electoral Union (UE). Individually, however, the political parties entering these alliances tend to be weak and to strongly gravitate around the leader's charisma, the most visible face of the party. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the results for all parliamentary and presidential elections held between 1994 and 2009; and these are analyzed in more detail next.

The 1994 elections meant more than the mere choice for the government party and the president for all those involved in its preparation. For the first time ever, the two former belligerents were confronting each other in the polls and the Mozambicans were given the opportunity to choose their political leaders for the five upcoming years. Cahen (1998) labeled these elections as the "Elections of Silence", as they were imbued with the «desire for reconciliation and the tremendous will to revive the society», which pretty much led people «to vote for both parties in order that the two would get along» (Cahen 1998, 3). Regardless of the uncertainty that surrounded these elections, the levels of participation were remarkable, for altogether 12 political parties, two coalitions and 2637 candidates participated in the polls and about 88% of the electorate cast votes. The results, as presented in Table 5.2, gave a narrow, but sufficient majority to the Frelimo, which gathered 44% of the votes and 129 of the 250 parliamentary seats. The Renamo came a close second with 38% of the votes and 112 seats. Finally, the coalition UD received 18% of the votes and nine seats. In terms of electoral geography, the Frelimo gained a majority in six Provinces; three located in the South (Inhambane, Gaza and Maputo – city and province) and two in the North (Cabo Delgado and Niassa), whereas the Renamo was the most voted in the remaining four Provinces – Manica, Sofala and Zambezia in the Center, and Nampula in the North. These results reflected war-time regional and ethnic divisions, which were strategically activated by Dhlakama in these elections (Chichava 2008). For instance, the dissatisfaction felt by the Zambezians and the *Macua-Lomé* (largest ethnic group in this province and in the country) against the Southern

[108] Lutero Simango (MDM Parliamentary Caucus Leader) and Ismael Mussa (current member of MDM) had very personal views about the ideological field of the party. For Lutero Simango, the party would be better situated at the centre of the political spectrum as it defends social economy; for Ismael Mussa the party is definitely liberal (it draws support from urban workers, namely civil servants, professors, liberal professions) and should join the International Liberal. The party, however, eventually joined the International Democratic Christian Association.

provinces, where the *Changana*, a subgroup of the *Tsongas*, are the most representative group and where the main leaders of the country were from, was mobilized by Dhlakama to gain support in the Zambezia Province (Chichava 2008a). In Nampula, the electoral behavior of the people from coastal villages of Angoche, Ilha de Moçambique and Nacala Porto also mirrored their perceptions of exclusion during one-partyism (Rosário 2009). Overall, these were elections in which ethnicity and regionalism were strategically activated by the Renamo to show how Southern provinces and ethnic groups were advantaged *vis-à-vis* the others Provinces and ethnic groups (Chichava 2008b).

As Table 5.3 reveals, the presidential elections were also positive for the Frelimo as its candidate, Joaquim Chissano, defeated the longtime leader of the Renamo, Afonso Dhlakama by a comfortable margin (53% against 34% of the votes). In the aftermath of these elections, the Renamo «issued demands for power sharing in the form of some sort of 'unity government' at national level», but president Chissano was unwilling to share power since his party had popular legitimacy (Manning 2008, 58).

In what concerns the quality of these elections, among the political and social actors interviewed during fieldwork, there is a consensual opinion that these were the fairest elections organized in the country. Even if this was partly due to the massive presence of the ONUMOZ officials as well as that of international election monitors in the country, these are probably the only elections that can actually be considered transparent and fair. With a very different opinion, Renamo's leaders Fernando Mazanga (Renamo, Spokesman) and António Muchanga (Renamo, member of the State Council), considered that elections in Mozambique have never been free and fair. They are rather marked by several irregularities and sources of tension, especially in the Southern Province of Gaza, where the party has never been able to elect a candidate since 1994. Moreover, vote rigging in the party's strongest constituencies – the Central and Northern Provinces – and police intimidation of the voters have been commonplace as this quotes illustrates:

> Elections have been held but not with normality. I have been in places where there have been constant outbreaks of tension since 1994. For instance in Gaza and here in the Maputo Province there are zones where election campaigns never went well. There have always been aggressions. I mean, there is an attempt to prohibit people to freely assemble and manifest their ideas. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of State Council)[109]

[109] Translated from the original: «*As eleições têm decorrido mas não com normalidade. Eu tive a sorte de trabalhar em locais onde sempre houve focos de confusões desde 1994. Por exemplo em Gaza e aqui na*

The general elections of 1999, held between 3rd and 5th December, were more competitive than the previous, but they eventually produced identical outcomes, as the Frelimo maintained its majoritarian status in the parliament (49% votes and 133 seats) and Joaquim Chissano (52%) was reelected for a second term. The Renamo-led coalition with ten additional minor parties, Renamo-UE, came very close in second, increasing its representation from 112 to 117 seats, whereas the presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama's stood four percentage points below (48%) the winning candidate. Although the results were substantively the same, these elections had different highlights.

In first place, there was a considerable drop in levels of turnout (down from 88% to 70%). In second place, the Renamo changed its strategy of competition by assembling a wide group of smaller political parties under its umbrella. In third place, this alliance managed to win the majority of votes in six of the country's 11 Provinces, including all Central Provinces and two Northern Provinces – Zambezia and Nampula, which are the country's most populated ones. The fact that Renamo-UE won the majority of Provinces, but eventually lost the elections, triggered a series of petitions about the nature of the electoral system, further aggravated by accusations of fraud, vote rigging and maladministration of the process by the *Comissão Nacional de Eleições*/ National Electoral Commission (CNE) [110]. The Renamo contested the results in the Supreme Court and threatened to boycott the new parliament. Yet, pressured to return to parliament by its coalition partners in the UE, it then sponsored a resolution to create a parliamentary commission of inquiry into the election results, which was voted down by the Frelimo majority. The Renamo then announced that it no longer recognized the Frelimo government and it insisted on talks between Dhlakama and Chissano as a condition for the party's further cooperation. Eventually, President Chissano agreed to set up a dialogue with Dhlakama (Manning 2008, 58; Brito 2008, 6-7; Chichava 2008, 23-25), but the negotiations were held with Raul Domingos[111], at the time leader of Renamo's parliamentary caucus.

Once again, the Renamo wanted guarantees of power-sharing, notably the right to nominate the Governors in the Provinces where it had won the majority, as an exchange for the acceptance of the results. In an interview, Raul Domingos, currently leader of the *Partido*

Província de Maputo houve zonas onde a campanha nunca correu bem! Sempre houve agressões. Quer dizer, há uma tentativa de proibir que as pessoas tenham liberdade de reunião e de manifestação das suas ideias».

[110] The majority of social and political actors interviewed – e.g. journalists from newspapers *Savana*, *O País*, and *Magazine Independente* and Renamo's leaders – shared the conviction that the Renamo was actually the winner of the 1999 polls.

[111] Raul Domingos begun his political life as a member of the Renamo and headed the Renamo delegation in the negotiation of the GPA.

para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento/ Party for Peace, Democracy, and Development (PDD), recalled the controversy that surrounded the meetings with President Chissano and the dramatic closure of the post-election period. In his view, allegations of lack of transparency and legitimacy from both sides and the general ambience of mistrust shed a lot of suspicion on what was really going on in those meetings and these eventually resulted in the loss of the election on the negotiation table by the Renamo and in his expulsion from the Renamo, under allegations of receiving bribes. For Raul Domingos, these groundless episodes served rather as an excuse used by Afonso Dhlakama to withdraw his support from him as he had gained a lot of visibility while leader of Renamo's parliamentary caucus, between 1994 and 1999.

The general elections of 2004 had four different nuances *vis-à-vis* its predecessors. Firstly, while the results of the 1994 and 1999 polls expressed a relative balance between the Frelimo and the Renamo, the 2004 polls exposed a significant gap between them, with the Frelimo winning the qualified majority of votes and seats (62% of votes and 64% of seats against Renamo's 29% of votes and 36% of seats) and its candidate, Armando Guebuza, strikingly defeating Afonso Dhlakama, who lost his third presidential race with the highest vote difference ever (64%against 32%).Secondly, the results of these elections were marked by an important shift in Frelimo's leadership. Coming from a close defeat in the run up for his second and last presidential mandate in 1999, Joaquim Chissano announced that he would not stand for reelection (as party leader) in 2004. The Central Committee of the party then chose Armando Guebuza, Secretary-General since 2002, as presidential candidate. His election as President of Republic in 2004 and as party leader in 2005 was a novelty given that it was the first time the leader came from a Northern Province, more concretely from Nampula; all predecessors were from Gaza. This could also be interpreted as part of the party strategy to react to accusations of being dominated by the southern elites (Chichava 2008b). Thirdly, in terms of electoral geography Frelimo's dominance was now country-wide. The party won nine Provinces in total: as in the past it got the majority of votes and seats in the Central Provinces but it was able to surpass the Renamo in its traditional strongholds, namely Nampula and Niassa in the North and Manica and Tete in the Center. With these results, the Renamo scored an historical defeat losing its supremacy in the Central and Northern territories of the country. Fourthly, these elections were marked by another dramatic drop in the turnout rates, which went down from 70% to 36%. According to Brito (2010), the causes of such high rates of abstention (which remained high in 2009) cannot be exclusively attributed to technical problems in voters' registration; rather the declining trends of electoral participation may be a sign of a structural problem of growing detachment of the electorate in

relation to the political process. This is particularly visible in the city of Maputo where the better educated and the more informed population resides and where despite the growth of the population, the number of registered voters has decreased (in 1999 it had declined by 2% compared to 1994) (Brito 2010, 4-5).

The fieldwork interviews suggested several hypotheses concerning this topic. On the one hand, there is the perception (e.g. of Raul Domingos) that the aftermath of the 1999 elections marked the beginning of Renamo's fall and of citizen's disengagement from the party. In fact, the Renamo had inexplicably lost the elections and its charismatic caucus leader went to create its own political party – the PDD –, which came in third in the 2004 polls. On the other hand, there is the opinion[112] that practices such as widespread fraud in voter registration, pro-government conduct of state agents that are responsible for monitoring the elections – e.g. the police, the CNE and the STAE[113] –, and finally Frelimo's inappropriate use of state resources during elections (e.g. vehicles, printing machines, stationary items, human resources, communications) contribute greatly to explain why the Frelimo systematically wins the elections. With a different opinion, some of the Frelimo's cadres interviewed[114] are confident that the elections have been accompanied by important improvements in the electoral laws, which have been systematically amended to improve the transparency of the technical procedures. Therefore, even if minor problems have occurred they did not strongly influence the final results. To these factors, Chichava (2008) adds Renamo's overconfidence and several operational issues, such as the delays in the opening of the polling stations and the lower levels of voter registration in the rural areas, where Renamo is stronger.

In the general elections of October 2009, Frelimo repeated its triumph by even larger margins, conquering the qualified majority of votes (75% of votes) and seats (N = 191) and reelecting Armando Guebuza (75% of votes), party leader since early 2005, for a second presidential term. The Renamo (20% of votes and 51 seats) and its eternal presidential candidate Afonso Dhlakama (16% of the votes) were again defeated by expressive numbers.

[112] This view is expressed by the generality of opposition political parties/elites interviewed. Just to mention a few examples: Fernando Mazanga and António Muchanga from the Renamo; André Balate from *Partido da Reconciliação Nacional*/ National Reconciliation Party (Parena); Magalhães Abramugy from *Partido Independente de Moçambique*/ Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo); Francisco Campira from the *Partido de Ampliação Social de Moçambique Social*/ Broadening Party of Mozambique/ (Pasomo) and Paulino Nicopola from the *Partido Liberal de Moçambique*/ Liberal Party of Mozambique (Palmo).

[113] *Secretariado Técnico da Administração Eleitoral*/ Technical Secretariat for the Administration of Elections (STAE)

[114] Leonardo Simão former cabinet Minister, Manuel Tomé current MP and Morais Mabyeka, party secretary for organization.

These elections were furthermore marked by a slight increase in turnout levels (from 36% to 44%) and by the emergence of a new parliamentary party – the MDM – which elected eight representatives in Sofala and Maputo, benefiting from an efficient campaign in the urban areas that mainly targeted young people, and from the removal of the 5% election threshold in 2006.

Yet, the MDM had to face another legal barrier, in order to constitute an effective opposition in parliament, since it did not have enough seats to form a parliamentary caucus[115] (Hanlon and Nuvunga 2009a). This barrier was overcome with the intervention of the international community, in particular the donors of the G-19, which finance about 50% of the state budget. This group pressured the Frelimo to accept the revision of the National Assembly regiment to allow the MDM to form a parliamentary caucus (Chichava 2010a, 18).

Beyond this, MDM's results were meaningful in several ways. In the first place, a new political party interfered in the bipolar scenario dominated by the Frelimo and the Renamo, and could potentially threaten Renamo's solitary position as the main opposition party inside and outside the parliament. In the second place, the MDM had only six months of existence when it ran for elections. In fact, the party had been created in March 2009, in Beira, capital of Sofala, after Afonso Dhlakama's decision to support the candidacy of Manuel Pereira, one of the historical leaders of the Renamo, in the local elections of that municipality, instead of that of Daviz Simango, incumbent Mayor since 2003. Daviz Simango then decided to run for election as an independent candidate, but he ended up being expelled by Afonso Dhlakama and by an intellectual ala of the Renamo that was mainly operating in the urban areas (Chichava 2010a; Chichava 2010b; Nuvunga and Adalima 2011).

Finally, the MDM was barred by the CNE from competing in seven of the eleven constituencies, on the grounds that their applications were full of irregularities. As a result, the MDM was only allowed to run in Maputo, Inhambane, Sofala and Niassa (Chichava 2010a; Chichava 2010b). Moreover, these elections were marked by the exclusion of several political parties; nearly twenty political parties were, partly or fully, excluded from competing in these polls under pleas of irregularities in the candidates' registration processes[116]. In face of this, nineteen opposition parties, that had been partly or totally excluded, gave their support to the MDM presidential candidate – Daviz Simango (*Jornal de Notícias*, 15 October 2009).

[115] In 1994 nine seats were required for the formation of a parliamentary group; this figure was raised to 11 in 2001.

[116] See *Portal do Governo de Moçambique* "Eleições 2009: CNE Exclui MDM Em Nove Círculos Eleitorais" (2009); and Hanlon and Nuvunga (2009b; 2009c).

Table 5.2 – Mozambique's Parliamentary Elections (1994-2009): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province

	1994						1999				2004				2009					
	Frelimo		Renamo		UD		Frelimo		Renamo - UE		Frelimo		Renamo - UE		Frelimo		Renamo		MDM	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
Northern																				
Cabo Delgado	57,8	15	22,7	6	5,8	1	61,0	16	26,6	6	73,7	18	16,9	4	80,8	19	14,9	3	0,0	
Nampula	30,6	20	48,4	32	4,5	2	39,1	24	43,9	26	47,4	27	39,2	23	65,7	32	28,4	13	0,0	
Niassa	46,3	7	32,8	4	6,0		39,8	6	45,8	7	64,8	9	26,4	3	81,3	12	13,1	2	3,4	
Central																				
Manica	27,1	4	57,9	9	4,0		31,7	5	56,9	10	45,2	7	44,7	7	71,0	12	25,0	4	0,0	
Sofala	14,2	3	76,0	18	1,4		19,3	4	70,4	17	25,1	6	63,8	16	50,8	10	23,1	5	23,4	5
Tete	31,0	5	49,1	9	5,9	1	37,1	8	49,2	10	73,1	14	20,8	4	87,2	18	10,3	2	0,0	
Zambezia	31,4	18	52,0	29	4,5	2	25,9	15	59,1	34	35,5	19	51,5	29	53,6	26	40,8	19	0,0	
Southern																				
Gaza	81,4	15	2,7		6,9	1	86,9	16	3,5		93,4	17	1,7		96,9	16	1,4		0,0	
Inhambane	59,5	13	12,9	3	11,8	2	61,9	13	20,6	4	76,0	15	9,7	1	83,7	15	6,9	1	4,5	
Maputo City	78,8	17	9,0	1	2,8		82,6	14	13,6	2	81,5	14	13,5	2	76,6	14	5,4	1	16,5	3
Maputo Province	77,6	12	7,0	1	5,9		84,7	12	9,5	1	84,8	12	8,7	1	88,4	15	7,8	1	3,9	
Africa											90,7	1	7,1		95,4	1	3,5		0,0	
Rest of the World											70,5	1	26,3		84,8	1	8,5		0,0	
Total	***44,3***	***129***	***37,8***	***112***	***5,5***	***9***	***48,6***	***133***	***38,8***	***117***	***61,5***	***160***	***29,0***	***90***	***74,7***	***191***	***17,7***	***51***	***3,9***	***8***
Tunout %	***87,9***						***67,9***				***36,3***				***44,4***					

Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/(retrieved on 30-09-2010).

Notes: The UD is a coalition of three political parties – *Partido Liberal Democrático de Moçambique*/ Liberal Democratic Party of Mozambique (Palmo); *Partido Nacional Democrático*/ National Democratic Party (Panade) and *Partido Nacionalista de Moçambique*/ Nationalist Party of Mozambique (Panamo).

The Renamo-UE is a coalition led by the RENAMO, which includes – *Aliança Independente de Moçambique*/ Independent Alliance of Mozambique (Alimo); *Frente de Accão Patriótica*/ Patriotic Action Front (FAP); *Frente Unida de Moçambique - Partido de Convergência Democrática*/ Mozambique United Front-Democratic Convergence Party (Fumo-PCD); *Movimento Nacionalista Moçambicano - Partido Social Democrata* /Mozambican National Democratic Movement-Social Democratic Party (Monamo-PMSD); *Partido da Convenção Nacional*/ National Convention Party (PCN); *Partido do Progresso do Povo de Moçambique*/ Mozambique People's Progress Party (PPPM); *Partido Renovador Democrático*/ Democratic Renewal Party (PRD); *Partido da Unidade Nacional* /National Unity Party (PUN); *Frente Democrática Unida*/ United Democratic Front (UDF) and *União Nacional Moçambicana*/ Mozambique National Union (Unamo).

Table 5.3 – Mozambique's Presidential Elections (1994-2009): Most voted candidates (%)

Candidate (Party)	1994	1999	2004	2009
Joaquim Chissano (Frelimo)	53,3	52,3		
Afonso Dhlakama (Renamo)	33,7	47,7	31,7	16,7
Armando Guebuza (Frelimo)			63,7	75,0
Daviz Simango (MDM)				6,6
Turnout	***87,9***	***69,5***	***36,4***	***44,6***

Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010).

According to Salomão Moyana, from the newspaper *Magazine Independente*, the Frelimo and the Renamo combined strengths to restrict the participation of extra-parliamentary parties in these elections, particularly the MDM, which was perceived by both as a serious competitor. As result of this, and no differently from preceding ones, these elections were considered irregular by the main opposition parties and Frelimo seized power amidst contestation.

Although this descriptive analysis has focused on national election results (Tables 5.1 and 5.2), it is worth noting that Frelimo has also proven unbeatable at the sub-national level. In the local elections of 1998, Frelimo ran unopposed and won all municipalities (33), whereas Renamo boycotted the polls and a mere 15% of the registered electorate cast votes. In 2003, Frelimo won 28 municipalities and Renamo five[117], and finally in 2008 Frelimo won 41 of the then 43 municipalities (the number of municipalities is 53 since 2013). In the first Provincial Assembly elections ever (in 2009), Frelimo won 703 (or 87%) of the 812 seats in competition. In this sense, there seems to exist similar patterns of party support across the different territorial levels of the polity.

Let us now shift to the Zambian electoral context. Since the democratic opening elections of 31st October 1991, Zambia has held four parliamentary elections (1996, 2001, 2006 and 2011) and five presidential elections (1996, 2001, 2006, 2008 and 2011). The first local government elections were held in November 1992, the following on 30th December 1998 and since then they have been organized simultaneously with the presidential and the parliamentary polls in 2001, 2006 and 2011. According to the 24th August 1991 Constitution, the plurality system, FPTP in SMC[118], is kept for the election of the 150 seats of the National Assembly of Zambia, and it is also applied to the presidential election.

[117] These were Nacala-Porto, Ilha de Moçambique and Angoche in Nampula and Beira and Marromeu in Sofala.
[118] From the countries with plurality formula all have SMC, the exception is Mauritius, which has Multi-member-constituencies (MMC).

The main political competitors, that have been able to systematically elect representatives throughout this period are the Movement for Multiparty Democracy – MMD (ruling party between 1991 and 2006), the Patriotic Front – PF (ruling party from 2011-to present) and the United Party for National Development – UPND (with sizeable parliamentary representation since 2001). In terms of ideological content the majority of the party leaders finds it difficult to use a single label to describe the core ideals of their political offer and tend to generally anchor their positions on the "development cause". Despite this, the MMD defines itself as a liberal or pro-capitalist party (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary); the UPND is in the same political spectrum (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD, Secretary-General)[119] and the PF tends to devalue ideology in detriment of a pro-poor and pro-workers discourse (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director).

Among the opposition, three minor political parties have been able to elect representatives in more than one occasion: the UNIP (1991, 2001 and 2006 – under the UDA alliance[120]), the Forum for Democracy and Development – FDD (2001, 2006 – under the UDA alliance – and 2001) and the Zambian Republican Party – ZRP (2001 and 2006 – under the National Democratic Focus alliance). Other parties had brief stints in parliament: for example, the Agenda for Zambia – AZ the National Party – NP and the Zambia Development Conference – ZDC elected representatives in the 1996 polls; while the Heritage Party – HP and the Alliance for Democracy and Development – ADD elected representatives in 2011.[121] One highlight of Zambian politics it that most of these parties – namely the ZDC, the FDD, and the HP – were off-shoots of the MMD, based on various personalized factions, which differed from the mainstream (or the Chiluba) faction of the MMD, only because they refused to accept the envisaged constitutional change on the presidential terms. According to Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003, 32-33) they are «'one-issue parties' which differ «from the MMD only because of the 'third term' issue – and, of course, on leadership». Another interesting feature of Zambian's polls is the election of independent candidates from 1996 onward. Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 present the results of the

[119] For Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003, 33) it is difficult to find major political differences between the MMD and the strongest opposition party, the UPND.
[120] UDA = United Democratic Alliance.
[121] The ideological core of these parties is again difficult to capture, since most of them do not have a website or available documents to help us discriminate. Some members of these parties were interviewed during the fieldwork, namely the ZRP president, Wright Musoma, who stated «we are in favor of capitalism... capitalism and a bit of socialism... so I wouldn't say we are capitalist, but we favor that [...] we definitely we are in favor of any ideology that is there to empower to change Zambia as well as to empower the Zambians», and the ADD Secretary-General, Lizu Kahoma that stated: «[...] we are kind of conservatives actually; we are a national party [...] there is a bit of capitalism for example and just a little bit of socialism … and communism not anywhere near yeah; but there is a bit of capitalism and socialism [...] kind of a mix set up».

parliamentary and presidential polls held between 1991 and 2011, which are next described in more detail.

The 1991 elections were held after 17 years of single-party rule in the country. The Zambians were again given the opportunity of choosing parliamentary candidates from two major (UNIP and MMD) and three minor political parties (NADA, NPD and DP[122]), to hand a sweeping victory to the MMD, whose leader, trade unionist Frederick Chiluba, became president with a spectacular 76% of the vote, while MMD's parliamentary candidates captured 125 of 150 National Assembly seats. Contrary to the first Mozambican elections that were highly participated (87%), Zambia's founding elections registered only 44% of turnout. Following this trend, a mere 14% of the registered voters participated in the November 1992 local government elections, while an average of 21% took part in the parliamentary by-elections held between 1991 and 1994 (Bratton 1999, 555). These rates are particularly surprising if one considers that the Zambian transition to democracy was anchored in social and popular protest, while the Mozambican was an elite-led process in which only the two former belligerents participated. According to Bratton (1999)[123], the low levels of turnout in Zambia's founding elections may result from citizens being more attached to the local than to the national level of politics and more inclined to establish direct personal links with the political parties than to cast their votes in election times.

By 1996, voter turnout had risen to 79%. Nevertheless, the background of these elections was more challenging for the MMD, which was brought to public as a profoundly divided party. In fact, between 1991 and 1996, the party had lost several prominent MPs and cabinet ministers who left to create the NP, the ZDC and the AZ in 1993, 1995 and 1996, respectively. Amidst in-fighting almost from the start of its formation, the MMD government «orchestrated a constitutional amendment» to bar the strongest challengers to compete in the elections (NDI and FODEP 2003, 6). Since the party held more than two-thirds of the seats in the National Assembly, it took advantage of the fact to introduce changes in the Constitution to restrict other political parties' as well as traditional chiefs' participation:

> One of the changes required 'anyone aspiring to the presidency to prove that their parents were Zambians'. This was a rule perceived by many to be intended to prevent the candidacy of

[122] NADA= National Democratic Alliance, founded in 1991; NDP = National Democratic Party, founded by losers of the MMD convention in 1991, and DP = Democratic Party, founded in 1991.

[123] These conclusions result from a national survey to 421 eligible adult voters in June 1993. The research sites were Choma District (Southern Province), Kitwe Urban District (Copperbelt Province), Lusaka Urban District (Lusaka Province), Mumbwa District (Central Province), Petauke District (Eastern Province), and Solwezi District (North-Western Province) Bratton (1999, 556).

> Kaunda, whose father was born in Malawi. Furthermore, no one was allowed to stand if they had not lived in Zambia for at least 20 years. This stipulation targeted the Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC) leader, Dean Mung'omba (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004, 6).

Despite in-fighting, Frederick Chiluba was again elected president (73% of the vote cast) and the MMD increased its share of seats from 125 to 131. Breakaway parties, namely the NP, the ZDC and the AZ, assembled nine parliamentary seats in total, while independent candidates reached 10 seats. Yet, as Tables 5.4 and 5.5 indicate, this proved to be a sporadic event as the number of independent candidates elected dropped dramatically in the following elections. In what regards the overall quality of these polls, they were considered seriously flawed by both national and international observers; while several opposition parties unsuccessfully petitioned the results in the Courts (Bratton 1998; Burnell 2002; Simutanyi 2005).

The 2001 elections were the most competitive ever. A total of seven political parties won parliamentary representation, but none enjoyed a majoritarian status. The MMD, the most penalized party in these elections, was for the first time in a minority position[124], dropping from 131 to 69 seats and seeing its presidential candidate, Levy Mwanawasa (with 29% of the votes), elected by a narrow margin to the runner up party, the UPND, which won 49 parliamentary seats and saw its presidential candidate, founder and party leader Anderson Mazoka, being voted by 27% of the electorate. After having boycotted the 1996 polls, the UNIP, now headed by Tilyenji Kaunda, was the third political force in the parliament with 13 seats, while the FDD, founded by Zambia's former Vice-President Christon Tembo, was awarded 12 seats in these elections. The remaining seats went to the HP (4), the ZRP and the PF (one MP each); and an independent candidate was also elected.

MMD's fall in these elections partly reflect a troubled pre-electoral scenario that was marked by a lot of controversy and popular contestation after Frederick Chiluba's announcement of his desire to change the Constitution to be able to run for a third mandate. Among other aspects, this episode led to two splits inside the MMD and to the creation of political parties that performed fairly well in the 2001 polls (NDI and FODEP 2003; Simutanyi 2005; Momba and Madimutsa 2009). The first break originated when a total of 22 MMD's parliamentarians, which included Christon Tembo and five cabinet ministers, openly opposed Chiluba's third-term bid and were subsequently expelled. They later founded the FDD (Simutanyi 2005, 6; Momba and Madimutsa 2009, 10). A second break originated the

[124] Even after nominating eight MPs, the opposition outnumbered the MMD MPs 81 against 77. Through co-optation a total of seven opposition MPs were re-elected to Parliament after joining the MMD. The state of affairs changed with the MMD now commanding 84 seats against the opposition's 74 seats (Simutanyi 2005, 7).

PF, which was created by Michael Sata, popularly known as "King Cobra", after his resignation from his position as Minister without Portfolio and MMD's National Secretary. His exit occurred when Frederick Chiluba proposed Levy Mwanawasa as the party presidential candidate, despite the fact that he had left the MMD in 1995 after losing the convention for party presidency (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011).

In the 2006 polls, MMD's performance improved slightly; its parliamentary representation rose from 69 to 74 seats, but it was not enough to provide for a majoritarian status. Levy Mwanawasa was reelected for a second term and beat his two most direct competitors, Michael Sata (PF) and Hakainde Hichilema (new UNPD leader), by a comfortable margin; the vote distribution was 43%, 29% and 25%, respectively. The UPND, the UNIP and the FDD ran under the UDA coalition and elected 27 seats, whereas the PF rose from one MP in 2001 to an impressive 46 seats, becoming the second political force in the parliament. The remaining seats went to the NDF and to an independent candidate. According to Kabimba and Simbyakula (2011), PF's inspiring results in these polls resulted from a well planned strategy to establish the party as a regular and nation-wide competitor. For this purpose, the party set out to participate in all by-elections conducted between 2001 and 2006 and developed efforts to grow beyond its regional stronghold in Northern, Luapula, Copperbelt and Lusaka Provinces as a means to erode the perception that it was a regionally and ethnically based political organization. In addition, Michael Sata brought representatives of the other Provinces to the party's Central Committee (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 7-8). In what regards the quality of the elections, transparent ballot boxes and a voter's card with photo and bio-data were used for the first time to reduce electoral fraud (see Zambia IPU Parline report). International observers considered that elections were largely well-organized and transparent, despite some «shortcomings regarding the new voter's cards which may have prevented some young people from casting their ballots» (Ibid.).

The background of the 2011 elections was marked by the failure of an electoral pact – known as the Reedbuck Protocol[125] – between the UPND and the PF due to disagreements on several core questions notably, (i) leadership over their platform, the Joint National Council (JNC), (ii) candidate selection for the Luena parliamentary by-election in August 2010 and (iii) overall strategy for the presidential and the parliamentary elections of 2011[126] (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 15-20). The UPND pulled out of the pact and consequently the PF

[125] The parties signed a joint communiqué on 4th June 2009, at the Reedbuck Hotel in Lusaka.

[126] It is worth nothing this was the second time that the two parties failed to concretize a pact. Before the 2006 polls, the UPND had approached the PF to form a alliance, but the PF eventually allied with the ULP ,while the UPND headed the UDA coalition together with the FDD and the UNIP (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 13-20)

started an «aggressive campaign» to win countrywide support as well as to engage the diplomatic community. The party strategy also implied seeking coverage in private media and being able to control the voting process in the polling stations. All these actions eventually paid off, as, in 2011, Michael Sata, finally succeeded and ousted the incumbent President Rupiah Banda, who had been elected in the 2008 by-elections following the death of Levy Mwanawasa, by 43% against 36% of the vote cast. In the parliamentary elections, the PF won 61 seats with the MMD still coming a close second with 55 seats. This time the UPND, the FDD and the UNIP contested the polls separately, but only the former two were able to elect candidates (29 and one, respectively). Moreover, three independent candidates and one candidate of the ADD were elected.

In explaining the first alternation in the country's history since 1991, Chembe Nyangu, Deputy National Secretary of the MMD, pointed out two main reasons. Firstly, «people wanted the change for the sake of change»; secondly, the party faced internal problems and «had a claim in leadership» and «could not articulate this decision properly». As a result, the campaign was «not very effective» and people eventually felt it. Other politicians interviewed during fieldwork highlighted PF's appealing campaign, which particularly targeted the youth under the slogan "For lower taxes, more jobs and more money in your pockets" and Zambian voters' disenchantment with the MMD, as the main anchors of Michael Sata's victory. Here are some exemplificative quotes:

> The people were looking at the party that could easily take out MMD. [...] they wanted the change yes. We all wanted the MMD to fall but we were thinking that good policies would come, but they are not coming [...]. (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD Secretary-General)

> He [Sata] was a minister in so many ministries here in Zambia, he was also a MP; and in all these ministries he delivered. So people had confidence in him. [...] that is why they called him man of action. [...] the new voters, the girls and boys from schools who were expecting jobs voted [...]. [...] you know young people always want to change. (Charles Zulu, independent candidate elected in 2011)

Table 5.4 – Zambia's Parliamentary Elections (1991-2001): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province

	1991				1996										2001													
	MMD		UNIP		MMD		INDEP		NP		AZ		ZDC		MMD		UPND		HP		FDD		UNIP		ZRP		INDEP		PF	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
Central	72,9	14	26,9		48,0	12	23,0	2	3,9				9,3		30,4	7	26,4	5	12,3	2	11,1		8,7		5,2		1,4		1,3	
Copperbelt	89,1	22	10,4		67,5	22	7,1		5,1				9,0		34,6	20	10,7		16,6	1	11,3		7,3	1	6,8		1,6		5,1	
Eastern	23,9		74,1	19	58,9	19	2,2		6,1				23,2		17,0	1	4,7		6,2	1	26,2	5	34,5	12	3,6		3,0		0,9	
Luapula	86,1	13	13,9	1	68,3	14	10,2		2,3				10,3		49,8	13	4,1		2,1		9,2		6,1		14,0		6,6	1	3,3	
Lusaka	75,8	10	22,6	2	61,2	10	9,5	1	4,2	1	0,2		14,8		15,4	1	24,3	4	8,0		28,8	6	7,5		4,0	1	2,1		2,8	
Northern	83,7	20	15,8	1	60,7	18	17,0	3	3,4				12,5		37,8	20	5,7		5,0		14,2		12,0		9,3		4,6		6,2	1
North-Western	66,0	10	30,9	2	43,9	10	8,1	2	34,7				7,5		31,5	3	38,8	9	5,7		9,1		4,2		1,8		6,0		0,5	
Southern	83,7	19	15,5		54,0	19	5,6		3,4		1,2		18,5		15,6	1	62,4	18	1,4		8,7		2,9		2,2		4,1		0,4	
Western	79,7	17	19,6		47,8	7	7,1	2	9,6	4	14,4	2	15,7	2	27,3	3	41,4	13	1,5		11,1	1	6,5		2,5		3,5		2,1	
Total	**74,0**	**125**	**25,0**	**25**	**60,9**	**131**	**10**	**10**	**7,1**	**5**	**1,5**	**2**	**14**	**2**	**28,0**	**69**	**23,8**	**49**	**7,6**	**4**	**15,6**	**12**	**10,6**	**13**	**5,5**	**1**	**3,4**		**2,8**	**1**
Turnout	**44,4**				**78,5**										**68,6**															

Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010).

Notes: INDEP = Independents

Table 5.5 – Zambia's Parliamentary Elections (2006-2011): Votes (%) and seats (total) per party and province

	2006										2011											
	MMD		UPND FDD UNIP (UDA)		PF		INDEP		NDF		MMD		UPND		PF		INDEP		ADD		FDD	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
Central	43,2	12	18,8	2	29,0	0	4,8	0	0,5	0	44,4	9	21,6	2	26,6	3	6,0		0,2		0,3	
Copperbelt	41,7	4	15,7	0	27,3	18	10,1	0	0,4	0	28,3	4	5,8		61,6	18	3,3		0,4		0,1	
Eastern	40,5	15	35,4	4	5,2	0	11,6	0	0,9	0	55,7	15	5,6		18,9	1	13,0	2	0,4		4,2	1
Luapula	37,5	4	5,1	0	42,1	9	6,8	0	7,6	1	26,6	1	0,8		61,6	13	8,8		0,9		0,1	
Lusaka	29,7	5	19,1	0	40,1	7	6,5	0	0,2	0	27,8	4	11,8		55,4	8	2,0		0,3		0,3	
Northern	44,3	10	8,0	1	33,5	10	10,8	0	1,5	0	32,4	4	1,6		53,2	16	10,9	1	0,5		0,8	
North-Western	54,8	10	28,2	2	0,1	0	14,4	0	0,7	0	44,7	9	34,4	3	10,1		7,8		0,1		0,6	
Southern	21,8	0	58,5	17	1,4	1	13,4	1	0,3	0	20,6	1	57,7	18	3,2		15,3		0,5		0,0	
Western	53,8	14	11,7	1	0,1	1	13,3	1	0,1	0	34,4	8	28,0	6	20,2	2	4,4		11,4	1	0,1	
Total	**39,1**	**74**	**22,7**	**27**	**22,7**	**46**	**9,5**	**2**	**1,0**	**1**	**33,6**	**55**	**17,0**	**29**	**38,2**	**61**	**7,8**	**3**	**1,2**	**1**	**0,7**	**1**
Turnout	**70,7**										**54,0**											

Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011).

Notes about 2006 polls: elections were postponed in Lupososhi (Northern Province) and Kabompo East (North-Western Province) due to the deaths of two candidates. The two seats were won by the MMD. The FDD ran alone in the Bwacha constituency in the Central Province.

Notes about the 2011 polls: Two by-elections – in Nakonde in the Northern Province and in Magoye in the Southern Province decided the allocation of the two remaining seats. The PF won Nakonde and the UPND retained the Magoye constituency.

Table 5.6 – Zambia's Presidential Elections (1991-2011): Most voted candidates (%)

Candidate (Party)	1991	1996	2001	2006	2008	2011
Frederick Chiluba (MMD)	**75,8**	**72,6**				
Kenneth Kaunda (UNIP)	24,2					
Dean Mung'omba (ZDC)		12,7				
Levy Mwanawasa (MMD)			**29,2**	**43,0**		
Anderson Mazoka (UPND)			27,2			
Christon Tembo (FDD)			13,2			
Tilyenji Kaunda (UNIP)			10,1			
Michael Sata (PF)			3,4	29,4	38,6	**42,9**
Hakainde Hichilema (UPND) [UDA]				25,3	20,0	18,5
Rupiah Banda (MMD)					**40,6**	36,2
Godfrey Miyanda (HP)					0,8	
Turnout	***45,0***	***58,4***	***67,8***	***70,8***	***45,4***	***54,0***

Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011).

Notes: other presidential candidate per election; **1996**: Dean Mung'omba (ZDC), Humphrey Mulemba (NP), Akashambatwa Mbikusita Lewanika (AZ) and Chama Chakomboka (MDP) – combined 27,4 % of the votes. **2001**: Nevers Mumba (NCC), Gwendoline Konie (SDP), Inonge Mbikusita-Lewanika (AZ), Yobert Shamapande (NLD), Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Benjamin Mwila (ZRP) – combined 17% of the votes. **2006**: Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Winright Ngondo (APC) – combined 2,3 % of the votes. **2011**: Charles Milupi (ADD), Elias Chipimo (NAREP), Tilyenji Kaunda (UNIP), Edith Nawakwi (FDD), Ng'andu Magande (NMP), Godfrey Miyanda (HP) and Fredrick Mutesa (ZED) – combined 2,4 % of the votes.

Before ending this section we make a brief note on the impressive number of by-elections the country has held to elect vacant seats at the parliament. According to the Constitution, ministers are drawn from the National Assembly, and any time parliamentarians move, die, resign or shift to a different party, fresh elections for that seat in the National Assembly are conducted[127].

Because factionalism, primarily motivated by personalism and ethnicity than by political or ideological orientations, is a mark of party politics in Zambia and electoral results are frequently petitioned, by-elections have become a routine rather than an exception from the onset of multipartism. Soon after the 1991elections, a political crisis within the MMD created a gap between Frederick Chiluba's cabinet and parliamentarians around the agenda of economic reforms. This crisis eventually led to major ministerial reshuffles in 1993, resulting in the departure of several key ministers – the Minister of Finance Emmanuel Kasonde, the

[127] This is completely different from Mozambique, where MPs are not allowed to simultaneously serve in the parliament and as members of cabinet. Moreover, when a sitting MP ceases functions (motivated by death, illness or other reasons) he/she is immediately substituted by the next candidate in the party list for that constituency. By-elections have been held but only at the subnational level (articles 155 and 163 of the Electoral Law No. 7/2007, 26th February 2007).

Minister of Agriculture, Guy Scott, the Minister of Mines, Humphrey Mulemba, and the Minister of Education, Arthur Wina – who had participated in the founding of the party. Some of these individuals joined to form the NP in 1993. To fill in the vacant places left in the parliament during this period, the government announced the realization of by-elections (Rakner 2003, 106). These were, however, the first of the many challenges faced by the new ruling party. Factionalism originated two additional splitting parties – the ZDC (founded in 1995) and the AZ (founded in 1996) – and the need for further by-elections. As a result, between 1991 and 1996, 48 by-elections took place in Zambia, following defections from the various parties and deaths of several MPs. «Eight parties contested these elections, but only the MMD, the UNIP and the NP succeeded in winning seats» (Rakner 2003, 108).

The general elections of 2001 were also followed by several by-elections. The first was motivated by the death of an MP from the ruling MMD. Three additional by-elections took place in Kabwe (Central province) as a result of two newly elected MPs defecting from the opposition HP to join the MMD and a third was held in Sesheke (Western Province), where a newly elected MP was dismissed by the UPND after voting against the party's position on the election of the speaker of Parliament (Carter Center 2002, 54). Between 2006 and 2011, another 15 parliamentary by-elections were held according to the Electoral Commission of Zambia's (ECZ) website. These were won by the PF (6), the MMD (5), the UPND (3) and the ADD (1). While some by-elections were caused by death (e.g. Solwezi), the majority resulted from MPs swinging from the opposition to the ruling party. Finally, since the PF won the elections of September 2011, a total of 31 by-elections have been conducted. Eleven of the 31 resulted of defections to the ruling party, three were due to the death of sitting MPs and seven because of court nullifications petitioned by losing PF candidates (Motsamai and Chipenzi 2013).

While by-elections are in accordance with Zambia's electoral laws, their frequency entails important consequences for the way the political system works. In fact, beyond the economic impact on the country's coffers, the multiplication of by-elections can provoke citizens' fatigue, since they are constantly called to cast votes outside the regular electoral period and political parties are in a permanent "election mood". Moreover, elections become more polarized and personalized given that what is in stake is the election of a particular seat in a particular constituency.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has had the two-fold objective of providing a framework for the comparative analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and describing the main characteristics of party politics in Mozambique and Zambia since the early days of independence.

Bearing these two objectives in mind, we started by featuring the environmental and the relational mechanisms of PSI that will be compared across the case studies. Environmental mechanisms – path to democratic transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – are inherently connected with the background conditions within which party systems operate. These conditions simultaneously provide for a schema of resources and for the possible lines of actions for all the engaging parts. Relational mechanisms, complementarily, focus on the political actors and on their networks. In this context, relevance is given to the patterns of connection ensued between the parties in the system and between parties and citizens.

Regarding the second objective, a brief contextualization was provided for both Mozambique and Zambia. The main highlights showed two different political profiles before and after multipartism. While Mozambique had one major anti-colonial movement (Frelimo) which negotiated its own position as ruling party with the former colonial power, Zambia's decolonization struggle was led by two main political parties (ANC and UNIP), which aggregated the popular protest against the colony. Unlike what happened in Mozambique, in Zambia elections were held before independence was granted and since that moment direct elections were maintained throughout the entire period of one-partyism (1973-1991) and the brief experience of multipartism (1964-72). Kenneth Kaunda's Humanism was different from Samora Machel's Marxist-Leninism but, in practice, both ideologies allowed the citizens' indoctrination into a socialist paradigm in which the party and the state were indistinguishable structures and opposition activity was legally restricted.

The analysis of the multiparty elections brought more differences to the fore. In Mozambique, the Frelimo continued to be the dominant party in the new democratic dispensation, especially after the 1999 elections; while the UNIP lost the first multiparty elections in 1991 and it is today a secondary party in the Zambian political arena. As a matter of fact, it did not elect representatives in the latest parliamentary election in 2011. UNIP's unsuccessful career since 1991 can be owed to several aspects. It can certainly be argued that the party was heavily anchored on the state resources and infrastructures and that it had lost popular support in the latest years of one-partyism. Yet, moving beyond that argument, it is important to bring other factors into the equation. Firstly, the MMD was a very competent

contender that, through its own credits, legal engineering and strategic co-optation (through patronage) of MPs, was able to nullify the former ruling party. For instance, in 1993 and early 1996, Chiluba declared the state of emergency under allegations that the UNIP was engaging in violent practices to destabilize the country[128]. Those events suspended almost all fundamental political and civil rights, and made the arbitrary detention of opposition UNIP politicians possible (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 14-15). Secondly, the UNIP has experienced serious leadership problems since the exit of Kenneth Kaunda in 1992, with internal squabbling and factionalism leading to leadership turnover, suspensions and sometimes expulsions. In this sense, the influence of the party's founder and former President Kenneth Kaunda may have had a negative impact on party organization and membership morale, as the party seems to be divided between two camps; on the one side the supporters of the former president, and on the other side those who want fresh leadership without formal ties to Kaunda (NDI and FODEP 2003, 10).

Finally, a sort of path-dependency explanation can be put forward building on van de Walle's (2003, 301) analysis of the factors that drive political parties' success in new democracies. He argues that in a good number of African countries, the party's performance in the first legislative and particularly the first presidential election «turns out to be critical to its long-term fortunes». Furthermore, the:

> outcome of the transition election also largely determined whether a new party or the old single party would emerge in power. Whichever was able to control the chief executive's office, and attain a winning legislative majority following the first election, was then able to consolidate power. If the ex-single party managed to survive the move to multiparty politics with its hold on power intact, it was able to use all its resources to marginalize the opposition and re-consolidate power in the second and third multiparty elections (van de Walle 2003, 301).

This argument clearly applies to Mozambique where the Frelimo won the first election, therefore closing the transition process with a golden key, while in Zambia the MMD was the ultimate winner of the transition process and used its resources to minimize the role of the former ruling party, which eventually lost visibility after having boycotted the 1996 polls.

In addition to what has been already mentioned, the descriptive analysis of the election results helped us shed light on our previous findings about the nature of Mozambique's and

[128] The most controversial of these alleged conspiracy acts were the "Zero Option" and "Black Mamba" "plots" that resulted in a number of UNIP leaders being detained.

Zambia's party system. Chapter III portrayed Mozambique as highly and overinstitutionalized and Zambia as weakly and inadequately institutionalized. While, in the first case, the process of institutionalization outstrips political participation and innovation, in the second, the party system is not strong enough to promote change in society, while encouraging the political participation of citizens and social groups. The election results give support to this description as in Mozambique, especially since 1999, electoral acts have been marked by high levels of abstention at the same time as the Frelimo increased its electoral and parliamentary dominance as well as its organizational proficiency. In Zambia turnout levels reached the lowest values in 1991 (44%), and have varied between 54% and 79% ever since. Although the MMD won all elections between 1991 and 2006, only in two occasions was it able to form a majoritarian cabinet (1991 and 1996) without needing to co-opt opposition MPs (offering cabinet positions). Even though, since 2001, the ruling party has been able to engineer a majoritarian status in the parliament (since 2001) thanks to successful incursions into opposition parties, the high number of by-elections has had financial and political costs, the most important of which is the undermining of the living space and the fragmentation of the parliamentary opposition.

Ethnicity and regionalism often emerge in elections times and echo early cleavages formed in the processes of state formation and nation-building. After independence the Frelimo and the UNIP both had the purpose of unifying the country beyond ethnic, linguistic, religious and regional differences. That was the goal of their modernization project[129]. Yet this project created resistance and antagonism since it was imposed in an authoritarian fashion by the elite that took over the state[130].

With the introduction of multiparty elections, a ban on regional, religious and ethnic parties was introduced in the Mozambican Constitution of 1990 and in the GPA, but still the Renamo and more minor parties held to these territorial cleavages to mobilize voters (Pereira and Shenga 2005). On its side the Frelimo, sought to overcome any connotation with tribalism, notably by seeking support in areas of the country where it was less popular (Northern and Central Provinces). It did so by recognizing their political and social relevance

[129] Slogans like "*Um só povo, uma só Nação, do Rovuma ao Maputo"* from Samora Machel and "One Zambia, One Nation" from Kenneth Kaunda, clearly expressed this idea.

[130] Cahen (1994) explains that the North vs. South cleavage within the Frelimo basically expressed the failure of the nation-building process, which had excluded large portions of the territory from political and social power (namely rural inhabitants, Northern and Central provinces and traditional leaders). In Zambia in the First Republic the ANC was seen as *Tonga*, the UP as *Lozi* and the UPP and the UNIP as Bemba (Posner 2005, 54-55). In the Second Republic when Kenneth Kaunda banned all opposition the UNIP became the realm of ethnic dispute as the *Bemba* ethnic group, mainly concentrated in the Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt Provinces, has also been considered privileged *vis-à-vis* the others.

(Florêncio 2008; Lourenço 2009)[131] and in 2004 by nominating a North born party leader. With this, territorial cleavages lost some strength and the 2004 elections show that. Otherwise, in Zambia there are no legal provisions banning regional or ethnic parties (Hartmann and Kemmerzell 2010, 653); therefore as in the First Republic these types of parties continue to proliferate even when they distance themselves from such labels. For instance the AZ has been seen as *Lozi*, the UPND as *Tonga* and all the parties that have ever been in power – UNIP, MMD and PF – have been supported by the *Bemba* (the largest ethnic group) but still collected votes across other ethnic groups. In explaining varying patterns of party support, Posner (2005) advances that there is an association between the ethnic affiliation of the party leader and individuals' sympathies as:

> Zambians simply assume that if the party president is a member of a particular ethnic group then, in directing the functions and setting the agenda of the party, he will put the interests of that group first. Even when the president surrounds himself with deputies from other groups (as party presidents invariably do), the overwhelming tendency is for voters to ignore the vice presidents, secretaries general, and party chairpersons from other groups and to draw their inferences about the party's patronage orientation from the ethnic background of its top leader (Posner 2005, 55).

Beyond distinctive features mentioned so far, a common ground of electoral processes in these countries is that elections are always highly contested and petitioned by the main political parties. In fact, allegations of electoral fraud, vote rigging, intimidation of opposition parties by state agents, uneven media coverage and unlawful use of state resources by the incumbent party are recurrent in election times.

Having set out the overall context for the analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and described the historical and political profile of Mozambique and Zambia, the next chapter moves one step forward to actually conduct the analysis of the environmental and relational mechanisms of PSI. As previously indicated, in this part of the research the goal is to discuss the main findings delivered by the quantitative strand and to seek mechanisms of causality in

[131] Until 1999 this recognition was far from linear. For instance, Law No. 3/94 (about the Institutional Framework) stated that the local government should take into account the opinion of the traditional leaders as means to coordinate local activities that address the needs of the community. However, this prerogative was considerably diminished in Law no. 2/97. Later, Law no. 19/97 (about the Land) gave traditional leaders the responsibility to manage and allocate the land fund of the community yet, the big turn happened after the 1999 elections when the party finally recognized the role of the traditional leaders (partly motivated by the electoral results) and published the Decree-law no. 15 of 20th of June 2000 which defined the framework of the relations between local government and traditional leaders.

the relations identified between the dependent variable and the independent variables. Furthermore, new variables which have not been observed previously will be added to the analysis to a more comprehensive study of the different processes of PSI.

CHAPTER VI – MECHANISMS OF PARTY SYSTEM INSTITUTIONALIZATION: MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA COMPARED

In the previous chapter, we presented the scheme for the analysis of the mechanisms of PSI and featured the main political actors, institutions and political developments both in Mozambique and in Zambia, since independence. To that end, we started by displaying a brief theoretical overview of each mechanism and then combined bibliographical and documental sources, raw electoral data and semi-structured interviews to contextualize the case studies and to introduce this new strand of analysis. The descriptive analysis carried out highlighted two different profiles: in the Mozambican case, regime change is vertically enacted as a means of conflict resolution and elections produce majoritarian results; whereas in the Zambian case, political change is achieved via popular and societal input and elections result in more fragmented parliaments. Nevertheless, in the latter case, the participation of different social groups in the political arena has represented a challenge to the creation of an institutionalized national party system. Bearing this description in mind, this chapter examines the environmental and relational mechanisms of PSI and it is organized in five sections. Section 6.1 focuses on the path to democratic transition and highlights the mode of transition, the negotiation process and the political cleavages formed at this point. Section 6.2 addresses the mechanical effects of Mozambique's PR system and Zambia's FPTP system and discusses their unconventional results. Section 6.3 emphasizes the relevance and the limits of funding/finance in interparty competition. Section 6.4 evinces the prominent networks developed between the parties in the system (party coalitions) and between the parties and their constituencies (party-citizen linkages). A mix of clientelism and localism seem to pattern these relations. There is, however, also room for programmatic linkages, at least in Zambia. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the issues approached throughout the chapter by arguing that environmental and relational mechanisms are relevant in shaping different outcomes of PSI. Yet, to the extent to which the competition is more or less structured, the causal effects of these mechanisms will eventually be moderated.

6.1 Path to democratic transition

In the late 1980s, dramatic changes in the internal (economic decline, draught and famine, exhaustion of the troops) and external (fall of communist states and the end of the Cold War) scenes led civil war protagonists in Mozambique – the Frelimo and the Renamo – to finally acquiesce to the appeals of the church and those of the international community for a negotiated end to the war and for democratic opening. Despite international mediation, Mozambique's double transition from war to peace and to democracy was a locally owned process in which the former belligerents, sole negotiators of the transition process, had great

leeway to bargain and minimize the risks of sharing political power with other political parties in direct and competitive multiparty elections. Zambia's political opening, in turn, was anchored in the dissatisfaction of large sectors of the population – especially trade unionists, students and intellectuals –, which came together under a political movement that preceded the formation of the MMD. Although the incumbent party (UNIP) had some leverage over the negotiation process, what was achieved, in terms of institutional outlook and agenda of liberalization, ultimately resulted from the intensive pressure put on by the pro-democratic groups.

Through a narrative rooted in the principles of the historical institutionalism[132], this section argues that what happened during the transition moment matters for party system development. In fact, this is a moment when old and new political parties (re)emerge and when the institutional shape of the upcoming regime is crafted. In this sense, the mode of transition and who initiates and controls the process are aspects of great relevance (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995). Another important feature with formative influence on party development has to do with the way in which political parties react to the previous authoritarian experience and find new identitarian references. In the case of Mozambique this question principally relates to how both the Frelimo and the Renamo were able to break with the legacies of the warring past and adapt their structures and ideologies to the new multiparty framework. In the case of Zambia, however, two sensitive issues may be determinant in shaping intra and interparty competition. The first is the extent to which the UNIP was able to refashion itself as a democratic political player (similar to other cases of departure from one-partyism); the second regards the ability of the MMD to overcome its grassroots origin and be a cohesive political force. In fact, having emerged from a broad social alliance, the main challenge for the MMD is to appease conflictive and/or competing agendas, hence providing a coherent political offer. The descriptive analysis will show that bipolarization in Mozambique and fragmentation in Zambia trace back to the transition moment.

[132] Four distinctive marks are attributed to this paradigm: «First, historical institutionalists tend to conceptualize the relationship between institutions and individual behavior in relatively broad terms. Second, they emphasize the asymmetries of power associated with the operation and development of institutions. Third, they tend to have a view of institutional development that emphasizes path dependence and unintended consequences. Fourth, they are especially concerned to integrate institutional analysis with the contribution that other kinds of factors, such as ideas, can make to political outcomes» (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938).

6.1.1 Modes of transition, political actors and cleavages

In Mozambique the processes of democratization and peacebuilding were simultaneously developed. Under the instrumental play of international actors that brokered a peace agreement between the warring parties and supported the post-conflict peace-building and recovery process, the country found itself in a situation that required both (i) the introduction of liberalization reforms that would allow its rupture with the previous authoritarian regime and (ii) the implementation of a peace agreement that would end a civil war that had shattered the country's human and material resources for over a decade. A similar juxtaposition of peace and democracy agenda can be found in several other contemporary polities in Sub-Saharan Africa. Some examples are: Angola (Bicesse Accords: 1992; Luena Memorandum of Understanding: 2002), Burundi (Arusha Accords: 2000-2003), Chad (various peace and reconciliation processes between 1989-2006), Republic of Congo (National Dialogue Process: 1999-2001), Democratic Republic of Congo (Inter-Congolese Dialogue process: 1999–2003) and Guinea-Bissau (Abuja Peace Agreement: 1998) (Jarstad 2008, 33-34). However, what differentiates Mozambique from the generality of these countries is the fact that the first post-war elections clearly played a vital role in making a decisive break with the past (Benjamin Reilly 2008a, 181). This does not mean that the formerly warring parties «decided to forgive and forget» (Manning 2002, 25), but simply that there was no return to war; the results were peacefully accepted and a new political order was inaugurated even if the war cleavage remained salient in party politics.

Zambia shifted from a *one-party competitive system* – variant of neopatrimonialism in which regular elections are held and some degree of opposition is allowed (Bratton and van de Valle 1997) –, to multipartism through popular and social protest (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003). In fact, since the mid-80s, the socio-economic decline caused serious legitimacy problems for the ruling party. On the one hand, the party was limited in its patronage capacity, thus it became more difficult to contain internal dissidence (Tordoff 1988, 23-25)[133]. On the other hand, it was facing increasing contestation from various civil society organizations, with Frederick Chiluba, the Chairman of the leading trade union in the country (ZCTU), arising as the most visible face of the movement towards democracy and multipartism (Erdmann and

[133] According to Tordoff (1988, 23-24) competition for patronage was not between UNIP and the opposition, but between the various factions inside UNIP. Most of these factions originated from ethnic or regional divides and each aimed at gaining more political power. Given the ongoing in-fight, patronage allowed the establishment of coalitions or consensus across different ethnic groups. Yet, with the economic downturn the party could no longer provide extensive patronage as it did before, thus it increasingly relied on other institutions, namely state bureaucracy to sustain underpinning regime.

Simutanyi 2003 9-10). Amidst persisting and growing social unrest, and after initial reluctance to open the regime, President Kenneth Kaunda eventually changed his tactics to regain initiative and control over the liberalization process. The UNIP MPs amended the Constitution to allow for the formation of political parties in December 1990.Yet, the newly formed MMD, as well as most of the other smaller parties, did not accept a number of proposals contained in the new Constitution and so they gathered in a conference and proposed 68 alterations to it. This meeting paved the way to the first free and fair elections (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003,13).

These two processes were significant in different ways. Mozambique set a successful example for war-to-democracy transitions, which has been praised by many (Reilly 2008b, 18; Manning 2008). Indeed, the country had succeeded where other countries had failed: namely in what regards the attainment of a stable peace process, of multiparty elections and the transformation of the armed opposition into a civil political party (Ostheimer 2001). Bordering Zambia became the first Anglophone country to peacefully replace the longtime ruling party in competitive polls that represented the "icing on the cake" for a competent negotiation reform conducted by the main opposition political forces (Ihonvbere 1995). Erdmann and Simutanyi (2003) suggest a number of contributing factors to this comparatively quick and peaceful transition, including: the relatively "open" character of the authoritarian regime, which never managed to control all dissidence; the political unity and relative strength of the opposition movement, which included a crucial and well organized political force; the trade union movement; and, in particular, the mineworkers who could have brought the country's economy to a halt (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 12). Still, these exemplar modes of democratic transition also enclosed challenges for the actors involved.

Using Jarstad's (2008) four dilemmas – *horizontal, vertical, systemic and temporal* – it is possible to provide a more systematic reading of Mozambique's process. Democratic and peace negotiations were mostly characterized by *verticality* instead of *horizontality*. In fact, apart from the church, which had a facilitating role, no other civil society organization or political group at the national level took part in the various talks and meetings held. Not only did the Frelimo and the Renamo monopolize the entire process, but they both held to very strategic and immediate interests which they were not willing to concede (Brito 2009, 24) until positive incentives (e.g. funding) became more concrete throughout the ongoing negotiations (Manning 2002). Thus, it can be sustained that the local agents had ownership over the process (*systemic*), even though the international agents were called to resolve several deadlocks, namely delays in the demilitarization and in the implementation of

electoral procedures, which eventually postponed the realization of elections (*temporal*). It is also important to take into consideration that these negotiations were held in a changing paradigm of international intervention in which Mozambique set a precedent for the financial and staff support (Manning and Malbrough 2009, 83). In fact, financial incentives for the demobilization and the reintegration of troops, the establishment of a trust fund to aid in Renamo's transformation into a political party, and the assurance of the participation of other political parties in the first competitive polls were a significant part of the international intervention in Mozambique (Nuvunga 2007; Manning and Malbrough 2009).

The bipolarization of the negotiation process was relevant in two ways. In the first place, the Frelimo and the Renamo were able to negotiate the most advantageous conditions in exchange for their commitment to adopt peace and democratization measures. For example, the definition of an election threshold between 5% and 20% and the definition of a trust fund to finance political parties' activities clearly benefited the local negotiators agenda[134]. The international community provided a US$17 million trust fund to convert the Renamo from a rebel group into a political party (Kumar and Zeeuw 2008, 274), while seventeen other parties were given a much lower budget, of US$ 150 thousands each, to register and finance their activities (Manning and Malbrough 2009, 90). Moreover, with the approach of the 1994 elections , and despite having been granted much more financial support than other political parties, the Renamo continued asking for more financial support as a means to conduct a successful election campaign (Manning 2002, 110).

Secondly, the electorate remained polarized around the wartime political cleavage (Manning 2008, 8), which partly explains its behavior in the 1994 and 1999 elections. Electoral support for the Frelimo and the Renamo in these two elections mirrored their respective wartime patterns of support: the Renamo exhibiting its strongest social base in the country's five Central provinces and in rural areas, while the Frelimo strongholds were mainly in the South where the majority of the party cadres came from[135]. In this sense, the patterns of vote in several regions of the country can be read as a reaction to Frelimo's "authoritarian modernization", namely villagization and the denial of traditional systems of power [for the Province of Zambezia, see Chichava (2008), for the Province Nampula, see Rosário (2009)].

[134] As shown later, the Renamo defended the highest threshold (20%) and negotiated higher levels of financial support *vis-à-vis* the other political parties, whereas the Frelimo preferred the lower threshold (5%).
[135] All leaders of the Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and Joaquim Chissano were born in Gaza. The exception is Armando Guebuza, elected in 2005, who is from Nampula (in the North).

The conference *Peace Consolidation and Democracy in Mozambique: the role of political parties*[136] held in 2012 in Maputo, was very clear in showing that political parties remain attached to the warring past, even though 20 years have passed since the signature of the GPA. In this meeting, representatives of the Renamo argued that the Frelimo had not fulfilled the terms of the GPA and still governed as if it was in a one-party setting. The lack of dialogue on the side of the Frelimo was pointed out as the main factor leading the party leader, Afonso Dhlakama, to engage in more effective actions, namely to set up a camp in the bush again (in Gorongosa, Renamo's former headquarters). This was also backed by fieldwork interviews as this extract indicates:

> We have a serious problem that is the problem of the military. After the GPA, which ended the war it was agreed that the Renamo would have 1500 men and the Frelimo 1500 men [in the Armed Forces of Mozambique]. That was not possible [...] today; the party in power went on dismissing all those from Renamo; that is a rising conflict. There is also the problem of the police force. It was defined that the Police of the Republic of Mozambique would also be formed by Renamo's demobilized members, but that never happened. Therefore, there is a serious problem with the enforcement of the GPA. [...] and presently we have the president in the bush. (Maria Angelina Enoque, Renamo, Parliamentary caucus leader)[137]

In a similar tone, MDM leaders stated that peace was rather absent from politics since violence and intimidation during election times persisted, whereas Salomão Moyana (Magazine Independente, journalist) and Raul Domingos (PDD, President) concurred that the country had simply experienced the minimum required for peace, that is, 'the silencing of the weapons" and Sheik Abdul Carimo (Electoral Observatory, director[138]) recommended political parties to abandon the bellicose discourse.

[136] Translated from the original: *A consolidação da Paz e Democracia em Moçambique: o papel dos partidos políticos*. The conference was held between 23rd-24th October 2012 under the organization of *Associação de Parlamentares Europeus com Áfric*a/Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa (AWEPA) and Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD); over twenty political parties participated. I was also able to participate in this meeting since it took place during my fieldwork mission.

[137] Translated from the original: «*[...] nós temos um problema sério que é um problema dos militares. Depois do AGP que fez com que a guerra terminasse ficou definido que a Renamo teria 15 mil homens a Frelimo 15 mil homens [Nas Forças Armadas de Moçambique]. Isso não foi possível [...] hoje o partido no poder foi tirando todos aqueles que vieram da parte da Renamo; é um conflito que está a surgir. Por outro lado há um problema da polícia [...]. Ficou definido, que a Polícia da República de Moçambique seria composta também por membros que viessem do partido Renamo, entre os quais os desmobilizados e isso não aconteceu. Portanto é uma lacuna do cumprimento do AGP. [...] e hoje nós temos o presidente na mata.*»

[138] Also the General Secretary of *Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique*/ Islamic Council of Mozambique (Cislamo).

Beyond interparty competition, the legacies of the war and the salience given to these by political parties also influence citizens' engagement in the country's political life. According to Pereira (2008), in new democracies that emerged after a long period of civil war, people's main concerns is with political stability (Pereira 2008, 432). Therefore, in Mozambique more than political, economic and social divides, it was the fear of a return to war and the desire of reconciliation that shaped the background and the outcome of the first elections held in the country. This view can be traced back to the studies of Cahen (1998) who label the first election as the "election of silence" and of Heimer and Silva (2002) who, based on exploratory open ended interviews conducted in Luanda and Maputo in 2001, found out that political culture in these two countries was framed by values of safety (related both to military actions and violent urban criminality), common goals and solidarity (instead of individual or intergroup competiveness) and good governance (transparency and accountability of the state institutions).

Yet, this narrative does not tell the full story, particularly if we take into consideration the results of the 2004 and the 2009 elections in which the Frelimo clearly became a dominant party. In fact, to better understand these results two other factors must be considered. Firstly, how political parties have evolved over the years (Manning 2008; Pereira 2008). Particularly since 1999 the Frelimo was able to modernize itself as a pragmatist party and successfully occupied Renamo's agenda (Pereira 2008, 434) while Renamo remained «largely underdeveloped and connected with the war cleavage» and highly «personalized and centralized around the figure of Afonso Dhlakama» (Manning 2008 151-152). Secondly, that the Frelimo has been in control of the state since 1975. Indeed, by controlling the parliament, the presidency, the majority of municipalities and province assemblies it enjoys a considerable leeway to access and distribute state resources, without proper checks and balances. This in turn increases the party's ability to sustain its neopatrimonial networks.

Zambia's transition through negotiated reform was comparatively milder. There was no violent past to be dealt with and, as in previous periods of the country's history (independence struggle), a broad-based opposition movement was again pressuring the outgoing regime towards change. Even if the MMD took the lead during this period, it represented several organizations and movements from civil society: the labor movement (under the umbrella of the ZCTU); professional associations, notably the Law Association of Zambia (LAZ) and the Press Association of Zambia (PAZA); the Economic Association of Zambia (EAZ) and the University of Zambia Students Union (Momba and Madimutsa 2009, 2). In this context, the weakness of the old elites and their eventual compliance with the process allowed the

establishment of a new institutional framework without the problematic constraints that are associated with more controlled transitions (Ibid.). Inside the UNIP this process would be marked by some internal resistance from the hard-liners of the party, but Kaunda still assented to the opposition's demands for a referendum on multipartism, competitive elections, international observers and constitutional limits on executive power. His acquiescence to the process might have resulted from overconfidence and underestimation of his personal popularity and that of his party (Bratton 1992, 92), but it eventually contributed for a smoother transition to democracy in which institutional changes were, after all, minimum. Indeed, the following sections will show that there was not a total break with the institutional past. In fact, the electoral system (FPTP) and the form of government (presidential) are inherited from the pretransition period and party funding/finance remains unregulated as it was both in the First and in the Second Republics.

Now, returning to the nature of the transition, apart from the MMD, a number of newly emerged political parties (e.g. the NADA and the DP) also participated in the process of constitutional amendment that eventually laid down the rules of the new democratic settlement. Nevertheless, the MMD, as ruling party, had to deal with far-reaching challenges namely to contain the internal and external opposition and to keep the support of its constituencies (Ihonvbere 1995). An additional challenge regarding the MMD as a political organization had to do with how it would depart from its social basis and reconcile the interests of the various groups that had adhered to the movement (Momba and Madimutsa 2009). According to Rakner and Svåsand (2004), the development of political parties in Zambia, between 1991 and 2001, had two sources:

> first, there were the political entrepreneurs motivated by running for office and taking advantage of the possibility to form new parties. They had two options, either to seek nomination within an existing party or to form their own party. Second, since the MMD was formed as a broad anti-UNIP alliance, it was likely to fragment over time (Rakner and Svåsand 2004, 53).

While the first way of party formation is more or less common, in new democracies of Latin America, Asia and Africa (Salih and Nordlund 2007; Randall and Svåsand 2002b), the latter is deeply rooted in the revolutionary and broad-based nature of the Zambian transition. Indeed, as Chapter V has shown, the MMD was challenged with splits and factionalism from the onset of its formation; with several political parties, including the current party in government, the PF, resulting from breaks inside the MMD. The truth is that, with a far more

open party system, Zambia has witnessed several political parties and individuals (independent candidates, party leaders, former cabinet ministers) contesting and winning parliamentary seats.

This section has discussed the mode of democratic transition, highlighting its effects on PSI, taken as a structural expression of stable patterns of interparty competition, rootedness in society and organizational continuity. To conclude it, we need to recover the main arguments on how different transition paths underscore different profiles of institutionalization. Frelimo and Renamo emerged as the main beneficiaries of the transition process in Mozambique. They were given special conditions to negotiate the terms of their commitment to a new peaceful and democratic order, under a new international community model of financial support for peacebuilding missions. Due to the bipolarization of the negotiations, an already existing war cleavage crystallized in the choice of political institutions, which became the new battlefield for the former belligerents. At the citizen level, the fear of a return to war still influenced the way the electorate voted in the first polls and remained salient as the Renamo still holds to it – not only discursively, but through localized military actions – and mobilizes it as a trade-off for political legitimacy, from time to time. The Frelimo, in turn, has modified itself into a pragmatic political party and has been able to increase its electoral support over the years, not just through organizational development but also through its ability to surpass the Renamo in its traditional constituencies (rural areas and traditional leaderships). Furthermore, the rivalry between the Renamo and the Frelimo remains visible because no other party has been able to break the bipolar *status quo*, which is polarized to the extent that there are no episodes of former Renamo officials defecting to the Frelimo, or of «aisle crossings» between the two parties in parliament (Manning 2008, 51).

Differently, Zambia's transition was led by a social movement, later transformed into a political party, but that ultimately did not overcome its fragmented social basis[139]. In fact, during the first democratically elected legislature, Frederick Chiluba's MMD suffered three major splits which led to the exit of several founding members of the party and to the formation of three new political parties; the NP, the ZDC and the AZ in 1993, 1995 and 1996, respectively (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 30). These three splits were mainly triggered by political divergences with the way Chiluba was running the government with a mix of personal and collective policies (Ibid.). Yet, factionalism motivated by tribalism also led to the formation of an additional group, the Caucus for National Unity (CNU), in 1992. The

[139] In fact, signs of fragmentation started short after the MMD was formed on 4th January 1991. The first came in March 1991 when the losers of the first MMD convention decided to found the NDP.

group was created by leaders from a number of ethnic groups (principally Lozi-speakers) who complained that all key positions in the Chiluba government were held by members of the president's own group (the Bemba-speaking group) (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 13). These events, also described in Chapter V, continue to mark Zambia's weakly institutionalized party system.

As far as the actors who conducted the negotiations in Mozambique are concerned, there was a two-level playing field, first between local and international agents and then between the belligerents. The Frelimo and the Renamo were able to own the process despite international interference and then were contented – without other political parties involved – to define the institutional outlook of the upcoming regime. In Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, UNIP's leader since 1959, lost the negotiations and was surpassed by the opposition, which effectively conducted the negotiations. Finally, as far as political cleavages were concerned, in Mozambique the transition process, because it was led, by the former belligerents, encapsulated the regime's main cleavage around the war. In Zambia, however, the horizontality of the transition process echoed past processes of regime change (independence) and resulted in a party system characterized by a dominant party (more evident between 1991-1996 than between 2001-2011), fragmentation and ethnoregionalism. Since we are highlighting continuities, it is also important to acknowledge that this puzzling combination of dominance, fragmentation and ethnoregionalism, has been a mark of Zambia's political history. In fact, during the First Republic, the UNIP was the dominant political force but faced active antagonism from other political forces – the ANC resilient in the Southern Province, the UP established by the Lozi-speakers as breakaway within the UNIP (active in the Western Province) and the UPP, which competed in the Bemba-speaking areas (Burnell 2001, 245; Larmer 2006).

6.2 The Electoral system: Unconventional effects

In the previous chapter, we saw that electoral institutions exert both mechanical (e.g. fragmentation and disproportionality) and psychological (e.g. strategic vote and electoral coalitions) effects on party systems (Duverger 1959). Yet, these effects can be modeled by the structure of the party system itself (Sartori 2003). Further contributions led us to also consider the motivations regarding political parties' choices over one or another electoral formula; for they might be willing to keep or change the provisions that are (or will be) more beneficial to them in the future (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005). This section builds upon this discussion to

analyze the relationship between electoral system and PSI in Mozambique and Zambia. The quantitative strand of this study has already indicated the electoral system as a relevant factor of higher levels of institutionalization, with PR and mixed formulas being more favorable to this political outcome than majoritarian formulas. What makes this approach even more interesting is that Mozambique's PR and Zambia's FPTP formula produce different outcomes from what is conventionally expected. In fact, while FPTP elections are better known for promoting a party system with relatively few parties, PR is said to facilitate the representation of various social groups (Horowitz 2006, 9). This will be addressed again in the final part of this section; but first the origins and the consequences of electoral institutions will be addressed.

In Mozambique the choice over the electoral institutions was made during the war-to-democracy transition and was sealed with the GPA and later with the Electoral Law No. 4/93 of 28th December 1993. Like the major transitional elections conducted under UN auspices (Reilly 2008a, 173) and similar to other Lusophone countries (see country case studies in Lobo and Neto 2009), the parties agreed on a PR system, with the least proportional formula – D'Hondt –, closed list ballot and 5% threshold for representation in parliament. This threshold prevented smaller parties from gaining a place in national political institutions and had the vigorous support of the Renamo up until 2006, when it was abolished (Manning 2008, 50; Brito 2009, 23). Legislative and presidential elections were to be held simultaneously, a situation which can be also perceived as more advantageous for larger than smaller parties, particularly in presidential systems or systems in which the president is constitutionally strong (Shugart and Carey 1992; Cox 1997). This is to be expected because (i) large and statewide parties are likely to win the presidential elections (Cox 1997) and (ii) the president's popularity carries his/her party in the legislature (Shugart and Carey 1992). Therefore, when presidential and legislative elections are concurrent, the party that wins the presidency tends to win a majority in the national legislature, which has been the case in Mozambique.

According to Brito (2009), during the peace negotiations, the Renamo defended a PR system with maximum threshold of 20%, whereas the Frelimo had a preference for the majoritarian formula and for a lower election threshold. In this sense, the Renamo was mainly interested in limiting participation to the new parties but also in guaranteeing a fairer representation in parliament, while Frelimo's strategy was to back the adoption of an electoral system that would reinforce its dominant position and diminish the possibility of cohabitation or power-sharing. Furthermore, the inclusion of a low election threshold would allow other political parties to weaken Renamo's position as the main opposition party. Until the most

recent election (2009), the electoral laws have been changed every time an election takes place. Yet these have been minor changes, mainly targeting the composition of the electoral bodies[140].The most relevant change, however, led to the removal of the 5% threshold, against the desire of the Renamo, but as petitioned by a group of smaller political parties supported by the Frelimo. In December 2006, it was eliminated by a majority vote in the National Assembly (Manning 2008, 50). Nevertheless, among political parties and intellectuals a wide discussion remains open on whether Mozambique should adopt a more proportional system, like the largest remainder method, which would facilitate the representation of smaller parties (Hanlon and Nuvunga 2005; Brito 2011)

Zambia inherited the plurality formula – FPTP in SMC – as part of the constitutional legacy of the departing British colonialist upon independence in 1964. Applied in all direct elections throughout the First and Second Republics, FPTP was one of the institutional marks from the previous regime that was kept unchanged during transition. Nonetheless, because the «[...] transition period was telescoped into just 22 months [...] struggles over both the general constitutional framework and particular voting procedures raged until the eleventh hour and were a basic feature of the entire campaign» (Bratton 1992, 87). Disagreements related to the constitutional commission's report released in June 1991, which had been unilaterally discussed by UNIP's MPs, without any input from the MMD, civil society organizations or other smaller political groups (Erdmann and Simutanyi 2003, 11) .

The electoral formula was somewhat disregarded in this process, but there has been an ongoing debate regarding constitutional and electoral amendment from the outset of the first multiparty elections, even though no relevant changes have been introduced. The Mvunga Commission of 1990[141], the Mwanakatwe Commission of 1993[142], the Mung'omba Commission of 2003[143] and the Zaloumis Electoral Reforms Committee established in

[140] The electoral law has been revised three times between 1994-2009: Law No. 13/1999, Law No. 7/2004, Law No. 7,8,9, 19 and 18/2007. The main changes regarded the composition of the electoral bodies (CNE and STAE) which supervise the election process: since 1994 there has been a trend to decrease the number of parliamentary parties, to deny the representation of extra-parliamentary parties and to increase the number of representatives of civil society organizations (CSOs). Even though this is perceived as an indicator of non-partisanship, the opposition political parties believe that due to their financial precariousness some CSOs are easily co-opted by the ruling party and thus are not truly independent (Muendane 2011, 20-23). Another change was the inclusion of a provision in which in case of a mismatch between the number of ballot papers cast and the actual number of voters in a certain circle, the CNE will take into account the number of ballot papers if it is not higher than the number of registered voters (article 85º of Law No. 7/2007).

[141] The Mvunga Commission was appointed in 1990 to recommend a constitution that could serve a plural political system. This resulted in the 1991 Constitution.

[142] The Mwanakatwe Commission was appointed in 1993; it resulted in the 1996 amendment to the 1991 Constitution. This Constitution brought in the parental clause for the election of the President.

[143] Following the submission of the Mung'omba Constitution to the Government, the Government established the National Constitutional Conference (NCC) through the National Constitutional Conference Act, No.17 of

2003[144], all attempted to engage the population and civil society agents into the process of Constitution and electoral law amendment (Maregere and Mofya 2006). Although there have been recommendations, by the Mvunga and Mwanakatwe Commissions, to change the electoral formula from plurality to 50%+1, this has not been adopted by the incumbent political parties[145]. More recently, the National Constitutional Conference – NCC (which includes traditional leaders, politicians and members of civil society organizations) was created for the examination, debate and adoption of proposals to alter the Constitution. Notwithstanding, interviews collected during fieldwork suggested some skepticism regarding the success of this commission to actually change the Constitution. As of March 2014, the new Constitution has yet to materialize.

Shifting the focus from the origins to the consequences of electoral system, if we simply look at the mechanical effects of the electoral institutions as displayed by the levels of disproportionality (measured as Rae's *D*) and fragmentation (measured as the effective number of parliamentary parties[146]) additional differences can be discerned across Mozambique and Zambia. As Tables 6.1 and 6.2 indicate, Mozambique's PR system produces lower levels of disproportionality (average D = 5.4) and of parliamentary fragmentation (average ENPP = 1.9) than Zambia's FPTP formula (average D = 15.7 and average ENPP = 2.3). From a longitudinal point of view both indexes are declining in the Mozambican context. In what regards the decreasing levels of disproportionality, they can be associated with successive changes in the size of the constituencies, which have been systematically rescaled before every electoral act due to technical problems in the voter registration process[147]:

- Six changes between 1994 and 1999: Niassa (+2), Nampula (-4), Manica (+2), Tete (+3), Inhambane (-1) and Maputo City (-2);

2007. The NCC submitted its draft constitution in August, 2010. The 2010 draft Constitution was presented to Parliament in 2011, but failed the two-third vote.

[144] See Technical Committee On Drafting The Zambian Constitution http://zambianconstitution.org/terms-of-reference-.html

[145] The National Constitutional Conference (NCC) was established under the Act No. 19 of 2007. http://www.ncczambia.org/aboutthencc.php.

[146] ENPP is calculated with the proportion of seats, while the ENEP, used in the previous Chapter, draws on the proportion of votes. The first informs about parliamentary fragmentation and the latter about electoral fragmentation.

[147] According to the law, the distribution of mandates per electoral district is proportional to the number of registered voters in each electoral district. Since there have been several technical problems with voter registration – e.g. obsolete equipment, poorly trained workers (Carter Center 2004, Boletim da República 1999) – the number of mandates has varied frequently. Yet, no changes in the law have been effected. For example, the CNE alleged lack of means to conduct voter registration abroad in the 1994 and 1999 elections even though the first Electoral Law – Law No. 4/93 of 28th December – predicted the existence of three foreign electoral districts. For this reason, Mozambican citizens living abroad voted for the first time in 2004.

- Eight changes between 1999 and 2004: Niassa (-1), Manica (-1), Sofala (+1), Zambezia (-1), Gaza (+1), Inhambane (-1), Africa (+1) and Rest of the World (+1), and finally;
- Nine changes between 2004 and 2009: Nampula (-5), Niassa (+2), Manica (+2), Sofala (-2), Tete (-2), Zambezia (-3), Gaza (-1), Maputo City (+2) and Maputo Province (+3).

The removal of the 5% election threshold in 2006 might have also contributed to the drop of the disportionality levels between 2004 (D = 4.8) and 2009 (D = 2.6). We recall that in these elections the MDM gained parliamentary representation (eight seats) after being voted by 3,9% of the electorate. The evolution of the ENPP basically reflects Frelimo's increasingly dominant status particularly since the 1999 general elections.

Contrary to Mozambique, Zambia has had a steady electoral system. No major electoral reforms have been made in what regards the size of the constituencies or the electoral formula, even though as described above, there is an ongoing debate about whether a 50%+1 formula should be adopted to replace the FPTP. Another distinguishing feature is that independent candidates are allowed to run for parliamentary elections on their own; that is, without having to integrate a party ticket. The somewhat non-linear values of disproportionality across elections mainly result from the mechanical effects of the electoral system as it stands and also to the nature of competition in certain constituencies. Moreover, because Zambia has held several by-elections there are slight differences between the number of votes and the number of seats.

Zambia's parliamentary elections also show, as expected for FPTP formula (Horowitz 2006, 9), that the parties with the highest number of votes are generously rewarded when votes are translated into mandates, while the least voted parties are always penalized in that process. So, this is also another reading about the levels of proportionality in FPTP systems. As Table 6.2 shows, the MMD is the most benefited party. Looking, for example at the 2001 and 2006 elections, the most hard-fought, the result was very close to a majoritarian status in parliament, with the MMD winning 46% and 49% of the seats despite having been voted by 28% and 39% of the electorate, respectively.

Table 6.1 – Mozambique's Parliamentary Elections: Degrees of disproportionality and fragmentation

	Party	Votes %	Seats %	Votes % - Seats %	D	ENPP
1994	Frelimo	44 ,3	51 ,6	7 ,3		
	Renamo	37 ,8	44 ,8	7 ,0		
	UD	5 ,2	3 ,6	-1 ,6	7.9	2.1
1999	Frelimo	48 ,6	53 ,2	4 ,6		
	Renamo - UE	38 ,8	46 ,8	8 ,0	6.3	2.0
2004	Frelimo	61 ,5	64 ,0	2 ,5		
	Renamo - UE	29 ,0	36 ,0	7 ,0	4.8	1.9
2009	Frelimo	74 ,7	76 ,4	1 ,7		
	Renamo	17 ,7	20 ,4	2 ,7		
	MDM	3 ,9	3 ,2	-0 ,7	2.6	1.6
Total (as average)					**5 ,4**	**1.9**

Source: Elaborated with data from the National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010). Note: D = Disproportionality and ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties.

Table 6.2 – Zambia's Parliamentary Elections: Degrees of disproportionality and fragmentation

	Party	Votes %	Seats %	Votes % - Seats %	D	ENPP
1991	MMD	74 ,0	83 ,3	9 ,3		
	UNIP	25 ,0	16 ,7	-8 ,3	8.8	1.4
1996	MMD	60 ,9	84 ,0	26 ,5		
	Independents	10 ,0	6 ,7	-3 ,3		
	NP	7 ,1	3 ,3	-3 ,8		
	AZ	1 ,5	1 ,3	-0 ,1		
	ZDC	13 ,8	1 ,3	-12 ,5	23.1	1.3
2001	MMD	28 ,0	46 ,0	18 ,0		
	UPND	23 ,8	32 ,7	8 ,9		
	HP	7 ,6	2 ,7	-4 ,9		
	FDD	15 ,6	8 ,0	-7 ,6		
	UNIP	10 ,6	8 ,7	-1 ,9		
	ZRP	5 ,5	0 ,7	-4 ,9		
	Independents	3 ,4	0 ,7	-2 ,7		
	PF	2 ,8	0 ,7	-2 ,2	25.5	3.0
2006	MMD	39 ,1	49 ,3	10 ,3		
	UDA*	22 ,7	18 ,0	-4 ,7		
	PF	22 ,7	30 ,7	8 ,0		
	Independents	9 ,5	1 ,3	-8 ,2		
	NDF	1 ,0	0 ,7	-0 ,4	15.7	2.9
2011	MMD	33 ,6	36 ,7	3 ,1		
	UPND	17 ,0	19 ,3	2 ,4		
	PF	38 ,2	40 ,7	2 ,4		
	Independents	7 ,8	2 ,0	-5 ,8		
	ADD	1 ,2	0 ,7	-0 ,5		
	FDD	0 ,7	0 ,7	-0 ,1	7.1	3.0
Total (as average)					**16 ,0**	**2.3**

Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010; and 14-10-2011). Note: *UDA is a coalition of UPND, FDD and UNIP. D = Disproportionality and ENPP = Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties.

This descriptive analysis has shown that Mozambique's PR system is more proportional than Zambia's FPTP system. They produce, however, unconventional outcomes as far as the parliamentary fragmentation is concerned: the PR system produces a dominant party system with two major competitors and the FPTP system originates a multiparty system and has failed to create majoritarian cabinets since 2001[148]. In theory, a PR formula usually facilitates the parliamentary representation of various social groups, while FPTP is likely to restrict the parliamentary representation of smaller political parties (Duverger 1959; Horowitz 2006; Sartori 2003). Yet the case studies confronted us with "unconventional" effects, which will be examined in the next section using Sartori's (2003) typology about the interplays between the structure of the party system and the nature of the electoral system.

6.2.1 Beyond the direct effects of electoral systems

According to Sartori (2003), the effects of electoral institutions on party systems are indirect and, to a large extent, depend on the structure of the party system itself; with more structured party systems being better able to create majoritarian results out of the electoral rules rather than less structured ones. Thus, even though we have sustained that electoral institutions matter[149], building on the results of the quantitative analysis and on the literature on the political consequences of electoral institutions (Grofman and Lijphart 2003; Diamond and Plattner 2006), the descriptive analysis of the case studies led us to consider the reasons why in some cases the rules turn out to work the other way around. Addressing this problem is relevant not only for the cases here selected, but also for other cases in the sample in which plurality formula seem to be associated to higher fragmentation or weaker levels of PSI, when compared to PR and mixed formula (e.g. Mauritius, The Gambia and Malawi).

Sartori's (2003) model is particularly relevant for the reassessment of the role of electoral systems in party systems. He suggests four possible interactions between these two institutions: (i) strong electoral system and strong party system, (ii) feeble electoral system and strong party system, (iii) strong electoral system and feeble party system, and (iv) feeble electoral system and feeble party system (Sartori 2003, 61-63). *Strong electoral systems* include the plurality formula and also the "strongly impure" PR formula and *feeble electoral*

[148] Like Zambia, Mauritius and Malawi are other cases of FPTP formulas that do not conform to the two-party system format; here multiparty systems have also emerged. In the majority of the 19 countries analyzed, however, the FPTP has produced dominant party systems (for example Botswana, Tanzania, Nigeria); the only exception in the sample is Ghana, which has a classical two-party system.
[149] See Chapter IV.

systems refer to the relatively pure PR formula; *strong party systems* include two-party formats while *feeble party systems* are more fragmented (Sartori 2003, 61).

Mozambique falls into combination (i) with a strong electoral system (PR) encountering a structured party system (dominant). It seems counterintuitive to label Mozambique's PR system strong, but we explain this further. Sartori (2003, 61) conceives PR systems as both strong and feeble institutions depending on their degree of proportionality and on the size of the electoral districts. Since in Mozambique the PR formula used is the least proportional one (D' Hondt) and until 2006 there was a 5% election threshold, the electoral system is better labeled as strong. Zambia, in turn, falls into combination (iii) with a feeble party system (fragmented) paring with a strong electoral system (FPTP). In Mozambique's case the voter is constrained not only by the electoral system, but also by the potency of party channeling. In fact, because there is strong systemic structuring (of the party system), the effects of the PR (which are notorious for promoting higher fragmentation) are eventually nullified. In the Zambia, the electoral system cannot produce reductive effects on a national scale, but merely at the constituency level. A two-party format becomes impossible because there is cross-constituency dispersion of issues which cannot be represented by the two major parties (Sartori 2003).

Mozambique's overinstitutionalized party system is thus anchored in a strong electoral system that favors its reproduction over time. Especially in the first two elections (1994; 1999), the two main parties seem to have gained from the electoral law as the late appearance of the MDM, in 2009, suggests. The removal of the 5% barrier clearly benefited this party, which despite receiving just 3,9% of the votes cast, still gained eight parliamentary seats. An earlier removal of this barrier could have also benefited the PDD which came third in 2004, after the Frelimo and the Renamo-UE. The highlight here is Frelimo's ability to persist as the most voted party through time and regime changes. Indeed, the "Frelimo-State" model, which emerged shortly after independence and developed until 1990, remains present as no other party has been able to remove it from power. This is also the result of the party's ability to modernize and detach itself from its warring past legacies and to present itself, even if only discursively, as a democratic force, but not only. In fact, the Frelimo used its incumbency to make incursions into Renamo's electorate, delivering economic development and patronage that the Renamo could not (Manning 2008, 44) and was successful in occupying its agenda[150].

[150] Interviews with António Muchanga (Renamo, member of the State Council) and José Macuane also highlighted this point.

> With the assistance of good anthropologists, the Frelimo was able to work on Renamo's weaknesses as well as on its own. For example, the Frelimo extinguished the *marchas de guia*, finished with the communal villages and recognized religious confessions and traditional authorities. Therefore, it absorbed the four sources of Renamo's electoral support. [...] The Renamo, in turn, was not capable to do the same within Frelimo's traditional electorate (Ismael Mussa, former Renamo, and current MDM)[151].

Given the increasing dominance of the Frelimo, the Renamo, which came to the political arena in 1992 led by individuals with no experience in government, still holding to some of its wartime political issues (mentioned above in Ismael Mussa's interview[152]), was unable to reinvent itself. Afonso Dhlakama, the party leader since 1969, has never been replaced. He centralizes the most important decisions and ignores the party senior bodies defined in the party law (Manning 2008, 43-44). Having received a good amount of funding throughout the years (Nuvunga 2007)[153], the party showed no concrete investment in organizational development and despite having attracted the interest of a new intelligentsia between 1999-2009, it quickly encapsulated itself around Dhlakama, who demoted or dismissed all those that gained too much visibility (e.g. PDD's President Raul Domingos and MDM's President Daviz Simango) (Nuvunga 2007).

In Zambia's inadequately institutionalized party system, FPTP elections have been unable to create a two-party system since 1996 and a majoritarian government since 2001. It would be expected that more stable patterns of competition, at least at the government level, would emerge but the conventional expectation does not apply in this case. The political scene has been hallmarked by factionalism and in-fighting, with high cadres breaking away from the incumbent party to form alternative political parties. In this sense, major opposition parties in parliament have been formed within the ruling party. This has been one of the major causes of

[151] Translated from the original: «*A Frelimo; e de certa maneira também com assessoria de bons antropólogos também trabalhou os pontos fortes da Renamo e soube trabalhar os seus pontos fracos. Por exemplo a Frelimo [...] extinguiu as guias de marcha; acabou com as aldeias comunais, reconheceu as confissões religiosas e reconheceu e valorizou as autoridades tradicionais. Portanto as quatro bases [eleitorais] [...] da Renamo foram absorvidas pela Frelimo [...]. A própria Renamo não teve e mesma capacidade de o fazer dentro daquilo que era o eleitorado tradicional da Frelimo.*»

[152] This opinion was also conveyed by José Jaime Macuane and João Pereira professors at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration/University Eduardo Mondlane.

[153] In June 1982, the Lonrho (British/German Company) subsidiary signed a secret protection agreement with the Renamo leaders covering the Beira oil pipeline. The agreement stipulated payments of US$500.000, which continued up to the signing of the GPA and amounted to some US$5 million. From October 1992 to February 1993, the government of Mozambique declared that US$307.000 were spent on Renamo's needs, basically on food, transport, domestic air travel and house furnishing. In the first legislature, the Renamo was entitled to US$85.000 per month from the state budget, amount which Dhlakama said was only two thirds of the party's running costs and allowed nothing for (economic) investment (Nuvunga 2007, 10-14).

fragmentation together with the periodic ethnicization of electoral campaigns in certain constituencies (Levinson 1998; Habasonda 2009; Erdmann 2007a; Cheembe 2013). Among the main political parties, the UPND is most often associated with more parochial approaches. The party's strongest supporters are to be found in the Southern Province, where the *Tonga* are the largest ethnic group. Since its foundation in 2001, it has won the majority of seats in this Province, which is also the homeland of Anderson Mazoka, the founding leader of the party. His death opened a succession dispute between Sakwiba Sikota, highest in the party hierarchy, and Hakainde Hichilema, a businessman that belonged to the same tribal line of the late leader (*Tonga*). Hakainde Hichilema was eventually elected party leader and Sakwiba Sikota went on to establish his own party – the United Liberal Party (ULP) (Habasonda 2009, 16).

Regarding the other political parties, it is very difficult to find clear tribal lines in the sense that there is some volatility in the patterns of support across different Provinces (Habasonda 2009). The UNIP seemed to have a stronghold in the Eastern Province (home of the *Nsenga* and the *Tumbuka*) having won the 19 seats in competition in 1991 and 12 of 19 seats in 2001. Yet, the electorate shifted alliances in the following elections and granted a majority to the MMD in the 2006 and in the 2011 polls. PF's success in the *Bemba* (largest ethnic group) Provinces – Northern, Luapula and Copperbelt – has been relevant, for more than half of the seats gained in 2006 and 2011 came from these Provinces.

According to Simutanyi (2010, 10), the fact that «Michael Sata has been unable to obtain electoral support from the *Lozi* of Western Province, the *Lunda*, *Luvale* and *Kaonde* of North-Western, the *Nyanja*-speaking people of Eastern and the *Tonga* of Southern province, just as Hakainde Hichilema's appeal has failed to resonate outside his home region of Southern Province» suggest that no «ethnic group can hope to capture power on its own, without forging a kind of ethnic coalition (Simutanyi 2010, 10). Therefore, more instrumental approaches to certain constituencies and ethnic groups can prove crucial in election times (Osei-Hwedie 1998; Erdmann 2007a; Erdmann 2007b). The case of Zambia exemplifies a context in which the dispersion/concentration of ethnic and linguistic divisions across constituencies is "above-plurality", which means that because there is not a major ethnic group, the patterns of competition tend to be centrifugal rather than centripetal and this, in turn, undermines the formation of a nationwide two-party system[154]. Moreover, factionalism –

[154] Already in the late 1960s Rae (1967) criticized Duverger laws to consider different patterns of two-party competition in different regions, for where regional parties were strong, like in Canada, the FPTP failed to create a classical two-party system.

mostly motivated by personalism and tribalism instead of ideological and programmatic differences – contribute to higher levels of instability in the party system.

6.3 Party funding/finance

Particularly in the context of new democracies, it is believed that financial resources are determinant to sustain a democratic party system, as political parties need resources to have territorially comprehensible organizations and to develop their activities (from campaigning through ongoing socialization and mobilization of voters) (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Salih and Nordlund 2007). In the majority of African countries, however, these provisions are rather absent, and when they exist they are poorly enforced into political practices, which overall tends to blur the question of how much money parties actually have and what are its sources (Fambom 2003; Saffu 2003; Salih and Nordlund 2007; Sokomani et al. 2010).

Building on the results of the quantitative strand of analysis, this section argues that the existence of provisions for public funding and of wider rules of finance disclosure contributes to the institutionalization of party system. Principally in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa where economies are weaker, political parties are young and lack mass membership. Moreover, there is a huge gap between incumbent and opposition parties, and public funding is necessary not only to level the playing field but also to help support smaller parties activities. The disclosure of finances, in turn, enables some degree of transparency and accountability even if minimal. That said, funding is necessary but not sufficient, for as Salih and Nordlund (2007) note, the ability of political parties to seek resources and mobilize sympathizers is also relevant for their autonomy *vis-à-vis* state resources. Later on, we present extracts of interviews conducted during the fieldwork, to support this point.

As in the previous section, the present analysis takes into consideration how the cases' characteristics (party dominance in Mozambique, and party dominance, factionalism and ethnoregionalism in Zambia) influence the effects of party funding/finance in the party system.

Mozambique's Party Law (PL) No. 7/91 23rd January lays out the rules of party formation and registration as well as the conditions of funding in the new multiparty setting. These were later reinforced in the GPA's Protocol II "Criteria and arrangements for the formation and recognition of political parties". Political parties were granted equal rights with respect to their access to the mass media and to sources of public funding and public facilities, on the basis of criteria of parliamentary representativeness (article 20 of the PL). Modalities

of funding – membership fees, donations, public subsidies and other forms or finance (not specified) – and duties related to the annual disclosure of their accounts and sources of funding were also stipulated (article 17 of the PL). The finance of electoral campaigns is subject to the Law No. 7/2004 17th July 2004. The law allows contributions of candidates themselves and parties/or alliances, voluntary contributions of national or foreign citizens, "friendly parties" and non-governmental organizations and funding coming from campaign activities and the State. It prohibits government and public entities financing (articles 33 to 40). Despite highly regulated party funding/finance, provisions are poorly implemented in practice, notably in what regards the public disclosure of finances and the supervision on the side of the CNE and the Administrative Court (Nuvunga 2010; Sokomani et al. 2010).

Despite malpractices, a meeting organized by the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), in the run-up to the 2009 election, in which several political parties and civil society organizations[155] took part, reinforced the relevance of funding for Mozambican political parties. Among major constraints it was emphasized that the «lack of funding reduces the parties' visibility by limiting their actions; creates constraints in strategy design and the registration of party members; weakens the internal communication networking of parties, especially at the territorial level; and weakens parties' capacity building and civic education programs» (Mulhovo 2010). A note was also made to the four possibilities in terms of political party funding, namely: members' contributions, donations and gifts, funds from the state budget and other sources; as well as to the parties' disagreement over funding through the state budget, as it is allocated according to a party's representation in the parliament. «In general, political parties with representation in parliament accept the criteria as fair, while extra-parliamentarian political parties find the criteria endanger their survival» (Mulhovo 2010).

Members of political parties interviewed during fieldwork conveyed two types of positions regarding public funding. On the one hand, there seems to be a deficit in the process of implementation of legal provisions: funding is not provided within schedule, and the lack of proper supervision allows the unlawful use of public funds by the incumbent party. On the other hand, the existing criteria of public funding, based upon the number of seating MPs, is rather insufficient to level the playing field. Extra-parliamentary parties (over 40 parties now), only receive funds at elections times. The majority does not have a physical address and some

[155] The meeting aimed at discussing the results of a study conducted by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Several organizations were present, notably the *Observatório Eleitoral*/ Electoral Observatory (OE), which is a consortium of Mozambican civil society organizations created to promote the transparency and the fairness of the electoral processes.

engage in "out of the box" solutions, such as sharing their office with another political party to remain active[156]. But there are also those who argue that public funding is not relevant, as political parties need to develop more effective means to fund their activities in-and-out of the electoral period. In what regards the capacity of funding to actually level the playing field some argue that it can actually undermine the competition by downplaying the actual weight and relevance of the political parties. Here are some interview extracts that express some of these views:

> We are not able to start the campaign all in the same day and at the same time because the electoral bodies do not deliver the money on time … sometimes they give us the money with only 15 days [of campaign] left … (André Balate, Parena, President)[157]

> some people sustain that state funding for political parties during election campaigns should be equal, I do not agree with that criterion. There are parties AND parties. There are parties centered on the president [...] and there are mass parties; how can we equalize different things? [...] I could agree with what happens in certain countries, where at the end of each electoral act, some parties are banned if they fail to reach a certain electoral mark. Because we have over 50 parties in Mozambique now. (Benedito Marime, founder of PCN, currently on MDM)[158]

> they [the funds] are essential but not determinant. The MDM reached the parliament with few resources, it all depends on the strategy used by the party to get votes out of the abstention. (Ismael Mussa, former Renamo, and currently on MDM)[159]

> We develop some economic activities that help us be self sustainable. For instance, we can define that 2% of the militants' salary will contribute to fund big events like the Party Congress. The party has shops with campaign material for sale, in informal meetings everyone including the president, uses the [party] t-shirt, but they have to buy it. Can you imagine? In the Congress

[156] For example the Palmo and the Pasomo share the same office (as of May 2013).
[157] Translated from the original: «[...] *o que faz com que não iniciemos a campanha no mesmo dia, na mesma hora, são os órgão eleitorais, porque não disponibilizam o financiamento na hora … às vezes dão dinheiro enquanto só faltam 15 dias, faltam 15 dias … e com esses 15 dias tu pões material ali… material acolá… sei lá o quê.*»
[158] Translated from the original: «[...] *há quem advogue que o financiamento do estado, portanto aos partidos aquando das campanhas eleitorais deve ser por igual, eu não concordo com este critério. Ate porque há partidos e há partidos. Há partidos reduzidos ao seu presidente; [...] e há partidos de massas; como é que nos vamos igualar coisas diferentes. [...] eu era capaz de aprovar aquilo que acontece em determinados países, em que no final de cada processo eleitoral há partidos que são extintos, quando não atingem uma certa fasquia eleitoral, porque nós temos agora em Moçambique para cima de 50 partidos.*»
[159] Translated from the original: «*são essenciais mas não são determinantes. Porque o MDM com poucos recursos conseguiu chegar ao parlamento. Tudo depende da estratégia que for adotada para ir buscar o voto à abstenção*.»

> we were about 2000 delegates all dressed up. Imagine that during the Congress people would change ... and use another t-shirt; from various designs and colors. Additionally, those militants of the party that own companies give some donations to the party. (Morais Mabyeka, Frelimo, Secretary for Organization)[160]

> In the majority of extra-parliamentary parties, the money ends up going to the pockets of the party leaders, who in turn have never been elected. This happens because they do not invest the money in the campaign. My personal opinion about this matter, not the official opinion of the party, is that we need to somehow limit the number of times a party can run without electing an MP and then make a decision about whether it should be financed or not. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of the State Council)[161]

Zambia's 1991 Constitution outlawed the one-party system and opened the way for a multiparty framework with political parties being allowed to register and take part in the country's political life. Under the one-party rule, the UNIP received grants and was funded by the government for the purposes of conducting election campaigns (Mbewe 2009, 4). Yet, the 1991 constitutional text did not address the issue of financing political parties and election campaigns. The «only piece of legislation that relates to party finance is the Societies Act which regulates all legal entities from political parties to any civil society organization. According to the Societies Act (Article 16), the Registrar of Societies, is the only state institution mandated to ask for and receive annual reports from political parties and requires them to file annual returns in a prescribed format and defined timeframe» (Sokomani et al. 2010, 33-34). In 2003, legislation to provide for the funding of political parties with parliamentary seat, the Political Parties Fund Bill, was unanimously voted in the National Assembly; however «President Mwanawasa condemned his MPs for having voted and referred to the action as 'irresponsible,' given that the government had no money. He vowed

[160] Translated from the original: «*Nós temos algumas atividades económicas que em algum momento podem ajudar. Nós por exemplo, nesses grandes eventos que nós temos, que é o congresso determinamos que 2% do salário dos militantes vai contribuir só para aqueles eventos. Por exemplo, temos algumas lojas onde temos material de campanha. Por exemplo as nossas reuniões, praticamente se é informal incluindo o presidente, todos põem a camiseta mas têm que comprar! Estás a imaginar? Por exemplo, no congresso eramos cerca de 2000 e tal todos equipados. Imagina que durante os congressos as pessoas mudavam … tinham outra camiseta; de vários modelos de várias cores. Por exemplo, aqueles militantes do partido que tem posses de empresas, nessa altura eles dão umas contribuições para o partido do poder.*»

[161] Translated from the original: «*Este dinheiro acaba ficando nos bolsos de dirigentes desses partidos, na maior parte dos chamados partidos extraparlamentares, esses que desde que começou [o multipartidarismo] estão a concorrer e nunca ganham. É porque não investem esse dinheiro lá na campanha. [...] Eu penso que em relação a esse assunto… essa é a minha opinião pessoal não do partido, tinha-se que se estudar uma maneira ou limitava-se quantas vezes um partido poderia concorrer sem ganhar e depois tomava-se a decisão deste partido não voltar a ser financiado.*»

that the resolution passed by Parliament would not be implemented as long as he remained President» (Simutanyi 2005, 10). With overall lack of transparency and accountability, it is not possible to know how much money the political parties and their members receive every year in Zambia (Sokomani et al. 2010, 33-34).

It is known that political parties raise limited money through membership dues. Therefore, three forms of finance have allowed political parties to be active groups in society (Kabemba and Eiseman 2004, 15-16). The first is through personal wealth of the party leadership and candidates. This is the case of some political parties, namely the UPND, since its founding father – Anderson Mazoka – and current leader – Hakainde Hichilema – were/are both businessmen. The second is through the party's ownership of economic assets and this is particularly the case of the UNIP which was able to accumulate some property during its period as ruling party. Finally, the third is through the use of public resources. Even though the Electoral Code of Conduct bans the use of government resources for party or campaign purposes, the Code does not carry any legal power (Sokomani et al. 2010, 33-34), thus allowing the ruling party (the MMD or the PF) to pursue the same practices as the UNIP during one-partyism (Kabemba and Eiseman 2005, 15-16). In addition to this, political parties are expected to raise funds through campaign activities (such as dinners and luncheons) and donations.

The combined dominance of parties by wealthy members and donors with the absence of financial regulations and transparency creates a real threat to the integrity of electoral and political processes in Zambia and opens them to corruption (Kabemba and Eiseman 2005, 16). The current incumbent party, the PF, tends not to support public funding. Also the MMD, while in government, refused to pass a law (in 2003) that would allow for public funding of political parties. Testimonies collected during fieldwork suggest that funding for the main political parties should be allowed, but on equal grounds. Smaller political parties tend to support the adoption of public funding; but not under the parliamentary representation criterion (expressed by the leaders of the NRP, the NDP, and the APC). Here are some interview excerpts:

> it is very difficult for me to subscribe to that kind of thinking especially coming from a party that had no budget but formed government, so money doesn't really win you an election if we have to go by recent events, you know? Money didn't win the MMD the elections, they had all the money... and unfortunately it is a bit of a fantasy for people in a Third world country like Zambia, struggling with a GDP per capita of only about 1500 dollars, wanting the luxury for

> instance of funding political parties. I find it a little bit funny, that in such a country we can have such funding priorities (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director)

> you see parties are supposed to be funded because there are very well meaningful people out there who can deliver but the only problem; the only challenge that they have are funds... you know... so they lose out... so parties are really supposed to be funded by the government. (Charles Zulu, independent candidate elected in 2011)

> My view, my personal view is that if political parties are going to be funded you must set criteria for them to qualify and the amount of money given to any political party should be the same, because they are competing. They are competing. So if they are competing the best is to give a fair ground for everybody. If you give the ruling party more than the opposition, how are they going to compete? They are not going to compete. That is not competition. That is advantaging and disadvantaging the other side. […] So my view myself personally, is that if we must decide, we will fund but we are going to give these funds to the three best parties. (Alfred Ndhlovu, MMD, Information and Publicity Secretary)

> So, I think that in principle it is a very good principle [state funding] we should support it... but concretely and in practical terms in Zambia it can prove very difficult unless some other criteria would be used for funding. I am totally against the criteria which would be used in Zambia and which is used in other countries; that of funding people with seats in the parliament. That would mean creating a big gap between disadvantage and the advantaged ones. (Tentani Mwanza, NDP, President)

> the new Constitution will put in place funding for political parties but again [...] it is unfair because it is only the political parties in parliament that will be funded. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, President)

> we try to do and we are still trying to do something different; we don't rely for example on the president of the party for funding, currently we are working our ways, in which we can attract funding for the party. Because it is essential, because without funding you cannot operate, you need to travel around the country ... you need stationery, you need computers. As Secretary-General of the United Liberal Party you can imagine I rely on my office computer [...]. (Inambao Inambao, ULP, Secretary-General)

Apart from political parties, civil society leaders, who have been involved in the most recent process of constitutional amendment (started in 2011) argue that there are no mechanisms for

the sustainability of political parties (Richwell Mulwani, AVAP President), that political parties are owned by the leader and do not spend time in institutional strengthening (Horance Chilando, ZCID Director; Juliet Chibuta Women Lobby Director) and that resources are among their main challenges (Boniface Cheembe, SACCORD Director; Sombo Chunda, Diakonia Country Representative)[162]. Yet, the issue of funding remains controversial and unresolved as incumbent parties are still unwilling to adopt the changes suggested by civil society organizations and opposition political parties. The several commissions for constitutional amendment express this reluctance. The Mvunga Commission «recommended that political parties that have secured any number of seats in Parliament should be assisted with Government grants through Parliament in equal amounts and that any external assistance to parties should be channeled through the Government» (Report of the Constitution Review Commission 2005, 567); the Mwanakatwe Commission called for funding of political parties by the state, and so did the Mung'omba (2005) and the NCC Draft Constitutions of Zambia (2010). Despite systematic recommendations, funding for political parties obeys rules of disclosure which are still the same as the ones applied to any other civil organization operating in the country.

This analysis has shown that even though there are provisions regulating public and private funding in Mozambique they remain poorly enforced in practice. This narrowness is seen to benefit the ruling party *vis-à-vis* the others, both directly (because finance is distributed in accordance with parliamentary representation) and indirectly (because the party has somewhat unsupervised access to state resources). The amalgamation between the Frelimo and the state since 1975, labeled as "Estado-Frelimo" by several Mozambican scholars[163], skews some of the known attributes of public funding such as, leveling the playing field, increasing accountability and transparency. Yet, it contributes to the high and overinstitutionalized party system by reinforcing existing rules of interparty competition. At the same time, the rules of state funding (based upon parliamentary representation), have allowed the Frelimo and the Renamo to have guaranteed sources of money and, for that reason, they have tended to defend existing provisions (or more restrictive rules) while opposition parties prefer relaxing the rules. Even if poorly supervised, the existing provisions favor the reproduction of an overinstitutionalized party system. In Zambia, the absence of provisions makes political parties more exposed to influence-peddling and their structures

[162] Opinion collected through fieldwork interviews.
[163] For example, José Jaime Macuane and Domingos do Rosário, both professors at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration/University Eduardo Mondlane.

more vulnerable to the wealthier elites that sponsor the party. Combined with the existing factionalism and personalism, the necessary ingredients are present to reproduce a weakly and inadequately institutionalized party system.

6.4 Networks and party system institutionalization

In the previous chapter we relied on Tilly (2001) and Ansell (1998) to argue that relational mechanisms are about networks and that networks are a set of relations within and across individuals or collectivities in which resources, information, influence and capital are exchanged to create patterns of mutual cooperation or coercion, *inter alia*. The analysis of the relational mechanisms is relevant for the purposes of our study since they will allows us to identify the most common networks behind different processes of PSI.

As discussed in the previous chapter, neopatrimonialism is the most relevant informal feature in African politics encompassing practices such as tribalism, clientelism and patronage, in turn inherited from the pretransition authoritarian regime (Bayart 1989; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; Chabal 2002; van de Walle 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 2003). In modern political systems, neopatrimonial behaviors occurs in a institutional frameworks in which presidents are endowed with strong constitutional powers (van Cranenburgh 2008, 952) and are circled by a small ruling elite that uses the state's resources to keep the support of large networks of political clients (van de Walle 2002, 69).

According to van de Walle (2003), presidentialism and pervasive clientelism crucially shape party system development in Africa. In the majority of countries, he states, the presidency is the key arena for decision-making and because of such centralization the clientelistic access to state resources in Africa is also highly concentrated in the presidency. This institutional design affects the party system by underplaying both the role of legislative elections and of the political parties.

Clientelism, even when it is largely symbolic, implies a patron and client linkage, it has been associated to parochial ways of doing politics, as a way of rewarding loyal constituencies (ethnic, regional or politically based), but it is also a means of forging «alliances across different social elites, often in the form of overt power-sharing arrangements» (van de Walle 2003, 312).

As far as patronage is concerned, van de Walle (2003) notes that it is not as pervasive since «African state structures are woefully small, compared with those in other, richer states». For example, «the entire civil service in Africa represents on average only 2% of the

population, compared with 6,9 % in Eastern Europe, for example, or 7,7% in the OECD countries» (van de Walle 2003, 312). Additionally, rather than «individually excludable goods such as jobs, there is much more potential to influence voting with promises of community goods, notably in the form of social services, in this sense, perhaps the most common electoral promise made by African politicians, particularly as they venture out of the capital, is that they will provide better roads and social services to populations who vote for them» (van de Walle 2003, 312).

Therefore, the most common form of linkage between political parties and their constituents seems to be a mixed form of clientelism and local collective goods (local development). Ethnicity is also relevant in this equation since individuals are likely to vote for individuals of their own ethnic group, particularly in ethnically divided societies, such as Mozambique and Zambia, even if there is not a clear device or system of reward (Ibid.).

Building upon this literature, two sorts of networks are of interest here: interparty, i.e. between the parties in the system, and extraparty i.e. between the parties and their constituencies. Focusing on party coalitions, we show that despite the fact that they have been largely unsuccessful in defeating the incumbent party in both Mozambique and Zambia, in the former's case there is a national approach to the way coalitions are structured, while in the latter formal pre-electoral alliances for national elections are unusual, due to the salience of other relational patterns such as factionalism and personalism. In this sense, the study of relational mechanisms is relevant to shed light on the informal ways through which political parties change or crystallize the rules of interparty competition.

6.4.1 Party coalitions

In one of the few studies about party coalitions in Africa, Kadima (2006a, 2-8) argues that multipartism created an opportunity for parties to combine strengths either to win parliamentary representation or the possibility to form government. Given this, coalitions would be more likely to occur in an FPTP system than in a PR system, since the first entails more wasting of votes and thus encourages political parties to establish alliances to minimize losses (Kadima 2006b).

Moving from likelihood of occurrence to actual results, a study of Resnick (2011) covering 17 electoral democracies in Africa reveals that coalitions rarely result in incumbent defeat». In fact, the possibility of coalitions to actually break the *status quo* and alter established patterns and rules of competition is held back by several key features of African

politics as both these studies show (Kadima 2006a; Resnick 2011). Some of these features have been previously mentioned in this dissertation and are made clear in this quote:

> pervasiveness of ethnoregionalist politics within political parties and coalitions combined with the dominance of identity-based voting behavior over issue-based choices; the presidentialist deviation of presidential regimes, which tends to endow the presidency with excessive executive powers, to the detriment of Parliament; the prevailing unstable party systems; and the limited opportunities outside the state, which often lead to the prevalence of opportunistic coalitions. Moreover, party coalitions in Africa are likely to be affected by factors such as the inadequate institutionalization of democracy on the continent and the dominance of founding leaders over the party as well as the structural and organizational weaknesses of the parties themselves (Kadima 2006a, 10).

With the 5% election threshold, smaller political parties in Mozambique were incentivized to enact alliances from the onset of the 1994 elections, as can be seen in Table 6.3. The number of alliances has increased up until the 2009 polls. Yet, they have never been able to defeat the incumbent party – the Frelimo. Pre-electoral coalitions where the majority of parties are equally small, barely achieved parliamentary representation. In fact, only the UD was able to surpass the 5% threshold and elect candidates; even though this might have been caused by the party's symbol (the cashew nut, well known especially in rural areas) and its position at the bottom of the ballot paper (Brito 1996; Kadima and Matsimbe 2006). Apart from this, smaller political parties – namely their President or Secretary-General[164] – were able to gain seats in parliament after the 1999 and 2004 elections under the Renamo-UE coalition, in which the Renamo was the leading force (it collected about 85% of the seats won by the alliance in both elections).

Another interesting feature is that party-coalitions change from one election to the other. We find cases like the UD, which ran in three different elections always with a different composition and the Renamo-UE that won more partners between 1999 and 2004 and eventually dissolved before the 2009 polls. Then there are also parties which have integrated several different alliances (e.g. the Monamo-PMSD and the FAP first formed the UD and after that joined the Renamo-UE) and cases of more short-lived alliances as the ones contesting in 2004. In 2009, only Renamo's and Frelimo's candidacies were approved in all 11 provinces; about 10 political parties and coalitions were completely disqualified from

[164] Renamo's cadres António Muchanga and Fernando Mazanga stated that usually the party leaders would negotiate their position in parliament as an exchange for taking part in the coalition.

participating in the polls, while several others were partly excluded (e.g. MDM). As a result, only two pre-electoral coalitions participated in these parliamentary elections (UE and ADACD) to gather less than 0,7% of the votes cast.

Table 6.3 – Party Coalitions in Mozambique (1994 – 2009)

General Election	Coalition**	Affiliated Parties	Votes% (Seats)
1994	UD	Panade, Palmo, Panamo	5,1 (9 seats)
	AP	Monamo-PMSD, FAP	2,3
1999	UD	Pademo, Pacode, Pamomo	1,5 *
	Renamo-UE	Renamo, PPPM, PRD, FAP, Alimo, PUN, PCN, Monamo-PMSD, FDU, Fumo-PCD, Unamo	38,8 (117 seats)
2004	Renamo-UE	Renamo, Alimo, FAP, PRD, PUN, PPPM, PCN, Fumo-PCD, Monamo-PSD, FDU, Pemo	29,0 (90 seats)
	MBG	Unamo, Partonamo	0,4 *
	FAO	LF, PAC	0,3 *
	UD	Panade, PLDM	0,3 *
	Usamo	Padres, PSM, PSDM, UM	0,2 *
2009	UE	Pemo , PUN	0,2 *
	ADACD	PSM, Pacode, PUR	0,4 *

Source: Kadima and Matsimbe (2006, 157-158); EISA - http://eisa.org.za/WEP/mozparties2004.htm; African Elections Database - http://africanelections.tripod.com/; National Electoral Commission (CNE) – http://www.stae.org.mz/.

Note: * means no seats won; ** see acronym list for full name of parties and alliances.

Several aspects concur to the lack of success and to the ephemeral nature of party coalitions in Mozambique, notably the weakness and fragmentation of opposition political parties, the lack of resources and the apolitical motivations of party leaders who seem to be somewhat more interested in getting jobs than in establishing linkages based on ideological

proximity. In addition, because political parties tend not to establish clear political strategies, shifting and dissolving alliances, they eventually lack stable patterns of support, as it also becomes more difficult for the citizens to perceive what they stand for. This is something highlighted by the literature (Kadima 2006b), but it also echoed from fieldwork interviews:

> Well the problem is that other political parties do not have ideological positions. I mean; it is three or four friends who meet and decide [...] our experience in 1999 [under the Renamo-UE coalition] led us to realize that some parties were not parties at all, they were family clans. Some were only interested in getting a job. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of the State Council)[165]

> We have friendly relationships [...] as far as ideological affinity, the great problem is this: I will give you the example of Frelimo and Renamo. Renamo defines itself as a conservative party but if you ask how much businessmen it has they won't tell you; and you will find that its social base is mainly of individuals that came from the rural areas, yet it is conservative. [...] if you take Frelimo's case, it proclaims to be leftist ... yet today it has nothing to do, for example, with the workers, or the farmers or the employees. (Lutero Simango, MDM, Parliamentary caucus leader)[166]

> As institutions, political parties develop friendly relationships. In the last five years we have been associated to Frelimo [...] but to my knowledge there is nothing formalized. (Magalhães Abramugy, Pimo, Secretary-General)[167]

> My view is that the opposition should avoid fragmentation. More than ever the opposition should try to work things together and maximize their strengths and potentialities to improve

[165] Translated from the original: *«Bom o problema é que os outros partidos [...] não têm definição ideológica. Quer dizer: são três ou quatro amigos que se encontram e decidem [...] aquela experiência de 99 permitiu-nos perceber que alguns ali não eram partidos não eram nada; eram grupos de famílias! Alguns eram pessoas que eram aliciadas em nome do emprego e pronto!»*

[166] Translated from the original: *«há relações de amizade [...] Em termos de afinidades ideológicas o grande problema é este: vou dar-lhe um exemplo concreto da própria Frelimo e da Renamo. A Renamo autoafirma-se como um partido conservador, mas se perguntar à Renamo quantos empresários tem não é capaz de mostrar e vai verificar que a sua base social, a maior parte são indivíduos que vem das zonas rurais, mas é um partido conservador! [...] se pegar no caso da Frelimo, quer dizer proclama de que são esquerdistas … mas hoje nada tem a ver, por exemplo, com os operários nem com os camponeses nem os trabalhadores assalariados! Nada!»*

[167] Translated from the original: «[...] *Internamente em termos de relações entre partidos, as instituições relacionam-se amigavelmente. Não há nada formalizado. É verdade que nos últimos cinco anos o nosso partido foi conotado como tendo aliança com a Frelimo, nos últimos cinco anos, mas que eu saiba não existe nada que diga que a Frelimo está ligada ao Pimo … aliás que o Pimo está ligado à Frelimo* [...]».

> their chances. I do not think the opposition will perform well any time soon given its current situation (João Colaço, MDM, former member of the party secretariat)[168]

Apart from the formal pre-electoral alliances, other political platforms sought to promote a joint action of smaller parties. In 2005, the *Partido Independente de Moçambique*/ Independent Party of Mozambique (Pimo) of Ya-qub Sibindy and the PDD of Raul Domingos created the *Centro de Promoção da Democracia Multipartidária*/ Centre for the Promotion of Multiparty Democracy to institutionally support extra-parliamentary parties (Mutemba 2011, 12). Two years after the 2004 elections, the Pimo initiated the *Oposição Construtiva*/ Constructive Opposition (OP)[169] which initially assembled more than twenty political parties, among which the Panamo, the Pacode, the Parede, the PUR, the PE and the PT[170]. This grouping was, however, contested from the beginning, both internally and externally. The close relationship between Ya-qub Sibindy, the head of the OP, and the Frelimo raised suspicions over the financing of the platform and over its actual political independence. The participation of Ya-qub Sibindy in the Frelimo Congress between 10th and 15th November 2006 and his public declarations supporting Frelimo's policies eventually led to the exit of about 18 members of the OP (Mutemba 2011, 17). Only three members, apart from Pimo, remained after these events: the PT of João Massango, the PE of Miguel Mabote and the Panamo of Marcos Juma.

In Zambia, pre-electoral coalitions are less frequent, what contradicts Kadima's (2006b) expectations that coalitions are more frequent in FPTP systems than in PR systems. Since 1991, only the UDA and the PF/ULP have contested the elections (in 2006). The UDA coalition assembled two parties with more or less equal strengths, namely the UNIP (former ruling party; second in parliament in 1991 and third in 2001) and the UPND (second in parliament in 2001); and one smaller party, the FDD (fourth in parliament in 2001).

The PF/ULP pact had a more "localist" approach; the two parties ran under the alliance in certain constituencies and alone in others. In what regards the results, the UDA clearly

---

[168] Translated from the original: «*O que eu acho é que a oposição não devia continuar nesse processo de fragmentação. Isso não vai ajudar para a alteração da opinião pública. Mais do que nunca acho que a oposição devia tentar um entendimento de modo a que fossem capazes de maximizar as suas forças as suas potencialidades, para melhorar o seu próprio desempenho. Não estou a ver a oposição, nas condições atuais em que ela se encontra, a conseguir resultados encorajadores*».

[169] See political platform here: http://pimo-construtivo.blogspot.pt/2010/10/proposta-dialectica-e-construtiva-sobre.html.

[170] *Partido Nacional de Moçambique*/National Party of Mozambique (Panamo), Partido do Congresso Democrático/ Democratic Congress Party (Pacode), *Partido de Reconciliação Democrática*/ Democratic Reconciliation Party (Parede), *Partido de União e Reconciliação*/ Union for Reconciliation Party (PUR). *Partido Trabalhista*/ Labour party (PT), *Partido Ecologista*/ Ecologist Party (PE).

failed as a coalition as the UNIP, the UPND and the FDD received less than half of the seats they had previously won in the 2001 polls (combined 74 seats in 2001 against 27 seats in 2006). The PF/ULP pact, conversely, proved determinant in certain constituencies[171]. The 2006 elections were, however, mostly about the PF, which scored an impressive rise out of this coalition, becoming the second party in parliament.

Differently, the UDA coalition was composed of relevant parties and had a national approach. It was created in a moment when the MMD had won three consecutive polls (1991, 1996 and 2001) and it became increasingly clear for the opposition parties that a different strategy needed to be adopted to oust the incumbent MMD. Partners of coalition were also encouraged by the results of the 2001 polls in which they, as opposition, combined more seats in parliament than the MMD, which found itself in a minoritarian position for the first time since 1991. As described in the previous chapter, the UDA emerged after the PF and the UPND failed to form a pact to contest the 2006 elections. The PF then entered into a pact with the ULP of Sakwiba Sikota who had just left the UPND after losing the party presidency to Hakainde Hichilema (Kabimba and Simbyakula 2011, 13-14). It was decided that the ULP would field parliamentary candidates in Southern and Western Province, and all those standing in Lusaka would be under the PF ticket. For the remaining Provinces the parties ran alone.

In the run-up to the 2011 elections, the UPND approached the PF again. The Reedbuck Protocol was signed along the following principles: (i) that the UPND and the PF would cease to attack each other in public, in both print and electronic media; (ii) that they would form a caucus of PF and UPND members in parliament to vote and work together in parliament, on matters of common interest; (iii) that the parties from the date of the communiqué would not run against each other; and (iv) that the PF and the UPND would put forward one candidate for the presidential elections in 2011. Under the JNC both parties contested parliamentary by-elections in Luena and Chilanga; and local government by-elections in Kahoma Central. This pact never made it to the 2011 polls due to several disagreements over the filling of the candidates and the actual strategy for sharing power at the national level. Due to the poor results of electoral pacts and alliances, there is a lot of skepticism about their relevance. As

[171] «Speaking after provisional results placed him ahead of other contestants at Kabwata Community Hall [...], Lubinda attributed his victory to the influence of the Patriotic Front (PF) and United Liberal Party (ULP) pact. "I won't dare underestimate the influence the pact had in my success and I would not give any certainty as to whether I would have performed the same way under UDA".» Available online at: http://business.highbeam.com/3548/article-1G1-152191725/lubinda-links-his-victory-pfulp-pact (accessed 30-11-2010).

we show next, some political parties and civil society leaders think that they might actually be bad for party politics.

In a recent article published in *The Post Online,* Charles Milupi, the president of the ADD, declared that some political parties «[...] want to get into political alliances for the sole purpose of riding on others». In the same piece *The Post Online's* journalist wrote that:

> The issue of pacts is not new [...]. Unfortunately, very little, if not nothing, has come out of these pacts. In 2006, the UPND, UNIP and FDD went into an electoral pact and lost - coming third behind MMD and PF. In 2009, UPND initiated a pact with PF. That pact failed and the reasons for its failure are well known to the Zambian people and need no further disquisition. [...] These pacts seem to be brought about by only one desire: the desire to win power. That will to win power is the one idea that they hold in common. But with the passage of time, that will prove an insubstantial glue. The signs of division start to grow (Post Online 2014).

In a similar tone, MacDonald Chipenzi, executive director of the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP), stated to the *Zambia Daily Mail* that «political alliances formed to remove a democratically elected government do not work [...] that history has many examples of such pacts that have failed to unseat governments». He also stated that «electoral alliances have encouraged regionalism as some political parties cannot contest by-elections in certain areas where an alliance member is said to be stronger than the other» (Mvula 2014). In the past, MacDonald Chipenzi defied leaders of the PF/UPND pact to voice their position regarding their future and political objectives (ZANIS 2010). The following interview extracts express political elites' positions about coalitions:

> The situation in Zambia is that the political parties do not work together because politics is a game of participation so all political parties must stand; but we agree on certain causes. Because we are not on the government our biggest enemy, of each political party in the opposition, is the ruling party: that is the enemy number one [...]. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary)

> We have connected to the PF President, where our agreement is that when they are wrong we attack them... but we will not go to the media and shout at them... we will write ... a solution to that problem. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, President)

> There was an attempt to work together with other parties... and ... I also told you that ZADECO works together with the current party in government; but [...] we failed to move together at some point. As of now we are working together with the UNPD [...]. I did mention that in 2008 and 2011 we supported the MMD as a party. [...] we supported them because we felt that we wanted them to win [...]. (Langton Sichone, ZDC, President)

> We enjoyed the relationship with UNIP which the South African Communist party enjoyed with the African National Congress in South Africa. Between 1994 up to I would say up to 2006, so our platform has not been divorced from that of UNIP for quite some time [...] Now we don't think ... we are not sure they are socialist as they used to call themselves. (Tentani Mwanza, NDP, President)

> First of all and foremost we have decided we will never be in alliance with any political party. Because those are some of the things that led to the decline [...] in our political party. (Wright Musoma, ZRP, President)

> I think in 2016, obviously I must stand on a party ticket, in the PF ticket; I will stand on the PF ticket. [...] I think I will be a full time member of PF you know? Yes because it is still difficult for me to work with the government in power, because they have their own ways of doing things, me as a independent MP I have got my own way of doing things so I can see maybe conflicts, little conflicts arising... so the best is for me to join the party... so that I am a full time member I am free to do anything, because obviously when you are working as an independent in the government there are always certain things they don't want you to know, because it is their party you know? But now I want to be full time, next time I want to be in the party full time. So that I can participate in everything; I can be provincial chairman of the party or maybe I can be in the national executive committee of the party but now as an independent they can't allow me. (Charles Zulu, independent candidate elected in 2011)

Even if not very successful, party coalitions are more common in Mozambique than in Zambia. In fact, political parties in Zambia have tended more towards factionalism than coalition. Since its foundation in 1991, the MMD have originated a good number off-shoot parties that have been able to elect parliamentary seats (see Table 6.4). The most successful of the splinter groups is the PF, which defeated the MMD in 2011.

Table 6.4 – Splits within MMD (1991 – 2011)

	Votes	Seats (N)	Seats (%)
1996			
NP	7,1	5	3,3
AZ	1,5	2	1,3
ZDC	13,8	2	1,3
2001			
HP	7,6	4	2,7
FDD	15,6	12	8,0
PF	2,8	1	0,7
2006			
PF	22,7	46	30,7
FDD (under UDA)	22,7	27	18,0
2011			
PF	38,2	61	40,7
FDD	0,7	1	0,7

Source: Elaborated with data from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) – http://www.elections.org.zm/ (retrieved on 30-09-2010).

Adding to this, party switching, co-optation of opposition by the ruling party, lack of party discipline and limited allegiance of politicians to their parties, are frequently found in Zambian politics. Even though the Zambian parliament is extremely weak *vis-à-vis* the president[172] (Momba 2005; Burnell 2003), it has been an arena of intense party competition where the different faces of the parties often collide. From time to time there are divergences within the party in public office (those in government vs. those in parliament) and between the party in public office and the party the central office (those in national party structures) (Mair 1994,4). During MMD's third legislature (2001-2006), 22 of its MPs were expelled after opposing to Chiluba's third term bid; and on several other occasions MMD's backbenchers openly attacked government policies (Simutanyi 2005, 11). In the opposition similar divisions between the party in public office and the party in central office have also occurred. Just to mention one example, in 2003, three UPND MPs who had voted against the party and in favor of the ruling party were expelled (Simutanyi 2005).

The weak discipline is part of a system in which individual politicians have considerable leeway, party organizations are weak and not particularly valued. All these aspects are indicative of the weakness of political parties, which are affected not only by few

[172] «The constitution states that cabinet shall formulate the policy of the government [...]. However, the constitution also contains the much weaker statement that cabinet shall be responsible for advising the president with respect to the policy of the government. Furthermore it says the president is expected to act in his own deliberate judgment, and is not bound by advice from his colleagues. So, although the constitution states that cabinet ministers and deputy ministers shall be accountable collectively to the National Assembly, the president's prerogative over policy determination weakens this accountability or contains it to advice on policy or implementation (Burnell 2003, 52).

resources but also by limited discipline and weak loyalties. Moreover, because parties exercise comparatively little control over political elites, these elites rather than political parties are the principal agents of representation. This does not mean that Mozambique has been free of factionalism and floor-crossing. In fact, several interviews conducted during fieldwork indicate that one of the major problems facing smaller political parties and even the major opposition party is keeping up with party membership since many members give up, due to the fact that the only way they can work in the state and or in the private sector is by becoming Frelimo's members.

6.4.2 Party-citizen networks: More than mixed clientelism and local collective goods?

African political parties have been widely described by: (i) thin resources, notably lack of mass membership, nation-wide structures, funding base and human resources; (i) dominance of informal relationships, as in other Third Wave democracies, parties appear as vehicles for the ambitions of individual politicians; (iii) pervasiveness of informal networks; (iv) lack of intra-party democracy and poor communication within the party hierarchy; (v) high degree of factionalism, lack of party loyalty, circulation of elites and floor-crossing; and finally (vi) loose formal links to citizens and lack of strong articulated ideologies (Randall and Svåsand 2002; Manning 2005; Mozaffar 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Salih and Nordlund 2007). These features are commonly pointed out in studies with a narrower or wider comparative approach and have been confirmed also for the Mozambican (Pereira and Shenga 2005; Pereira 2009) and the Zambian cases (Szeftel 2000; Burnell 2001a; Burnell 2001b; Tobolka 2014).

Among the several features mentioned above, the one about the nature of linkages between party and citizens has deserved a lot of attention recently, either through more qualitative (Tobolka 2014), or quantitative comparative analysis (Osei 2012). Given the literature about the nature of state and power in Africa, in which the most salient concept is neopatrimonialism – a system of informal networks such as personalism, clientelism, and patronage (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Lindberg 2001; van de Walle 2002; van de Walle 2003) – these studies have analyzed the extent to which more programmatic or ideological linkages are found among African parties and their electorate. They have done it inspired in typologies of scholars such as Lawson (1980) who identifies participatory linkage, police-

responsive linkage, linkage by reward and directive linkage[173], and Kitschelt (2000) who also navigates around similar categories – programmatic, clientelistic and charismatic (Kitschelt 2000, 849- 851). Our goal is not to replicate these studies but simply to use them as the conceptual umbrella under which to develop our analysis about PSI's networks.

Altogether, these studies tell us that clientelistic linkages or those motivated by a reward will be more frequent than the ones that presuppose an ideological or programmatic ground. This is expected to flow across countries – Mozambique and Zambia – with more or less saliency, as clientelistic linkages are more often the rule than the exception. Different nuances may, however, appear due to the different nature of these party systems and their process of institutionalization.

In the previous chapter the data about voter turnout in Mozambique's and Zambia's elections raised initial questions about the relationship between political parties and their citizens. In both countries, but particularly in Mozambique, levels of mobilization are frankly low, thus suggesting loose linkages. If we look at indicators such as individuals' party identification and trust in political parties, other dimensions can be added to this discussion. Drawing on data from the two more recent surveys of the Afrobarometer – round 4 (rd4), held from 2008-2009 and round 5 (rd5) held between 2010-2012 – Figure 6.1 displays data for party identification, trust in the ruling party and trust in the opposition[174]. The values are in rounded percentages and express positive answers.

Above the African average in all indicators, Mozambique is the country where more citizens express party identification (72% and 71% in rd4 and rd5) and where there is a wider gap between the levels of trust in the ruling party (75% and 70% in rd4 and rd5, respectively) and the levels of trust in the opposition parties (18% and 31% in rd4 and rd5, respectively). More aligned with the African average, but frankly below the Mozambican score, is the proportion of Zambian respondents with party identity, which declined from 60% in r4 to 50% in rd 5.

[173] Participatory linkage: political parties serve as agencies through which citizens can participate in government; Policy-responsive linkage: political parties serve as agencies for ensuring that government officials will be responsive to the views of rank-and-file voters; Linkage by reward: political parties act primarily as channels for the exchange of votes for favors; Directive linkage: Linkage used by political parties that are governments to maintain coercive control over their subjects (Lawson 1980).

[174] Party identification is measured as the percentage of those who answered "yes" to the question «Do you feel close to any particular political party?», Trust in the ruling party and in opposition parties are measured by the percentage of those who responded "Somewhat or a lot", to the questions: «How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?» and «How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Opposition Political Parties?».

The levels of trust for the ruling party are lower despite having strikingly increased from 37% (r4) to 58% (r5), whereas trust in opposition parties has decreased from 45% (r4) to 32% (r5). Although cross-regional comparisons should always be considered carefully, looking at the data from Latin America provides an opportunity to put the findings from Africa into perspective. In fact, according to the most recent survey of the Latino Barometer (2010)[175] about 53% of the respondents feel close to a political party and only 22% show a lot or some trust towards political parties. In this sense, the values found in the African sample are not that exceptional despite contextual features[176].

Figure 6.1 – Citizens' attitudes towards political parties: cross-sectional and longitudinal comparisons



Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2008-2009) and round 5 (2010-2012) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/.

If we disaggregate the data on party identification it is possible to note that in Mozambique the overwhelming majority of respondents identify themselves with the Frelimo (65% and 85%, in rd4 and rd5, respectively), while the major opposition party, the Renamo, captures about 3% of preferences in both rounds (see Table 6.5). In Zambia the panorama is much more fragmented and tends to reflect the balance of power of the day. In r4 ruling MMD was the party gathering the largest share of respondent's preferences (22%), closely followed by the PF (18%) and the UPND (13%). In r5, however, the alternation in power was also expressed by an alternation in sympathies, for the PF became the preferred party (62%) at a wide distance of the UPND (14%) and the MMD (10%).

[175] Latino Barometer (2010) available online at http://www.latinobarometro.org/
[176] That said Mozambique's party identification figures are particularly high and thus an outlier both in Africa and in Latin America.

Table 6.5 – Party preferences in Mozambique and Zambia

Mozambique					Zambia				
	2008		2012			2008		2012	
Parties	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	**Parties**	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**
Frelimo	776	65,0	1456	85,0	MMD	268	22,0	62	10,0
Renamo	40	3,0	57	3,0	PF	219	18,0	378	63,0
PDD	5	0,0	3	0,0	UPND	157	13,0	82	14,0
Pimo	1	0,0	2	0,0	UNIP	9	1,0	11	2,0
MDM			73	4,0	FDD	6	1,0	2	0,0
					HP	4	0,0	2	0,0
					ADD			3	1,0
					NMP			1	0,0
					NAREP			12	2,0

Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2008-2009) and round 5 (2010-2012) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/.

Given these results it is important to understand what types of features are behind individuals' attachment to political parties. During fieldwork we asked political about the main characteristics of the electorate and also about the political offer of their political parties. In what follows, some interview extracts are featured with the aim of describing what relevance ideology has both for the parties and for the citizens.

In Mozambique a good part of the politicians downplays the role of ideology:

> There is no such thing as parties with ideology in Mozambique. Not even the Frelimo. (Magalhães Abramugy, Pimo, Secretary-General)[177]

> Those [left, right] are classic international labels and, to some extent, we should try to also apply those labels, but I don't think we got there yet. For instance, theoretically Frelimo would be a left-wing party, but it has nothing to do with the leftist views. On the contrary, it is aligned with the more reactionary rightist views. [...] Looking to the right side of the spectrum one could also ask, if rightist parties exist, and if yes how are they distinguished? Market economy? We all defend that. State and Social Justice, we all defend that... But do we really defend these values or is it simply a convenient discourse? Thus, I would not distinguish ideologies, despite the existing connotations. (Benedito Marime, founder of PCN, currently on MDM)[178]

[177] Translated from the original: «*Em Moçambique não há partidos com ideologias. Mesmo a própria Frelimo, já não tem ideologia.*»
[178] Translated from the original: «*Estes conceitos são clássicos internacionais, e nessa medida em Africa nós também utilizamos esses figurinos, mas para mim eu penso que ainda não chegamos a essa caraterização!*

Still the Renamo clearly positions itself:

> The Renamo is a center-right party; it holds conservative views regarding tradition, people, communities and family. (António Muchanga, Renamo, member of the State Council)[179]

> We are definitely a rightist party. From the center-right. (Fernando Mazanga, Renamo, Spokesman)[180]

Finally, for some parties, ideology is a contending field within the party:

> I have suggested the change of the Frelimo hymn because it is not coherent with what we defend and to what we are actually creating. My suggestion was to change it to "march ahead successful businessmen in the exploitation …". This would say a lot more about the current policies of the Frelimo. (Jorge Rebelo, Frelimo, founding member, former cabinet minister)[181]

> Under Frelimo's broad umbrella, there has always been a constant: to enable Mozambican's to develop themselves and to exit poverty and misery; to allow all Mozambicans to participate in the development of the country. Therefore we have a sort of democratic socialism [as ideology] (Luísa Diogo, Frelimo, former Prime-Minister)[182]

> The MDM is from the center-right, aligning however with the conservative European parties (João Colaço, MDM, former member of the party secretariat)[183]

Porque o partido Frelimo por exemplo teoricamente seria de esquerda, mas não tem nada de esquerda, antes pelo contrário está hoje alinhado com a direita mais reacionária! [...] E se também nos olhamos para a direita perguntaríamos então se há partidos de direita o que é distingue portanto esses partidos entre si? Economia de mercado? Todos defendemos! Estado; justiça social? Todos defendemos! Mas defendemos mesmo ou esse é o discurso conveniente? Portanto eu não iria por aí apesar de haver conotações!»

[179] Translated from the original: «*Renamo é um partido de centro-direita, é um partido da lógica um pouco conservadora, conservadora das tradições, das pessoas e das comunidades, e das famílias*.»

[180] Translated from the original: «*Sem dúvidas que somos da direita. Do centro-direita*.»

[181] Translated from the original: «*Eu podia remetê-la para o hino da Frelimo que diz "avante operários, camponeses" [...] "Unidos contra a exploração. Nossa pátria será o túmulo do capitalismo". [...] Eu numa outra reunião não aqui no congresso já sugeri porque não mudar o hino porque não há coerência entre o que fazemos e o que defendemos e aquilo que é a situação que nós próprios estamos a criar. Então sugeri vamos pôr: avante empresários de sucesso unidos na exploração. Corresponderia muito mais àquilo que é a realidade atual; àquilo que são as políticas da Frelimo [...]*.»

[182] Translated from the original: «*Mas dentro do invólucro que é a Frelimo esteve sempre presente uma coisa que tem sido constante; que é fazer com que os Moçambicanos se desenvolvam, fazer com que os Moçambicanos saiam da pobreza da miséria. Fazer com que os Moçambicanos todos eles de uma forma inclusiva participem no desenvolvimento do país, portanto pode se chamar isso socialismo democrático [...]*.»

[183] Translated from the original: «*O MDM é do centro-direita. Centro direita porém é preciso dizer isso, com uma certa inclinação do ponto de vista de relações com partidos conservadores europeus*.»

> We have had several discussions about our ideology: whether it should be left, right, center-right or center-left. Before answering I should personally say something. When we speak to the people they are not interested in knowing what our ideological field is. What they really want to know is whether the government of the day is able to satisfy their needs [...]. Trying to answer to your question the MMD values the individual, the human being, the basic principles of democracy, liberty and human life. It defends a market economy [...] but it does not lean to the right; it is at the center. (Lutero Simango, MDM, Parliamentary caucus leader)[184]

In Zambia there is a similar landscape, still some parties position themselves more easily:

> We are capitalist; we are a liberal party. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary)

> We are socialist [...] our party's name is more closed to the people's problems [...]. We are using a socialist kind of approach; we have adopted Kaunda's, the first President of this country, approach. He a was socialist. We must realize that development is not just how much you are educated... Development is not capitalism. (Cosmo Mumba, NRP, President)

Others consider ideology labeling pointless, but still provide some clues about their political views:

> It doesn't really make sense [to speak about ideology] but as a political party we are liberal democrats [...] we also believe in a free market and economy. (Winstone Chibwe, UNPD, Secretary-General)

> It doesn't make sense [to speak about ideology]. We actually, subscribe to a lot of policies that are pro-poor [...]. We haven't found a word for our ideology really. It is indescribable because it is all about orientation towards the common person and alleviating the problems of the common person, providing social security, providing a decent livelihood, providing proper health care [...]. (Chanda Mfula, PF, Media and Publicity Director)

[184] Translated from the original: «*Já tivemos várias discussões sobre o campo ideológico, se temos que estar na esquerda ou estar na direita ou no centro-direita ou centro-esquerda. Eu antes de responder eu devo pessoalmente dizer o seguinte. Hoje em dia quando falamos com as pessoas, quando tentamos convencer os eleitores muitas das vezes eles não estão preocupados em saber qual é o campo ideológico, o que eles querem de fato é que a governação consiga satisfazer as suas necessidades básicas [...]. Mas indo à sua pergunta em concreto, nós no MDM valorizamos o indivíduo; valorizamos a pessoa humana e acreditamos em valores e princípios básicos que são a democracia, o respeito pela liberdade, o respeito pela vida humana, e somos defensores de uma economia de mercado [...] mas nós não vamos para a direita queremos ficar no centro.*»

> I mean I can tell you what we believe in: the state should have a minimal role in facilitating economic development; so largely it leaves it to the private sector; but always having a strategic hand in how it guides the unfolding of economic activity, so that as many people as possible can benefit in true opportunity. Where that fits in? I am not really sure. Some might call it you know Liberal? [...] But it has elements of liberalism, it has elements of conservatism as well because we are trying to bring back the values, the principles, but we do need some radical change to take place. In that sense we are not conservative as such but we don't go as far as promoting the kind of rights that full liberalism might entail. You know, so we definitely take quite a strong moral and religious position on a lot of issues, which feed in our political outlet. (Elias Chipimo, NAREP, President)

Finally, others seem to navigate in between ideologies:

> We are in favor of capitalism. Capitalism and a bit of socialism... so I wouldn't say we are capitalist, but we favor that. [...] definitely we are in favor of any ideology that is there to empower, to change Zambia as well as to empower the Zambians. (Wright Musoma, ZRP, President)

> First of all we want to strike a balance in terms of policy formulation, in terms of providing policies for people that are pro-poor but promote individual initiative. (Inambao Inambao, ULP, Secretary-General)

> Actually we are kind of conservatives; actually we are a national party kind of [...] there is a bit of capitalism for example, and just a little bit of socialism … and communism not anywhere near; but there is a bit of capitalism and socialism [...] kind of a mix set up [...]. In terms of inclination we are Zambians and Christian [...] we are ruled by the norms of Christianity [...]. (Lizu Kahoma, ADD, Secretary-General)

> Politics in Africa is more or less about personalities, and because of that if a particular ideology is being upheld and defended by a particular personality it is possible that the content, the ideological content can go over to the people. (Tentani Mwanza, NDP, President)

While these quotes have expressed that, to a large extent, ideology is either irrelevant or quite a contentious issue within the political parties, it has also shown that in the Zambian context the panorama is more diverse in what regards the differences across parties, what relates to the very nature of party competition within the country. Different from Mozambique where

competition is more centripetal (national and at the center of political spectrum, due to Frelimo's occupation of Renamo's political space), in Zambia competition tends to be more centrifugal due to the higher levels of factionalism and to the dispersion of votes across constituencies, shaped, in turn, by ethnic and regional divides. In this sense, it is crucial to ask to what extent are individuals' linkages to political parties heterogeneous, and to what extent they express any ideological or programmatic content.

To take this exercise further we rely on data from the Afrobarometer and test whether individuals with different party identities vary significantly across a selected group of political statements. A total of eight statements, in which the respondent is asked to choose the sentence closest to its view[185], are included. They are diverse enough to cover topics such as individual rights, preference for family or community linkages and evaluation of economy:

1. Statement 1: Citizens should be more active in questioning the actions of leaders/ Statement 2: In our country, citizens should show more respect for authority.
2. Statement 1: People are like children; the government should take care of them like a parent/ Statement 2: Government is like an employee; the people should be the bosses who control the government.
3. Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against its policies /Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the government approves of it.
4. Statement 1: Government should be able to close newspapers that print stories it does not like/Statement 2: The news media should be free to publish any story that they see fit without fear of being shut down.
5. Statement 1: Government should not allow the expression of political views that are fundamentally different from the views of the majority/ Statement 2: People should be able to speak their minds about politics free of government influence, no matter how unpopular their views may be.
6. Statement 1: Since leaders represent everyone, they should not favor their own family or group/Statement 2: Once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community.
7. Statement 1: The costs of reforming the economy are too high; the government should therefore abandon its current economic policies/Statement 2: In order for the economy to get better in the future, it is necessary for us to accept some hardships now.

[185] Reply codes/options are the following: 1=Agree very strongly with Statement 1; 2=Agree with Statement 1; 3=Agree with Statement 2; 4=Agree very strongly with Statement 2; 5=Agree with neither, 9=Don't know, 998=Refused to answer, -1=Missing data.

8. Statement 1: The government's economic policies have helped most people; only a few have suffered/Statement 2: The government's economic policies have hurt most people and only benefited a few.

In the results displayed in Table 6.6, non-responses, missing data and neutral positions were excluded. Moreover, some statements were re-coded so that they would vary in the same direction; in a scale from 1 (closer to 1st statement) to 4 (closer to 2nd statement). The answers to these statements are contrasted across groups, built on the basis of individuals' party identities. For Mozambique there are two major groups one for the Frelimo (=1) and another for the Renamo (=2); in Zambia three groups are considered: the MMD (=1), the PF (=2) and the UPND (=3). For this analysis we use the results of rd4 of the Afrobarometer, since the datasets of rd5 were not available to the public yet.

Table 6.6 compares the means of each of these political groups across the different statements. To assess whether the differences between them are statistically significant, ANOVA tests were also run, the full tables are presented in Appendix F. The values accompanied by asterisks are the ones in which a statistically significant relation was found. Starting with Mozambique, the results indicate that the individuals that are identified with the Frelimo tend to agree with more authoritarian stances *vis-à-vis* those identified with the Renamo. The differences between the groups in these statements is not statistically significant, meaning that there is not a strong polarization across these themes. Furthermore, those identified with the Frelimo tend to agree with a community rather than with a more parochial or familiar approach to policy making and that economic policies have tended to benefit the majority of the people rather than just a few.

Renamo's sympathizers go slightly in the opposite direction, but again the differences are not statistically significant between the two groups. The only statement where the difference between groups is significant is the one about whether the government should abandon its current economic policies or keep them. In this statement, those identified with the Frelimo tend to support compliance with harsher economic reforms.

Table 6.6 – Matching political positions and party preferences in Mozambique and Zambia

		1= support for individual rights; 4 = deference to authority					1 = equally; 4 = community	1 = withdraw of current economic policies; 4 = acceptance	1 = economic policies benefited majority; 4 = benefited few
STATEMENTS		Question actions of leaders vs. respect authority	Government like a parent vs. an employee	Individuals free to join vs. Govt. bans organizations	Newspapers free to publish vs. Govt. close newspapers	People speak their mind vs. Govt. suppress expression	Leaders treat all equally vs. help own community	Abandon economic reforms vs. accept hardships	Economic policies helped most vs. hurt most
MOZAMBIQUE									
Frelimo	Mean	2,5185	2,97	2,295	2,03	2,0831	2,3782	2,9538*	2,3958
	N	675	694	634	645	626	661	606	672
	Std. Deviation	1,12730	1,073	1,0738	1,066	1,02893	1,15039	,97803	1,11801
Renamo	Mean	2,4857	2,97	2,029	2,00	1,9706	2,2286	2,6364*	2,5278
	N	35	38	35	35	34	35	33	36
	Std. Deviation	1,19734	1,127	1,0428	1,085	,96876	1,19030	1,05529	1,02779
Total	Mean	2,5169	2,97	2,281	2,03	2,0773	2,3707	2,9374*	2,4025
	N	710	732	669	680	660	696	639	708
	Std. Deviation	1,12998	1,075	1,0731	1,067	1,02552	1,15202	,98380	1,11330
ZAMBIA									
MMD	Mean	2,1929	2,9349	2,2181*	1,7893*	1,8862*	2,3514*	2,4628	3,2362*
	N	254	261	243	242	246	259	242	254
	Std. Deviation	1,15848	1,21828	1,15608	,99010	,94505	1,20886	1,19154	1,05543
PF	Mean	1,9452	2,7227	1,8952*	1,5229*	1,6758*	2,2364*	2,2899	3,5945*
	N	219	220	210	218	219	220	207	217
	Std. Deviation	1,08226	1,27871	1,00643	,73235	,83496	1,25278	1,21601	,75251
UPND	Mean	2,0863	2,8857	2,0315*	1,5909*	1,6154*	2,1135*	2,3769	3,2199*
	N	139	140	127	132	130	141	130	141
	Std. Deviation	1,06650	1,20003	1,09788	,84668	,74067	1,15939	1,14976	,92653
Total	Mean	2,0801	2,8486	2,0603*	1,6470*	1,7496*	2,2565*	2,3817	3,3595*
	N	612	621	580	592	595	620	579	612
	Std. Deviation	1,11461	1,23770	1,09866	,87764	,87009	1,21529	1,19155	,94264

Source: Source: Afrobarometer round 4 (2009) available online at http://www.afrobarometer.org/. Notes: (*) signals statistically significant differences between groups.

In Zambia there seems to be a different political landscape. In fact, from the total of eight sentences selected for this exercise, five vary in a statistically significant manner across the different political groups. Starting with sentences where differences were not strong: PF identifiers seem to be more supportive of sentences that enhance individual rights when compared to the other groups, particularly the MMD, which has sympathizers who lean towards deference of authority.

As far as the other sentences are concerned, there are statistically significant variances in individuals' stances regarding government interference on civil society (with the PF more against it than the UPND and the MMD), media freedom (with the MMD more against it than the UPND and the PF), freedom of individual expression (with the UPND more against it than the PF and the MMD) and leaders favoring the community (with the UPND more against it than the PF and the MMD). Finally, regarding whether the government economic policies have benefited only a few or the majority, the different political groups tend to agree that they have benefited a minority, particularly the group of PF sympathizers.

These results hence show that overall individuals' party identification does encompass some kind of programmatic differentiation, particularly in the Zambian political landscape. In Mozambique, conversely, sympathizers from Renamo and Frelimo do not diverge significantly in their political stances towards the issues here considered. In this sense, these results help to complement the analysis started in this section in which we sought to understand (i) the extent to which the linkages between parties and citizens in Mozambique and Zambia reflected what is already known about this topic in the African context (Osei 2012; Tobolka 2014) and (ii) the extent to which they underlined different processes of institutionalization. The data about party identification and trust in the ruling party and in the opposition parties clearly detached Mozambique from Zambia and from the general African average but for different reasons.

In Mozambique, the majority of the respondents reveals a party preference (mainly for the Frelimo) and mistrusts the opposition political parties. This thus suggests that the Frelimo is strongly anchored in society. Yet, this should not obscure the fact that Frelimo is the party of the state and that it has largely developed under its dependency. The following quotes are illustrative of this point:

> The party in power is the state and the state is the biggest employer. As a civil servant I am required to fill in a membership card of the party in power. I have to do it even if I don't want to

> in order to guarantee my survival. If I refuse to do that I risk losing my job. (Maria Angelina Enoque, Renamo, Parliamentary caucus leader)[186]

> Frelimo's rootedness was facilitated by the fact that it received the independence on a tray. [...] the Frelimo was alone in the country and took over the state. Yesterday I heard the Frelimo's president talking about the party's patrimony; he mentioned over three hundred houses. If you ask how the Frelimo got those houses they will never say. They got to the point of expelling house owners only to nationalize their houses. Yet, when we tell that a house is nationalized, we mean that it is nationalized by the state and not by a party. And certainly not by a party that takes control over the houses […]. Thus, Frelimo's rootedness was facilitated by the way independence was declared. (Antonio Muchanga, Renamo, Renamo member of the State Council)[187]

The Renamo remains poorly developed and lost its traditional strongholds as well as its ability to rely on informal networks such as clientelism to attract membership. At the same time, the Frelimo resorts to mix of clientelistic and local collective goods to gain and maintain support where the party has fewer sympathizers, particularly in the rural areas:

> The Renamo has been losing ground since 1994 because it fails to understand what is wrong inside the party. One thing is the lack of internal democracy. It still follows the same military mindset. The Renamo was a military movement that opposed the government of Mozambique but when it transformed into a civil party it continued to function under the same models. The party did not change its behaviors. (Leonardo Simão, Frelimo, former cabinet Minister)[188]

> In the countryside, people live dispersed and are less exposed to the media, people's major concern is to survive. For this reason, I would say that today it is highly unlikely that the

[186] Translated from the original: «*O partido no poder é o Estado e o Estado é o maior empregador! Mesmo que eu não queira como funcionário do Estado se me trazem a ficha é preciso preencher e ter um cartão do partido no poder. Eu vou preencher mesmo que eu não queira para poder garantir a minha sobrevivência! Se não o fizer eu tenho o meu emprego meio tremido! Então as pessoas fazem-no!*»

[187] Translated from the original: «*Bom o que facilitou o enraizamento da Frelimo, foi que o colono entregou a independência de bandeja! [...] a Frelimo estava sozinha no país. Assumiu o estado! Ainda ontem ouvi o Presidente da Frelimo a falar do património imóvel que a Frelimo tinha, falava de mais de três centenas de casas! Se você for a perguntar como é que a Frelimo adquiriu essas casas... Nunca vão dizer. Eles chegaram a expulsar os donos das casas e disseram que a casa estava nacionalizada. Só que quando se diz que a casa estava nacionalizada é nacionalizada pelo Estado não é nacionalizada por um partido[…]! Portanto o enraizamento da Frelimo foi facilitado pela maneira como a independência foi declarada*.»

[188] Translated from the original: «*A Renamo tem vindo a perder desde 1994 até agora porque não percebe que alguma coisa que não está bem dentro do próprio partido. Uma delas é a falta democracia interna do partido! Portanto não conseguiu libertar-se um pouco da mentalidade militar que a caracterizou na sua origem! Era um movimento militar, que se opunha ao governo de Moçambique mas quando passou a partido civil continuou exatamente com a mesma ideologia. Com a mesma forma de agir.*»

> Frelimo wouldn't win elections in the rural areas. Unlikely because the effect of a school in a rural area is tremendous. You build a school in the city and nothing changes but in the country side it makes a lot of difference, the construction of a health center visibly reduces the number of fatal births [...]. A health center with a midwife will make a difference for that community. (Manuel Tomé, Frelimo, MP)[189]

In this sense, Mozambique's institutionalization has been more underlined by a mix of clientelism and local networks than by ideological or programmatic networks. In the case of Zambia, we have seen that factionalism (creating a good number of splits) as well as floor crossing (through strategic co-option of cabinet ministers from the opposition) are typical and that clientelism and reward politics are momentarily accompanied by the mobilization of tribal or regional differences, particularly because of the high number of by-elections, which tend to enhance constituency-level differences. Moreover, the analysis of the Afrobarometer data revealed that there are fewer individuals with a party identity and who trust the ruling party; whereas trust in the opposition parties is higher than the average found in the African sample. Additional data on party identification showed that these results partly reflected the higher levels of party system fragmentation as well as some balance of power between Zambian political parties. These characteristics have been noted elsewhere since the FPTP system has failed to deliver majoritarian cabinets since 2011, therefore leading the ruling party to rest on strategies such as co-optation (through patronage, offering cabinet positions, etc.) to lean the balance of power in its favor.

Going back to the Afrobarometer data, we first saw that the majority of Zambian respondents felt close either to the MMD, the PF or the UPND, and then further descriptive and explanatory analysis showed that, unlike in Mozambique, these different party affiliation groups correlated to different policy preferences. Indeed, they exhibited statistically different political stances about their rights, the role of the leaders towards their community and the scope of economic policies. As there is not one sole major political party and the political market is more open, with splitting groups and new political parties easily entering the parliament (despite varying degrees of success), political polarization is naturally high. The following quotes echo some of our reflections:

[189] Translated from the original: «*No campo, as pessoas vivem dispersas tem menos influência da comunicação social, e o grande objetivo das pessoas é a sua sobrevivência. Por isso hoje é que quase, não digo impossível, mas é muito improvável que a Frelimo não ganhe as eleições nas zonas rurais! Improvável! Porque o efeito de uma escola, numa zona rural é tremendo! Tu constróis uma escola na cidade não tem efeito nenhum não muda nada… a construção de uma escola no campo muda logo, a construção de um posto de saúde reduz visivelmente para a população o número de partos fatais [...]. Portanto aquele posto de saúde ali com uma enfermeira parteira muda a vida daquela comunidade.*»

> The biggest challenge I will tell you I think in Zambia is to, also in other African countries, is to institutionalize political parties. That is the biggest problem. Political parties fail to ... people fail to turn political parties into institutions. I don't know whether it is lack of resources ... of course resources play a big part. They fail to institutionalize their operations ... they are centered around individuals, believe me all political parties without exception. (Inambao Inambao, ULP, Secretary-General)

> for you to master good support you must have done a lot of civil work in the communities for people to notice that you represent something new [...]. If you do not, then you are in trouble you can't win, because people are very sensitive to what they can see as against what they can't see [...]. (Chembe Nyangu, MMD, Deputy National Secretary)

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter main goal was to describe the mechanisms that underlie the different processes of PSI in Mozambique and Zambia. To this end, both environmental – path to democratic transition, electoral system and party funding/finance – and relational mechanisms – party coalitions and party-citizen linkages – were analyzed. As previously noted, these mechanisms are relevant in light of the results of the quantitative strand and are anchored in the theoretical approaches of the new institutionalism (historical and network institutionalism) and in the scholarly work about the nature of party and party system development in Africa.

In this sense, the comparative case study analysis has provided a great opportunity to refine the findings of the previous strand while adding new dimensions into the research. In Mozambique the risky process of transition from war and one-party rule to peace and democracy, was handled by the two former belligerents, under the auspices of the international community. The verticality of this process contributed to the crystallization of the war cleavage beyond its end, and overflowed into shaping political institutions and political actions in the new upcoming regime. From time to time the issue of war emerges, with former belligerents, particularly the Renamo, evoking the GPA to claim more legitimacy and political power. Yet, the structuring of the party system, modeled by Frelimo's capture of the State, largely influences the patterns of interparty competition leaving a narrower margin for an actual political change to take place. In turn, this has led the Renamo to engage in more violent actions (such as guerrilla actions in the Gorongosa bushes). Moreover, the dominant nature of the party system indirectly influences the effect of the electoral system (which is

supposed to create more fragmentation) and of party funding (which is expected to level the playing field, thus creating more systemic opportunities for parties in the opposition) by skewing their known virtuosities. Opposition parties, challenged by the lack of resources and basis of social support seem unable to alter this *status quo*. Apart from the MDM, minor political parties enjoyed only brief stints in parliament through party coalitions. Defining the ideological core of political parties is difficult even for some of the party leaders interviewed. In fact, they rather state their commitment to the well-being of people and to the development cause than clearly identifying their political offer, which they tend to underplay.

At the citizens' level, the Afrobarometer data showed that there are differences across the sympathizers of Frelimo and Renamo, but these are not statistically relevant. This suggests that not many things are significantly separating the Frelimo from the Renamo as far as the political offer is concerned. A concurrent explanation for this result may be Frelimo's successful incursions into Renamo's constituencies, mainly since 1999, as referred in Chapter V.

Zambia's party system, in turn, is composed of parties of more or less equal size. Since 2001 none has been able to enjoy a majoritarian position in the parliament without needing to co-opt opposition MPs. Major opposition parties have originated within the ruling party and have been able to secure seats in parliament either alone or in party coalitions. However, because episodes of factionalism and lack of discipline are common, coalitions hardly follow a nation-wide strategy. In fact, they seem to be a strategic mechanism for parties to win seats in particular constituencies. More frequently than in Mozambique, in Zambia splinter groups and new political parties enter the parliament more easily also because citizens are not polarized around one major cleavage and strongly diverge on a variety of topics which address their individual rights, their clientelistic or local ties and their positions towards economic policies. Due to parties' and citizens' polarization, the FPTP has been unable to provide a stable and nationwide two-party system. Since change is more foreseeable, given Zambia's more open electoral market as well as the high number of by-elections, party funding/finance makes a bigger difference in party competition than in the Mozambican case, where the Frelimo clearly detaches itself from all other parties.

In sum, this analysis has shown four main aspects. First, different transition paths underline different profiles of institutionalization; not only because of the mode of transition itself (whether vertical or horizontal, negotiated or war-related) but also because of the stakes involved (higher in a two-fold transition to peace and democracy). Mozambique's overinstitutionalized party system builds upon two parties (also former belligerents) which

had their power legitimized at the transition moment. Zambia's transition drew on a broad social and popular protest that, under the MMD umbrella, effectively ousted the then incumbent party. Yet, the MMD quickly fragmented after the first years of incumbency. Minimal changes were enacted just to allow for the arrival of multipartism, but the electoral system and the (absence of) rules for party funding/finance remained. Second, electoral institutions matter even when their effects are more unconventional. Strong electoral systems can lead both to overinstitutionalization (Mozambique) and inadequate institutionalization (Zambia). If competition is centripetal and cleavages are vaguer, stronger electoral systems will reinforce the party system of the day. If polarization and fragmentation are higher, causing competition to be more centrifugal, a strong electoral system fails to create stability. If the situation is the opposite, it enhances it. Third, party funding, even if not fully observed in practice, can influence the level of institutionalization. In Mozambique the existing criteria clearly favor the two major parties in parliament, which tend to defend stricter criteria for funding. In Zambia, the absence of state funding enhances further factionalism and fragmentation and weakens parties *vis-à-vis* individuals. Finally, we drew on the Afrobarometer data to show that Mozambique's overinstitutionalization is supported by higher levels of trust in the ruling party and party identification, whereas in Zambia levels of trust in the opposition are above the African sample and levels of party identification are about the same. Further analysis also revealed there seems to exist greater political polarization in Zambia than in Mozambique.

In the following Chapter we systematize the main findings made in this thesis and raise implications for future research.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis has carried out a comparative analysis of PSI in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on three essential questions: "To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?" "Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?" and finally, "What mechanisms underlie variance in PSI?"

Following an *explanatory sequential design* (Creswell 2002; Creswell et al. 2003; Creswell 2006a), we started with a quantitative strand in which we measured PSI in 19 African countries that have held competitive lower house elections up until 2011 and then tested the main explanations for PSI with the help of regression analysis. Then, we proceeded to a qualitative strand to conduct a comparative analysis of the mechanisms of PSI in two cases: Mozambique and Zambia. Now, let us summarize the main findings resulting from this research design.

Main findings

To provide answers to the first research question, "To what extent are party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa institutionalized?" a careful revision of existing measures of PSI was conducted. On the basis of that revision, four arguments were made. Firstly, that institutionalization is a multidimensional concept, comprising both attitudinal and structural behaviors, which are better analyzed separately because they evoke distinct institutional phenomena (Levitsky 1998; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). Secondly, that the institutionalization of parties is different from that of party systems in the sense that a highly (or weakly) institutionalized party system is not always the result of highly (or weakly) institutionalized parties, or vice versa (e.g. Welfling 1973a; Randall and Svåsand 2002a). Thirdly, that the institutionalization of party systems varies across different territorial levels (national and subnational) and different arenas of competition (electoral, parliamentary, governmental, and organizational) within a polity (Bardi and Mair 2008). Thus, scholars must clearly define the levels and the arenas of analysis to avoid an ecological fallacy in their analysis. Finally, inspired by early works that have identified ideal types of institutionalization resulting from different ratio with modernization, we have argued that institutionalization varies not merely in level but in quality (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968; Ben-Dor 1975).

Reconciling these four premises, a partly new measure for the institutionalization of national party systems was proposed on the basis of three structural dimensions: stable patterns of interparty competition, stable roots in society, and organizational continuity. The main novelties of this measure is that it includes indicators that express parties' interactions across various arenas (governmental, parliamentary, electoral, and organizational arenas), covering a wider range of elections per country, while at the same time focusing on one single element, structural. In this sense, it is at once more concise but wider in its scope.

The results of this analysis revealed that, more than classically diverging in terms of the number of parties, African party systems varied in levels and in quality of institutionalization. The results ranked Botswana, Namibia, Cape Verde, Seychelles, Mozambique, South Africa, The Gambia, Tanzania, and Senegal as the most institutionalized countries and Benin, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, and Nigeria as the least institutionalized. In the middle, Sao Tome and Principe, Ghana, and Mauritius presented levels of PSI closer to the sample's average (27.8). If the format of the party system is put in the equation, it is possible to see that the majority of dominant party systems are highly institutionalized, yet they also appear in the lowest positions (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Zambia up until 2011), and that multiparty systems (e.g. Mauritius) can be significantly institutionalized. Therefore, different levels of PSI seem to be compatible with different formats of party systems.

Further differences emerged once a Cluster Analysis including levels of PSI, turnout rates (%), and democratic performance (measured by Freedom House scores) was conducted. This exercise was meant to test whether different ratios between institutionalization and aspects usually associated to political modernization (political participation and democratization) were conducive to adequate institutionalization, inadequate institutionalization (Huntington 1965; Huntington 1968), or overinstitutionalization (Ben-Dor 1975). The results of the Cluster Analysis confirmed that these categories were present in the sample. In fact, a first cluster assembled adequately institutionalized countries (Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa), where the highest levels of PSI, turnout, and democratic performance were found. A second cluster of the overinstitutionalized countries assembled party systems characterized by the lowest levels of voter turnout and democratic performance but that still had high levels of PSI (Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania). In these cases, a strong party system limits political participation and the democratic nature of the regime. Finally, a third cluster of the inadequately institutionalized countries included party systems that were too

weak to encourage mobilization and promote political change in the regime. Countries in this cluster had the lowest levels of PSI, combined with medium levels of voter turnout and democratic performance (Benin, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Sao Tome and Principe, and Zambia). These results are relevant to the extent that they do not take for granted that high or low levels of institutionalization are inherently good or bad. Instead, they highlight that more rigorous research of institutionalization should take into account the quality of PSI at work in a given polity.

Having measured PSI, we then moved forward to the second research question, "Why do levels of PSI vary across countries and time?" Relying on studies that focused on the causes of party system stability or development in Third Wave countries[190] we propose the test of six main explanations for PSI, which unfolded in nine hypotheses: social structure (H1), institutionalization over time (H2 and H3), institutional design (H4 and H5), party and party systems characteristics (H6 and H7), economic performance (H8), and electoral participation (H9). These explanations were researched with the help of a pooled times series cross-sectional regression analysis.

The results of this analysis (which explained between 46% and 56% of the variance found in the sample) gave some support for the theoretical explanations based on institutionalization over time, social structure, and institutional design. In fact, countries with more durable polities (H3), with the lowest levels of party system fragmentation (H6), and with extensive regulations for party funding/finance (H4) were found to be associated to higher levels of PSI. Moreover, the results also indicated that although the linguistic and the ethnic divides have positive effects, even if not statistically significant, the religious divide has a negative and strong effect on PSI (H1). In the group of control variables, the type of electoral system also emerges as a relevant factor, with majoritarian formulas being generally linked to weakly institutionalized party systems.

The remaining independent variables, electoral participation (H9), presidentialism (H5), party institutionalization (H7), and short-term economic performance (H8), were never significant factors to explain PSI variance. However, they are still relevant for more descriptive purposes. Electoral participation's negative regression coefficient indicates that Bartolini and Mair's (1990) hypothesis that higher oscillations in voter turnout are associated with higher levels of instability is indeed correct. The fact that presidential regimes were

[190] Among cited works are Tavits (2005; 2006; 2007), Horowitz and Browne (2005), and (Casal Bértoa 2011) for post-Communist Europe; Roberts and Wibbels (1999) for Latin America; Croissant and Völkel (2010) for East and South Asia; Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and Mainwaring and Torcal (2005) for cross-regional comparisons; and Ferree (2010) and Riedl (2008).

associated with weaker levels of PSI also goes in the direction hypothesized by Mainwaring and Zoco (2007) and Ferree (2010), among others. As far as party institutionalization is concerned, the positive regression coefficient found in the sample opposes the one found in Latin America (Roberts and Wibbels 1999) and post-Communist countries (Tavits 2005), where the regression coefficient is negative. Even if it is not statistically significant, this result points toward a linear and positive association between party institutionalization and PSI in Africa. Finally, the minor role of economic performance (measured by GDP and inflation) in shaping a more institutionalized party system contradicts some studies about the development of stable patterns of support in Western European (Bartolini and Mair 1990) and post-Communist countries (Tavits 2005). Yet, this result confirms what other studies have said about the secondary role of economies in shaping political processes in Africa (van de Walle 2002; Ferree 2010; Azevedo-Harman 2012, 436).

From this analysis, three main findings merit highlight. The first is that party funding/finance strongly correlates with PSI. This relation was tested in the African sample for the first time, even though numerous works (academic or more policy-oriented) have defended its inherent virtuosities, particularly in Africa where parties lack mass membership and comprehensive territorial structures and a huge gap between incumbent and opposition parties exists. Within these works, the existence of funding is seen as a good mechanism to level the playing field and which enables political parties to develop their activities and to continuously present themselves in elections as stable competitors. Concurrently, provisions regulating disclosure of finance and banning or limiting certain practices are seen as mechanisms to allow for some degree, even if minimal, of accountability and transparency.

The second is that mainstream explanations about the impact of time and social divisions on party systems are right but must be framed in different ways. More specifically, we showed that more than the years since multipartism, it is the years a polity has remained unchanged that matters and that more than the ethnic and the linguistic divide, it is the religious divide that emerges with larger potential for instability in contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa.

A third main finding is the relevance of the electoral system, whose role has been considered less relevant by other studies (Riedl 2008; Ferree 2010). Our analysis has revealed that majoritarian formulas weaken PSI and this echoes Riedl's (2008) remark that plurality formulas in Africa do not, for the most part, result in less fragmented party systems.

In the third stage of this study, the final research question, "What mechanisms underlie variance in PSI?" was analyzed. To this end, both environmental (path to democratic

transition, electoral system, and party funding/finance) and relational mechanisms (party coalitions and party-citizen linkages) were investigated. The relevance of these mechanisms has different sources. Electoral system and party funding follow from the results of the quantitative analysis and enclose an interesting puzzle to the extent that Mozambique's PR elections have produced less fragmented results than Zambia's FPTP elections and that Mozambique has comprehensive regulations for party funding/finance, whereas Zambia is in the pool of countries with the fewest provisions of this type (other similar cases are Botswana, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Nigeria, and Senegal).

However, the qualitative strand is not meant to exclusively discuss the findings of the quantitative strand; it is also meant to add unobserved dimensions or factors in the analysis to account for what remains to be explained by the statistical model. Building upon this idea, which is at the core of a mixed methods design, and on the principles of historical institutionalism, we focused on one *critical juncture*, the path to democratic transition, for it is said to influence the institutional outlook and the patterns of competition of the upcoming political systems (Linz and Stepan 1996; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Yet, we went beyond the mere classification of the modes of transition to encompass actors' choices and strategies during this moment. Moreover, relying on the principles of the network institutionalism and on the scholarly work about political institutions' development in Africa, which identify informal networks such as personalism and clientelism as underlining features of politics, we carried out a study of these networks in the context of party coalitions and party-citizen linkages. For that purpose, we combined semi-structured interviews collected during fieldwork in Mozambique and Zambia, electoral statistics, and survey data (Afrobarometer).

For Mozambique's overinstitutionalized party system, our analysis has revealed that the two-fold transition to peace and democracy reinforced the bipolarization of the political sphere around the two former belligerents, Frelimo (in power since 1975) and Renamo, which alone negotiated the most favorable institutional framework for the upcoming regime. Moreover, because the two-fold transition was sealed with the signature of a peace accord (GPA), there was an overlap between a political and a war cleavage, which remains salient in the political sphere. Indeed, more often than not, political parties, particularly the Renamo, evoke the infringement of the GPA protocols to engage Frelimo in a dialogue for power sharing measures.

At the same time, the fact that the Frelimo has been in power for as many years as the Mozambican independent state has been in existence influences not only the direct effects of

political institutions but also the relationship between the parties in the system and the linkages between parties and their constituencies. Indeed, the case study analysis showed that the structuredness of the party system skews the effects of the electoral institutions and of the party funding/finance, notably their ability to increase representation and to level the playing field. Opposition parties, challenged by the lack of resources and stable basis of support seem rather unable to alter this *status quo*. Apart from the MDM, minor political parties only had brief stints in parliament through party coalitions. However, these coalitions seem to have been mostly driven by a perspective of reward (a job or a parliamentary seat) rather than by ideological or programmatic linkages. Furthermore, these coalitions have behaved erratically, with member parties travelling across different alliances in between elections.

Generally, ideology is not valued. A large part of the political party members or leaders interviewed during fieldwork vaguely highlighted their commitment to the well-being of the people and to the development of the country as their main political offer.

Afrobarometer data about citizens' levels of support for the ruling party and party identity consistently affirmed Mozambique's high PSI, with the percentages of individuals with a party preference and expressing support for the ruling party being frankly higher than the ones found in Zambia and in the African sample. As far as political positions are concerned, the data suggests that not many things are separating Frelimo's and Renamo's sympathizers in their perceptions about individual rights, their clientelistic or local ties, and their positions towards economy. The literature about politics in Mozambique and the fieldwork interviews suggest that this can be a result of Frelimo's successful incursions into Renamo's constituencies, namely in the Northern and Central provinces.

In contrast, Zambia's inadequately institutionalized party system was built upon a polarized political transition in which the input came from below. The MMD eventually emerged as a broad social alliance and representing a will for change claimed by various social groups and sectors of the population. Due to the more horizontal and fragmented nature of the transition, a more polarized party system emerged.

From the outset of multipartism, episodes of splits motivated by tribal or personal aspirations within the ruling party (MMD), have led to the emergence of several political parties and some of which have performed well in the general elections. A good example is the PF, the current party in power. Floor-crossing from the opposition to the incumbent party has also been frequent and is a indication that party structures are fragile *vis-à-vis* their political elites. In contrast to Mozambique, where the elections have always declared a clear winner with a majority of votes and seats, in Zambia, since 2001, political parties have been

unable to form a majoritarian cabinet without needing to co-opt opposition MPs. Major opposition parties have originated from within the ruling party and have been able to secure seats in parliament either alone or in party coalitions.

However, because episodes of factionalism and lack of discipline are common, coalitions do not follow a nation-wide strategy; rather, they seem to be a strategic mechanism for parties to win seats in particular constituencies. New political parties easily enter the parliament and are successful at polarizing the electorate. Zambia's Afrobarometer data confirms low PSI, with much lower levels of trust for the incumbent and share of individuals expressing party preferences. Nevertheless, here the levels of trust in opposition parties are above the African sample. This combined with pervasive factionalism, the high number of by-elections, and the absence of party funding/finance regulations has contributed to accentuate the lower levels of PSI in Zambia over time. Further analysis revealed that sympathizers of the MMD, the PF, and the UPND (currently the three most relevant parties) significantly diverged on a variety of topics that address their individual rights, their clientelistic or local ties, and their positions towards economy, which thus suggests that a more politicized environment exists in Zambia.

All together, this thesis has contributed to the literature not only through a partly new measure of PSI, which easily travels across countries with different regimes and that cautiously deals with the numerous dilemmas enclosed within this literature, but also by providing a new hypothesis (party funding/finance) and new ways to assess the effects of time and social structure in the African sample. The case study analysis contrasted countries where the effects of political institutions are distorted by the nature of competition and by the salience of certain political cleavages. Therefore, through a mixed methods design, we have shown that the effects given by the quantitative analysis enclose relevant environmental and relational mechanisms that should be taken into account in any analysis or generalization about PSI in Africa.

Overall interpretation and implications

In the introductory chapter of this thesis, we presented institutionalization as a paramount concept to examine how political institutions develop in contemporary polities. To this extent the major problem it addresses is the one inherited from Huntington (1965; 1968) which is of explaining why some institutions come to be more stable, autonomous, and valued over time

while others eventually decay. In this section, we clarify how this study has contributed to address this larger question.

Firstly, it showed that institutional change results from exogenous factors. In this regard, social cleavages (in a wider picture one can also think of political culture), institutional designs, and *critical junctures* all play an important role. Social cleavages define the main axis of political competition within a polity. Institutional designs such as electoral institutions or party funding/finance can either enforce or modify how party systems operate. *Critical junctures* matter to the extent that they open up opportunities for key political actors to alter existing systemic constraints and therefore to redesign the contours of the upcoming political system in more beneficial ways (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 1). The path to democratic transition is one of those *critical junctures* where possibilities for change are foreseeable but also uncertain. Therefore, focusing on actors' agencies, choices, and strategies becomes crucial for understanding institutions' trajectories of development.

Secondly, it revealed that not all changes came from the "outside" or are contingent to the opportunities created by the structure. Institutional change also comes from "within". Endogenous factors like party and party system characteristics and networks linking the different agents within the system should be also considered to understand why some courses of change are more possible than others, despite exogenous constrains. Frelimo's ability to refashion itself as pragmatist party and to deactivate certain lines of cleavage is a clear illustration of this point. It has contributed to its development as a dominant party and to the structuredness of the party system in ways that favor the development of a highly and overinstitutionalized party system. Looking at Zambia, the patterns of fragmentation, factionalism, and personalism that characterize the party system also concur to its weaker and inadequate institutionalization. In one case, there are signs of institutional development (even if there are important challenges in democratization and participation) and in the other there are signs of institutional decay, with factionalism and personalism playing a key role in that regard.

Thirdly, it has showed that some new players are emerging even if the contours of the system remain, for now, unaltered. In Zambia, the PF has been the incumbent party since 2011 and in Mozambique the MDM is now beginning to threaten Renamo's solitary position as the main opposition party. In both cases, the bet on the growing urban electorate and particularly on the young people paid off and contributed to altering the distribution of political power, even if changes at the systemic level are not significant yet. The future will tell if this trend is likely to prevail and how political institutions will adapt to new profiles of

voters, which have been socialized under a freer political setting and that are becoming increasingly concerned with public policies such as employment, education, health, and housing.

Lastly, it emphasized that African party systems are distinguishable not only in terms of their variance in the degree of institutionalization but also in the quality of institutionalization, with each variant encompassing different challenges in terms of democratic development and political participation. More than twenty years after the arrival of democratization in Africa, it matters to consider not only the extent to which party systems are institutionalized (at a certain degree in time) but also the extent to which party systems are able to perform democratic tasks and to increase political participation. Theoretically, this means dealing with institutionalization not as something inherently good or bad but as a dynamic property of the polities. Empirically, this means that political development requires institutions to be stable but at the same time adaptable to ongoing macrosocial changes.

APPENDIX A – ELECTION DATA SOURCES

A1 – Sources per country and election

Country	# Elections	Lower house election	Source	OBS
Benin	1	17 February 1991	*La Cour Constitutionnelle du Bénin*	* Grateful to Akil Elegbede who personally collected the electoral data in Benin.
	2	28 March 1995		
	3	30 March 1999	Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook	
	4	30 March 2003	*Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome*	
	5	31 March 2007	*L'Assemblée Nationale*	
	6	17 April 2011	*Commission Électorale Nationale Autonome*	
Botswana	7	1 March 1965	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/	Accessed on between 19-11-2010 and 22-11-2010
	8	18 October 1969		
	9	26 October 1974		
	10	20 October 1979		
	11	8 September 1984		
	12	7 October 1989		
	13	15 October 1994		
	14	16 October 1999	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/bot1999results3.htm	
	15	30 October 2004	Independent Electoral Commission: http://www.iec.gov.bw/	
	16	16 October 2009		
Burkina Faso	17	24 May 1992	Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook	Accessed on 01-12-2010
	18	11 May 1997		
	19	5 May 2002	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/	
	20	6 May 2007	*Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante*	
Cape Verde	21	13 January 1991	Boletim Oficial de Cabo Verde	Accessed on 17-02-2011
	22	17 December 1995		
	23	14 January 2001	Semedo, Barros e Costa (2007)	
	24	22 January 2006		
	25	6 February 2011	*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*: www.cne.cv/	

A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.)

Country	# Elections	Lower house election	Source	OBS
Gambia	26	26 May 1966	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/	Accessed on19-01-2011
	27	28 & 29 March 1972		
	28	4 & 5 April 1977		
	29	4 & 5 May 1982		
	30	11 March 1987		
	31	29 April 1992		
	32	2 January 1997	Independent Electoral Commission of The Gambia: http://www.iec.gm/results	Accessed on 18-02-2011
	33	17 January 2002		
	34	25 January 2007		
Ghana	35	29 December 1992	Electoral Commission of Ghana: http://www.ec.gov.gh/node/63	Accessed on 18-02-2011
	36	7 December 1996		
	37	7 December 2000		
	38	7 December 2004		
	39	7 December 2008		
Guinea-Bissau	40	3 July 1994	Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook	Accessed on 26-11-2010 and 18-01-2011
	41	28 November 1999	*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*: http://www.guine-bissau.com/eleicoes/index.aspx?action=1	
	42	28 March 2004		
	43	16 November 2008		
Lesotho	44	27 March 1993	Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook	Accessed on 10-12-2010
	45	23 May 1998		
	46	25 May 2002	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/	
	47	17 February 2007	Independent Electoral Commission: http://www.iec.org.ls/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=50&Itemid=63	
Malawi	48	17 May 1994	Malawi Electoral Commission: www.mec.org.mw/	* Grateful to Henzily Simon Munkhondya the Head of Electoral Services of Malawi Electoral Commission, who kindly sent the maps with the official results by email on 23-05-2011.
	49	15 June 1999		
	50	20 May 2004		
	51	19 May 2009		

A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.)

Country	# Elections	Lower house election	Source	OBS
Mozambique	52	27 & 29 October 1994	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz1994results3.htm http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz1999results3.htm http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/moz2004results3.htm	Accessed on 25-11-2010
	53	3 & 5 December 1999		
	54	1 & 2 December 2004		
	55	28 October 2009	Centro de Integridade Pública de Moçambique: http://www.cip.org.mz/election2009/pt/	
Mauritius	56	20 December 1976	Electoral Commissioner's Office: http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/eco/menuitem.37ba32a3c4783128d6c8662948a521ca/?content_id=630b9dbfa1158010VgnVCM100000ca6a12acRCRD	Accessed on 18-01-2011 * Grateful to the Electoral Commissioner for having clarified my doubts about the data.
	57	11 June 1982		
	58	21 August 1983		
	59	30 August 1987		
	60	15 September 1991		
	61	20 December 1995		
	62	11 September 2000		
	63	3 July 2005		
	64	5 May 2010		
Namibia	65	7 & 11 November 1989	Nohlen, Krennerich and Thibaut (1999) Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook	Accessed on 20-01-2011 * Grateful to Bill Lindeke for information on data location.
	66	7 & 8 December 1994	Electoral Commission of Namibia: http://www.electionwatch.org.na/	
	67	30 November & 1 December 1999		
	68	15 November 2004		
	69	27 November 2009		
Nigeria	70	20 February 1999	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/	Accessed on 16-01-2011 and 28-06-2011
	71	12 April 2003		
	72	21 April 2007	Independent National Electoral Commission: http://www.inecnigeria.org/election/show_result.php?catagory=Governorship&state=36&election=2562; http://www.inecnigeria.org/results/state_houses/	
	73	2 April 2011		
Sao Tome and Principe	74	20 January 1991	Archer and Tavares (2006)	Accessed on 16-01-2010 * Grateful to Gerhard Seibert for information on data location.
	75	2 October 1994		
	76	8 November 1998		
	77	3 March 2002		

A1 – Sources per country and election (cont.)

Country	# Elections	Lower house election	Source	OBS
Sao Tome and Principe	78	26 March 2006	Archer and Tavares (2006)	
	79	1 August 2010	*Comissão Nacional de Eleições*	
Senegal	80	27 February 1983	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ Commission Nationale Electorale Autonome: www.cena.sn/	Accessed on 19-01-2011
	81	28 February 1988		
	82	9 May 1993		
	83	24 May 1998		
	84	29 April 2001		
	85	3 June 2007		
Seychelles	86	20 & 23 July 1993	African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/ Office of the Electoral Commissioner: http://www.ecs.sc/pages/legislations/elecsys.aspx	Accessed on 17-01-2011
	87	20 March 1998		
	88	4 December 2002		
	89	10 May 2007		
South Africa	90	26 & 29 April 1994	Electoral Commission of South Africa: www.elections.org.za/	Accessed on 29-11-2010
	91	2 June 1999		
	92	14 April 2004		
	93	22 April 2009		
Tanzania	94	29 October & 19 November 1995	Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/	Accessed on 16-01-2011 * Grateful to Deane Stuart who kindly sent me the data for the 2001 election by mail.
	95	29 October 2000		
	96	14 December 2005	The National Electoral Commission of Tanzania: www.nec.go.tz	
	97	31 October 2010		
Zambia	98	31 October 1991	The Electoral Commission of Zambia: http://www.elections.org.zm/	Accessed on 30-09-2010; 16-01-2011 and 04-10-2011
	99	18 November 1996		
	100	27 December 2001		
	101	28 September 2006		
	102	20 September 2011		

APPENDIX B – MAPS

B1 – Map of Mozambique

Source: *Portal do Governo de Moçambique (*Mozambique's Government Web Portal), available at http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Mozambique/mapa_mocambique.jpg (retrieved on 26-05-2013).

B2 – Map of Zambia

Source: http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/zambia.pdf
Map No. 3731 Rev. 4 United Nations, January 2004, Department of Peacekeeping Operations Cartographic Section (retrieved on 26-05-2013).

APPENDIX C – INTERVIEW GUIDE

Presentation

My name is Edalina Rodrigues Sanches I am a PhD candidate at the Institute of Social Sciences – University of Lisbon, and currently a visiting researcher at the University Eduardo Mondlane/University of Zambia. My thesis analyzes the process of party system institutionalization (PSI) in sub-Saharan Africa, with a particular emphasis on the cases of Mozambique and Zambia. I would like to pose you a group of questions about politics [electoral process, legal framework, interactions between political parties, strategies of competition, linkages to groups of civil society etc.], which I believe might be related to the process of PSI in Mozambique/Zambia. The interview has an estimated duration of 45 minutes.

Permission to record and confidentiality

Before starting the interview I would like to ask your permission to electronically record the interview, as well as to take notes during our conversation. The interview will be used for my research only. Please feel free to ask me to stop recording or taking notes in case you would like to say something "off the record". If you are not comfortable with a particular question feel free not to answer. If I decide to quote parts of this interview in my PhD dissertation may I attribute the information to you personally or would you prefer to be referred to anonymously? Can I contact you in case I have additional questions?

Part I – Background questions

1. Could you tell me a bit more about your personal background? [educational, professional and political career and motivations to become involved in politics] [ALL]
2. How would you describe the electoral process in [Country]? [quality, voter turnout, main political issues] [ALL]
3. What are in your opinion the main characteristics of national party politics in [Country]? [ALL]
4. Can you give me further information about your organization/institution? [mission, main political activities, sources of funding] [NGOs ONLY]

Part II – Parties' foundation, organizational continuities and changes [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
(This bloc of questions was adapted from EISA)

5. How was [the name of the party] founded and what were the key motivations for its establishment? Have there been any changes in the party's aims/objectives over the years?
6. Did your party received initial support from civil society organizations or social groups [i.e. ethnic, regional, urban, rural, religious, military, business, civic groups, trade unions]? Have patterns of support changed over the years?
7. How have the party's organizational structures evolved since the first election? What were the main changes?
8. How would you describe your political party in terms ideology? [right, left, pragmatic, conservative, liberal, socialist, green, religious, nationalist etc.] Have there been changes in the ideological content of the party? [For JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS and NGOs: "how would you describe political parties ideologies ..."]

Part III – Dimensions of party institutionalization

9. Electoral and party laws are considered relevant to party system development. What would you say are the main constraints and incentives to your party in this regard [electoral formula, rules for funding etc.]? [For JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS and NGOs: "How relevant are electoral and party laws in shaping electoral outcomes..."]
10. Who finances the party? [State funds, foreign funding, member's quotes]? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
11. Would you say your party is better organized than other parties? Why? [For JOURNALISTS, ACADEMICS and NGOs: "In your opinion, which party is better organized..."]
12. Are there any updated figures on membership? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
13. What have been the main changes within the party [party splits, mergers, change of leaders]? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
14. What are the principal campaign strategies? [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
15. Does your organization/institution help the development of political parties? If yes how? [NGOs ONLY]
16. Are your organization/institution claims represented by any political party? [NGOs ONLY]
17. How would you characterize the relationship of your organization/institution with political parties? [NGOs ONLY]

Part IV – Dimensions of party system institutionalization

18. How would you characterize your party relationship with other parties? [informal, cooperation, antagonism, etc.] [POLITICAL ELITES/PARTY MEMBERS ONLY]
19. Would you say that all parties compete in equal conditions? If not what are the main differences? [ALL]
20. What is your opinion about the one-party dominance in Mozambique?/ What is your opinion about the reverse of one-party dominance in Zambia? Do you think it is a good thing, a bad thing or neither? Why? [ALL]
21. What are/were the main causes for this continuity/change? [ALL]

End of interview.

APPENDIX D – LISTS OF INTERVIEWS

D1 – Interviewees in Mozambique

#	Name	Institution	Position
Political Elites			
1	Leonardo Simão	Frelimo	Former Minister
2	Manuel Tomé	Frelimo	Current MP
3	Luísa Diogo	Frelimo	Former Prime Minister
4	José Luís Cabaço	Frelimo	Former Minister (during one-partyism)
5	Morais Mabyeka	Frelimo	Party Secretary for Organization
6	Jorge Rebelo	Frelimo	Former Minister (during one-partyism)
7	João Colaço	MDM	Former member of the Party Secretariat and former Chief of Strategy
8	Lutero Simango	MDM	Parliamentary caucus leader
9	Ismael Mussá	MDM	Vice-President of Parliamentary caucus (Ex- Renamo)
10	Benedito Marime	MDM	Party Deputy Chief of Foreign Affairs (Ex-PCN)
11	Máximo Dias	Monamo	President
12	Fernando Chapane	Pahumo	President
13	Paulino Nicopola	Palmo	President
14	André Balate	Parena	President
15	Francisco Campira	Pasomo	President
16	Raul Domingos	PDD	President (Ex-Renamo)
17	Magalhães Abramugy	Pimo	Secretary-General
18	Fernando Mazanga	Renamo	Renamo Spokesperson
19	Maria Angelina Enoque	Renamo	Parliamentary caucus leader
20	António Muchanga	Renamo	Member of the State Council
Civil Society Organizations			
21	Adriano Nuvunga	Centro de Integridade Pública	Director
22	Alice Mabote	LDH - Liga dos Direitos Humanos em Moçambique	President
23	Brazão Mazula	CEDE - Centro de Estudos de Democracia e Desenvolvimento	Former CNE President
24	Elisa Muianga	AWEPA - Parlamentares Europeus com África	Acting country representative
25	Hermenegildo Mulhovo	NIMD - Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy	Acting country representative
26	João Gundana	AMODE - Associação Moçambicana para a Democracia	Director
27	Marcos Macamo	CCM - Conselho Cristão de Moçambique	Secretary-General
28	Salomão Muchanga	Parlamento Juvenil	Director
29	Sheik Abdul Carimo Vazirna	CISLAMO - Conselho Islâmico de Moçambique	Secretary-General
Journalists			
30	Francisco Carmona	Savana	Editor
31	Lázaro Mabunda	O país	Editor
32	Salomão Moyana	Magazine Independente	Editor
Academics			
33	João Pereira	University Eduardo Mondlane	Professor (also leader of civil society organization)
34	Domingos Rosário	University Eduardo Mondlane	Professor
35	José Jaime Macuane	University Eduardo Mondlane	Professor (also leader of civil society organization)

D2 – Interviewees in Zambia

#	Name	Institution	Position
Political Elites			
1	Lizu Kakoma	ADD	Secretary-General
2	Chozi Ng'uni	APC	President
3	Charles Zulu	Independent	Current MP
4	Chembe Nyangu and Alfred Ndhlovu	MMD	Party Information and Publicity Secretary Party Deputy National Secretary
5	Elias Chipimo Jr.	NAREP	President
6	Tentani Mwanza	NDP	President
7	Cosmo Mumba	NRP	President
8	Chanda Mfula	PF	Party media and publicity Director
9	Inambao Inambao	ULP	Secretary-General
10	Winstone Chibwe	UNDP	Secretary-General
11	Langton Sichone	ZDC	President
12	Wright Musoma	ZRP	President
Civil Society Organizations			
13	Goodwell Lungu	Transparency International Zambia	Executive Director
14	Heiner Naumann	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	Resident Director
15	Horrance Chilando	Zambia Center for Inter-Party Dialogue	Executive Director
16	James Banda	LAZ - Law Association of Zambia	President
17	McDonald Chipenzi	FODEP - Foundation for Democratic Process	Executive Director
18	Boniface Cheembe	SACCORD - Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes	Executive Director
19	Juliet Chibuta	ZNWL - Zambia National Women's Lobby	Executive Director
20	Neo Simutanyi	CIP - Centre for Policy Dialogue	Executive Director
21	Suzanne Matale	CCZ - Council for Churches in Zambia	General Secretary and CEO
22	Richwell Mulwani	AVAP - The Anti-Voter Apathy Project	Executive Director
23	Sombo Chunda	Diakonia	Acting country representative
Journalists			
24	Speedwell Mupuchi	The Post online	Deputy Managing Editor
25	Brebner Changala* / Clayson Hamasaka	Political activist*/Zambia Watchdog	Political activist*/Journalist
26	Patson Phiri	PAZA - Press Association of Zambia	Executive Secretary
Academics			
27	Jotham Momba	UNZA - Department of Political and Administrative Studies	Professor
28	Njekwa Mate	UNZA - Department of Political and Administrative Studies	Head of Department

APPENDIX E – REGRESSIONS MODELS

Model 1

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id	Number of obs	= 83
Time variable:	time_panel	Number of groups	= 19
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	= 3
Autocorrelation:	no autocorrelation	avg	= 4.368421
Sigma computed by	casewise selection	max	= 8
Estimated covariances	= 190	R-squared	= 0.4623
Estimated autocorrelations	= 0	Wald chi2(10)	= 1797.06
Estimated coefficients	= 11	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

PSI11	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
timefistelec	-.0260386	.0398816	-0.65	0.514	-.1042051	.0521279
durable	.1025112	.0461857	2.22	0.026	.0119889	.1930336
turnout_vol	.0079518	.025949	0.31	0.759	-.0429072	.0588109
frac_index	-1.206224	.7794738	-1.55	0.122	-2.733964	.3215169
presidenti~y	.0067846	.7753236	0.01	0.993	-1.512822	1.526391
enep	-.8697261	.1207429	-7.20	0.000	-1.106378	-.6330744
partyage	-.0023805	.0254048	-0.09	0.925	-.0521729	.047412
publicfundx	.1517983	.0588579	2.58	0.010	.0364389	.2671578
gdp	.0081438	.0871065	0.09	0.926	-.1625817	.1788693
inflation	-.0010551	.0153912	-0.07	0.945	-.0312214	.0291111
_cons	29.15383	1.711384	17.04	0.000	25.79958	32.50808

Model 2

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id	Number of obs	= 82
Time variable:	time_panel	Number of groups	= 19
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	= 3
Autocorrelation:	no autocorrelation	avg	= 4.315789
Sigma computed by	casewise selection	max	= 8
Estimated covariances	= 190	R-squared	= 0.5213
Estimated autocorrelations	= 0	Wald chi2(14)	= 1069.12
Estimated coefficients	= 15	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

PSI11	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
timefistelec	-.0041361	.0468487	-0.09	0.930	-.0959578	.0876857
durable	.1088208	.052326	2.08	0.038	.0062638	.2113779
turnout_vol	-.018734	.0221332	-0.85	0.397	-.0621142	.0246463
frac_index	2.390498	1.393975	1.71	0.086	-.3416433	5.122639
presidenti~y	-.4005219	.741804	-0.54	0.589	-1.854431	1.053387
enep	-.9991129	.1922921	-5.20	0.000	-1.375999	-.6222273
partyage	-.0076982	.0238667	-0.32	0.747	-.0544761	.0390798
publicfundx	.0949321	.0569206	1.67	0.095	-.0166303	.2064945
gdp	.0769828	.0803236	0.96	0.338	-.0804487	.2344142
inflation	.0159265	.0162261	0.98	0.326	-.0158761	.047729
PSIlag	.0806448	.1949887	0.41	0.679	-.301526	.4628155
PR_N	-.0933518	.1721992	-0.54	0.588	-.430856	.2441524
majority_d~y	-1.144351	.505005	-2.27	0.023	-2.134142	-.154559
religion	-2.271127	1.141141	-1.99	0.047	-4.507723	-.0345307
_cons	27.30372	6.185487	4.41	0.000	15.18039	39.42706

Model 3

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id	Number of obs	= 82
Time variable:	time_panel	Number of groups	= 19
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	= 3
Autocorrelation:	no autocorrelation	avg	= 4.315789
Sigma computed by	casewise selection	max	= 8
Estimated covariances	= 190	R-squared	= 0.5599
Estimated autocorrelations	= 0	Wald chi2(15)	= 5255.55
Estimated coefficients	= 16	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

PSI11	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
timefistelec	-.0044341	.0455155	-0.10	0.922	-.0936429	.0847746
durable	.0935584	.048751	1.92	0.055	-.0019919	.1891086
turnout_vol	-.0157412	.0218083	-0.72	0.470	-.0584847	.0270024
frac_index	5.396012	2.402697	2.25	0.025	.6868119	10.10521
presidenti~y	-.0949369	.8055296	-0.12	0.906	-1.673746	1.483872
enep	-.9239291	.1875985	-4.93	0.000	-1.291615	-.5562428
partyage	-.0046241	.0255332	-0.18	0.856	-.0546682	.04542
publicfundx	.1301975	.0567031	2.30	0.022	.0190615	.2413334
gdp	.070428	.0676881	1.04	0.298	-.0622382	.2030943
inflation	.0151438	.0132661	1.14	0.254	-.0108573	.0411449
PSIlag	.0421544	.1887974	0.22	0.823	-.3278817	.4121904
PR_N	-.1964183	.177975	-1.10	0.270	-.5452429	.1524063
majority_d~y	-1.013839	.5298291	-1.91	0.056	-2.052285	.024607
religion	-3.836053	1.601326	-2.40	0.017	-6.974594	-.697512
adqPSI	1.814739	.7752933	2.34	0.019	.2951918	3.334286
_cons	26.47982	5.59601	4.73	0.000	15.51184	37.4478

Model 4

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id	Number of obs	= 83
Time variable:	time_panel	Number of groups	= 19
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	= 3
Autocorrelation:	no autocorrelation	avg	= 4.368421
Sigma computed by	casewise selection	max	= 8
Estimated covariances	= 190	R-squared	= 0.4974
Estimated autocorrelations	= 0	Wald chi2(12)	= 2039.73
Estimated coefficients	= 13	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

PSI11	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
timefistelec	-.0298774	.0437077	-0.68	0.494	-.1155429	.0557881
durable	.1067392	.0493587	2.16	0.031	.0099978	.2034805
turnout_vol	-.00646	.0229753	-0.28	0.779	-.0514907	.0385707
ethnic	1.044395	1.696358	0.62	0.538	-2.280406	4.369196
language	.4431111	1.200437	0.37	0.712	-1.909702	2.795925
religion	-2.749211	.7624863	-3.61	0.000	-4.243657	-1.254765
presidenti~y	-.6661895	.684431	-0.97	0.330	-2.00765	.6752706
enep	-.8217729	.1243902	-6.61	0.000	-1.065573	-.5779726
partyage	.0024057	.0253279	0.09	0.924	-.047236	.0520475
publicfundx	.125884	.0660025	1.91	0.056	-.0034785	.2552465
gdp	.062213	.1008002	0.62	0.537	-.1353518	.2597778
inflation	.0093583	.018033	0.52	0.604	-.0259857	.0447023
_cons	28.93722	1.824874	15.86	0.000	25.36053	32.5139

Model 5

Linear regression, correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)

Group variable:	id	Number of obs	= 82
Time variable:	time_panel	Number of groups	= 19
Panels:	correlated (unbalanced)	Obs per group: min	= 3
Autocorrelation:	no autocorrelation	avg	= 4.315789
Sigma computed by	casewise selection	max	= 8
Estimated covariances	= 190	R-squared	= 0.4934
Estimated autocorrelations	= 0	Wald chi2(13)	= 1881.78
Estimated coefficients	= 14	Prob > chi2	= 0.0000

PSI11	Panel-corrected Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
timefistelec	-.0218479	.0470622	-0.46	0.642	-.1140881	.0703922
durable	.0907992	.0559838	1.62	0.105	-.018927	.2005254
turnout_vol	-.0170378	.0229739	-0.74	0.458	-.0620658	.0279902
ethnic	.8165923	1.777589	0.46	0.646	-2.667417	4.300602
language	.5166723	1.154296	0.45	0.654	-1.745706	2.77905
religion	-2.35915	.9221973	-2.56	0.011	-4.166624	-.551677
presidenti~y	-.6050069	.665537	-0.91	0.363	-1.909435	.6994217
enep	-.9144813	.1876082	-4.87	0.000	-1.282187	-.5467759
partyage	.0000776	.0247867	0.00	0.998	-.0485034	.0486587
publicfundx	.1398135	.0666622	2.10	0.036	.0091579	.270469
gdp	.0446205	.0946242	0.47	0.637	-.1408395	.2300805
inflation	.0088312	.0156324	0.56	0.572	-.0218077	.0394702
PSIlag	.1074311	.1984788	0.54	0.588	-.2815801	.4964424
_cons	26.32278	5.9731	4.41	0.000	14.61572	38.02984

APPENDIX F – ANOVA RESULTS

F1 – Frelimo vs. Renamo

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q10. Abandon economic reforms vs. accept hardships	Between Groups	(Combined)	3,153	1	3,153	3,270	,071
	Within Groups		614,343	637	,964		
	Total		617,496	638			
Q11. Economic policies helped most vs. hurt most	Between Groups	(Combined)	,595	1	,595	,480	,489
	Within Groups		875,681	706	1,240		
	Total		876,275	707			
Q16. Question actions of leaders vs. respect authority	Between Groups	(Combined)	,036	1	,036	,028	,867
	Within Groups		905,261	708	1,279		
	Total		905,297	709			
Q17. Leaders treat all equally vs. help own community	Between Groups	(Combined)	,744	1	,744	,561	,454
	Within Groups		921,618	694	1,328		
	Total		922,362	695			
Q18. Government like a parent vs. an employee	Between Groups	(Combined)	,002	1	,002	,002	,963
	Within Groups		844,144	730	1,156		
	Total		844,146	731			
Q19. Government bans organizations vs. join any	Between Groups	(Combined)	2,354	1	2,354	2,047	,153
	Within Groups		766,815	667	1,150		
	Total		769,169	668			
Q20. Government close newspapers vs. free to publish	Between Groups	(Combined)	,035	1	,035	,031	,861
	Within Groups		772,316	678	1,139		
	Total		772,351	679			
Q21. Govt. suppress expression vs. people speak minds	Between Groups	(Combined)	,408	1	,408	,388	,534
	Within Groups		692,651	658	1,053		
	Total		693,059	659			

F2 – MMD vs. PF vs. UPND

			Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Q10. Abandon economic reforms vs. accept hardships	Between Groups	(Combined)	3,341	2	1,671	1,177	,309
	Within Groups		817,305	576	1,419		
	Total		820,646	578			
Q11. Economic policies helped most vs. hurt most	Between Groups	(Combined)	18,590	2	9,295	10,796	,000
	Within Groups		524,325	609	,861		
	Total		542,915	611			
Q16. Question actions of leaders vs. respect authority	Between Groups	(Combined)	7,223	2	3,612	2,925	,054
	Within Groups		751,854	609	1,235		
	Total		759,077	611			
Q17. Leaders treat all equally vs. help own community	Between Groups	(Combined)	5,304	2	2,652	1,800	,166
	Within Groups		908,921	617	1,473		
	Total		914,224	619			
Q18. Government like a parent vs. an employee	Between Groups	(Combined)	5,621	2	2,810	1,840	,160
	Within Groups		944,151	618	1,528		
	Total		949,771	620			
Q19. Government bans organizations vs. join any	Between Groups	(Combined)	11,878	2	5,939	4,988	,007
	Within Groups		687,010	577	1,191		
	Total		698,888	579			
Q20. Government close newspapers vs. free to publish	Between Groups	(Combined)	8,668	2	4,334	5,717	,003
	Within Groups		446,546	589	,758		
	Total		455,215	591			
Q21. Govt. suppress expression vs. people speak minds	Between Groups	(Combined)	8,123	2	4,062	5,445	,005
	Within Groups		441,564	592	,746		
	Total		449,687	594			

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Achen, Christopher H. 2001. «Why Lagged Dependent Variables Can Suppress the Explanatory Power of Other Independent Variables.» Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 20-22 July.

Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and Romain Wacziarg. 2003. «Fractionalization.» *Journal of Economic Growth*, 8: 155–194.

Allison, Paul D. 2009. *Fixed Effects Regression Models*. USA: Sage Publications.

Almeida, Cláudia, and Edalina Sanches. 2011. «'Das Balas aos Votos': Um estudo comparado das primeiras eleiçoes pós-guerra civil em Angola e Moçambique.» In *PALOP: Investigação em Debate*, ed. Marzia Grassi. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 119–139.

Anderson, Lisa, ed. 1999. *Transitions to Democracy*. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press.

Ansell, Christopher. 1998. «Network Institutionalism.» In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, eds. Sarah A. Binder, R. A. W. Rhodes, and Bert A. Rockman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 75–89.

Archer, Maria da Graça, and Sónia Tavares. 2006. *Eleições da República Democrática de São Tomé e Príncipe de 1990 a 2006 (Referendo, Presidenciais, Legislativas, Autárquicas e Regionais)*. Vila Franca de Xira: Soartes.

Armon, Jeremy, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines, eds. 1998. «The Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective.» *Accord: an international review of peace initiatives, 3*. London and Maputo: Conciliation Resources and Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique.

Austin, Reginald, and Maja Tjernström, eds. 2003. *Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns*. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.

Azevedo, Elisabete. 2009. «O Semipresidencialismo na Guiné-Bissau: Inocente ou Culpado da Instabilidade Política?» In *O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, eds. Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 139–170.

Azevedo-Harman, Elisabete. 2012. «Parliaments and Citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa.» *The Journal of Legislative Studies*,18 (3): 419–440.

Bakke, Elisabeth, and Nick Sitter. 2005. «Patterns of Stability: Party Competition and Strategy in Central Europe since 1989.» *Party Politics*, 11 (2): 243–263.

Bardi, Luciano, and Peter Mair. 2008. «The Parameters of Party Systems.» *Party Politics*, 14 (2): 147–166.

Barley, Stephen R, and Pamela S Tolbert. 1997. «Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links between Action and Institution.» *Articles & Chapters*, Paper 130.

Bartolini, Stefano, and Peter Mair. 1990. *Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilisation of European Electorates 1885-1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Basedau, Matthias. 2007. «Do Party Systems Matter for Democracy? A Comparative Study of 28 Sub-Saharan Countries.» In *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, eds. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 105–143.

Basedau, Matthias, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler, eds. 2007. *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Basedau, Matthias, and Alexander Stroh. 2008. «Measuring Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries: A New Research Instrument applied to 28 African Political Parties.» *GIGA Working Papers*, n.º 69.

Bazenguissa-Ganga, Rémy. 1999. «The Spread of Political Violence in Congo-Brazzaville.» *African Affairs*, 98 (390): 37–54.

Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. «Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have we Learned in the Last Few Years?» *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4: 271–293.

Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan N Katz. 1995. «What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data.» *American Political Science Review*, 89 (3): 634–647.

Bellucci, Paolo, Marina Costa Lobo, and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 2012. «Economic Crisis and Elections: The European Periphery.» *Electoral Studies*, 31 (3): 469–471.

Ben-Dor, Gabriel. 1975. «Institutionalization and Political Development: A Conceptual Theoretical Analysis.» *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 17 (3): 309–325.

Benoit, Kenneth. 2004. «Models of Electoral System Change.» *Electoral Studies*, 23 (3): 363–389.

Bermann, George A., and Terence Daintith, eds. 2006. *Party Funding and Campaign Financing in International Perspective*. Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing.

Bermeo, Nancy. 1999. «Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict During Democratic Transitions.» In *Transitions to Democracy*, ed. Lisa Anderson. New York Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 120–140.

Bielasiak, Jack. 2002. «The Institutionalization of Electoral and Party Systems in Postcommunist States.» *Comparative Politics*, 34 (2): 189–210.

Binder, Leonard. 1964. «National Integration and Political Development.» *American Political Science Review*, 58 (3): 622–631.

Birch, Sarah. 2001. «Electoral Systems and Party System Stability in Post-Communist Europe.» Paper presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 30 August-2 September.

Blaikie, Norman. 1993. *Approaches to Social Inquiry*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Blais, André, and Louis Massicotte. 1996. «Electoral Systems.» In *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspectives*, eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris. London: Sage Publications, 40–61.

Blondel, Jean. 1968. «Party Systems and Patterns of Government in Western Democracies.» *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1 (2): 180–203.

Bogaards, Matthijs. 2004. «Counting Parties and Identifying Dominant Party Systems in Africa.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 43: 173–197.

———. 2007. «Electoral Systems, Party Systems and Ethnicity in Africa.» In *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, eds. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 168–193.

———. 2008. «Dominant Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Africa: A Comment on Mozaffar and Scarritt.» *Party Politics*, 14 (1): 113–130.

Bogaards, Matthijs, Matthias Basedau, and Christof Hartmann. 2010. «Ethnic Party Bans in Africa: An Introduction.» *Democratization*, 17 (4): 599–617.

Bogaards, Matthijs, and Françoise Boucek, ed. 2010. *Dominant Political Parties and Democracy: Concepts, Measures, Cases and Comparisons*. London: Routledge.

Boletim da República. 2000. *Acta de Apuramento dos Resultados Eleitorais*, I Série - No. 1, 7 January 2000, Maputo: Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique.

Booth, Eric, and Joseph Robbins. 2010. «Assessing the Impact of Campaign Finance on Party System Institutionalization.» *Party Politics*, 16 (5): 629–650.

Brass, Paul R. 1977. «Party Systems and Government Stability in the Indian States.» *American Political Science Review*, 71 (4): 1384–1405.

Bratton, Michael. 1992. «Zambia Starts Over.» *Journal of Democracy*, 3 (2): 81–94.

———. 1998. «Second Elections in Africa.» *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (3): 51–66.

———. 1999. «Political Participation in a New Democracy: Institutional Considerations from Zambia.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 32 (5): 549–588.

Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brito, Luís de. 1996. «Voting Behaviour in Mozambique's First Multiparty Elections.» In *Mozambique: Elections, Democracy and Development*, ed. Brazão Mazula. Maputo: Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 455– 481.

———. 2008. «Uma Nota Sobre Voto, Abstenção e Fraude em Moçambique.» *Colecção de Discussion Papers do IESE No. 4.*

———. 2009. «O Sistema Eleitoral: Uma Dimensão Crítica da Representação Política em Moçambique.» In *Desafios Para Moçambique 2010*, eds. Luís de Brito, Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, Sérgio Chichava, and António Francisco. Maputo: IESE, 17–30.

———. 2010. «A Challenge for Democracy: Low Turnout in Mozambique, Lesotho and Zambia.» Paper presented at the IESE/CMI Conference on Electoral Processes, Liberation Movements and Democratic Change in Africa, Maputo, 9-11 April.

———. 2011. «Revisão da Legislação Eleitoral. Algumas Propostas para o Debate.» In *Desafios Para Moçambique 2011*, eds. Luís de Brito, Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, Sérgio Chichava, and António Francisco. Maputo: IESE, 91–107.

Brown, Desmond. 1977. «Dilemmas of Deinstitutionalization.» *Sociological Analysis*, 38 (2): 140–144.

Bryan, Shari, and Denise Baer, eds. 2005. *Money in Politics: A Study of Party Financing Pratices in 22 Countries*. USA: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs.

Bull, Mutumba. 1968. Review of *Zambia: the politics of independence, 1957-1964*, by David C. Mulford, *The Journal of African History*, 9 (3): 494–496.

Burnell, Peter. 2001a. «The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future.» *African Affairs*, 100 (399): 239–263.

———. 2001b. «The First Two MMD Administrations in Zambia: Millennium Dawn or Millennium Sunset?» *Contemporary Politics*, 7 (2): 95–111.

———. 2002. «Zambia's 2001 Elections: The Tyranny of Small Decisions, 'Non-Decisions' and 'Not Decisions'.» *Third World Quarterly*, 23 (6): 1103–1120.

———. 2003. «Legislative-Executive Relations in Zambia: Parliamentary Reform on the Agenda.» *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21 (1): 47–68.

Cahen, Michel. 1998. «'Dhlakama É Maningue Nice!' An Atypical Former Guerrilla in the Mozambican Electoral Campaign.» *Transformation*, 35: 1–48.

Cameron, A. Colin, and Pravin K. Trivedi. 2009. *Microeconometrics Using Stata*. College Station: Stata Press.

Campbell, D. T. 1969. «Definitional versus Multiple Operationalism.» *Et Al*, 2: 14–17.

Canon, David T. 1989. «The Institutionalization of Leadership in the U. S. Congress.» *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 14 (3): 415–443.

Carbone, Giovanni M. 2003. «Political Parties in a 'No-Party Democracy': Hegemony and Opposition Under 'Movement Democracy' in Uganda.» *Party Politics*, 9 (4): 485–501.

———. 2005. «Continuidade na Renovacão? Ten Years of Multiparty Politics in Mozambique: Roots, Evolution and Stabilisation of the Frelimo-Renamo Party System.» *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 43 (3): 417–442.

———. 2007. «Political Parties and Party Systems in Africa: Themes and Research Perspectives.» *World Political Science Review*, 3 (3): 57–86.

Carothers, Thomas. 2002. «The End of the Transition Paradigm.» *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (1): 5–21.

Carter Center. 2002. «Observing the 2001 Zambia Elections.» Atlanta: Carter Center.

Carter Center. 2004. «The Carter Center Report on the Mozambique Voter Registration Update.» Atlanta/Maputo: Carter Center.

Cartwright, Nancy. 2002. «In Favor of Laws That Are Not Ceteris Paribus After All.» *Erkenntnis*, 57: 425–439.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando. 2011. «Sources of Party System Institutionalization in New Democracies: Lessons from East Central Europe.» *EUI Working Papers, SPS/2011/01*.

———. 2012. «Parties, Regime and Cleavages: Explaining Party System Institutionalisation in East Central Europe.» *East European Politics*, 28 (4): 452–472.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando, and Zsolt Enyedi. 2010. «Party System Closure : Conceptualization, Operationalization and Validation.» *DISC Working Paper Series, WP/2010/11*.

Casal Bértoa, Fernando, and Peter Mair. 2010. «Two Decades: How Institutionalized are the Post- Communist Party Systems?» *EUI Woking Papers, SPS/2010/03.*

Chabal, Patrick. 1998. «A Few Considerations on Democracy in Africa.» *International Affairs*, 74 (2): 289–303.

———. ed. 2002. *A History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Chaffey, Douglas C. 1970. «The Institutionalization of State Legislatures: A Comparative Study.» *The Western Political Quarterly*, 23 (1): 180–196.

Cheembe, Boniface. 2013. *Political, Ethnic and Land Conflicts in Zambia*. Lusaka: The Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

Chichava, Sérgio. 2008a. «Uma Província 'Rebelde'. O Significado do Voto Zambeziano a Favor da Renamo." In *Cidadania e Governação em Moçambique*, eds. Luis de Brito, Carlos Castel Branco, Sérgio Chichava, and António Francisco. Maputo: IESE, 15–48.

———. 2008b. «Por Uma Leitura Sócio-Histórica da Etnicidade em Moçambique.» *IESE Discussion Papers No.1*.

———. 2010a. «Movimento Democrático de Moçambique: Uma Nova Força Política na Democracia Moçambicana ?» *Cadernos IESE No. 2.*

———. 2010b. «MDM: A New Political Force in Mozambique?» Paper presented at the IESE/CMI Conference on Election Processes, Liberation Movements and Democratic Change in Africa, Maputo, 9-11 April.

Chiriyankandath, James. 2007. «Colonialism and Post-Colonial Development.» In *Politics in the Developing World*, eds. Peter Burnell, Vicky Randall and Lise Rakner. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 35–53.

Clemens, Elisabeth S., and James M Cook. 1999. «Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change.» *Annual Review of Sociology*, 25: 441–466.

Colomer, Josep M. 2005. «It's the Parties That Choose Electoral Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down).» *Political Studies*, 53: 1–21.

Converse, Philip E. 1969. "Of Time and Partisan Stability.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 2: 139–171.

Cotter, Cornelius P., and John F. Bibby. 1980. «Institutional Development of Parties and the Thesis of Party Decline.» *Political Science Quarterly*, 95 (1): 1–27.

Cox, Gary. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crano, William D., and Marilynn B. Brewer. 1986. *Principles and Methods of Social Research*. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Incorporated.

Creswell, John W. 2002. *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Thousand Oaks/US: Sage Publications.

———. 2006a. «Choosing a Mixed Methods Design.» In *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks/US: Sage Publications, 53–106.

———. 2006b. «The Foundations of Mixed Methods Research.» In *Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research*. Thousand Oaks/US: Sage Publications,19–52.

Creswell, John W., Vicki L. Plan Clark, Michelle L. Gutmann, and William E. Hanson. 2003. «Advanced Mixed Methods Research Designs.» In *Sage Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research*, eds. Abbas Tashakkori and Charles Teddlie. Thousand Oaks/US: Sage Publications, 209–240.

Crewe, Ivor. 1985. «Introduction: Electoral Change in Western Democracies: A Framework for Analysis.» In *Electoral Change in Western Democracies: Patterns and Sources of Volatility*, eds. Ivor Crewe and David Denver. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1–22.

Crisis Group. 2007. «Burundi: Finalising Peace with the FNL.» *Crisis Group Africa Report No. 131*.

———. 2008. «Central African Republic: Untangling the Political Dialogue.» *Crisis Group Africa Briefing No. 55*.

Croissant, Aurel, and Philip Völkel. 2010. «Party System Types and Party System Institutionalization: Comparing New Democracies in East and Southeast Asia.» *Party Politics*,18 (2): 235–265.

Crotty, William. 1993. «Political Parties in a Changing Age.» *American Review of Politics*, 14: 593–561.

Dahl, Robert, ed. 1966. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2008. «The Rule of Law versus the Big Man.» *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (2): 138–149.

Diamond, Larry, and Leonardo Morlino. 2004. «The Quality of a Democracy: An Overview.» *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (4): 20–31.

Diamond, Larry, and Marc Plattner, ed. 1999. *Democratization in Africa*. USA: The John's Hopkins University Press.

Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, ed. 2006. *Electoral Systems and Democracy*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Dix, Robert H. 1992. «Democratization and the Institutionalization of Latin American Political Parties.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 24 (4): 488–511.

Doorenspleet, Renske. 2003. «Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa.» In *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih. London: Pluto Press, 169–187.

———. 2004. «The Structural Context of Recent Transitions to Democracy.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 43 (3): 309–335.

Du Plessis, Stan, and Ben Smit. 2007. «South Africa's Growth Revival after 1994». *Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers No. 01/06.*

Duvall, Raymond, and Mary Welfling. 1973a. «Determinants of Political Institutionalization in Black Africa: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 5: 387–417.

———. 1973b. «Social Mobilization, Political Institutionalization, and Conflict in Black Africa: A Simple Dynamic Model.» *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 17 (4): 673–702.

Duverger, Maurice. 1959. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. London: Methuen & Co.

———. 1990. «A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 8 (2): 165–187.

Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 1964. «Institutionalization and Change.» *American Sociological Review*, 29 (2): 235–247.

Elgie, Robert. 2004. «Semi-Presidentialism: Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Explanations.» *Political Studies Review*, 2 (3): 314–330.

———. 2005. «A Fresh Look at Semipresidentialism: Variations on a Theme.» *Journal of Democracy*, 16 (3): 98–112.

———. 2007. «What Is Semi-Presidentialism and Where Is It Found?» In *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, eds. Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup. London and New York: Routledge, 1–13.

Elgie, Robert, and Sophia Moestrup. 2007a. «The Choice of Semipresidentialism and Its Consequences.» In *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, eds. Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup. London and New York: Routledge, 237–248.

———. eds. 2007b. *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe. A Comparative Study*. London and New York: Routledge.

Emerson, Stephen A. 2014. *The Battle for Mozambique. The Frelimo-Renamo Struggle, 1977-1992*. West Midlands, Englandm and Pinetown South Africa: Helion & Company Ltd. and Pinetown and 30° South Publishers.

Enyedi, Zsolt. 2005. «Party Politics in Post-Communist Transition.» In *Handbook of Party Politics*, Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty. London and Thousands Oaks: Sage Publications, 228–238.

Epstein, David L, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 2006. «Democratic Transitions.» *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (3): 551–569.

Erdmann, Gero. 2007a. «The Cleavage Model, Ethnicity and Voter Alignment in Africa: Conceptual and Methodological Problems Revisited.» *GIGA Working Papers No. 63*.

———. 2007b. «Ethnicity, Voter Alignment and Political Party Affiliation. An African Case: Zambia.» *GIGA Working Papers No. 45*.

Erdmann, Gero, Sebastian Elischer, and Alexander Stroh. 2011. «Can Historical Institutionalism be Applied to Political Regime Development in Africa?» *GIGA Working Papers No. 166.*

Erdmann, Gero, and Ulf Engel. 2006. «Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept.» *GIGA Working Papers No.16.*

Erdmann, Gero, and Neo Simutanyi. 2003. «Transition in Zambia: The Hybridisation of the Third Republic.» *Konrad Adenauer Foundation Occasional Papers*, Zambia: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung.

Falola, Oyin, and Matthew M. Heaton. 2008. *A History of Nigeria*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fambom, Samuel. 2003. «Public Funding of Political Parties in Africa.» Paper presented at the Africa Conference on Election, Democracy and Governance, Pretoria, South Africa, 7-10 April.

Fearon, James D., and David D. Latin. 2008. «Integrating Qualitative and Quantitative Methods.» In *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, eds. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry Brady, and David Collier. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 756–774.

Ferree, Karen E. 2010. «The Social Origins of Electoral Volatility in Africa.» *British Journal of Political Science*, 40 (8): 759–779.

Florêncio, Fernando. 2008. «Autoridades Tradicionais vaNdau de Moçambique: O Regresso Do Indirect Rule ou Uma Espécie.» *Análise Social*, XLIII (2): 369–391.

Gerring, John. 2004. «What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?» *American Political Science Review*, 98 (02): 341–354.

Gertzel, Cherry, Carolyn Baylies, and Morris Szeftel, eds. 1984. *The Dynamics of the One-Party State in Zambia*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Gonçalves, Fernando. 1998. «Ideological Shifts, Economic Imperatives: Southern African States and the Mozambican Peace Process.» In *Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, eds. Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines. London and Maputo: Conciliation Resources and Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 18–25.

Granjo, Paulo. 2007. «Limpeza Ritual e Reintegração Pós-Guerra em Moçambique.» *Análise Social*, XLII (182): 123–144.

Grofman, Bernard, and Arend Lijphart, eds. 2003. *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*. New York: Agathon Press.

Groth, Alexander J. 1979. «The Institutional Myth: Huntington's Order Revisited.» *The Review of Politics*, 41 (2): 203–234.

Grotz, Florian. 1999. «Burkina Faso.» In *Elections in Africa, A Data Handbook*, ed. Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. 2007. «Political Parties, Elections and Patronage: Random Thoughts on Neo-Patrimonialism and African Democratization.» In *Votes, Money and Violence: Political Parties and Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa*, eds. Matthias Basedau, Gero Erdmann, and Andreas Mehler. Uppsala, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 21–33.

Habasonda, Lee. 2009. *Tribalism and Elections in Zambia: An Anatomy of a False Consciousness*. Lusaka: The Southern African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes.

Hall, Peter, and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. 1996. «Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms.» *Political Studies*, XLIV: 936–957.

Hanlon, Joseph, and Adriano Nuvunga. 2005. *Boletim Sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique No. 32*. Maputo: AWEPA, Parlamentares Europeus para a África.

———. 2009a. «MDM na AR: Mudo e Impotente.» In *Boletim Sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique No. 31*. Maputo: AWEPA, Parlamentares Europeus para a África.

———. 2009b. «MDM Só Concorre em Quatro Províncias.» *Boletim Sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique No. 1*. Maputo: AWEPA, Parlamentares Europeus para a África.

———. 2009c. "MDM Falhou a Entrega de Documentos Chave." *Boletim Sobre o Processo Político em Moçambique No. 2*. Maputo: AWEPA, Parlamentares Europeus para a África.

Hartmann, Christof, and Jörg Kemmerzell. 2010. «Understanding Variations in Party Bans in Africa.» *Democratization*, 17 (4): 642–665.

Hay, Colin, and Daniel Wincott. 1998. «Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism.» *Political Studies*, XLVI: 951–957.

Heimer, Franz-Wilhelm, and Elisete Silva. 2002. «Culturas Políticas em Angola e Moçambique. Elementos para uma Agenda de Investigação.» *Caderno de Estudos Africanos*, 3: 27–36.

Hirsch, John L. 2009. «Peace and Justice: Mozambique and Sierra Leone Compared.» In *Peace versus Justice? The Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa*, eds. Chandra Lekha Sriram and Suren Pillay. South Aftrica: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 202–219.

Hodgkin, Thomas L. 1961. *African Political Parties. An Introductory Guide*. Baltimore: Penguin Books.

Hogan, John. 2006. «Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach.» *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 39 (3): 657–679.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. California: University of California Press.

———. 2006. «A Primer for Decision Makers.» In *Electoral Systems and Democracy*, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 3–15.

Horowitz, Shale, and Eric C. Browne. 2005. «Sources of Post-Communist Party System Consolidation: Ideology Versus Institutions.» *Party Politics*, 11 (6): 689–706.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1965. «Political Development and Political Decay.» *World Politics*, 17 (3): 386–430.

———. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Idoye, Patrick E. 1988. «Ideology and Theather: The Case of Zambia.» *Journal of Black Studies*, 19 (1): 70–78.

Ihonvbere, Julius O. 1995. «From Movement to Government: The Movement for Multi-Party Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia.» *Canadian Jounal of African Studies*, 29 (1): 1–25.

Immergut, E. M. 1998. «The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism.» *Politics & Society*, 26 (1): 5–34.

Janda, Kenneth. 1970. *A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties*. Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Jarstad, Anna K. 2008. «Dilemmas of War-to-Democracy Transitions: Theories and Concepts.» In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, eds. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk. New York: Cambridge University Press, 17–36.

Jarstad, Anna K., and Timothy D. Sisk, eds. 2008a. *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2008b. «Introduction.» In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, eds. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1–14.

Johnston, Patrick, and Chris Lee. 2003. «Political Liberalisation and Democratic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1970-1995: A Cross Sectional Analysis.» *Democracy & Development: Journal of West African Affairs*, 3 (2): 37–50.

Kabemba, Claude, and Michael Eiseman. 2004. «Multipartyism in Zambia.» In *Elections and Democracy in Zambia*, ed. Claude Kabemba. Johannesburg, South Africa: EISA, 3–21.

Kaberuka, Donald, Gurría Angel, Helen Clark, and Abdoulie Janneh. 2011. *Perspectives Économiques en Afrique 2011*. BAfD, OCDE, PNUD, CEA. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Generic-Documents/Media_Embargoed_Content/FR-AEO_2011P_embargo%206%20juin.pdf.

Kabimba, Wynter, and Ngosa Simbyakula. 2011. *The History and Development of the Patriotic Front: 2001 to 2011*. Lusaka: Patriotic Front - Department of Political and Civic Education.

Kadima, Denis. 2006a. «The Study of Party Coalitions in Africa: Importance, Scope, Theory and Research Methodology.» In *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*, ed. Denis Kadima, South Aftrica: EISA and KAS, 1–14.

———. ed. 2006b. *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*. South Aftrica: EISA and KAS.

Kadima, Denis, and Zefanias Matsimbe. 2006. «RENAMO União Eleitoral: Understanding the Longevity and Challenges of an Opposition Party Coalition in Mozambique.» In *The Politics of Party Coalitions in Africa*, ed. Denis Kadima. South Africa: EISA and KAS, 149–178.

Kayizzi-Mugerwa, Steve. 1999. «Privatisation and Market Development.» In *The African Economy: Policy, Institutions and the Future*, ed. Steve Kayizzi-Mugerwa. London and New York: Routledge.

Keele, Luke, and Nathan J. Kelly. 2006. «Dynamic Models for Dynamic Theories: The Ins and Outs of Lagged Dependent Variables.» *Political Analysis*, 14 (2): 186–205.

Keohane, Robert O. 1969. «Institutionalization in the United Nations General Assembly.» *International Organization*, 23 (4): 859–896.

Kesselman, Mark. 1970. «Overinstitutionalization and Political Constraint: The Case of France.» *Comparative Politics*, 3 (1): 21–44.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. «Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 33: 845–879.

Kittel, Bernhard. 1999. «Sense and Sensitivity in Pooled Analysis of Political Data.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 35: 225–253.

———. 2006. «International Sociology.» *International Sociology*, 21 (5): 647–677.

Kodila-Tedika, Oasis, and Julius Agbor. 2013. «Religious Diversity and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: So Far So Good.» *MPRA Paper No. 46305*.

Krennerich, Michael. 1999a. «Mozambique.» In *Elections in Africa, A Data Handbook*, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 645–658.

———. 1999b. «Zambia.» In *Elections in Africa, A Data Handbook*, eds. Dieter Nohlen, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 939–962.

Kreuzer, Marcus, and Vello Pettai. 2011. «Political Parties and the Study of Political Development: New Insights from the Postcommunist Democracies.» *World Politics*, 56 (4): 608–633.

Kuenzi, Michelle, and Gina Lambright. 2001. «Party System Institutionalization in 30 African Countries.» *Party Politics*, 7 (4): 437–468.

———. 2005. «Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in Africa's Electoral Regimes.» *Party Politics*, 11 (4): 423–446.

———. 2007. «Voter Turnout in Africa's Multiparty Regimes.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 40 (6): 665–690.

———. 2010. «Who Votes in Africa? An Examination of Electoral Participation in 10 African Countries.» *Party Politics*, 17 (6): 767–799.

Kumar, Krishna, and Jeroen de Zeeuw. 2008. «International Support for Political Party Development in War-Torn Societies.» In *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*, eds. Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund. Hong Kong: United Nations University Press, 261–285.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. «The 'Effective' Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 12 (1): 3–27.

Landman, Todd. 2005. *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An Introduction*. New York: Routledge.

LaPalombara, Joseph. 2007. «Reflections on Political Parties and Political Development, Four Decades Later.» *Party Politics*, 13 (2): 141–154.

Larmer, Miles. 2006. «A Little Bit Like A Volcano-The United Progressive Party and Resistance to One-Party Rule in Zambia, 1964-1980.» *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 39 (1): 1964–1980.

Larmer, Miles, and Giacomo Macola. 2007. «The Origins, Contex , and Political Significance of the Mushala Rebellion Against the Zambian One-Party State.» *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 40 (3): 471–496.

Lawson, Kay. 1980. *Political Parties and Linkage. A Comparative Perspective.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Leonardi, Robert, Raffaella Nanetti, and Gianfranco Pasquino. 1978. «Institutionalization of Parliament and Parliamentarization of Parties in Italy.» *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 3 (1): 161–186.

Levinson, David. 1998. *Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*. Arizona: Oryx Press, 197–180.

Levitsky, Steven. 1998. «Institutionalization and Peronism: The Case, the Concept, and the Case for Unpacking the Concept.» *Pacific Affairs*, 4 (1): 77–92.

———. 2009. «Institutionalization: Unpacking the Concept and Explaining Party Change.» In *Concepts and Method in Social Science: The Tradition of Giovanni Sartori*, eds. David Collier and John Gerring. New York: Routledge, 315–328.

Lewis, Paul G. 2008. «Party System Institutionalisation in East-Central Europe: Empirical Dimensions and Tentative Conclusionss.» Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions, Rennes, University of Rennes, 11-16 April.

Lijphart, Arend. 1994. *Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990*. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1997. «Trichotomy or Dichotomy?» *European Journal of Political Research*, 31: 125–128.

———. 2004. «Constitutional Design for Divided Societies.» *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (2): 96–109.

Lindberg, Staffan I. 2001. «Forms of States, Governance, and Regimes: Reconceptualizing the Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Africa.» *International Political Science Review*, 22 (2): 173–199.

———. 2005. «Consequences of Electoral Systems in Africa: A Preliminary Inquiry.» *Electoral Studies*, 24 (1): 41–64.

———. 2007. «Institutionalization of Party Systems? Stability and Fluidity among Legislative Parties in Africa's Democracies.» *Government and Opposition*, 42 (2): 215–241.

———. 2013. «Have the Cake and Eat It: The Rational Voter in Africa.» *Party Politics*, 19 (6): 945–961.

Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan J., Alfred Stepan, and Richard Gunther. 1995. «Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, with Reflections on Latin and Eastern Europe.» In *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective*, eds. Richard Gunther, Nikiforos P. Diamandouros, and Hans-Jürgen Puhle. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 77–123.

Lipset, Martin Seymour, and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. Toronto: The Free Press.

———. 1990. «Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments.» In *The West European Party System*, ed. Peter Mair. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 91–138.

Lobo, Marina Costa, and Octavio Amorim Neto, eds. 2009. *O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa*. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.

Lourenço, Vitor Alexandre. 2009. «Estado, Autoridades Tradicionais e Transição Democrática em Moçambique: Questões Teóricas, Dinâmicas Sociais e Estratégias Políticas.» *Caderno de Estudos Africanos*, 16/17: 115–138.

Lynch, Gabrielle, and Gordon Crawford. 2011. «Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: An Assessment.» *Democratization*, 18 (2): 275–310.

Macuane, José Jaime. 2009. "O Semipresidencialismo (?) em Moçambique (1986 a 2006)." In *O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, eds. Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 171–199.

Magnusson, Bruce A., and John F. Clark. 2014. «Understanding Democratic Survival and Democratic Failure in Africa: Insights from Divergent Democratic Experiments in Benin and Congo (Brazzaville).» *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 47 (3): 552–582.

Mahoney, James, and Kathleen Thelen, ed. 2010. *Explaining Institutional Change Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott. 1989. «Transitions to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation.» *Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 130*.

———. 1990. «Brazilian Party Underdevelopment.» *Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 134*.

———. 1998. "Party Systems in the Third Wave." *Journal of Democracy*, 9 (3): 67–81.

———. 1999. *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil*. Standford, California: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Timothy R. Scully, eds. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Standford, California: Stanford University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Mariano Torcal. 2005. «Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization.» *Kellogg Institute Working Paper No. 319*.

Mainwaring, Scott, J. Samuel Valenzuela, and Guillermo O'Donnell, eds. 1992. *Issues in Democratic Consolidation. The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Mainwaring, Scott, and Edurne Zoco. 2007. «Political Sequences and the Stabilization of Interparty Competition: Electoral Volatility in Old and New Democracies.» *Party Politics*, 13 (2): 155–178.

Mair, Peter, ed. 1990. *The West European Party System*. USA: Oxford University Press.

———. 1994. «Party Organizations: From Civil Society to the State.» In *How Parties Organize: Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western Democracies*, eds. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair. London: Sage Publications, 1–22.

———. 1996. «Comparing Party Systems.» In *Comparing Democracies: Elections and Voting in Global Perspectives*, eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi, and Pippa Norris. London: Sage Publications, 83–106.

———. 1997. *Party System Change: Approaches and Interpretations*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Manning, Carrie. 1998. «Constructing Opposition in Mozambique: Renamo as Political Party.» *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 24 (1): 161–189.

———. 2002. *The Politics of Peace in Mozambique: Post-Conflict Democratization, 1992-2000*. Westport, USA: Praeger Publishers.

———. 2005. «Assessing African Party Systems after the Third Wave.» *Party Politics*, 11 (6): 707–727.

———. 2007. «Semi-Presidentialism and the Preservation of Ambiguity in Post-War Mozambique.» In *Semi-Presidentialism Outside Europe: A Comparative Study*, eds. Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup. New York: Routledge, 121–136.

———. 2008. *The Making of Democrats: Elections and Party Development in Postwar Bosnia, El Salvador, and Mozambique*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Manning, Carrie, and Monica Malbrough. 2009. «Learning the Right Lessons from Mozambique's Transition to Peace.» *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 5 (1): 77–91.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. «The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life.» *American Political Science Review*, 78 (3): 734–749.

Maregere, Peter Tendaiwo, and Brenda Mofya. 2006. «Electoral Reforms: Managing Electoral Conflict in Zambia.» *Conflict Trends*, (2): 29–33.

Mbewe, Luke Chenjelani. 2009. «The Effectiveness of Zambia's Electoral System in Curbing Electoral Corruption.» Bachelor of Laws Degree, Lusaka, School of Law - Universtiy of Zambia.

McFaul, Michael. 2002. «The Fourt of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World.» *World Politics*, 54 (2): 212–244.

Meleshevich, Andrey A. 2007. *Party Systems in Post-Soviet Countries: A Comparative Study of Political Institutionalization in the Baltic States, Russia, and Ukraine*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Migdal, Joel S. 1988. *Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Momba, Jotham C. 1989. «The State, Rural Class Formation and Peasant Political Participation in Zambia: The Case of Southern Province.» *African Affairs*, 88 (352): 331–357.

———. 2003. «Democratic Transition and the Crises of an African Nationalist Party: UNIP, Zambia.» In *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih. London: Pluto Press, 37–65.

———. 2005. «Evolution of Parliament–Executive Relations in Zambia.» In *African Parliaments: Between Governance and Government*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 101–119

———. 2006. *Political Parties and the Quest for Democratic Consolidation in Zambia*. Johannesburg, South Africa: EISA.

Momba, Jotham C., and Clever Madimutsa. 2009. «The Evolution and Development of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy in Zambia.» *SAIIA Occasional Paper No. 17*.

Montalvo, Jose G., and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2002. «The Effect of Ethnic and Religious Conflict on Growth». http://www.econ.upf.edu/~montalvo/sec1034/jde.pdf.

———. 2003. «Religious Polarization and Economic Development.» *Econometric Letters*, 80: 201–210.

———. 2005. «Ethnic Diversity and Economic Development.» *Journal of Development Economics*, 76 (2): 293–323.

Morgan, Glenda. 1990. «Violence in Mozambique: Towards an Understanding of Renamo.» *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28 (4): 603–619.

Moser, Robert G. 1999. «Electoral Systems and the Number of Parties in Postcommunist States.» *World Politics*, 51 (3): 359–384.

Motsamai, Dimpho, and McDonald Chipenzi. 2013. «By-Elections Galore in Zambia: Is Parliamentary Democracy under Threat?» http://www.issafrica.org/iss-today/by-elections-galore-in-zambia-is-parliamentary-democracy-under-threat.

Moyo, Dambisa. 2009. *Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is a Better Way for Africa*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Mozaffar, Shaheen. 2005. «Introduction.» *Party Politics*, 11 (4): 395–398.

Mozaffar, Shaheen, and James R. Scarritt. 2005a. «The Puzzle of African Party Systems.» *Party Politics*, 11 (4): 399–421.

Mozaffar, Shaheen, and James R. Scarritt. 2005b. «The Puzzle of African Party Systems.» *Party Politics*, 11 (4): 399–421.

Mozaffar, Shaheen, James R. Scarritt, and Glen Galaich. 2003. «Electoral Institutions, Ethnopolitical Cleavages, and Party Systems in Africa's Emerging Democracies.» *American Political Science Review*, 97 (3): 379–390.

Muendane, Elísio Emanuel. 2011. «Competição Partidária e Incerteza Eleitoral na Perspectiva da Governação Eleitoral em Moçambique (1994-2009).» Tese de Licenciatura, Maputo, Departamento de Ciência Política e Administração Pública, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

Mulenga, Friday E. 2012. «The History of Political Parties - Trade Unions Relations in Zambia 1946-2012.» http://www.fes-zambia.org/pages/publications.php.

Mulhovo, Hermenegildo. 2010. «Campaign and Political Party Funding in Mozambique.» Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy.» http://www.nimd.org/news/1989.

Munck, Gerardo L. 1994. «Democratic Transitions in Comparative Perspective.» *Comparative Politics*, 26 (3): 355–375.

Munck, Gerardo L., and Carol Skalnik Leff. 1997. «Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 29 (3): 343–362.

Musambachime, Mwelwa C. 1987. «Rural Political Protest: The 1953 Disturbances in Mweru-Luapula.» *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 20 (3): 437–453.

Mutemba, Hélder Gonçalves Arlindo. 2011. «Contribuição dos Partidos Políticos da Oposição Extra-Parlamentar na Estabilidade Política e Consolidação da Democracia em Moçambique.» Tese de Licenciatura, Maputo, Departamento de Ciência Política e Administração Pública, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane.

Mvula, Steven. 2014. «FODEP Dismisses Political Alliances.» *Daily Mail*, 14 January 2014. http://daily-mail.co.zm/blog/2014/01/14/fodep-dismisses-political-alliances/.

Mwiinga, Jowie. 1994. «Zambia Politics: Ethnic Conflict Erupts.» *Inter Press Service New Agency*, 30 December 1994. http://www.ipsnews.net/1994/12/zambia-politics-ethnic-conflict-erupts/.

NDI, and FODEP. 2003. «The State of Political Parties in Zambia.» Lusaka: NDI and FODEP.

https://www.ndi.org/files/The_State_of_Political_Parties_in_Zambia_2003_Final_Report.pdf

Negretto, Gabriel L. 2006. «Choosing How to Choose Presidents: Parties, Military Rulers, and Presidential Elections in Latin America.» *The Journal of Politics*, 68 (2): 421–433.

Neto, Octavio Amorim, and Marina Costa Lobo. 2014. «Semi-Presidentialism in Lusophone Countries: Diffusion and Operation.» *Democratization*, 21 (3): 434–457.

Newitt, Malyn. 2002. «Mozambique.» In *History of Postcolonial Lusophone Africa*, ed. Patrick Chabal. England: C. Hurts & Co. Ltd. , 185–235.

Njoh, Ambe J. 2000. «The Impact of Colonial Heritage on Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.» *Social Indicartors Research*, (52): 161–178.

Nohlen, Dieter, Bernard Thibaut, and Michael Krennerich, eds. 1999. *Elections in Africa*. Oxford University Press.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. «Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems.» *International Political Science Review*, 18 (3): 297–312.

Norris, Pippa, and Robert Mattes. 2003. «Does Ethnicity Determine Support for the Governing Party?» *Afrobarometer Paper No. 26*.

Noyoo, Ndanga. 2000. «Ethnicity and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa.» *Journal of Social Development*, 15 (2): 55–67.

Nuvunga, Adriano. 2007. «Post-War Reconstruction in Mozambique: The United Nations' Trust Fund to Assist the Former Rebel Movement RENAMO». *CIP Report*, Maputo: CIP.

———. 2010. «Promovendo a Transparência no Financiamento Político na SADC». *CIP Report*, Maputo: CIP.

Nuvunga, Adriano, and José Adalima. 2011. *Mozambique Democratic Movement (MDM): An Analysis of a New Opposition Party in Mozambique.* Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.

Ohman, Magnus. 2012. *Political Finance Regulations Around the World*. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.

Olsen, Marvin E. 1968. «Multivariate Analysis of National Political Development.» *American Sociological Review*, 33 (5): 699–712.

Omotola, J. Shola. 2010. «Political Parties and the Quest for Political Stability in Nigeria.» *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, 6 (2): 125–145.

Osei, Anja. 2012. *Party-Voter Linkage in Africa: Ghana and Senegal in Comparative Perspective*. Konstanz, Germany: Springer VS.

Osei-Hwedie, Bertha. 1998. «The Role of Ethnicity in Multi-party Politics in Malawi and Zambia.» *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 16 (2): 227–247.

Ostheimer, Andrea E. 2001. «The Permanent Entrenchment of Democratic Minimalism.» *African Security Review*, 10 (1): 1-15.

Ozbudun, Ergun. 1981. «The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation.» *Middle Eastern Studies*, 17 (2): 228–240.

Panebianco, Angelo. 1988. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1997. «Semi-Presidentialism: A Political Model at Work.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 31: 128–137.

Pedersen, Mogens N. 1983. «Western European Party Systems: Continuity and Change.» In *Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility in European Party Systems: Explorations in Explanation*, eds. Hans Daalder and Peter Mair. Beverly Hills, CA and London: Sage, 29–66.

Pennock, J. Roland. 1966. «Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods.» *World Politics*, 18 (3): 415–434.

Pereira, João C. G. 2008. «Antes O 'Diabo' Conhecido do que Um 'Anjo' Desconhecido: As Limitações do Voto Económico Na Reeleição do Partido Frelimo.» *Análise Social*, XLIII: 419–442.

———. 2009. «The Impact of Democracy in Mozambique: Assessing Political, Social and Economic Developments since the Dawn of Democracy». Center for Policy Studies in Johannesburg, *Research Report 118*.

Pereira, João C. G., and Carlos Shenga. 2005. *Strengthening Parliamentary Democracy in SADC Countries: Mozambique Country Report*. Pretoria: South Africa Institutional Affairs.

Pettman, Jan. 1974. «Zambia's Second Republic -The Establishment of a One-Party State.» *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12 (2): 231–244.

Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. «The Institutionalization of the U. S. House of Representatives.» *American Political Science Review*, 62 (1): 144–168.

Portal do Governo de Moçambique. 2009. «Eleições 2009: CNE Exclui MDM em Nove Círculos Eleitorais.» http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/noticias/news_folder_politica/setembro-2009/eleicoes-2009-cne-exclui-mdm-em-nove-circulos-eleitorais/.

Posner, Daniel N. 2001. «Regime Change and Ethnic Cleavages in Africa.» Paper presented at the Workshop on Democracy in Africa in Comparative Perspective, California, Stanford University, 27 April.

———. 2005. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Posner, Daniel N., and Daniel J. Young. 2007. «The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa.» *Journal of Democracy*, 18 (3): 126–140.

Post Online. 2014. «Riding on Others.» *The Post Online*, 14 January 2014.

Pottie, David. 2003. «Party Finance and the Politics of Money in Southern Africa.» *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21 (1): 5–26.

Prempeh, H. Kwasi. 2008. «Presidents Untamed.» *Journal of Democracy*, 19 (2): 109–123.

Pridham, Geoffrey. 1990. «Political Actors, Linkages and Interactions: Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe.» *West European Politics*, 13 (4): 103–117.

Protsyk, Oleh, and Andrew Wilson. 2003. «Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power and Virtuality.» *Party Politics*, 9 (6): 703–727.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rae, Douglas W. 1967. *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. California: University of California Press.

Rakner, Lise. 2003. *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991–2001*. Stockholm: The Nordic Africa Institute.

Rakner, Lise, and Lars Svåsand. 2004. «From Dominant to Competitive Party System: The Zambian Experience 1991–2001.» *Party Politics*, 10 (1): 49–68.

Randall, Vicky, and Lars Svåsand. 2002a. «Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Africa.» *Democratization*, 9 (3): 30–52.

———. 2002b. «Party Institutionalization in New Democracies.» *Party Politics*, 8 (5): 5–29.

Rasmussen, Thomas. 1969. «Political Competition and One-Party Dominance in Zambia.» *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7 (3): 407–424.

———. 1974. «The Popular Basis of Anti-Colonial Protest.» In *Politics in Zambia*, ed. William Tordoff. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 40–61.

Reilly, Ben, and Andrew Reynolds. 1999. *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*. Washington: National Academy Press.

Reilly, Benjamin. 2008a. «Post-War Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition.» In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, eds. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk. New York: Cambridge University Press, 157–181.

———. 2008b. «Introduction.» In *Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development*, eds. Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund. Hong Kong: United Nations University Press, 3–24.

Remmer, Karen L. 1991. «The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s.» *American Political Science Review*, 85 (3): 777–800.

Resnick, Danielle. 2011. «Do Electoral Coalitions Facilitate Democratic Consolidation in Africa?» *Party Politics*, 19 (5): 735–757.

Rhodes, R. A. W., Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman, eds. 2006. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Riedl, Rachel Beatty. 2008. «Institutions in New Democracies: Variations in African Political Party Systems.» PhD Dissertation, Princeton, Department of Politics of the Princeton University.

Roberts, Kenneth M., and Erik Wibbels. 1999. «Party Systems and Electoral Volatility in Latin America: A Test of Economic, Institutional, and Structural Explanations.» *American Political Science Review*, 93 (3): 575–590.

Rosário, Domingos do. 2009. «Les Mairies Des 'autres': Une Analyse Politique, Socio-Historique et Culturelle des Trajectoires Locales. Le Cas D' Angoche, de L' Île de Moçambique et de Nacala Porto.» PhD dissertation, Université Montesquieu - Bordeaux IV.

Rose, Richard, and William Mishler. 2010. «A Supply-Demand Model of Party-System Institutionalization: The Russian Case.» *Party Politics*, 16 (6): 801–821.

Rose, Richard, and Neil Munro. 2009. *Parties and Elections in New European Democracies*. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

Rupiya, Martin. 1998. «Historical Context: War and Peace in Mozambique.» In *Mozambican Peace Process in Perspective*, eds. Jeremy Armon, Dylan Hendrickson, and Alex Vines. London and Maputo: Conciliation Resources and Arquivo Histórico de Moçambique, 10–17

Saffu, Yaw. 2003. «Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns.» In *The Funding of Political Parties and Election Campaigns in Africa*, eds. Reginald Austin and Maja Tjernström. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA, 21–30.

Saine, Abdoulaye. 2002. «Post-Coup Politics in the Gambia.» *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (4): 167–172.

Salih, M. A. Mohamed. 2001. *African Democracies and African Politics*. London: Pluto Press.

———. ed. 2003. *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*. London: Pluto Press.

Salih, M. A. Mohamed, and Per Nordlund. 2007. *Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty Democracy*. Stockholm, Sweden: International IDEA.

Sanches, Edalina Rodrigues. 2008. «Sistema de Partidos Cabo-Verdiano no Período Democrático: 1991-2006.» Master Thesis, Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais da Universidade de Lisboa.

———. 2011. «Institucionalização dos Sistemas Partidários na África Lusófona. O Caso Cabo-Verdiano.» *Caderno de Estudos Africanos*, 20: 112–138.

———. 2013. «Institucionalização do Sistema Partidário e Democratização em Cabo Verde: 1991-2011.» In *Entre África e a Europa: Nação, Estado e Democracia em Cabo Verde*, eds. Cristina Montalvão Sarmento and Suzano Costa. Lisboa: Almedina, 249–270.

Sangreman, Carlos, Fernando Sousa Jr, Guilherme Zeverino, and Miguel Barros. 2006. «A Evolução Política Recente na Guiné-Bissau: As Eleições Presidenciais de 2005, Os Conflitos, O Desenvolvimento, A Sociedade Civil.» *CESA Série Documentos de Trabalho nº 70*.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1991. «Comparing and Miscomparing.» *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 3 (3): 243–257.

———. 2003. «The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Method?» In *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, eds. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart. New York: Agathon Press, 43–68.

Scarritt, James R. 1979. «The Decline of Political Legitimacy in Zambia: An Explanation Based on Incomplete Data.» *African Studies Review*, 22 (2): 13–38.

Schmitter, Philippe C. 2009. «The Nature and Future of Comparative Politics.» *European Political Science Review*, 1 (1): 33–61.

Seawright, Jason, and John Gerring. 2008. «Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options.» *Political Research Quarterly*, 61 (2): 294–308.

Seibert, Gerhard. 2003. «The Vagaries of Violence and Power in Post-Colonial Mozambique.» In *Rethinking Resistance: Revolt and Violence in African History*, eds. Gerrit Jan Abbink, Mirjam de Bruijn, and Klaas van Walraven. Leiden: Brill, 254 – 276

———. 2009. «Instabilidade Política e Revisão Constitucional em São Tomé e Príncipe.» In *O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa*, eds. Marina Costa Lobo and Octavio Amorim Neto. Lisboa: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais, 201–230.

Semedo, José, Crisanto Barros, and Daniel Costa. 2007. Estudo Sociológico sobre as Eleições Legislativas e Presidenciais de 2001 e 2006. Praia: DGAE.

Sender, John. 1999. «Africa's Economic Performance: Limitations of the Current Consensus.» *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 13 (3): 89–114.

Shils, Edward. 1960a. «Political Development in the New States.» *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2 (3): 265–292.

———. 1960b. «The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States.» *World Politics*, 12 (3): 329–368.

———. 1960c. «Political Development in the New States II.» *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 2 (4): 379–411.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 1999. «Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and the Provision of Collective Goods in Less-Developed Countries.» *Constitutional Political Economy*, 10: 53–88.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg, and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Siaroff, Alan. 2003. «Comparative Presidencies: The Inadequacy of the Presidential, Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Distinction.» *European Journal of Political Research*, 42 (3): 287–312.

Simutanyi, Neo. 2005. «The Relationship between Members of Parliament and Their Parties in Zambia.» *EISA Occasional Paper No. 36*.

———. 2010. «The 2008 Presidential Elections in Zambia - Incumbency, Political Contestation and Failure of Political Opposition.» Paper presented at the *IESE/CMI* Conference on Election Processes, Liberation Movements and Democratic Change in Africa, Maputo, 9-11 April.

Smith, Gordon. 1989. «A System Perspective on Party System Change.» *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1 (3): 349–363.

Sokomani, Andile, Alex M. Ngoma, Adriano Nuvunga, Eldred Masunungure, and Frederico Links. 2010. *Comparative Analysis and Findings from Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe*. Harare: Transparency International Zimbabwe.

Steiner, Nils D. 2013. «Testing for a Political Bias in Freedom House Democracy Scores: Are U.S. Friendly States Judged to Be More Democratic?.» *Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis* (forthcoming).

Stockton, Hans. 2001. «Political Parties, Party Systems, and Democracy in East Asia: Lessons from Latin America.» *Comparative Political Studies*, 34 (1): 94–119.

Szeftel, Morris. 2000. «'Eat With Us': Managing Corruption and Patronage Under Zambia's Three Republics, 1964-99.» *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 18 (2): 207–224.

Tavits, Margit. 2005. «The Development of Stable Party Support: Party Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe.» *American Journal of Political Science*, 49 (2): 283–298.

———. 2006. «Party System Change: Testing a Model of New Party Entry.» *Party Politics*, 12 (1): 99–119.

———. 2007. «Party Systems in the Making: The Emergence and Success of New Parties in New Democracies.» *British Journal of Political Science*, 38: 113–133.

Taylor, Charles Lewis. 1972. «Indicators of Political Development.» *Journal of Development Studies*, 8 (3): 103–109.

Teshome, Wondwosen. 2009. «Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analysis.» *International Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, 3 (1): 1–15.

Thames, Frank C. 2007. «Discipline and Party Institutionalization in Post-Soviet Legislatures.» *Party Politics*, 13 (4) (July 1): 456–477.

Thelen, Kathleen. 1999. «Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.» *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1): 369–404.

Thomson, Alex. 2004. *An Introduction to African Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Tilly, Charles. 2001. «Mechanisms in Political Processes.» *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4: 21–41.

Tobolka, Radim. 2014. «Political Parties In Zambia, Burundi, and Togo: Organization, Cohesion, and Party - Voter Linkage.» PhD Dissertation, Department of Political Science of the Univerzita Hradec Králové.

Tordoff, William. 1988. «Political Parties in Zambia.» In *Political Parties in the Third World*, ed. Vicky Randall. London: Sage Publications, 7–28.

Tordoff, William, and Ian Scott. 1974. «Political Parties: Structures and Policies.» In *Politics in Zambia*, ed. William Tordoff. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 107–154.

Valenzuela, Arturo. 2004. «Latin American Presidencies Interrupted.» *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (4): 3–19.

Van Biezen, Ingrid. 2000a. «Party Financing in New Democracies: Spain and Portugal.» *Party Politics*, 6 (3): 329–342.

———. 2000b. «On the Internal Balance of Party Power: Party Organizations in New Democracies.» *Party Politics*, 6 (4): 395–417.

———. 2004. «Political Parties as Public Utilities.» *Party Politics*, 10 (6): 701–722.

Van Biezen, Ingrid, and Petr Kopecký. 2007. «The State and the Parties: Public Funding, Public Regulation and Rent-Seeking in Contemporary Democracies.» *Party Politics*, 13 (2): 235–254.

Van Cranenburgh, Oda. 2003. «Power and Competition: The Institutional Context of African Multi-Party Politics.» In *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalisation and Governance*, ed. M. A. Mohamed Salih. London: Pluto Press, 188–206.

———. 2008. «'Big Men' Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries.» *Democratization*, 15 (5): 952–973.

———. 2011. «Democracy Promotion in Africa: The Institutional Context.» *Democratization* 18 (2): 443–461.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 1994. «Political Liberalization and Economic Reform in Africa.» *World Development*, 22: 483–500.

———. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2002. «Africa's Range of Regimes.» *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2): 66–80.

———. 2003. «Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems.»*The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41 (2): 297–321.

Vencovsky, Daniel. 2007. «Presidential Term Limits in Africa.» *Conflict Trends*, 2: 15–21.

Ware, Alan. 1996. *Political Parties and Party Systems*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2002. «Mozambique: A Fading U.N. Success Story.» *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (1): 141–156.

Welfling, Mary. 1973. *Political Institutionalization: Comparative Analysis of African Party Systems*. USA: Sage Publications.

Wooldridge, Jeffrey. 2000. *Introductory Econometrics. A Modern Approach*. Mason: South-Western.

Yardimci-Geyikci, Sebnem. 2013. «Party Institutionalization and Democratic Consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective.» *Party Politics* (published online on June 7 2013) .

Young, Crawford. 2012. *The Postcolonial State in Africa. Fifty Years of Independence 1960-2010*. Wisconsin: The University of Winsconsin Press.

ZANIS. 2010. «FODEP Dares PF/UPND.» *Zambia News and Information Services, Lusaka* Times, 27 September 2010. http://www.lusakatimes.com/2010/09/27/29920/.

Online Data Sources

ACE Electoral Network: http://aceproject.org/.

African Elections Database: http://africanelections.tripod.com/.

CIA – The World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za.

Fractionalization Data: http://www.nsd.uib.no/macrodataguide/set.html?id=16&sub=1.

IDEA Political Finance Database: http://www.idea.int/political-finance/.

IDEA Voter Turnout Database: http://www.idea.int/vt/.

International Monetary Fund: http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm.

IPU PARLINE Database on National Parliaments: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp.

Polity IV: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.

World Bank: http://data.worldbank.org/.

Laws / Regulations

Mozambique

Boletim da República, 1ª Série, No. 44, 2 November 1990, Constitution of the Republic of Mozambique

Law No. 7/1991 of 23 January, Party Law

Law No. 13/1992 of 14 October, Ratifies the General Peace Agreement

Law No. 4/1993 of 28 December, Defines the legal framework for the first multiparty elections

Law No. 13/1999 of 2 February, Electoral law amendment

Law No. 7/2004 of 17 June, Campaign regulations

Laws No. 7, 8 and 9/2007, Electoral law amendment

Zambia

Government of Zambia Act No.17 of 1996, The Constitution of Zambia.

The Societies Act of the Republic of Zambia.

Technical Committee on Drafting the Zambian Constitution:

http://zambianconstitution.org/terms-of-reference-.html.

The National Constitutional Conference: http://www.ncczambia.org/aboutthencc.php.

Encyclopedias

Middleton, John ed. 1997. *Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara*. Vols 1-4. New York City: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Banks, Arthur S., Thomas C. Muller, William R. Overstreet, and Judith F. Isacoff. eds. 1975. *Political Handbook of the World*. Washington: CQ Press (all years from 1975 to 2000).

Murison. Katharine, ed. 2000. *Africa South of the Sahara*. London and New York: Europa Publications (all years from 2000 to 2011).